V. I.

Lenin

MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy ( Chapter Three: The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism and of Empirio-Criticism. III )

3. Causality And Necessity In Nature

The question of causality is particularly important in determining the philosophical line of any new “ism,”
and we must therefore dwell on it in some detail.

Let us begin with an exposition of the materialist theory of
knowledge on this point. L. Feuerbach’s views are expounded with particular clarity in his reply to R. Haym
already referred to.

‘ Nature and human reason,’ says Haym, ‘are for him (Feuerbach) completely divorced, and between them a gulf is
formed which cannot be spanned from one side or the other.’ Haym grounds this reproach on § 48 of my
Essence of Religion where it is said that ‘nature may be conceived only through nature itself, that its necessity
is neither human nor logical, neither metaphysical nor mathematical, that nature alone is the being to which it is
impossible to apply any human measure, although we compare and
give names to its phenomena, in order to make them comprehensible to us, and in general apply human expressions and
conceptions to them, as for example: order, purpose, law; and
are obliged to do so because of the character of our language.’ What does this mean? Does it mean that there is
no order in nature, so that, for example, autumn may be
succeeded by summer, spring by winter, winter by autumn? That
there is no purpose, so that, for example, there is no co-ordination between the lungs and the air, between light and
the eye, between sound and the ear? That there is no law, so
that, for example, the earth may move now in an ellipse, now in
a circle, that it may revolve around the sun now in a year, now
in a quarter of an hour? What nonsense! What then is meant by
this passage? Nothing more than to distinguish between that
which belongs to nature and that which be longs to man; it does
not assert that there is actually nothing in nature corresponding to the words or ideas of order, purpose, law. All
that it does is to deny the identity between thought and being;
it denies that they exist in nature exactly as they do in the
head or mind of man. Order, purpose, law are words used by man
to translate the acts of nature into his own language in order that he may understand them. These words are not devoid
of meaning or of objective content ( nicht sinn-, d. h. gegenstandslose Worte ); nevertheless, a distinction
must be made between the original and the translation. Order,
purpose, law in the human sense express something arbitrary.

“ From the contingency of order, purpose and law in nature,
theism expressly infers their arbitrary origin; it infers the existence of a being distinct from nature which
brings order, purpose, law into a nature that is in itself
( an sich ) chaotic ( dissolute ) and indifferent to all determination.

The reason of the theists . . . is reason contradictory to nature, reason absolutely devoid of
understanding of the essence of nature. The reason of the
theists splits nature into two beings—one material, and
the other formal or spiritual” ( Werke , VII. Band, 1903, S. 518-20).

Thus Feuerbach recognises objective law in nature and objective
causality, which are reflected only with approximate fidelity by
human ideas of order, law and so forth. With Feuerbach the
recognition of objective law in nature is inseparably connected
with the recognition of the objective reality of the external
world, of objects, bodies, things, reflected by our mind. Feuerbach’s views are consistently
materialistic. All other views, or rather, any other philosophical line on the question of causality, the denial of
objective law, causality and necessity in nature, are justly
regarded by Feuerbach as belonging to the fideist trend. For it
is, indeed, clear that the subjectivist line on the question of
causality, the deduction of the order and necessity of nature
not from the external objective world, but from consciousness,
reason, logic, and so forth, not only cuts human reason off from
nature, not only opposes the former to the latter, but makes
nature a part of reason, instead of regarding reason as
a part of nature. The subjectivist line on the ques-tion of
causality is philosophical idealism (varieties of which are the
theories of causality of Hume and Kant), i.e. ., fideism, more or less weakened and diluted. The recognition of
objective law in nature and the recognition that this law is
reflected with approximate fidelity in the mind of man is
materialism.

