"FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF MARXISM"
SPB., 1908
[23-24] The idealists first transform thinking into an independent, self-subsistent entity (a "subject for itself"), and then declare that in this entity, the contradiction between being and thinking is resolved. This is because this entity, independent of matter, has a separate, independent existence. And indeed, the contradiction is resolved in it, for what is this entity? It is thinking. And this thinking exists—i.e., is—independently of anything else. But this resolution of the contradiction is purely formal. It is achieved only by eliminating one of its elements: namely, the existence independent of thinking. Being turns out to be merely a property of thinking, and when we say that a given object exists, it means only that it exists in thought... To be does not mean to exist in thought. In this respect, Feuerbach's philosophy is much clearer than that of I. Dietzgen. "To prove that something exists," Feuerbach remarks, "means to prove that it exists n o t o n l y i n t h o u g h t"*...
[28-31] The materialistic explanation of history had primarily methodological significance. Engels understood this very well when he wrote: "we need not so much the bare results as the study (das Studium); the results are nothing if taken independently of the development leading to them"**...
In general, one of the greatest contributions of Marx and Engels to materialism was the development of the correct
NB

* Werke, X. 187.
** Nachla., I, 477.
+
211

method. Focusing their efforts on combating the s p e c u l a t i v e element in Hegel's philosophy, Feuerbach undervalued and underutilized its dialectical element. He says: "true dialectic is not at all a dialogue of a solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialogue between I and you"* But, first, in Hegel, dialectic also did not have the meaning of "a dialogue of a solitary thinker with himself"; and second, Feuerbach's remark correctly defines the s t a r t i n g p o i n t of philosophy, but not its m e t h o d. This gap was filled by Marx and Engels, who understood that it would be wrong, in fighting against Hegel's speculative philosophy, to ignore his dialectic...
Many confuse dialectics with the theory of development, and indeed, it is such a theory. But dialectics differ essentially from the vulgar "theory" of evolution, which is entirely based on the principle that neither nature nor history makes leaps and that all changes in the world occur gradually. Hegel already showed that such an understanding of the theory of development is absurd and untenable...
[33]... Generally, the rights of dialectical thinking are confirmed by him** through the dialectical properties of being. Being here determines thinking...
[39] Thus, the properties of the geographical environment determine the development of productive forces; and the development of productive forces, in turn, determines the development of economic and, subsequently, all other social relations...
[42] Each given stage of development of productive forces corresponds to a certain character of armament, military art, and, finally, international—or more precisely, intersocietal, i.e., including inter-tribal—law. Hunting tribes cannot form large political organizations precisely because the low level of their productive forces f o r c e s t h e m, in the vivid old Russian expression, t o s p r e a d a p a r t, in small social groups, in search of means of subsistence...
[46-47] According to Marx, the geographical environment influences man through the intermediary of production relations, a r i s i n g i n a g i v e n l o c a l-
NB

* Werke, II, 345.
** Engels. Ed.

NOTES ON P. B. ALEXANDROV'S [P. B. PLEKHANOV'S] "FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF MARXISM"

...the development of productive forces, the first condition for the development of which is the properties of this environment...
[65-66] The character of the "economic structure" and the direction in which this character changes depend not on the will of people, but on the state of the productive forces and on what specific changes in the production relations arise and become necessary for society due to the further development of these forces. Engels explains this with the following words: "People make their own history, but they do so, even within individual societies, not according to a common will or a common plan. Their aspirations cross each other, and it is precisely because of this that necessity reigns in all such societies, the complement and external form of manifestation of which is c h a n c e." Human activity here is not defined as free, but as
necessary, i.e., as law-abiding, i.e., as capable of becoming an object of scientific investigation. Thus, historical materialism, while continuing to point out
that circumstances are changed by people, at the same time for the first time gives us the possibility to look at the process of this change from a scientific standpoint. And this is why we have every right to say that the materialist explanation of history provides the necessary preliminaries for any doctrine about human society that wishes to present itself as a science...
[68] In primitive society, which does not know class division, the productive activity of man directly influences his worldview and his aesthetic taste...
[81-82] If we were to briefly express the view of Marx-Engels on the relationship between the now-famous "base" and no less famous "s u p e r s t r u c t u r e," we would get the following:
1) The state of the productive forces;
2) The economic relations conditioned by them;
3) The socio-political system that has grown on the given economic "base";
4) The psyche of the social person, determined partly directly by the economy and partly by the socio-political system that has grown on it;
5) Various ideologies, reflecting the properties of this psyche...
[98] Let us take, for example, our contemporary agrarian question. To a clever landowner - a Cadet,
"compulsory expropriation of land" may seem more or less, i.e., inversely proportional to the size of the "fair compensation," a sad historical necessity. But to a peasant, striving to acquire "land," the more or less sad
necessity will be, on the contrary, only this "fair compensation," while the very
"compulsory expropriation" will necessarily appear to him as an expression of his free will and the most precious guarantee of his freedom.
In saying this, we perhaps touch upon the most important point in the doctrine of freedom, a point not mentioned by Engels, of course, only because it is clear to a person who has gone through the school of Hegel without any explanations...
Feuerbach and Dietzgen. 24*.
Notes made no earlier than May
1908.
First published partially in 1933 in the Lenin Collection XX V
Published in full in 1958 in the 4th edition of the Collected Works
of V. I. Lenin, vol. 38
Printed from the original

* Refers to page 24 of Plekhanov's book (see the present volume, p. 455). Ed.