Date: 1908
Source: ru:PSS/v20
Source: CW vol 20

The questions indicated in the title hold one of the first, if not the first, places in importance in the system of views of a Marxist who wishes to understand the reality surrounding him. The period of 1908–1910 undoubtedly represents something distinctive. The social structure of society and power is characterized by changes, without understanding which one cannot take a step in any area of public activity. Understanding these changes determines the question of prospects, meaning, of course, not empty guesses about what no one knows, but the basic tendencies of economic and political development—those tendencies, the resultant of which determines the immediate future of the country, those tendencies that determine the tasks, direction, and character of the activity of every conscious public figure. And this last question, about the tasks, direction, and character of activity, is closely linked with the question of liquidationism.

It is therefore not surprising that Marxists, already in 1908, as soon as it became clear or was becoming clear that we were facing a new, distinctive period in Russian history, put on the agenda precisely the questions of the social structure of power, prospects, and liquidationism, pointed out the inseparable connection of these questions, and subjected them to systematic discussion. Furthermore, they did not limit themselves to mere discussion—this would have been sheer literariness in the worst sense of the word, possible only in a discussion circle of intellectuals who do not realize their responsibility and are careless in politics—no, they developed a precise formulation of the results of the discussion, such that it could guide not only a member of a given literary circle, not only a person somehow connected with a certain intellectual category, but any, every, and each conscious representative of the class who considers Marxism their ideology. By the end of 1908, this necessary work was completed.

What are the main results of this work, I have already said in No. 2 of our journal{83}. I will allow myself to quote a few lines from there to make the following exposition understandable.

"The development of the Russian state system over the past three centuries shows us that it has changed its class character in one definite direction. The monarchy of the 17th century with the Boyar Duma does not resemble the official-noble monarchy of the 18th century. The monarchy of the first half of the 19th century is not the same as the monarchy of 1861–1904. In 1908–1910, a new phase clearly emerged, marking yet another step in the same direction, which can be called the direction toward a bourgeois monarchy. This step is closely linked with the Third Duma and our contemporary agrarian policy. Thus, the new phase is not accidental, but a specific stage in the capitalist evolution of the country. Not solving old problems, unable to solve them, and therefore not eliminating them, this new phase requires the application of new methods for preparing for the old solution of old problems" (No. 2, p. 43). And a few lines further: "Those who deny, or do not understand... that we are faced with old problems, that we are moving towards an old solution to these old problems, those in fact leave the ground of Marxism, those in fact fall into the clutches of the liberals (like Mr. Potresov, Mr. Levitsky, etc.)" (p. 44)[21]. However one may relate to the circle of ideas expressed in these statements, it is hardly possible to deny the closest connection and interdependence of the individual parts in this assessment of the given period. Take, for example, the decree of November 9, 1906 (the law of June 14, 1910): it is completely indisputable that it has a distinctly bourgeois character, signifying a principled turn in the agrarian policy that the "upper echelons" had long pursued in relation to the commune and allotment land ownership. But to say that this principled turn has already resolved the issue, already created new bases for capitalist peasant farming, already eliminated the old problems, even the most unprincipled and fickle people like the Cadets have not dared to assert this so far. The connection between the law of June 14, 1910, and the system of elections to the Third Duma and its social composition is obvious: otherwise, it would not have been possible to implement this law, to carry out a series of measures for its implementation, except through an alliance of the central government with feudal (let us use this not entirely accurate, pan-European, expression) landowners and the upper echelons of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. Thus, before us is a specific stage in the entire capitalist evolution of the country. Does this stage eliminate the retention of "power and income"—speaking in a sociological sense—by feudal-type landowners? No, it does not. The changes that have occurred, both in this and in all other areas, do not eliminate the basic features of the old regime, the old relationship of social forces. From this, the fundamental task of a conscious public figure is clear: to take into account these new changes, to "utilize" them, to encompass them—if one can put it that way—and at the same time not to give in helplessly to the current, not to throw out the old baggage, to preserve the essential in forms of activity, and not only in theory, in the program, in the principles of politics.