As regards Engels, he had, if I am not mistaken, no occasion to
contrast his materialist view with other trends on the particular question of causality. He had no need to do so, since
he had definitely dissociated himself from all the agnostics on
the more fundamental question of the objective reality of the
external world in general. But to anyone who has read his
philosophical works at all attentively it must be clear that
Engels does not admit even the shadow of a doubt as to the
existence of objective law, causality and necessity in nature. We shall confine ourselves to a few examples. In the
first section of Anti-Dühring Engels says:
“In order to understand these details [of the general picture of the world phenomena], we must detach them from their
natural ( natürlich ) or historical connection and examine each one separately, its nature, special causes,
effects, etc.” (pp. 5-6). That this natural connection,
the connection between natural phenomena, exists objectively, is
obvious. Engels particularly emphasises the dialectical view of
cause and effect: “And we find, in like manner, that cause
and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their
application to individual cases, but as soon as we consider the
individual cases in their general connection with the universe
as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded
when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which
causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what
is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and
vice versa ” (p. 8). Hence, the human conception of cause and effect always somewhat simplifies the objective
connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only
approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect of a
single world process. If we find that the laws of thought
correspond with the laws of nature, says Engels, this becomes
quite conceivable when we take into account that reason and
consciousness are “products of the human brain and that
man himself is a product of nature.” Of course, “the products of the human brain, being in the last
analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of
nature’s interconnections ( Naturzusammenhang ) but are in correspondence with them”
(p. 22). [5] There is no doubt that there exists a natural, objective interconnection
between the phenomena of the world. Engels constantly speaks of
the “laws of nature,” of the “necessities of nature” ( Naturnotwendigkeiten ), without
considering it necessary to explain the generally known
propositions of materialism.

In Ludwig Feuerbach also we read that “the general laws of motion—both of the external world and of
human thought—[are] two sets of laws which are identical
in substance but differ in their expression in so far as the
human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also
up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert
themselves unconsciously in the form of external necessity in
the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents” (p. 38). And Engels reproaches the old natural philosophy for
having

replaced “the real but as yet unknown interconnections” (of the phenomena of nature) by
“ideal and imaginary ones” (p. 42). [6]
Engels’ recognition of objective law, causality and necessity in nature is absolutely clear, as is his emphasis on
the relative character of our, i.e ., man’s approximate reflections of this law in various concepts.

Passing to Joseph Dietzgen, we must first note one of the
innumerable distortions committed by our Machians. One of the
authors of the Studies “ in” the Philosophy of Marxism , Mr. Helfond, tells us: “The
basic points of Dietzgen’s world outlook may be summarised
in the following propositions: . . . (9) The causal dependence
which we ascribe to things is in reality not contained in the
things themselves” (p. 248). This is sheer nonsense . Mr. Helfond, whose own views represent a
veritable hash of materialism and agnosticism, has outrageously falsified J. Dietzgen. Of course, we can find
plenty of confusion, inexactnesses and errors in Dietzgen, such
as gladden the hearts of the Machians and oblige materialists to
regard Dietzgen as a philosopher who is not entirely consistent. But to attribute to the materialist J. Dietzgen a
direct denial of the materialist view of causality—only a
Helfond, only the Russian Machians are capable of that.

“ Objective scientific knowledge,” says Dietzgen in his The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind
(German ed. 1903), “seeks for causes not by faith or speculation, but by experience and induction, not a priori , but a posteriori . Natural science looks
for causes not outside or back of phenomena, but within or by
means of them” (pp. 94-95). “Causes are the products of the faculty of thought. They are, however, not its
pure products, but are produced by it in conjunction with sense
material. This sense material gives the causes thus derived
their objective existence. Just as we demand that a truth should
be the truth of an objective phenomenon, so we demand that a
cause should be real, that it should be the cause of some
objective effect” (pp. 98-99). “The cause of the thing is its connection” (p. 100).

It is clear from this that Mr. Helfond has made a statement
which is directly contrary to fact . The world outlook of materialism expounded by J. Dietzgen recognises that
“the causal dependence” is contained “in the things themselves.”

It was necessary for the Machian hash that Mr. Helfond should confuse the materialist
line with the idealist line on the question of causality.

Let us now proceed to the latter line.

A clear statement of the starting point of Avenarius’ philosophy on this question is to be found in his first work,
Philosophie als Denken der Welt gemäss dem Prinzip des kleinsten Kraftmasses . In § 81 we read: “Just as
we do not experience ( erfahren ) force as causing motion, so we do not experience the necessity for any
motion. . . . All we experience ( erfahren ) is that the
one follows the other.” This is the Humean standpoint in
its purest form: sensation, experience tell us nothing of any
necessity. A philosopher who asserts (on the principle of
“the economy of thought") that only sensation exists could
not have come to any other conclusion. “Since the idea of
causality ,” we read further, “demands force and necessity or constraint as integral parts of the
effect, so it falls together with the latter” (§
82). “Necessity therefore expresses a particular degree of
probability with which the effect is, or may be, expected”
(§ 83, thesis).

