We have repeatedly had occasion to note the ideological and organizational disintegration on the right, in the camp of bourgeois democrats and socialist opportunists—a disintegration that was inevitable during the period of rampant counter-revolution—among parties and tendencies dominated by petty-bourgeois intellectuals. But the picture of disintegration would be incomplete if we did not also dwell on the disintegration "on the left," in the camp of petty-bourgeois "Socialist-Revolutionaries."

Of course, the expression "on the left" can only be used here in a very conditional sense, to characterize those inclined to play at leftism. We have already repeatedly pointed out in *Proletariy* that it was precisely the period of the Russian revolution at its greatest surge that revealed with particular clarity—in open, mass, political practice—all the instability, fragility, and complete unprincipled character of SR "revolutionism." It suffices to recall only the major events. The autumn upsurge of 1905: the SRs in a secret bloc with the Enesists, who lean toward a legal "People's Socialist Party." The SR party congress in December 1905 rejects the "plan" to form such a duplicate of the SR party, but in the spring and summer upsurge of 1906 we see the SRs again in daily newspapers—that is, on the main tribune of nation-wide agitation—entering into a bloc with the Enesists. The latter openly renounce revolution in autumn 1906, after the defeats at Sveaborg and Kronstadt{74}, openly come forward as opportunists, and yet, notwithstanding this, the elections to the II Duma in Petersburg (spring 1907) again resurrect the "populist bloc" of SRs, Enesists, and Trudoviks. In a word, the revolution fully and definitively exposed the complete absence of any definite class base for the SR party, reducing it in practice to the role of an appendage, a wing of petty-bourgeois peasant democracy, forcing it to vacillate constantly between verbal revolutionary fervor and Enesist-Trudovik diplomacy. The defection of the Maximalists, who throughout the revolution kept splitting off and could not finally split away from the SRs, only confirmed the class instability of populist revolutionism. The SR center, the "pure" SRs—as we wrote still in no. 4 of *Proletariy*, in the article "SR Mensheviks"—had nothing left but to defend themselves with arguments borrowed from Marxists against both "new" directions within Marxism{19}. If the Social-Democrats emerged from the revolution having definitively consolidated themselves with one definite class, namely the proletariat, and having stamped out two tendencies inherent in all international social-democracy—the opportunist and the revolutionary—then the Socialist-Revolutionaries emerged from the revolution without any direct base, without any definite boundary capable of separating them, on the one hand, from the Trudoviks and Enesists, connected with the mass of small proprietors, and on the other hand, from the Maximalists, as an intellectual terrorist group.

And now, after the disappearance—perhaps temporary—of Maximalism, we see the renewal of a kindred tendency in new garb. The little newspaper *Revolutionary Thought*{75} (no. 1—April 1908, no. 2—June), organ of a "group of socialists—isolates itself from the "official organ of the SR party," that is, from the central organ, *Banner of Labor*, and proclaims a "revision of our (that is, of the revolutionaries') SR theoretical worldview, our SR methods of struggle and organization." Of course, all this "revision," all this "critical creative work" promised by the new newspaper, is pure phraseology. In reality, there can be no talk whatsoever of any revision of theory, because the new newspaper has no theoretical worldview at all, but only a hundredfold variation on calls for terror, and an awkward, clumsy, naive adaptation to this supposedly new, but in fact old and very old method of views on revolution, on mass movement, on the significance of parties in general, etc. The striking impoverishment of such "theoretical" baggage becomes evident when compared with the grandiose promises of revision, criticism, and creativity. The complete confusion of theoretical views in both the "new" and "old" direction within Sism comes out all the more sharply because *Revolutionary Thought* itself emphasizes the "evolution occurring in the views of the leaders of the official organ of the SR party"—an evolution consisting of an extremely intensive emphasis on "systematic central political terror" to "hasten events." This is a citation from no. 8 of *Banner of Labor*. And in nos. 10–11 (February–March 1908) we encounter precisely the same speeches about "intensifying the efforts of the entire party" on "central political terror," about the necessity of finding "large monetary means" for this, and right beside this a "subtle hint" is made at the possible source of these means: "all parties," writes *Banner of Labor*, p. 7–8, "up to and including the Kadets and the Peaceful Renovationists, will benefit from the immediate fruits of this activity. And therefore the party has the right to count on the broadest public assistance in this struggle of theirs."