One might ask, how did those "ideological leaders" who gather around publications like "Vozrozhdeniye," "Zhizn'," "Delo Zhizni," "Nasha Zarya," etc., Messrs. Potresov and Martov, Dan and Axelrod, Levitsky and Martynov, react to this formulated answer to the "cursed questions," to this direct and clear exposition of certain views? They reacted not as politicians, not as "ideological leaders," not as responsible publicists, but as a literary category, as a circle of intellectuals, as free-lancers of free groups of the writing fraternity. They condescendingly chuckled—as people who know how to appreciate fashion and the spirit of the times, established in liberal salons—over this outdated, obsolete, eccentric craving for formulated answers to the cursed questions. What need is there for this formality when one can write anywhere, about anything, whatever one likes, however one likes? When Messrs. Milyukov and Struve provide excellent examples of all the benefits, conveniences, and advantages that flow from avoiding direct answers, precise expositions of views, formulated professions de foi[22], and so on? When Ivans Nefomnyashchiye (and especially Ivans who do not like to remember past formality) enjoy honor and respect in the broadest circles of "society"?

So, for all three years, we have not seen from this entire literary company the slightest attempt to oppose their own formulated answer to the "cursed questions." There were plenty of allegories and empty hypotheses, but not a single direct answer. A distinctive, characteristic feature of the company under consideration was a love for formlessness, i.e., precisely for such a feature that, at the very moment when a direct answer was given to the cursed questions, was recognized as an integral element of the concept of liquidationism. To float formlessly with the current, to be enchanted by one's formlessness, to "put a cross" over what is opposite to the formless present, this is one of the basic features of liquidationism. Opportunists always and everywhere passively give in to the current, content themselves with "case-by-case" answers, from congress to congress (from a drunken one to a factory one){84}, satisfied with the unification from one "society" (even if it is the most respectable and useful: trade union, consumer, cultural, temperance society, etc.) to another society, and so on. Liquidationism is a combination of tendencies inherent in any opportunism in general and manifesting in specific concrete forms during one of the periods of Russian history in one of our socio-political directions.

The totality of tendencies inherent in all opportunism in general and manifesting themselves in certain specific forms during one period of Russian history in one of our socio-political directions.

History has preserved only two precise responses from the liquidators to the above "direct answer" (to the damned questions). The first response: the adjective "bourgeois" should be replaced with the adjective "plutocratic." – Such a replacement, however, would be entirely incorrect. The era from 1861 to 1904 shows us in various areas of life the growth of influence, and often the predominant influence, of the plutocracy. In the period from 1908 to 1910, we see, in contrast to "plutocracy," the results of how the bourgeoisie, recognizing itself as a class, taking into account the lessons given by the previous three years to its class self-awareness, creates an ideology that is fundamentally hostile both to socialism (and not European socialism in general, but precisely Russian socialism) and to democracy. Moreover, the bourgeoisie is organized on a national scale, that is, precisely as a class, a certain part of which is constantly represented (and very influentially represented) in the Third Duma. Finally, in the agrarian policy of 1908–1910, there is a system implementing a specific plan for a bourgeois agrarian order. This plan "has not yet come to fruition," this is undeniable, but this failure is the failure of one of the bourgeois systems, while the "success" of the rural plutocracy is undoubted: that is, the rural plutocracy certainly benefits from the agrarian policy of 1908–1910, but the bourgeois order, for which many sacrifices are made, still cannot "settle in." In short, the proposal of the term "plutocratic" is unsuccessful in every respect, and so unsuccessful that the liquidators themselves, apparently, prefer to forget about this proposal.

Another response: the above-mentioned answer is supposedly incorrect because it boils down to the advice to "push where there were once"… failures{85}. This brief but energetic response is valuable in that it expressed in a striking form the results of all the literary appearances of the liquidators, from Potresov's "Public Movement" to Mr. Levitsky in "Our Dawn." The content of this response is purely negative; it limits itself to condemning the aspirations to "push there," without giving any positive indications about where to "push." In other words, drift along as you go, as "everyone" drifts, and do not bother with generalizations about what this leads to and should lead to.

But no matter how much the opportunists would like to rest from all generalizations, to avoid "unpleasant" conversations about a direct answer to the "damned questions," it turns out to be impossible. Drive nature out the door, and it will fly in through the window. The irony of history has arranged it so that those very liquidators who love to call themselves "advanced," people free from "conservatism" and who in 1908 disdainfully wrinkled their noses at the indication of the need for a direct answer, found themselves forced—almost a year and a half later, in the summer of 1910—to reckon with these indications. And they were forced to do so by events in their own camp. They had completely dismissed the direct answer demanded in some despised, obsolete, ossified, worthless, and harmful "dead ends"—when suddenly, a year and a half later, a "current" emerged among the liquidators themselves, demanding a direct answer and boldly providing a direct answer!

