V. I.

Lenin

MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy ( Chapter Three: The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism and of Empirio-Criticism. III )

6. Freedom and Necessity

On pages 140–41 of the Studies , A. Lunacharsky quotes the argument given by Engels in Anti-Dühring on
this question and fully endorses the “remarkably precise
and apt” statement of the problem made by Engels in that
“wonderful page” [1]
[1] Lunacharsky says: “. . . a wonderful page of religious economics. I say this at the risk of provoking a smile from the irreligious reader.” However good your intentions may be, Comrade Lunacharsky, it is not a smile, but disgust your flirtation with religion provokes. [10] — Lenin of the work mentioned.

There is, indeed, much that is wonderful here. And even more
“wonderful” is the fact that neither Lunacharsky, nor the whole crowd of other Machian would-be Marxists,
“noticed” the epistemological significance of
Engels’ discussion of freedom and necessity. They read it
and they copied it, but they did not make head or tail of it.

Engels says: “Hegel was the first to state correctly the
relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the
appreciation of necessity. ‘Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood .’ Freedom
does not consist in the dream of independence from natural laws,
but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this
gives of systematically making them work towards definite
ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external
nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence
of men themselves—two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in
reality. Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the
capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject. Therefore the freer a man’s judgment is
in relation to a definite question, the greater is the necessity with which the content of this judgment will
be determined. . . . Freedom therefore consists in the control
over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on
knowledge of natural necessity ( Naturnotwendigkeiten ).” (5th Germ. ed.,
pp. 112–13.) [8]

Let us examine the epistemological premises upon which this
argument is based.

Firstly, Engels at the very outset of his argument recognises
laws of nature, laws of external nature, the necessity of
nature— i.e. ., all that Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and Co. characterise as “metaphysics.” If
Lunacharsky had really wanted to reflect on Engels’ “wonderful” argument he could not have helped
noticing the fundamental difference between the materialist
theory of knowledge and agnosticism and idealism, which deny law
in nature or declare it to be only “logical,” etc., etc.

Secondly, Engels does not attempt to contrive “definitions” of freedom and necessity, the kind of
scholastic definition with which the reactionary professors
(like Avenarius) and their disciples (like Bogdanov) are most
concerned. Engels takes the knowledge and will of man, on the
one hand, and the necessity of nature, on the other, and instead
of giving definitions, simply says that the necessity of nature
is primary, and human will and mind secondary. The latter must
necessarily and inevitably adapt themselves to the former. Engels regards this as so obvious that he does not waste
words explaining his view. It needs the Russian Machians to
complain of Engels’ general definition of materialism (that nature is primary and mind secondary;
remember Bogdanov’s “perplexity” on this point!), and at the same time to regard one of the particular applications by Engels of this general and
fundamental definition as “wonderful” and “remarkably apt"!

Thirdly, Engels does not doubt the existence of “blind necessity.” He admits the existence of a necessity
unknown to man. This is quite obvious from the passage just quoted. But how, from the standpoint of the Machians, can
man know of the existence of what he does not know ? Is it not “mysticism,”
“metaphysics,” the admission of “fetishes” and “idols,” is it not the
“Kantian unknowable thing-in-itself” to say that we know of the existence of an unknown necessity? Had the Machians
given the matter any thought they could not have failed to
observe the complete identity between Engels’ argument on the knowability of the objective nature of things
and on the transformation of “things-in-themselves” into “things-for-us,” on the one hand, and his
argument on a blind, unknown necessity, on the other. The
development of con-sciousness in each human individual and the
development of the collective knowledge of humanity at large
presents us at every step with examples of the transformation of
the unknown “thing-in-itself” into the known “thing-for-us,” of the transformation of blind,
unknown necessity, “necessity-in-itself,” into the known “necessity-for-us.” Epistemologically, there
is no difference whatever between these two transformations, for
the basic point of view in both cases is the same, viz ., materialistic, the recognition of the objective
reality of the external world and of the laws of external
nature, and of the fact that this world and these laws are fully
knowable to man but can never be known to him with finality . We do not know the necessity of nature in the
phenomena of the weather, and to that extent we are inevitably
slaves of the weather. But while we do not know this necessity, we do know that it exists. Whence this
knowledge? From the very source whence comes the knowledge that
things exist outside our mind and independently of it, namely,
from the development of our knowledge, which provides millions
of examples to every individual of knowledge replacing ignorance
when an object acts upon our sense-organs, and conversely of
ignorance replacing knowledge when the possibility of such
action is eliminated.

