V. I.

Lenin

MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy ( Chapter Six: Empirio-Criticism and Historical Materialism )

2. How Bogdanov Corrects and
“Develops” Marx

In his article “The Development of Life in Nature and
Society” (From the Psychology of Society, 1902,
p. 35, et seq .), Bogdanov quotes the well-known passage
from the preface to Zur Kritik , [1] :

where the “great sociologist”, i.e., Marx, expounds the basis of
historical materialism. Having quoted Marx’s words, Bogdanov declares that
the “old formulation of historical monism, without ceasing to be basically
true, no longer fully satisfies us” (37). The author wishes, therefore, to
correct the theory, or to develop it, starting from the basis of the theory itself . The author’s chief conclusion is as follows:

“ We have shown that social forms belong to the comprehensive
genus —biological adaptations. But we have not thereby defined the province of social forms; for a definition,
not only the genus, but also the species must be established. . . . In their struggle for existence men can
unite only with the help of consciousness : without consciousness there can be no intercourse. Hence, social life in all its manifestations is a consciously psychical life . . . . Society is inseparable from
consciousness. Social being and social consciousness are, in the exact meaning of these terms, identical ” (pp. 50, 51, Bogdanov’s italics).

That this conclusion is absolutely alien to Marxism has been
pointed out by Orthodox (Philosophical Essays, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 183, ff.). But Bogdanov responded
simply by abuse, picking upon an error in quotation:
instead of “in the exact meaning of these terms,”
Orthodox had quoted “in the full meaning of these terms.” This error was indeed committed, and the author
had every right to correct it; but to raise a cry of “mutilation,” “substitution,” and so
forth (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, p. xliv), is simply to obscure the essence of the point at issue by wretched
words. What ever “exact” meaning Bogdanov may have invented for the terms “social being” and
“social consciousness,” there can be no doubt that the statement we have quoted is not correct .

“Social being” and “social consciousness” are not identical, just as being in general
and consciousness in general are not identical. From the fact
that in their intercoutse men act as conscious beings, it
does not follow that social consciousness is identical with social being. In all social formations of any
complexity—and in the capitalist social formation in particular—people in their intercourse are not conscious of what kind of social relations are being
formed, in accordance with what laws they develop, etc. For
instance, a peasant when he sells his grain enters into
“intercourse” with the world producers of grain in the world market, but he is not conscious of it; nor is he
conscious of the kind of social relations that are formed on the
basis of exchange. Social consciousness reflects social
being—that is Marx’s teaching. A reflection may be an approximately true copy of the reflected, but to speak of
identity is absurd. Consciousness in general reflects being—that is a general principle of all
materialism. It is impossible not to see its direct and
inseparable connection with the principle of historical
materialism: social consciousness reflects social being.

Bogdanov’s attempt imperceptibly to correct and develop
Marx in the “spirit of his principles” is an obvious distortion of these materialist principles in the
spirit of idealism . It would be ludicrous to deny it. Let us recall Bazarov’s exposition of
empirio-criticism (not empirio-monism, oh no!—there is such a wide, wide difference between these
“systems”!): “sense-perception is the reality existing outside us.” This is plain idealism, a
plain theory of the identity of consciousness and being. Recall,
further, the formulation of W. Schuppe, the immanentist (who
swore and vowed as fervently as Bazarov and Co. that he was not
an idealist, and who with no less vigour than Bogdanov insisted
on the very “exact” meaning of his terms):
“being is consciousness.” Now compare this with the refutation of Marx’s historical materialism by
the immanentist Schubert-Soldern: “Every material process
of production is always an act of consciousness on the part of
its observer. . . . In its epistemological aspect, it is not the
external process of production that is the primary (prius), but the subject or subjects; in other words, even
the purely material process of production does not lead us out
of the general connection of consciousness (Bewusstseinszusammenhang) .” (See Das menschliche Glück und die soziale Frage, S. 293,
295-96.)