In the role of the "bold" one, as expected, was Yuri Larin, but this time not alone. Larin, as is known, is the enfant terrible[23] of opportunism. He is distinguished by the enormous, from the point of view of opportunists, flaw that he takes seriously, sincerely, and thoughtfully the emerging tendencies among them, trying to connect them into something whole, think them through to the end, obtain direct answers, and make practical conclusions. Those familiar with Larin's book on the broad workers' party, which came out 3-4 years ago, probably remember how he strangled in his fervent embrace the notorious Axelrod idea of a workers' congress.

Since March 1910, Larin began to publish a series of articles in "Renaissance" on the question of the social structure of power, prospects, and liquidationism. Mr. Piletsky joined him. Both writers, with the zeal of neophytes, took up these questions, for which they had vainly sought a direct answer in their, the liquidator, camp, and went at it head-on. There is no point in talking about serfdom in modern Russia, the power has already transformed into a bourgeois one. "Both the first and second elements," says Larin, singling out the notorious "third element," "can sleep soundly: October 1905 is not on the agenda" ("Renaissance" No. 9-10, p. 20). "Abolishing the Duma, it would be restored even faster than the post-revolutionary Austria, which abolished the constitution in 1851, to recognize it again in 1860, nine years later, without any revolution, simply due to the interests of the most influential part of the ruling classes, which had reorganized their economy on a capitalist footing. Subsequently, the struggle between different layers of the ruling classes, after the establishment of the social order of bourgeois relations, will force them, as everywhere, to expand the boundaries of the electoral right…" (ibid., p. 26). "The process of Russia's integration into the capitalist world… finds its completion in the political sphere. This completion is the impossibility of a nationwide revolutionary movement, such as occurred in 1905, at the stage we are experiencing" (p. 27).

"Thus, if power" (according to Larin's conclusions), "is not 'almost entirely' in the hands of landowning feudal lords, then the struggle for power of the capitalists from the land and the factory against the feudal lords—cannot turn into a nationwide struggle against the existing power" (No. 11, p. 9)… "To build one's tactical lines in anticipation of an impending 'nationwide upsurge' would mean condemning oneself to fruitless waiting" (ibid., p. 11). "One cannot sit between two stools. If nothing has changed in the social character of power, then the tasks and forms of activity must remain the same, and it remains only to 'fight the liquidators.' But if someone wants to go further, to build something new in place of, in continuation of, and in glorification of the collapsed, obsolete old, let them consistently take stock of the conditions of construction" (ibid., p. 14).

Is this Larin not naive? He demands that the opportunists be "consistent," that they "not sit between two stools!"

The editorial board of "Renaissance" was at a loss. In No. 9-10, declaring disagreement with Larin, they wrote: "the freshness of thought" (in Larin), but "Yuri Larin's articles did not convince us." In No. 11, apparently on behalf of the editorial board, V. Mirov spoke out against Larin, acknowledging that in the person of Larin and Piletsky "there is a definite current, theoretically little developed, but speaking a very clear language" (the greatest flaw, from the point of view of opportunists!). "Larin touched upon, incidentally, and quite unexpectedly" (how so! always this restless Larin with his "very clear language" causes trouble for his friends!) "another question of liquidationism. It seems to us that there is no close connection between the forms of party building and the nature of the Russian government, and we reserve the right to speak about this separately" (p. 22, No. from July 7, 1910).

"Speaking separately" on behalf of this "we" was L. Martov in No. 1 of "Life" (August 30, 1910), who stated that he "can only join" (p. 4) V. Mirov and the editorial board against Larin. Thus, the last word in this entire discussion among the liquidators was spoken by L. Martov.

Let us examine this last word of liquidationism.

Martov takes up the matter, as always, very briskly and very… "skillfully." He begins by stating that "the bourgeoisie in power or the ruling bourgeoisie was carefully sought immediately after June 3, 1907." "The regime of June 3 is the regime of the dominance of the Russian commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. This scheme was equally accepted by the indicated group of Menshevik writers (Larin, Piletsky) and their antipodes, the orthodox Bolsheviks, who in 1908" wrote "about the birth of a bourgeois monarchy in Russia."