The reader sees that there is nothing new in the speeches of the new newspaper. It is characteristic only in that it provides instructive material for evaluating the disintegration covered by "leftist" and allegedly revolutionary phrases. The Mensheviks in *Voice of the Social-Democrat* (no. 1) justify the collection of funds from liberals on the basis of a certain political solidarity of aims. The SRs in *Banner of Labor* say to the Kadets and Peaceful Renovationists: you yourselves will benefit from the fruits. Extremes meet. Petty-bourgeois opportunism and petty-bourgeois revolutionism alike "keep glancing"—though from different sides—at the Kadets and Peaceful Renovationists. And it is not only in this that the indicated extremes converge. Disillusionment has been carried away from the revolution by both Mensheviks and "revolutionary" populists. Waving one's hand at party principle, at old party traditions, at revolutionary mass struggle—both are ready for this. "An error common to almost all revolutionary parties," writes *Revolutionary Misthinking*, "an error that has played a disastrous role in the crisis we are now experiencing, consists in an exaggerated faith in the possibility and necessity of mass popular uprisings"… "Life did not justify the party's expectations." It was in vain, you see, that the Socialist-Revolutionaries constructed a "socialist program on a Marxist pattern," constructed "a conception of revolution by identifying it with mass movement and mass uprisings, provoked by economic needs, though admittedly making an allowance for the initiative of a minority." Instead of allowances, one must develop "a theory and practice of active action of the initiative-taking minority" (no. 1, p. 6–7). One must exalt the significance of "the direct feeling that seizes the revolutionary and the ideals that inspire him" (no. 2, p. 1), while theoretical questions, philosophy, scientific socialism—all this is trifles, in the opinion of these "new" social-revolutionary obscurantists. "Is there hope for armed uprisings in the more or less near (so it literally says: "in the more or less near") future?"—asks *Revolutionary Misthinking* and answers: "On this everyone agrees: there is no such hope" (no. 2, p. 2). Conclusion: in Russia "a political overturn cannot be accomplished otherwise than by a revolutionary minority" (p. 7). "The causes of the failure of revolutionary parties over the last three years were not accidental and depended, in our view, not only on objective conditions and not only on tactical mistakes, but also lay in the very conception of their organization itself" (p. 10): revolutionaries set themselves, you see, "impossible tasks"—actually to lead the masses; the social-democrats confused the SRs and impelled them, to the detriment of real business—the terrorist struggle—to think about organizing the peasantry and preparing it for general armed uprisings (p. 11). Extreme centralization of parties—"generalship"—"the spirit of authoritarianism" (p. 12)—that is the evil. "In a large strong party revolutionaries saw the sole means and guarantee of achieving the goal they had set, not noticing either the practical impossibility, under our Russian conditions, of creating such a party, or all its dark sides" (p. 12).

I think that is enough! What chaos of thought reigns in *Revolutionary Thought*, what obscurantism it preaches, on what vulgar philistine despair, faint-heartedness, and disillusionment after the first difficulties of the undertaking is built the allegedly revolutionary program—about this there is no need to waste words. The cited quotations speak for themselves.