Bogdanov may curse the materialists as much as he pleases for
“mutilating his thoughts,” but no curses will alter the simple and plain fact. The correction of Marx’s theory
and the development of Marx supposedly in the spirit of Marx by
the “empirio-monist” Bogdanov in no essential respect differ from the way the idealist and
epistemological solipsist Schubert-Soldern endeavours to refute
Marx. Bogdanov assures us that he is not an idealist. Schubert-Soldern assures us that he is a realist
(Bazarov even believed him). In our time a philosopher has to
declare himself a “realist” and an “enemy of idealism.” It is about time you understood this,
Messrs. Machians!

The immanentists, the empirio-criticists and the empirio-monists
all argue over particulars, over details, over the formulation
of idealism, whereas we from the very outset reject all the principles of their philosophy common to this
trinity. Let Bogdanov, accepting in the best sense and with the
best of intentions all the conclusions of Marx, preach the “identity” of social being and social
consciousness; we shall say: Bogdanov minus “empirio-monism” (or rather, minus Machism)
is a Marxist. For this theory of the identity of social being
and social consciousness is sheer nonsense and an absolutely reactionary theory. If certain people
reconcile it with Marxism, with Marxist behaviour, we must admit
that these people are better than their theory, but we cannot
justify outrageous theoretical distortions of Marxism.

Bogdanov reconciles his theory with Marx’s conclusions,
and sacrifices elementary consistency for the sake of these
conclusions. Every individual producer in the world economic
system realises that he is introducing a certain change into the
technique of production; every owner realises that he exchanges
certain products for others; but these producers and these
owners do not realise that in doing so they are thereby changing
social being . The sum-total of these changes in all their ramifications in the capitalist world economy could not be
grasped even by seventy Marxes. The paramount thing is that the
laws of these changes have been discovered, that the objective logic of these changes and their historical
development have at bottom and in the main been disclosed—objective, not in the sense that a society of
conscious beings, men, could exist and develop independently of
the existence of conscious beings (and it is only such trifles
that Bogdanov stresses by his “theory”), but in the sense that social being is independent of
the social consciousness of men. The fact that you live
and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and
exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of
events, a chain of development, which is independent of your
social consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend
this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of
social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it
may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of
all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a
fashion as possible.

Bogdanov admits all this. And what does this mean? It means
in effect that his theory of the “identity of social being and social consciousness” is thrown
overboard, that it becomes an empty scholastic appendage, as
empty, dead and useless as the “theory of general substitution” or the doctrine of “elements,”
“introjection” and the rest of the Machian rigmarole. But the “dead lay hold of the living”;
the dead scholastic appendage, against the will of and independently of the consciousness of Bogdanov, converts
his philosophy into a serviceable tool of the
Schubert-Solderns and other reactionaries, who in a thousand
different keys, from a hundred professorial chairs, disseminate
this dead thing as a living thing, direct it against the living thing, for the purpose of stifling it. Bogdanov
personally is a sworn enemy of reaction in general and of
bourgeois reaction in particular. Bogdanov’s “substitution” and theory of the “identity of
social being and social consciousness” serve this reaction. It is sad, but true.

Materialism in general recognises objectively real being
(matter) as independent of consciousness, sensation, experience,
etc., of humanity. Historical materialism recognises social
being as independent of the social consciousness of humanity. In
both cases consciousness is only the reflection of being, at
best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact)
reflection of it. From this Marxist philosophy, which is cast
from a single piece of steel, you cannot eliminate one basic
premise, one essential part, without departing from objective
truth, without falling a prey to a bourgeois-reactionary
falsehood.

Here are further examples of how the dead philosophy of idealism
lays hold of the living Marxist Bogdanov.

The article “What Is Idealism?” 1901 (ibid ., p. 11 et seq .): “We arrive at
the following conclusion: both where people agree in their
judgments of progress and where they disagree, the basic meaning
of the idea of progress is the same, namely, increasing completeness and harmony of conscious life . This is the
objective content of the concept progress. . . . If we now
compare the psychological formulation of the idea of progress
thus arrived at with the previously explained biological
formulation

[“biological progress is an increase in the sum-total of life, ”
p. 14],

we shall easily convince ourselves that the former fully coincides with the latter and can be deduced from
it. . . . And since social life amounts to the psychical life of
members of society, here too the content of the idea of progress
is the same—increase in the completeness and harmony of
life; only we must add: the social life of men. And, of
course, the idea of social progress never had and cannot have
any other content” (p. 16).