This was equally accepted by the group of Menshevik writers (Larin, Piletsky) and their antipodes, the orthodox Bolsheviks, who in 1908 wrote about the "emergence of a bourgeois monarchy" in Russia.

Well, is this not a gem of "cleverness"? Larin reproaches Martov for sitting between two stools, openly acknowledging, without evasion or trickery, that it is necessary to fight the liquidators if one does not reconstruct anew the answer to the accursed questions, which has been given by the "orthodox."

And Martov "cleverly" somersaults in the air and tries to convince the readers (who in August 1910 had no opportunity to hear the other side) that "this scheme" was "equally accepted" by both Larin and the "orthodox"!!

This cleverness is Burenin's or Menshikov's cleverness{86}, for a more shameless... departure from the truth cannot be imagined.

"In literary discussions, it is usually forgotten who actually 'began,'" writes, among other things, Martov there. It is true that this happens in literary discussions when there is no question of formulating a precise, structured answer to the accursed questions. But we are dealing precisely not with a literary or merely literary "discussion," as this is magnificently, thoroughly, and directly known to L. Martov, who misleads the readers of "Zhizn." Martov knows perfectly well what the structured answer given and supported by the "orthodox" is. Martov knows perfectly well that it is precisely with this answer that Larin is fighting, calling it a "fossilized stereotype," "building castles in the air," and so on. Martov knows perfectly well that he himself and all his like-minded colleagues and associates rejected the structured answer given by the "orthodox." Martov knows perfectly well "who actually began"; who began (and ended) the formulation of a precise answer and who limited themselves to giggling and expressing disagreement, without giving and not giving any answer.

One cannot imagine a more outrageous, more dishonest trick than this trick of L. Martov! Larin, with his straightforwardness and frankness, painfully offended the diplomats of liquidationism, admitting (although after 1½ years) that a precise answer cannot be avoided. The truth hurts. And L. Martov tries to deceive the reader, presenting the matter as if Larin accepts the "same scheme" as the orthodox, although in reality, the two schemes are opposite: from Larin's scheme, the justification of liquidationism follows, from the "orthodox" scheme, the condemnation of liquidationism.

To cover up his trick, Martov plucks out one little word from the "scheme," distorting the context in which it stands (a technique perfected by Burenin and Menshikov). The orthodox, Martov assures, wrote about the "emergence of a bourgeois monarchy" in Russia, while Larin writes that there is no point in talking about serfdom in Russia, that power is already bourgeois, and therefore, the schemes of Larin and the orthodox are "the same"!! The trick is over. The reader who believes Martov is fooled.

In fact, the "scheme," or rather, the answer of the orthodox states that the old power in Russia "is taking another step on the path of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy," where it is precisely such a path of capitalist development that "would preserve for the landowners, specifically of a feudal type, their power and their incomes," and as a result of this state of affairs, "the basic factors of economic and political life that caused" the first crisis at the beginning of the 20th century "continue to act."

Larin says: power is already bourgeois, therefore, only supporters of the "fossilized stereotype" talk about "preserving power" for the feudal lords, therefore, the "basic factors" of the previous upsurge do not continue to act, therefore, something new must be built "in place of the old that has become obsolete."

The "orthodox" say: power is taking another step on the path of transformation into a bourgeois (not power in general, but) monarchy, where real power remains, is preserved in the hands of the feudal lords, so that the "basic factors" of previous tendencies, of the previous type of evolution "continue to act," and therefore, those who speak of the "old that has become obsolete" are liquidators, in fact, captivated by liberals.

The opposition of both schemes, both answers, is clear. We have before us two different, complete answers leading to different conclusions.

Martov tricks à la Burenin, referring to the fact that both answers "speak" about the "emergence of a bourgeois monarchy." With the same right, one could refer to the fact that both answers recognize the continuing capitalist development of Russia! On the basis of the general recognition (by all Marxists and all who wish to be Marxists) of capitalist development, the dispute is about its height, form, and conditions. And Martov confuses the disputable to present the undisputable as the subject of discussion! On the basis of the general recognition (by all Marxists and all who wish to be Marxists) of the development of the old power along the path of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy, the dispute is about the degree, form, conditions, and course of this transformation, and Martov confuses the disputable (do the previous factors continue to act? is it permissible to renounce the old forms? and so on) to present the undisputable as the subject of discussion!