But let the reader not think that such reasomings are simply nonsense accidentally blurted out by an unknown and insignificant clique. No, such a view would be mistaken. There is its own logic here—the logic of disillusionment with the party and with popular revolution, disillusionment in the ability of the masses for direct revolutionary struggle. This is the logic of intellectual overstrain, hysteria, incapacity for sustained, persistent work, inability to apply the fundamental principles of theory and tactics to changed circumstances, inability to conduct propagandistic, agitational, and organizational work under conditions sharply different from those we experienced not long ago. Instead of directing all efforts toward a struggle against the philistine disintegration permeating not only the higher but also the lower classes, instead of more firmly consolidating the scattered party forces in the defense of tested revolutionary principles—instead of this, unbalanced people, torn from their class base in the masses, throw overboard everything they have learned, and proclaim a "revision," that is, a return to old rubbish, to revolutionary handicraft, to the fragmented activity of little groups. No heroism of these groups and individual persons in terrorist struggle will change the fact that their activity, as members of a party, is a manifestation of disintegration. And it is extremely important to grasp the truth—confirmed by the experience of all countries that have experienced defeats of revolution—that one and the same psychology, one and the same class peculiarity, for instance of the petty bourgeoisie, manifests itself both in the despondency of the opportunist and in the desperation of the terrorist.

"Everyone agrees that there is no hope for armed uprisings in the more or less near future." Ponder this trite and hackneyed phrase. It is obvious that these people have never reflected on the objective conditions that engender first a broad political crisis, and then, as this crisis intensifies, civil war. They have memorized the "slogan" of armed uprising by rote, without understanding the significance and conditions of applicability of this slogan. Therefore they so easily cast aside half-thought-out slogans, accepted on faith, after the very first defeats of the revolution. And if these people valued Marxism as the sole revolutionary theory of the twentieth century, if they had learned from the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, they would see the distinction between a phrase and the development of genuinely revolutionary slogans. The Social-Democrats did not raise the "slogan" of uprising either in 1901, when demonstrations caused Krichevsky and Martynov to cry out about a "storming," or in 1902 and 1903, when the late Nadezhin called the old *Iskra's* plan "mere journalism." They only raised the slogan of uprising after January 9, 1905, when not a single person could any longer doubt that a nationwide political crisis had erupted, that it was intensifying in direct mass movement not by the day but by the hour. And within several months this crisis brought about an uprising.

What lesson flows from this? That we must now carefully follow the preparation of a new political crisis, teach the masses the lessons of 1905, the inevitability of the transition of every acute crisis into uprising, and strengthen the organization that will raise this slogan at the moment the crisis arrives. To pose the question as "is there hope in the near future?" is fruitless. The state of affairs in Russia is such that no thoughtful socialist whatsoever would venture on predictions. All that we know and can say comes down to this: without a reconstruction of agrarian relations, without a complete overthrow of the old landed order Russia cannot exist, and yet exist she will. The struggle is being waged over whether Stolypin will succeed in accomplishing this overthrow in a landlord manner, or whether the peasants under the leadership of the workers will themselves accomplish it in a way advantageous to themselves. The task of the Social-Democrats is to instill in the masses a clear understanding of this economic foundation of the growing crisis and to educate a serious party organization that would help the people to assimilate the rich lessons of the revolution and be capable of leading them in the struggle when the forces that are ripening mature for a new revolutionary "campaign."

But this answer will seem "indefinite," of course, to people who regard "slogans" not as a practical conclusion from class analysis and consideration of a definite historical moment, but as a talisman once and for all given to a party or tendency. To such people it is incomprehensible that the inability to adapt one's tactics to the differences between fully determined and undetermined moments is a result of political lack of education and narrowness of outlook. To strengthen the organization! Our heroes of revolutionary "shrieking" wrinkle their nose disdainfully at such a modest, innocent task, one that promises no "immediate" noise and crash, not tomorrow, not today. "Life did not justify the party's expectations." And this is said after three years of revolution, which gave unprecedented confirmation in world history of the role and significance of strong parties! It was precisely the Russian revolution in its very first period that showed that one can create, even under autocratic orders{77}, a party actually capable of leading classes. In spring 1905 our party was a union of underground circles; by autumn it had become a party of millions of proletarians. Did this happen "suddenly," gentlemen, or did a decade of slow, persistent, unseen and unhearalded work prepare and ensure such a result? And if at such a moment as the one we are experiencing, when both official and unofficial SRs place first and foremost the assassination of the tsar, rather than the creation of a party organization in the peasant masses capable of forging something more durable, ideological, solid, and sustained from the jelly-like revolutionism of the Trudovik tendency as a current—then we will say that populist socialism in Russia is dying, that it has long been dead, that its leaders feel obscurely their "crash" as populists, after the very first campaign of the people's revolution.

