V. I.

Lenin

MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy ( Chapter Three: The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism and of Empirio-Criticism. III )

2. Plekhanov’s Error Concerning The
Concept “Experience”

On pages x-xi of his introduction to L. Feuerbach (1905
ed.) Plekhanov says:

“ One German writer has remarked that for empirio-criticism
experience is only an object of investigation, and not a means of knowledge. If that is so, then the distinction
between empirio-criticism and materialism loses all meaning, and
discussion of the question whether or not empirio-criticism is
destined to replace materialism is absolutely shallow and
idle.”

This is one complete muddle.

Fr. Carstanjen, one of the most “orthodox” followers of Avenarius, says in his article on empirio-criticism
(a reply to Wundt), that “for The Critique of Pure Experience experience is not a means of knowledge but only
an object of investigation." [1]

It follows that according to Plekhanov any distinction between the views of Fr. Carstanjen and materialism
is meaningless!

Fr. Carstanjen is almost literally quoting Avenarius, who in his
Notes emphatically contrasts his conception of experience as that which is given us, that which we find
( das Vorgefundene ), with the conception of experience
as a “means of knowledge” in “the sense of the prevailing theories of knowledge, which essentially are
fully metaphysical” ( op . cit .,
p. 401). Petzoldt, following Avenarius, says the same thing in
his Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience (Bd. I, S. 170). Thus, according to Plekhanov, the distinction
between the views of Carstanjen, Avenarius, Petzoldt and
materialism is meaningless! Either Plekhanov has not read
Carstanjen and Co. as thoroughly as he should, or he has taken
his reference to “a German writer” at fifth hand.

What then does this statement, uttered by some of the most
prominent empirio-criticists and not understood by Plekhanov,
mean? Carstanjen wishes to say that Avenarius in his The Critique of Pure Experience takes experience,
i.e. ., all “human predications,” as the object of investigation. Avenarius does not investigate
here, says Carstanjen ( op . cit ., p. 50), whether these predications are real, or whether they relate, for
example, to ghosts; he merely arranges, systematises, formally
classifies all possible human predications, both idealist and materialist (p. 53), without going into the essence of
the question. Carstanjen is absolutely right when he characterises this point of view as “scepticism
par excellence” (p. 213). In this article, by the way, Carstanjen defends his beloved master from the ignominious (for
a German professor) charge of materialism levelled against him
by Wundt. Why are we materialists, pray?—such is the burden of Carstanjen’s objections—when we speak of
“experience” we do not mean it in the ordinary current sense, which leads or might lead to materialism, but in
the sense that we investigate everything that men “predicate” as experience. Carstanjen and Avenarius
regard the view that experience is a means of knowledge as
materialistic (that, perhaps, is the most common opinion, but
nevertheless, untrue, as we have seen in the case of
Fichte). Avenarius entrenches himself against the “prevailing” “metaphysics” which
persists in regarding the brain as the organ of thought and
which ignores the theories of introjection and co-ordination. By
the given or the found ( das Vorgefundene ), Avenarius means the indissoluble connection between the self and
the environment, which leads to a confused idealist interpretation of “experience.”

Hence, both the materialist and the idealist, as well as the
Humean and the Kantian lines in philosophy may unquestionably be
concealed beneath the word “experience"; but neither the
definition of experience as an object of investigation, [2]
[2] Plekhanov perhaps thought that Carstanjen had said, “an object of knowledge independent of knowledge,” and not an “object of investigation"? This would indeed be materialism. But neither Carstanjen, nor anybody else acquainted with empirio-criticism, said or could have said, any such thing. — Lenin nor its definition as a means
of knowledge is decisive in this respect. Carstanjen’s remarks against Wundt especially have no relation whatever to
the question of the distinction between empirio-criticism and
materialism.

As a curiosity let us note that on this point Bogdanov and
Valentinov, in their reply to Plekhanov, revealed no greater
knowledge of the subject. Bogdanov declared: “It is not
quite clear” (Bk. III, p. xi).—"It is the task of empirio-criticists to examine this formulation and to accept or
reject the condition.” A very convenient position: I, forsooth, am not a Machian and am not therefore obliged to find
out in what sense a certain Avenarius or Carstanjen speaks of
experience! Bogdanov wants to make use of Machism (and of the
Machian confusion regarding “experience"), but he does not
want to be held responsible for it.

The “pure” empirio-criticist Valentinov transcribed
Plekhanov’s remark and publicly danced the cancan; he sneered at Plekhanov for not naming the author and for not
explaining what the matter was all about ( op . cit ., pp. 108-09). But at the same time
this empirio-critical philosopher in his answer said not a single word on the substance of the matter, although
acknowledging that he had read Plekhanov’s remark “three times or more” (and had apparently not under
stood it). Oh, those Machians!

---
Notes:
[1]
Vierteljabrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie , Jahrg. 22, 1898,
S. 45.
— Lenin

[2] THIS FOOTNOTE has been moved into BODY OF DOCUMENT.