That power in Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries generally develops "along the path of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy," this is not denied by Larin, as no sane person wishing to be a Marxist has denied it until now. The proposal to replace the adjective "bourgeois" with "plutocratic" incorrectly assesses the degree of transformation, but does not fundamentally dispute that the actual "path," the path of real evolution, consists precisely in this transformation. Let him try to assert that the monarchy of 1861–1904 (i.e., undoubtedly less capitalist compared to the present) does not represent, in comparison with the era of Nicholas, serfdom, one of the steps "on the path of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy"!

Martov not only does not try to assert this, but, on the contrary, "joins" V. Mirov, who, opposing Larin, refers precisely to the bourgeois character of Witte's reforms, as well as the reforms of the 1860s{87}!

Let the reader now judge the "cleverness" of Mirov and Martov. First, they repeat against Larin the arguments that were brought by the "orthodox" a year and a half ago against the closest friends, like-minded colleagues, and associates of Martov and Mirov, and then they assure the reader that the "schemes" of Larin and the "orthodox" are the same.

This is not only an example of literariness against politics (for politics requires structured, direct answers, and literati often limit themselves to beating around the bush), it is an example of degrading literature to Bureninism.

Having quoted the above words of Larin that "if nothing has changed, etc., then there is nothing left but to fight the liquidators," Martov responds to him:

"We thought until now that our tasks are determined by the social structure of the society in which we operate, and the forms of our activity are determined, firstly, by these tasks, and secondly, by political conditions. The social nature of power, therefore, has no immediate (Martov's emphasis) relation to the determination of our tasks and forms of activity."

This is not an answer, but an empty evasive phrase. Martov again tries to confuse the issue, shifting the debate to where it is not being conducted. The question is not whether the social nature of power is immediately or mediately connected with the tasks and forms of activity. Let this connection be mediate; the matter does not change at all if a close and inseparable connection is recognized. And Martov does not dare to say a single word against recognizing a close and inseparable connection. His reference to "political conditions" is throwing dust in the reader's eyes. To oppose the "social nature of power" to "political conditions" is as meaningless as if I were to oppose man-made galoshes to muck boots. Muck boots are galoshes. And there are no other galoshes except those made by people. The nature of power is the political conditions. And there is no other nature of power except the social.

rubbers. Rubbers are galoshes. And there are no galoshes other than those made by people. The nature of power is political conditions, and there is no nature of power other than the social one.

In the end, we see that Martov "talked around" and evaded answering Larin. And he evaded because he had nothing to answer. Larin is entirely right in saying that the view on the "social character of power" (on its economic nature, to be more precise) is closely and inseparably linked with views on "tasks and forms of activity." Both Larin and the "orthodox" recognize and follow this connection. Martov (and his household) lacks coherence in his views. Therefore, Martov is forced to dodge and resort to "rubbers."

Listen further:

This long excerpt was necessary for us to show the reader Martov's "manner" in all its clarity. He admits that Kogan (a Menshevik who systematically collaborates in responsible "works" together with Martov) has "more or less clearly glimpsed" reformism. He admits that if reformism were the principled basis of liquidationism, it would be a "break with the past." He throws out a ringing, shouting, and effective phrase against "reformists, creeping in," etc. And how does he conclude? With an assurance that, of course, he does not "suspect" Larin of reformist "tendencies"!!

This is exactly the speech of Eduard Bernstein, Jean Jaurès, or Ramsay MacDonald. They all "admit" that among some "extremists" something bad, reformism, liberalism, "glimmers." They all admit that if liberalism were the "principled basis" of their policy, it would be a "break with the past." They all throw out ringing, shouting, and effective phrases against "liberals, crawling," etc. And they all conclude... with assurances that they do not "suspect" the Lariins, excuse me, their more frank, more "right" comrades, like-minded individuals, friends, colleagues, collaborators, of liberal-bourgeois tendencies.

The crux of the matter is that Larin provided, in the cited articles, an exposition of the system of views of the most undeniable, the most genuine reformism! To deny this is to go against the obvious, to deprive the concept of reformism of any meaning. And if you will "refute" Larin, "condemn" "principled" reformism, throw out ringing phrases against "creeping in," and at the same time, unhesitatingly, assure that you do not "suspect" Larin of reformism, then you fully expose yourself. By doing so, you fully prove that for you, the reference to your "principled" enmity towards "principled reformism" is the oath that a trader accompanies with his assurances: "believe me, I speak as honestly as I can, it would be to my own detriment."