We did not expect the peasants to have the capacity for a leading role or even an independent role in the revolution, and we will not lose heart at the failure of the first campaign, which showed the enormous prevalence of revolutionary-democratic, though extremely vague and sloppy, ideas among the peasantry. And we will know how to work again with the same persistence and determination as we worked before the revolution, so that the party tradition does not snap, so that the party strengthens and is able to lead in the second campaign not 2–3 million proletarians, but five, ten times that number. Do you not believe in this task? Does it bore you? Goodbye and good riddance, my most esteemed sirs: you are not revolutionaries, you are simply shriekers!

And your official organ poses the question of participation in the III Duma{20} in exactly the same shrieking fashion. In nos. 10–11 of *Banner of Labor* one shrieker mocks the errors of our SD deputies in the III Duma and exclaims regarding their declarations: "Who knows about these declarations, these votes and abstentions?" (p. 11).

To this we will say: yes, our SD deputies in the III Duma made many mistakes. And it is precisely this example, which the SRs saw fit to seize upon, that demonstrates the difference in approach to the business of a workers' party and an intellectual group. The workers' party understands that in a period of political lull and disintegration, the manifestation of this disintegration on the Duma faction is inevitable—a faction which in the III Duma, moreover, could concentrate even fewer major party forces than in the second. Therefore the workers' party criticizes and corrects the mistakes of its deputies; each organization, having discussed each speech and arrived at the conclusion that such and such a declaration or statement is an error, provides material for a political statement to the masses. Do not worry, gentlemen SRs: at the moment of sharpening of the political crisis our faction—and in any event the members of our Duma faction—will know how to fulfill their duty. And our criticism of their mistakes is made publicly, openly before the masses. Deputies learn from this criticism, classes learn from it, the party learns from it—a party that has seen hard times and knows that not by shrieking, but only by persistent and steadfast work of all organizations, can one emerge with honor from a difficult situation. *Proletariy*, as a newspaper published abroad, was conscious of its obligation to give advice carefully from afar, but it too proposed measures for improving the work of the faction. Our open party criticism, in addition to the work of the faction, achieves this: that the masses know both the Duma declarations and the character of party corrections to them. And to be unable to appreciate the significance of a Duma speech at such moments, when party organizations and party press are undergoing great disintegration, means to display immeasurable intellectual frivolity.

Gentlemen SRs do not understand the significance of open socialist statements with direct criticism and correction of them in their party organs. Gentlemen SRs prefer to hush up the mistakes of their leaders: no. 10–11 of *Banner of Labor* reminded us of this once again, by scolding us for "vulgar" declarations about Gershuni's Kadet-loving. We expressed our opinion on this question long ago{21} and would not necessarily repeat it now, soon after the death of a man tortured by the tsar's executioners, a man who by his devotion to the revolutionary organization earned himself profound respect. But if gentlemen SRs saw fit to raise the question, we will give an answer. Except for abuse, you can answer us in no way, gentlemen; you cannot say directly and openly who among you approves and who does not approve of Gershuni's position at the February (1907) party congress of the SRs. You cannot answer on the substance and expose the errors of your leaders, the number of their supporters, etc., because you do not have a party, do not value the education of the masses through open criticism of persons, declarations, directions, and shades of opinion.

The working class will be able to educate and temper its organizations by openly criticizing its representatives. Not suddenly, not without friction, not without struggle and not without labor, but we will solve the difficult task posed before us by the difficult turn of events: to unite open Duma statements with party illegal activity. In the solution of this task will be revealed the maturity of the party that has lived through the first campaign of the revolution—in the solution of this task will be given one of the guarantees that in the second campaign the proletariat will, under the leadership of social-democracy, be able to fight more skillfully and more solidly and to triumph more decisively.

*Proletariy* no. 32, (15) July 2, 1908.

Printed from the text of the newspaper *Proletariy*