This is outspoken subjectivism on the question of causality. And
if one is at all consistent one cannot come to any other
conclusion unless one recognises objective reality as the source
of our sensations.

Let us turn to Mach. In a special chapter, “Causality and
Explanation” ( Wärmelehre , 2. Auflage, 1900,
S. 432-39), we read: “The Humean criticism (of the
conception of causality) nevertheless retains its validity.” Kant and Hume (Mach does not trouble to deal
with other philosophers) solve the problem of causality
differently. “We prefer” Hume’s solution. “Apart from logical necessity
[Mach’s italics] no other necessity, for instance physical
necessity, exists.” This is exactly the view which was so
vigorously combated by Feuerbach. It never even occurs to Mach
to deny his kinship with Hume. Only the Russian Machians could
go so far as to assert that Hume’s agnosticism could be
“combined” with Marx’s and Engels’ materialism. In Mach’s Mechanik , we read:
“In nature there is neither cause nor effect” (S. 474, 3. Auflage, 1897). “I have repeatedly
demonstrated that all forms of the law of causality spring from
subjective motives ( Trieben ) and that there is no necessity for nature to correspond with them” (p. 495).

We must here note that our Russian Machians with amazing
naïveté replace the question of the materialist or idealist trend of all arguments on the law of causality by the
question of one or another formulation of this law. They
believed the German empirio-critical professors that merely to
say “functional correlation” was to make a discovery in “recent positivism” and to release one
from the “fetishism” of expressions like “necessity,” “law,” and so forth. This
of course is utterly absurd, and Wundt was fully justified in
ridiculing such a change of words (in the article, quoted above, in Philosophische Studien , S. 383, 388),
which in fact changes nothing. Mach himself speaks of “all
forms” of the law of causality and in his Knowledge and Error (2. Auflage, S. 278) makes the self-evident
reservation that the concept function can express the “dependence of elements” more precisely only when
the possibility is achieved of expressing the results of
investigation in measurable quantities, which even in sciences like chemistry has only partly been
achieved. Apparently, in the opinion of our Machians, who are so
credulous as to professorial discoveries, Feuerbach (not to
mention Engels) did not know that the concepts order, law, and
so forth, can under certain conditions be expressed as a
mathematically defined functional relation!

The really important epistemological question that divides the
philosophical trends is not the degree of precision attained by
our descriptions of causal connections, or whether these
descriptions can be expressed in exact mathematical formulas,
but whether the source of our knowledge of these connections is
objective natural law or properties of our mind, its innate
faculty of apprehending certain a priori truths, and so
forth. This is what so irrevocably divides the materialists
Feuerbach, Marx and Engels from the agnostics (Humeans)
Avenarius and Mach.

In certain parts of his works, Mach, whom it would be a sin to
accuse of consistency, frequently “forgets” his agreement with Hume and his own subjectivist theory of causality
and argues “simply” as a natural scientist, i.e. ., from the instinctive materialist standpoint. For
instance, in his

Mechanik , we read of “the uniformity which nature teaches us to find in its
phenomena” (French ed., p. 182). But if we do find uniformity in the phenomena of nature, does this mean
that uniformity exists objectively outside our mind? No. On the
question of the uniformity of nature Mach also delivers himself
thus: “The power that prompts us to complete in thought
facts only partially observed is the power of association. It is
greatly strengthened by repetition. It then appears to us to be
a power which is independent of our will and of individual
facts, a power which directs thoughts and [Mach’s italics] facts, which keeps both in mutual correspondence as a
law governing both. That we consider ourselves capable of making
predictions with the help of such a law only [!] proves that
there is sufficient uniformity in our environment, but it does
not prove the necessity of the success of our predictions”
( Wärmelehre , S. 383).

It follows that we may and ought to look for a necessity
apart from the uniformity of our environment, i.e. ., of nature! Where to look for it is the secret of
idealist philosophy which is afraid to recognise man’s perceptive faculty as a simple reflection of nature. In his last
work, Knowledge and Error Mach even defines a law of nature as a “limitation of expectation”
(2. Auflage, S. 450 ff.)! Solipsism claims its own.