Believe me, I speak as honestly as I can: I condemn principled reformism, but I do not "suspect" Larin of reformism (what a disgusting lot, these suspicious orthodox!) and I fully agree with Larin in liquidationist practice.

Such is the "expanded formula" of contemporary Russian opportunism.

Here is the application of this formula by Martov himself, whom naive (or those who do not understand the depths of the new regrouping) people still consider an "undoubted" non-liquidator:

"The tactics outlined in the activities of the so-called 'liquidators,'" writes Martov on pages 9–10, "is a 'tactic that places at the center the open workers' movement, striving for its expansion in all possible directions and seeking within (Martov's italics) this open workers' movement – and only there' – (note: and only there!) – 'elements for the revival of party existence.'"

This is said by L. Martov. And this is reformism, creeping into the regime of renewed Tolmachevism. The italics: "creeping" I borrowed from the same Martov, for it is important that he, Martov, in the words just quoted, actually preaches creeping. No matter how many oaths and vows against "principled reformism" you place next to such preaching, the matter does not change. In fact, by saying: "and only there," by saying: "at the center," Martov precisely leads a reformist line (in the special circumstances of Russia in 1908–1910), and let political infants believe in oaths, promises, assurances, and vows.

"...The disputes between Marx and Willich-Schapper in the early 1850s revolved precisely (!) around the question of the significance of secret societies and the possibility of leading political struggle from them... The Blanquists (in France in the 1860s) 'prepared' for these events (the collapse of Bonapartism) by organizing secret societies and isolating individual workers; the French section of the Marxists... went into workers' organizations, founded them, 'fought for legality' by all means..."

Neither example is from the same opera. Between Marx and Willich in the 1850s, between the Blanquists and the Marxists in the 1860s, the dispute was not at all about whether one should "only" seek "elements for the revival of party existence" in "peaceful, tolerable" (Martov, p. 10, No. 1 of Life) organizations. Martov knows this very well and vainly tries to mislead the readers. Both these disputes were not about the "revival" of the workers' party, for it was impossible to argue about reviving what had not existed before. Both disputes were precisely about whether a workers' party, based on the workers' movement, a class party, was needed at all. This is what both Willich and the Blanquists of the 1860s denied, as Martov well knows, vainly trying to cover up what is now controversial with talk about what is now undisputed. Not only in the 1850s and 1860s did Marx never stand on the position that one should "only" seek elements for the revival or birth of party existence in peaceful and tolerable organizations, but even later, in the late 1870s, at an immeasurably higher stage of capitalist development and the development of bourgeois monarchy, Marx and Engels waged an implacable war against German opportunists, who were liquidating the recent past of German "party existence," lamenting "extremes," talking about "more civilized" forms of movement ("Europeanization," in the language of contemporary Russian liquidators), defending the idea that "only" in "peaceful and tolerable" organizations should one "seek elements for revival," etc.

"I summarize," writes Martov. "For the theoretical justification and political vindication of what the Marxist Mensheviks, who have remained faithful, are currently doing, it is quite sufficient that the modern regime represents an internally contradictory combination of absolutism with constitutionalism and that the Russian working class has matured to the point where, like the workers of the advanced Western countries, it can seize this regime by the Achilles' heel of these contradictions."

These words of Martov ("quite sufficient") are quite sufficient for us to make our summary. What Martov finds "quite sufficient" is recognized by both the Cadets and part of the Octobrists. It was precisely "Rech" that posed the question in January 1911 as Martov proposed to pose it in August 1910: the contradictory combination of constitutionalism with anti-constitutionalism; two camps – for the constitution and against it. For Martov, it is "quite sufficient" what is quite sufficient for "Rech." There is not a grain of Marxism here. Here, Marxism has completely evaporated and been replaced by liberalism. For a Marxist, it is never "sufficient" that we have a "contradictory combination." Marxism begins only where there is an awareness, an understanding that this truth is insufficient, that it contains a spoonful of truth and a barrel of falsehood, that it obscures the depth of contradictions, prettifies reality, and denies the only possible means of getting out of the situation.

It is precisely that it contains a grain of truth and a barrel of untruth, that it glosses over the depth of contradictions, embellishes reality, and denies the only possible means of resolving the situation.