“ We have found . . . that idealism expresses the victory
in the human soul of moods more social over moods less social,
that a progressive ideal is a reflection of the socially
progressive tendency in the idealist psychology” (p. 32).

It need hardly be said that all this play with biology and
sociology contains not a grain of Marxism. Both in
Spencer and Mikhailovsky one may find any number of definitions
not a whit worse than this, defining nothing but the “good
intentions” of the author and betraying a complete lack of understanding of “what is idealism” and
what materialism.

The author begins Book III of Empirio-Monism, the article “Social Selection (Foundations of Method),”
1906, by refuting the “eclectic socio-biological attempts
of Lange, Ferri, Woltmann and many others” (p. 1), and on
page 15 we find the following conclusion of the “enquiry”: “We can formulate the fundamental
connection between energetics and social selection as follows:

“ Every act of social selection represents an increase or decrease of the energy of the social complex concerned. In the former case we have ‘positive selection,’ in the latter ‘negative selection .’”
(Author’s italics.)

And such unutterable trash is served out as Marxism! Can one
imagine anything more sterile, lifeless and scholastic than this
string of biological and energeticist terms that contribute
nothing, and can contribute nothing, in the sphere of the social
sciences? There is not a shadow of concrete economic enquiry
here, not a hint of the Marxist method, the method of dialectics and the world outlook of materialism, only a mere
invention of definitions and attempts to fit them into the ready-made conclusions of Marxism. “The rapid growth
of the productive forces of capitalist society is undoubtedly an
increase in the energy of the social whole. . . .” The second half of the phrase is undoubtedly a simple repetition of
the first half expressed in meaningless terms which seem to lend
“profundity” to the question, but which in reality in no way differ from the eclectic
biologico-sociological attempts of Lange and
Co.!—“but the disharmonious character of this process leads to its culmination in a crisis, in a vast waste of
productive forces, in a sharp decrease of energy: positive
selection is replaced by negative selection” (p. 18).

In what way does this differ from Lange? A biologico-energeticist label is tacked on to ready-made
conclusions on the subject of crises, without any concrete
material whatever being added and without the nature of crises
being elucidated.

All this is done with the very best intentions, for the author wishes to corroborate and give
greater depth to Marx’s conclusions; but in point of fact
he only dilutes them with an intolerably dreary and lifeless scholasticism. The only “Marxism” here is a
repetition of an already known conclusion, and all the “new” proof of it, all this “ social energetics ” (p. 34) and “social
selection” is but a mere collection of words and a sheer mockery of Marxism.

Bogdanov is not engaged in a Marxist enquiry at all; all he is
doing is to reclothe results already obtained by the Marxist
enquiry in a biological and energeticist terminology. The whole
attempt is worthless from beginning to end, for the concepts
“selection,” “assimilation and dissimilation” of energy, the energetic balance, and so
forth, are, when applied to the sphere of the social sciences,
but empty phrases . In fact, an enquiry into social phenomena and an elucidation of the method of
the social sciences cannot be undertaken with the aid of these concepts. Nothing is easier than to tack the labels of
“energetics” or “biologico-sociology” on to such phenomena as crises, revolutions, the class struggle and
so forth; but neither is there anything more sterile, more
scholastic and lifeless than such an occupation. The important
thing is not that Bogdanov tries to fit all his results
and conclusions into the Marxist theory—or “nearly” all (we have seen the
“correction” he made on the subject of the relation of social being to social consciousness)—but that the
methods of fitting—this “social energetics”—are thoroughly false and in no way
differ from the methods of Lange.