Fourthly, in the above-mentioned argument Engels plainly employs
the salto vitale method in philosophy, that is to say, he makes a leap from theory to practice. Not a single
one of the learned (and stupid) professors of philosophy, in
whose footsteps our Machians follow, would permit himself to
make such a leap, for this would be a disgraceful thing for a
devotee of “pure science” to do. For them the theory of knowledge, which demands the cunning concoction of
“definitions,” is one thing, while practice is another. For Engels all living human practice permeates the
theory of knowledge itself and provides an objective criterion of truth. For until we know a law of nature, it,
existing and acting independently and outside our mind, makes us
slaves of “blind necessity.” But once we come to know this law, which acts (as Marx pointed out a thousand times)
independently of our will and our mind, we become the masters of nature. The mastery of nature manifested in human
practice is a result of an objectively correct reflection within
the human head of the phenomena and processes of nature, and is
proof of the fact that this reflection (within the limits of
what is revealed by practice) is objective, absolute, and
eternal truth.

What is the result? Every step in Engels’ argument, literally almost every phrase, every proposition, is constructed
entirely and exclusively upon the epistemology of dialectical
materialism, upon premises which stand out in striking contrast
to the Machian nonsense about bodies being complexes of
sensations, about “elements,” “the coincidence of sense-perceptions with the reality that exists
outside us,” etc., etc., etc. Without being the least deterred by this, the Machians abandon materialism and repeat
( à la Berman) the vulgar banalities about dialectics, and at the same time welcome with open arms
one of the applications of dialectical materialism!
They have taken their philosophy from an eclectic pauper’s
broth and are continuing to offer this hotchpotch to the
reader. They take a bit of agnosticism and a morsel of idealism
from Mach, add to it slices of dialectical materialism from
Marx, and call this hash a development of Marxism. They
imagine that if Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt, and all the authorities of theirs have not the slightest inkling of how
Hegel and Marx solved the problem (of freedom and necessity),
this is purely acci-dental: why, it was simply because they
overlooked a certain page in a certain book, and not because
these “authorities” were and are utter ignoramuses on the subject of the real progress made by philosophy
in the nineteenth century and because they were and are
philosophical obscurantists.

Here is the argument of one such obscurantist, the philosophy
professor-in-ordinary at the University of Vienna, Ernst Mach:

“ The correctness of the position of determinism or indeterminism cannot be demonstrated. Only a perfect science or
a provedly impossible science could decide this question. It is
a matter of the presuppositions which we bring ( man heranbringt ) to the consideration of things, depending upon
whether we ascribe to previous successes or failures of the
investigation a greater or lesser subjective weight ( subjektives Gewicht ). But during the investigation
every thinker is of necessity a theoretical determinist”
( Knowledge and Error , 2nd Germ. ed., pp. 282-83).

Is this not obscurantism, when pure theory is carefully
partitioned off from practice; when determinism is confined to
the field of “investigation,” while in the field of morality, social activity, and all fields other than
“investigation” the question is left to a “subjective” estimate? In my workroom, says the
learned pedant, I am a determinist; but that the philosopher
should seek to obtain an integral conception of the world based
on determinism, embracing both theory and practice—of that
there is no mention. Mach utters banalities because on the
theoretical problem of freedom and necessity he is entirely at
sea.

“. . . Every new discovery discloses the defects of our
knowledge, reveals a residue of dependencies hitherto un-heeded. . .” (p. 283). Excellent! And is this
“residue” the “thing-in-itself,” which our knowledge reflects ever more deeply? Not at all:
“. . . Thus, he also who in theory defends extreme determinism, must nevertheless in practice remain an
indeterminist. . .” (p. 283). And so things have been amicably
divided [2]

:

theory for the professors, practice for the theologians! Or, objectivism
( i.e. ., “shamefaced” materialism) in theory and the “subjective method in
sociology” [9] in practice. No wonder the Russian ideologists of philistinism, the
Narodniks, from Lessevich to Chernov, sympathise with this banal
philosophy. But it is very sad that would-be Marxists have been
captivated by such nonsense and are embarrassedly covering up
the more absurd of Mach’s conclusions.