The "contradictory combination" of the old regime with constitutionalism exists not only in contemporary Russia but also in contemporary Germany and even in contemporary England (the House of Lords; the independence of the crown from the representatives of the people in matters of foreign policy, etc.). The question is, what position does a politician actually (i.e., regardless of good intentions and well-meaning speeches) take who declares that for a Russian it is "quite sufficient" to recognize what is true both in relation to Germany and in relation to England? Such a politician actually takes the position of a liberal, a Cadet. Even a somewhat consistent bourgeois democrat cannot and does not stand on such a position with us. Martov's final word, his concluding, summarizing formula for the entire discussion among the liquidators, gives an admirably precise, strikingly clear, and exhaustively complete expression of liberal views proclaimed under the guise of a supposedly Marxist banner.

When liberals—and not only Cadets, but also part of the Octobrists—say: it is quite sufficient for the theoretical justification and political vindication of our activity to recognize the internally contradictory combination of the old regime with constitutionalism, then the liberals remain entirely true to themselves. They give in these words a truly accurate liberal formula, the formula of liberal politics from 1908–1910 (if not 1906–1910). A Marxist, however, only and to the extent that he reveals his Marxism when he explains the insufficiency and falsity of this formula, which eliminates that specific, fundamentally distinguishing "contradictions" of Russian from English and German. "It is quite sufficient to accept that much opposes constitutionalism in our country," says the liberal. "Such recognition is completely insufficient," replies the Marxist. It is necessary to realize that there is no elementary, basic, cardinal, essential, necessary foundation for "constitutionalism" in general. The fundamental error of liberalism lies precisely in recognizing that this foundation exists, when in fact it does not, and this error explains the impotence of liberalism and is explained by the impotence of bourgeois sentimentality."

Translating this political antinomy into economic language, one can formulate it as follows. The liberal assumes that the path of economic (capitalist) development is already given, defined, completed, and that the issue is about clearing obstacles and contradictions from this path. The Marxist assumes that this given path of capitalist development has not yet led out of the impasse, despite such undeniable bourgeois progresses in economic evolution as November 9, 1906 (or June 14, 1910), the Third Duma, etc., and that there is another path of capitalist development, a path capable of leading to the main road, a path that must be pointed out, explained, prepared, defended, and implemented, despite all the vacillations, disbelief, and cowardice of liberalism.

Martov polemicizes with Larin as if he were much "to the left" of Larin. And many naive people are deceived, saying: of course, Potresov, Levitsky, and Larin are liquidators, of course, they are extreme rightists, well, like our Rouan, but Martov, Martov is not a liquidator! In reality, Martov's impressive phrases against Larin, against the creeping reformers, are merely a distraction, for in his conclusion, in his last word, in his summary, Martov precisely reinforces Larin. Martov is in no way "to the left" of Larin; he is only more diplomatic, more unprincipled, and more cunning in hiding behind colorful patches of supposedly "Marxist" phrases. Martov's conclusion: "it is quite sufficient" to recognize the contradictory combination—is precisely the confirmation of liquidationism (and liberalism) that Larin requires. But Larin wants to justify this conclusion, to prove it, to think it through to the end, to make it principled. And Martov tells Larin, as Vollmar, Auer, and other "old sparrows" of opportunism told the young opportunist Eduard Bernstein: "Dear Larin… that is: dear Eddy (diminutive of Eduard), you are a fool! This must be done, but it must not be said." "Dear Larin, for us 'it is quite sufficient' to have liquidationist practice, 'it is quite sufficient' to have a liberal recognition of the contradictoriness of the old regime with constitutionalism, but—please—do not go further, do not 'deepen,' do not seek principled clarity and integrity, do not build an assessment of 'the current moment,' for this exposes us. Let us act, but let us not speak."

Martov teaches Larin to be an opportunist.

One cannot sit between two stools, Larin tells Martov, demanding a principled explanation and justification for the liquidationism dear to both of them.