Let us examine the position of other writers of the same
philosophical trend. The Englishman, Karl Pearson, expresses
himself with characteristic precision ( The Grammar of Science , 2nd ed.): “The laws of science are products
of the human mind rather than factors of the external world” (p. 36). “Those, whether poets or
materialists, who do homage to nature, as the sovereign of man,
too often forget that the order and complexity they admire are
at least as much a product of man’s perceptive and reasoning faculties as are their own memories and
thoughts” (p. 185). “The comprehensive character of natural law is due to the ingenuity of the human mind”
( ibid .). “ Man is the maker of natural law ,” it is stated in Chapter III, §
4. “There is more meaning in the statement that man gives
laws to nature than in its converse that nature gives laws to
man,” although the worthy professor is regretfully obliged to admit, the latter (materialist)

view is “unfortunately far too common today” (p. 87). In
the fourth chapter, which is devoted to the question of
causality, Pearson formulates the following thesis (§ 11): “ The necessity lies in the world of conceptions and not in the world of perceptions .” It
should be noted that for Pearson perceptions or sense-impressions are the reality existing outside us. “In
the uniformity with which sequences of perception are repeated
(the routine of perceptions) there is also no inherent necessity, but it is a necessary condition for the existence of
thinking beings that there should be a routine in the perceptions. The necessity thus lies in the nature of the
thinking being and not in the perceptions themselves; thus it is
conceivably a product of the perceptive faculty (p. 139)

Our Machian, with whom Mach himself frequently expresses
complete solidarity, thus arrives safely and soundly at pure
Kantian idealism: it is man who dictates laws to nature and not
nature that dictates laws to man! The important thing is not the
repetition of Kant’s doctrine of apriorism—which does not define the idealist line in philosophy as such, but
only a particular formulation of this line—but the fact
that reason, mind, consciousness are here primary, and nature
secondary. It is not reason that is a part of nature, one of its
highest products, the reflection of its processes, but nature
that is a part of reason, which thereby is stretched from the
ordinary, simple human reason known to us all to a “stupendous,” as Dietzgen puts it, mysterious,
divine reason. The Kantian-Machian formula, that “man gives laws to nature,” is a fideist formula. If our
Machians stare wide-eyed on reading Engels’ statement that
the fundamental characteristic of materialism is the acceptance
of nature and not spirit as primary, it only shows how incapable
they are of distinguishing the really important philosophical
trends from the mock erudition and sage jargon of the professors.

J. Petzoldt, who in his two-volume work analysed and developed
Avenarius, may serve as an excellent example of reactionary
Machian scholasticism. “Even to this day,” says he, “one hundred and fifty years after Hume, substantiality
and causality paralyse the daring of the thinker” ( Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience ,
Bd. I, S. 31). It goes without saying that those who are most “daring” are the solipsists who discovered
sensation without organic matter, thought without brain, nature
without objective law! “And the last formulation of causality, which we have not yet mentioned, necessity, or
necessity in nature , contains something vague and mystical"—(the idea of “fetishism,”
“anthropomorphism,” etc.) (pp. 32, 34). Oh, the poor mystics, Feuerbach, Marx and Engels! They have been talking
all the time of necessity in nature, and have even been calling
those who hold the Humean position theoretical reactionaries!
Petzoldt rises above all “anthropomorphism.” He has discovered the great “ law of unique determination ,” which eliminates every obscurity,
every trace of “fetishism,” etc., etc., etc. For example, the parallelogram of forces (p. 35). This cannot be
“proven"; it must be accepted as a “fact of experience.” It cannot be conceded that a body under like
impulses will move in different ways. “We cannot concede
nature such indefiniteness and arbitrariness; we must demand
from it definiteness and law” (p. 35). Well, well! We demand of nature obedience to law. The bourgeoisie demands
reaction of its professors. “Our thought demands definiteness from nature, and nature always conforms to this
demand; we shall even see that in a certain sense it is
compelled to conform to it” (p. 36). Why, having received
an impulse in the direction of the line AB, does a body move
towards C and not towards D or F, etc.?

“ Why does nature not choose any of the countless other
directions?” (p. 37). Because that would be “multiple determination,” and the great
empirio-critical discovery of Joseph Petzoldt demands unique determination .

The “empirio-criticists” fill scores of pages with such unutterable trash!

“. . . We have remarked more than once that our thesis does not derive its force from a sum of separate experiences,
but

that, on the contrary, we demand that nature should recognise its validity ( seine Geltung ). Indeed, even
before it becomes a law it has already become for us a principle
with which we approach reality, a postulate. It is valid, so to
speak, a priori , independently of all separate experiences. It would, indeed, be unbefitting for a philosophy
of pure experience to preach a priori truths and thus relapse into the most sterile metaphysics. Its apriorism can
only be a logical one, never a psychological, or metaphysical
one” (p. 40). Of course, if we call apriorism logical, then the reactionary nature of the idea disappears and it
becomes elevated to the level of “recent positivism"!