But on the question of the will Mach is not content with
confusion and half-hearted agnosticism: he goes much further. “. . . Our sensation of hunger,” we read
in the Mechenik , “is not so essentially different from the affinity of sulphuric acid for zinc, and our will is
not so very different from the pressure of the stone on its
support. . . . We shall thus find ourselves [that is, if we hold
such a view] nearer to nature without it being necessary to
resolve ourselves into an incomprehensible nebula of atoms, or
to resolve nature into a system of phantoms” (French trans., p. 434). Thus there is no need for materialism (“nebula
of atoms” or electrons, i.e. ., the recognition of the objective reality of the material world), there is no
need for an idealism which would recognise the world as
“the otherness” of spirit; but there is a possible idealism which recognises the world as will ! We are
superior not only to materialism, but also to the idealism of a
Hegel; but we are not averse to coquetting with an idealism like
Schopenhauer’s! Our Machians, who assume an air of injured
innocence at every reminder of Mach’s kinship to philosophical idealism, preferred to keep silent on this
delicate question too. Yet it is difficult to find in philosophical writings an exposition of Mach’s views which
does not mention his tendency towards
Willensmetaphysik , i.e. ., voluntaristic idealism. This was pointed out by
J. Baumann, [3]

and in replying to him the Machian Kleinpeter does not take exception to this point,
but declares that Mach is, of course, “nearer to Kant and
Berkeley than to the metaphysical empiricism prevailing in
science” ( i.e. ., instinctive materialism; ibid ., Bd. 6, S. 87). This is also pointed out by
E. Becher, who remarks that if Mach in some places advocates
voluntaristic metaphysics, and in others renounces it, it only
testifies to the arbitrariness of his terminology; in fact,
Mach’s kinship to voluntarist metaphysics is beyond doubt. [4]

Even Lucka admits the admixture of this metaphysics ( i.e. ., idealism) to “phenomenalism”
( i.e. ., agnosticism). [5]

W. Wundt also points this
out. [6]

That Mach is a phenomenalist who is “not averse to voluntaristic idealism” is attested also in
Ueberweg-Heinze’s textbook on the history of modern philosophy. [7]

In short, Mach’s eclecticism and his tendency to idealism
are clear to everyone except perhaps the Russian Machians.

---
Notes:
[1] THIS FOOTNOTE has been moved into BODY OF DOCUMENT.

[2]
Mach in the Mechanik says:
“Religious opinions are people’s strictly private affair as long as they do not obtrude them on
others and do not apply them to things which belong to another
sphere” (French trans., p. 434).
— Lenin

[3]
Archiv für systemetische Philosophie , 1898, II, Bd, IV, S. 63, article on
Mach’s philosophical views.
— Lenin

[4]
Erich Becher, “The
Philosophical Views of Ernst Mach,” The Philosophical Review , Vol. XIV, 5, 1905, pp. 536, 546, 547, 548.
— Lenin

[5]
E. Lucka,
“ Das Erkenntnisproblem und Machs ‘Analyse der Empfindungen ’”
[ The Problem of Knowledge and Mach’s “ Analysis of Sensations "], in Kantstudien , Bd. VIII, 1903, S. 400.
— Lenin

[6]
Systematische Philosophie

[ Systeznatic Philosophy ], Leipzig, 1907,
S. 131.
— Lenin

[7]
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie

[ Outline of the History of Philosophy ], Bd. IV, 9. Aufl., Berlin, 1903,
S. 250.
— Lenin

[10]
Instead of the words “provokes not a smile, but disgust”, the
first edition of the book had “provokes more than a smile”. After he had read the proofs Lenin asked
A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova to alter the phrase in the text or
indicate this in the errata. Lenin ’s correction was printed in
a list of errata appended to the first edition.

[8]
See F, Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1959, p. 157.

[9]

“ The subjective method in sociology—an anti-scientific idealist approach to historical processes which
refuses to acknowledge objective laws of social development,
reducing them to the arbitrary actions of “outstanding personalities”. In the thirties and forties of the nineteenth
century, adherents of the subjectivist school in sociology were
the Young 1-legelians Bruno Bacer, David Strauss, Max Sthner and
others who declared the people to be an “uncritical mass” that
follows “critically thinking personalities”. K. Marx and
F. Engels in the Holy Family, the Cernoors Ideology and other works made a thorough and profound
criticism of the views of the Young Hegelians. In Flussia in the
second half of the nineteenth century re resentatives of the
subjective method in sociology were the liberal
Narodniks (P. L. Layroy, N. K. Mikhailovshy and others), who
denied the objective nature of the laws of social development
and reduced history to the actions of individual heroes,
’outstanding personalities ".

Marxism-Leninism exposed the fallacy of the subjective-idealist
trend in sociology and created’ a genuinely scientific, integral
theory of social development, of the decisive part played by the
masses in history and of the significance of the activities of
individuals.