“ Herr Lange (On the Labour Question, etc., 2nd ed.),” Marx wrote to Kugelmann on June 27, 1870,
“sings my praises loudly, but with the object of making
himself im portant. Herr Lange, you see, has made a great
discovery. The whole of history can be brought under a single
great natural law. This natural law is the phrase (in this application Darwin’s expression becomes nothing but a
phrase) ‘struggle for life,’ and the content of this phrase is the Malthusian law of population or, rather,
over-population. So, instead of analysing the ‘struggle
for life’ as represented historically in various definite
forms of society, all that has to be done is to translate every
concrete struggle into the phrase ‘struggle for life,’ and this phrase itself into the Malthusian
‘population fantasy.’ One must admit that this is a very impressive method—for swaggering, sham-scientific,
bombastic ignorance and intellectual laziness.” [2]

The basis of Marx’s criticism of Lange is not that Lange
foists Malthusianism in particular upon sociology, but that the
transfer of biological concepts in general to the sphere of the social sciences is
phrasemongering . Whether the transfer is undertaken with “good” intentions, or with the purpose of
bolstering up false sociological conclusions, the phrase
mongering none the less remains phrasemongering. And
Bogdanov’s “social energetics,” his coupling of the doctrine of social selection with Marxism, is just such
phrasemongering.

Just as in epistemology Mach and Avenarius did not develop
idealism, but only overlaid the old idealist errors with a bombastic terminological rigmarolc
(“elements,” “principal co-ordination,” “introjection,” etc.), so in sociology, even when
there is sincere sympathy for Marxist conclusions, empirio-criticism results in a distortion of historical
materialism by means of empty and bombastic energeticist and
biological verbiage.

A historical peculiarity of modern Russian Machism (or rather of
the Machian epidemic among a section of the Social-Democrats) is
the following. Feuerbach was a “materialist below and an
idealist above”; this to a certain extent applies also to
Büchner, Vogt, Moleschott and Dühring, with the essential difference that all these philosophers were pygmies
and wretched bunglers compared with Feuerbach.

Marx and Engels, as they grew out of Feuerbach and matured in
the fight against the bunglers, naturally paid most attention to
crowning the structure of philosophical materialism, that is,
not to the materialist epistemology but to the materialist
conception of history. That is why Marx and Engels laid the
emphasis in their works rather on dialectical materialism than on dialectical materialism, why
they insisted rather on historical materialism than on historical materialism . Our would-be Marxist Machians
approached Marxism in an entirely different historical period,
at a time when bourgeois philosophers were particularly
specialising in epistemology, and, having assimilated in a one-sided and mutilated form certain of the component parts of
dialectics (relativism, for instance), directed their attention
chiefly to a defence or restoration of idealism below and not of
idealism above. At any rate, positivism in general, and Machism
in particular, have been much more concerned with subtly
falsifying epistemology, assuming the guise of materialism and
concealing their idealism under a pseudo-materialist terminology, and have paid comparatively little attention to the
philosophy of history. Our Machians did not understand Marxism
because they happened to approach it from the other side, so to speak, and they have assimilated—and at
times not so much assimilated as learnt by rote—Marx’s economic and historical theory, without
clearly apprehending its foundation, viz ., philosophical materialism. And the result is that Bogdanov and
Co. deserve to be called Russian Büchners and Dührings turned inside out. They want to be materialists above, but are
unable to rid themselves of muddled idealism below! In the case
of Bogdanov, “above” there is historical materialism, vulgarised, it is true, and much corrupted by
idealism, “below” there is idealism, disguised in
Marxist terminology and decked out in Marxist words. “Socially organised experience,”
“collective labour process,” and so forth are
Marxist words, but they are only words, concealing an idealist philosophy that declares things to be complexes of
“elements,” of sensations, the external world to be “experience,” or an “empirio-symbol” of
mankind, physical nature to be a “product” of the “psychical,” and so on and so forth.

An ever subtler falsification of Marxism, an ever subtler
presentation of anti-materialist doctrines under the guise of
Marxism—this is the characteristic feature of modern revisionism in political economy, in questions of tactics and in
philosophy generally, both in epistemology and in sociology.

---
Notes:
[1]
This refers to the Preface to Marx’s work Zur Kritik der
politischen Ökonomie(Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy).

[2]
See K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, p. 290.