There can be no unique determination of psychical phenomena,
Petzoldt further teaches us; the role of imagination, the
significance of great inventions, etc., here create exceptions,
while the law of nature, or the law of spirit, tolerates
“no exceptions” (p. 65). We have before us a pure metaphysician, who has not the slightest inkling of the
relativity of the difference between the contingent and the
necessary.

I may, perhaps, be reminded—continues Petzoldt—of the motivation of historical events or of the development of
character in poetry. “If we examine the matter carefully
we shall find that there is no such unique determination. There
is not a single historical event or a single drama in which we
could not imagine the participants acting differently under
similar psychical conditions. . .” (p. 73). “Unique determination is not only absent in the realm of the psychical,
but we are also entitled to demand its absence from reality [Petzoldt’s italics]. Our doctrine is thus
elevated to the rank of a postulate , i.e. ., to the rank of a fact, which we regard as a necessary condition of
a much earlier experience, as its logical a priori ” (Petzoldt’s italics, p. 76).

And Petzoldt continues to operate with this “logical a priori ” in both volumes of his
Introduction , and in the booklet issued in 1906, The World Problem from the Positivist Standpoint . [1]

Here is a second instance of a noted empirio-criticist who has
imperceptibly slipped into Kantianism and who serves up the most
reactionary doctrines with a somewhat different sauce. And this
is not fortuitous, for at the very foundations of Mach’s
and Avenarius’ teachings on causality there lies an idealist falsehood, which no highflown talk of
“positivism” can cover up. The distinction between the Humean and the Kantian theories of causality is only a
secondary difference of opinion between agnostics who are
basically at one, viz ., in their denial of objective law in nature, and who thus inevitably condemn themselves to
idealist conclusions of one kind or another. A rather more
“scrupulous” empirio-criticist than J. Petzoldt, Rudolf Willy, who is ashamed of his kinship with the
immanentists, rejects, for example, Petzoldt’s whole theory of “unique determination” as leading to
nothing but “logical formalism.” But does Willy improve his position by disavowing Petzoldt? Not in the least,
for he disavows Kantian agnosticism solely for the sake of
Humean agnosticism. “We have known from the time of
Hume,” he writes, “that ‘necessity’ is a purely logical (not a ‘transcendental’)
characteristic ( Merkmal ), or, as I would rather say and
have already said, a purely verbal ( sprachlich )
characteristic” (R. Willy, Gegen die Schulweisheit , München, 1905, S. 91; cf. S. 173,
175).

The agnostic calls our materialist view of necessity “transcendental,” for from the standpoint of
Kantian and Humean “school wisdom,” which Willy does not reject but only furbishes up, any recognition of
objective reality given us in experience is an illicit “transcendence.”

Among the French writers of the philosophical trend we are
analysing, we find Henri Poincaré constantly straying into
this same path of agnosticism. Henri Poincaré is an eminent physicist but a poor philosopher, whose errors
Yushkevich, of course, declared to be the last word of recent
positivism, so “recent,” indeed, that it even required a new “ism,” viz .,
empirio-symbolism. For Poincaré (with whose views as a whole we shall deal in the chapter on the new physics), the laws
of nature are symbols, conventions, which man creates for the
sake of “ convenience .” “The only true objective reality is the internal harmony of the
world.” By “objective,” Poincaré means that which is generally regarded as valid, that which is
accepted by the majority of men, or by all [2]

;

that is to say, in a purely subjectivist manner he destroys objective
truth, as do all the Machians. And as regards “harmony,” he categorically declares in answer to
the question whether it exists outside of us —"undoubtedly, no.” It is perfectly obvious
that the new terms do not in the least change the ancient
philosophical position of agnosticism, for the essence of
Poincaré’s “original” theory amounts to a denial (although he is far from consistent) of objective
reality and of objective law in nature. It is, therefore,
perfectly natural that in contradistinction to the Russian
Machians, who accept new formulations of old errors as the
latest discoveries, the German Kantians greeted such views as a
conversion to their own views, i.e. ., to agnosticism, on a fundamental question of philosophy. “The French
mathematician Henri Poincaré,” we read in the work of the Kantian, Philipp Frank, “holds the point of view
that many of the most general laws of theoretical natural
science ( e . g ., the law of inertia, the law of the conservation of energy, etc.), of which it is so often
difficult to say whether they are of empirical or of a priori origin, are, in fact, neither one nor the other, but
are purely conventional propositions depending upon human
discretion. . . .” “Thus [exults the Kantian] the latest Naturphilosophie unexpectedly renews the
fundamental idea of critical idealism, namely, that experience
merely fills in a framework which man brings with him from
nature. . . ." [3]