—Well, what kind of opportunist are you after that, Martov replies, if you do not know how to sit between two stools? What kind of opportunist are you if you demand a precise, direct, and clear principled justification for practice? A real opportunist must precisely sit between two stools, must precisely defend the "tactics-as-process" (remember Martynov and Krichevsky of the 1901 era), must go with the flow, covering up traces, avoiding any principled stance. Bernstein now (after lessons from Vollmar, Auer, etc.) knows how to be a revisionist without proposing any changes to the orthodox Erfurt profession de foi{89}. And we must know how to be liquidators without proposing any changes to the orthodox formal answer (of 1908) to the "cursed questions" of the current moment{90}. To be a real opportunist, dear and beloved Larin, one must, in practice, in the character of one's work, creep in, but in public, in speeches, in print, not only not seek theories justifying creeping in, but, on the contrary, shout louder against those creeping in, swear and vow more fervently that we are not creeping in.

Larin fell silent. Deep down, he probably could not help but admit that Martov is a more skilled diplomat, a subtler opportunist.

We should also approach Martov's concluding formula—"it is quite sufficient" to recognize the contradictoriness of the combination of the old regime with constitutionalism—from another angle. Compare this formula with the famous formula of V. Levitsky: "Not hegemony, but a class party" ("Nasha Zarya" No. 7). In this formula, Levitsky (– Larin of "Nasha Zarya") expressed more directly, more openly, and more principledly what Potresov obscured, shaded, and draped in elaborate words, while editing and revising his article against hegemony under the influence of Plekhanov's ultimatums.

Martov's formula and Levitsky's formula are two sides of the same coin. Explaining this circumstance for Martov, who pretends not to understand the connection between the idea of hegemony and the question of liquidationism, will be the subject of the next article.

P.S. This article was already in typesetting when we received No. 2 of "Delo Zhizni" with the conclusion of Y. Larin's article: "To the Right – and About Face." The reformism, in which L. Martov, "of course, does not suspect" Y. Larin, is set forth with the same clarity by Larin in the new liquidationist journal. For now, we will limit ourselves to presenting the essence of the reformist program:

Formalism, in which L. Martov, "of course, does not suspect" Y. Larin, is clearly set forth by Larin in the new liquidationist journal. Let us confine ourselves for the time being to quoting the essence of the reformist program:

"A state of bewilderment and uncertainty, when people simply do not know what to expect from tomorrow, what tasks to set themselves—this is what the indefinite, wait-and-see mood means, these vague hopes now for a repetition of the revolution, now for 'we shall see.' The immediate task is not the fruitless waiting for fair weather at sea, but the penetration of broad circles with the guiding idea that in the new historical period of Russian life, the working class must organize itself not 'for the revolution,' not 'in expectation of the revolution,' but simply for the firm and systematic defense of its special interests in all spheres of life; for gathering and training its forces through this many-sided and complex activity; for the education and accumulation of socialist consciousness in general; for learning to orientate (understand) and stand up for itself!—in the complex interrelations of the social classes of Russia in the coming, after the economically inevitable exhaustion of the feudal reaction, constitutional renewal—in particular" (p. 18).

This tirade exactly expresses the entire spirit and the entire meaning of Larin's "program" and all the liquidationist writings of Nasha Zarya, Vozrozhdeniye, Delo Zhizni, etc., right up to the "quite sufficient" analyzed by L. Martov. This tirade is pure and complete reformism. We cannot dwell on this tirade now; we cannot analyze it here as thoroughly as it deserves. Therefore, let us confine ourselves to a brief remark. The left Cadets, non-party socialists, petty-bourgeois democrats (like the Trudoviks), and reformists among those who wish to be Marxists, preach to the workers the program: gather your forces, educate yourselves, train yourselves, defend your interests simply in order to stand up for yourselves in the coming constitutional renewal. Such a program curtails, narrows, and castrates the political tasks of the working class in 1908–1911 just as the "Economists" castrated these tasks in 1896–1901. The old "Economists," deceiving themselves and others, loved to refer to Belgium (the predominance of reformism among the Belgians was recently clarified by the excellent works of De Man and Broeck; we will return to these works); the new-Economists, i.e., the liquidationists, love to refer to Austria's peaceful acquisition of a constitution in 1867. Both the old "Economists" and our liquidationists choose such examples, cases, and episodes from the history of the labor movement and democracy in Europe, when the workers were weak, unconscious, and dependent on the bourgeoisie for one reason or another—and they present such examples as models for Russia. Both the "Economists" and the liquidationists are conduits of bourgeois influence on the proletariat.

Thought No. 4, March 1911. Signed: V. Ilyin

Printed from the text of the Thought journal