We quote this example in order to give the reader a clear idea
of the degree of naïveté of our Yushkeviches, who take a “theory of symbolism” for something genuinely
new , whereas philosophers in the least versed in their
subject say plainly and explicitly: he has become converted to
the standpoint of critical idealism! For the essence of this
point of view does not necessarily lie in the repetition of
Kant’s formulations, but in the recognition of the fundamental idea common to both Hume and Kant,
viz ., the denial of objective law in nature and the deduction of particular “conditions of experience,”
particular principles, postulates and propositions from the subject , from human consciousness, and not from
nature. Engels was right when he said that it is not important
to which of the numerous schools of materialism or idealism a
particular philosopher belongs, but rather whether he takes
nature, the external world, matter in motion, or spirit, reason,
consciousness, etc., as primary.

Another characterisation of Machism on this question, in
contrast to the other philosophical lines, is given by the
expert Kantian, E. Lucka. On the question of causality “Mach entirely agrees with
Hume." [4] “P. Volkmann derives the necessity of thought from the
necessity of the processes of nature—a standpoint that, in
contradistinction to Mach and in agreement with Kant, recognises
the fact of necessity; but contrary to Kant, it seeks the source
of necessity not in thought, but in the processes of nature” (p. 424).

Volkmann is a physicist who writes fairly extensively on
epistemological questions, and who tends, as do the vast
majority of scientists, to materialism, albeit an inconsistent,
timid, and incoherent materialism. The recognition of necessity
in nature and the derivation from it of necessity in thought is
materialism. The derivation of necessity, causality, law, etc.,
from thought is idealism. The only inaccuracy in the passage
quoted is that a total denial of all necessity is attributed to
Mach. We have already seen that this is not true either of Mach
or of the empirio-critical trend generally, which, having
definitely departed from materialism, is inevitably sliding into
idealism.

It remains for us to say a few words about the Russian Machians
in particular. They would like to be Marxists; they have all
“read” Engels’ decisive demarcation of materialism from the Humean trend; they could not have failed to
learn both from Mach himself and from everybody in the least
acquainted with his philosophy that Mach and Avenarius follow
the line of Hume. Yet they are all careful not to say a single word about Humism and materialism on the question of
causality! Their confusion is utter. Let us give a few examples. Mr. P. Yushkevich preaches the “new”
empirio-symbolism. The “sensations of blue, hard, etc.—these supposed data of pure experience” and
“the creations supposedly of pure reason, such as a chimera or a chess game"—all these are
“empirio-symbols” ( Studies , etc ., p. 179). “Knowledge is empirio-symbolic,
and as it develops leads to empirio-symbols of a greatet degree
of symbolisation. . . . The so-called laws of nature . . . are
these empirio-symbols. . .” ( ibid .). “The so-called true reality, being in itself, is that infinite [a
terribly learned fellow, this Mr. Yushkevich!] ultimate system
of symbols to which all our knowledge is striving” (p. 188). “The stream of experience . . . which lies at
the foundation of our knowledge is . . . irrational
. . . illogical” (pp. 187, 194). Energy “is just as little a thing, a substance, as time, space, mass and the other
fundamental concepts of science: energy is a constancy, an
empirio-symbol, like other empirio-symbols that for a time
satisfy the fundamental human need of introducing reason, Logos,
into the irrational stream of experience” (p. 209).

Clad like a harlequin in a garish motley of shreds of the
“latest” terminology, there stands before us a subjective idealist, for whom the external world, nature and its
laws are all symbols of our knowledge. The stream of experience
is devoid of reason, order and law: our knowledge brings reason
into it. The celestial bodies are symbols of human knowledge,
and so is the earth. If science teaches us that the earth
existed long before it was possible for man and organic matter
to have appeared, we, you see, have changed all that! The order
of the motion of the planets is brought about by us , it
is a product of our knowledge. And sensing that human reason is
being inflated by such a philosophy into the author and founder
of nature, Mr. Yushkevich puts alongside of reason the word
Logos , that is, reason in the abstract, not reason, but
Reason, not a function of the human brain, but something
existing prior to any brain, something divine. The last word of
“recent positivism” is that old formula of fideism which Feuerbach had already exposed.

Let us take A. Bogdanov. In 1899, when he was still a semi-materialist and had only just begun to go astray under the
influence of a very great chemist and very muddled philosopher,
Wilhelm Ostwald, he wrote: “The general causal connection
of phenomena is the last and best child of human knowledge; it
is the universal law, the highest of those laws which, to
express it in the words of a philosopher, human reason dictates
to nature” ( Fundamental Elements , etc .,
p. 41).

Allah alone knows from what source Bogdanov took this reference. But the fact is that “the words of a
philosopher” trustingly repeated by the “Marxist"—are the words of Kant. An unpleasant
event! And all the more unpleasant in that it cannot even be
explained by the “mere” influence of Ostwald.

In 1904, having already managed to discard both natural-historical materialism and Ostwald, Bogdanov wrote:
“. . . Modern positivism regards the law of causality only
as a means of cognitively connecting phenomena into a continuous
series, only as a form of co-ordinating experience” ( From the Psychology of Society , p. 207). Bogdanov
either did not know, or would not admit, that this modern
positivism is agnosticism and that it denies the objective
necessity of nature, which existed prior to, and outside of,
“knowledge” and man. He accepted on faith what the
German professors called “modern positivism.”
Finally, in 1905, having passed through all the previous stages
and the stage of empirio-criticism, and being already in the
stage of “empirio-monism,” Bogdanov wrote:
“Laws do not belong to the sphere of experience . . . they
are not given in it, but are created by thought as a means of
organising experience, of harmoniously co-ordinating it into a
symmetrical whole” ( Empirio-Monism , I,
p. 40). “Laws are abstractions of knowledge; and physical
laws possess physical properties just as little as psychological
laws possess psychical properties” ( ibid .).

And so, the law that winter succeeds autumn and the spring
winter is not given us in experience but is created by thought
as a means of organising, harmonising, co-ordinating. . . what
with what, Comrade Bogdanov?

“ Empirio-monism is possible only because knowledge actively harmonises experience, eliminating its infinite
contradictions, creating for it universal organising forms,
replacing the primeval chaotic world of elements by a derivative, ordered world of relations” (p. 57). That is
not true. The idea that knowledge can “create” universal forms, replace the primeval chaos by order, etc., is
the idea of idealist philosophy. The world is matter moving in
conformity to law, and our knowledge, being the highest product
of nature, is in a position only to reflect this conformity to law.

In brief, our Machians, blindly believing the “recent” reactionary professors, repeat the
mistakes of Kantian and Humean agnosticism on the question of
causality and fail to notice either that these doctrines are in
absolute contradiction to Marxism, i.e. ., materialism,
or that they themselves are rolling down an inclined plane
towards idealism.

---
Notes:
[1]

J. Petzoldt, Das Weltproblem von positivistischein Standpunkte aus , Leipzig, 1906, S. 130: “Also from
the empirical standpoint there can be a logical a priori ; causality is the logical a priori of the
experienced ( erfahrungsmässige ) permanence of our environment.”
— Lenin

[2]
Henri Poincaré, La valeur de la science

[ The Value of Science ], Paris, 1905, pp. 7, 9. There is a Russian translation.
— Lenin

[3]
Annalen der Naturphilosophie , [7] VI. B., 1907, S. 443, 447.
— Lenin

[4]
E. Lucka, Das Erkenntnisproblem und Machs “ Analyse der Empfindungen ”

[ The Problem of Knowledge and Mach’s “ Analysis of Sensations "], in
Kantstudien , VIII. Bd.. S. 409.
— Lenin

[5]
See F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscov.’, 1959, pp. 33, 36,
55.

[6]
See K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow,
1958, pp. 387, 389. p.

[7]
Annlen der Neturphilosophie (Annals of Natural Philosophy)— a journal of a positivist tendency,
published by Wilhelm Ostwald in Leipzig from 1901 to 1921. Its
contributors included Ernst Mach, Paul Volkmann and others. 60. See F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1959,
p. 135. 61. See F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1959,
p. 76.