Avenarius's doctrine of principial coordination is expounded in his *Human Conception of the World* and in his *Remarks*. The latter were written subsequently, and Avenarius emphasizes here that he is setting forth, admittedly in a somewhat different manner, nothing different from the *Critique of Pure Experience* and the *Human Conception of the World*, but the very same thing ("Bemerk."[41] 1894, p. 137 in the cited journal). The essence of this doctrine is the assertion of an "indissoluble (unauflösliche) coordination" (i.e., a correlative connection) of "our I (des Ich) and the environment" (p. 146). "Philosophically expressed," says Avenarius here, "one may say: 'I and not-I'". Both—both our I and the environment—we "always find together" (immer ein Zusammen-Vorgefundenes). "No complete description of the given (or found by us: des Vorgefundenen) can contain 'environment' without some I (ohne ein Ich) whose environment this environment is—at least that I which describes this found thing" (or given: das Vorgefundene, p. 146). The I is called the central member of coordination, the environment the counter-member (Gegenglied). (See *The Human Conception of the World*, 2nd ed., 1905, pp. 83–84, § 148 et seq.)

Avenarius claims that through this doctrine he recognizes the entire value of the so-called naive realism, i.e., the ordinary, non-philosophical, naive view of all people who do not trouble themselves with the question of whether they themselves exist and whether the environment, the external world exists. Mach, expressing his solidarity with Avenarius, also endeavors to present himself as a defender of "naive realism" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 39). Russian Machists, without exception, have believed Mach and Avenarius that this is indeed a defense of "naive realism": the I is recognized, the environment is recognized—what more could you want?

To sort out on whose side there exists here the greatest degree of actual naiveté, let us begin somewhat from afar. Here is a popular conversation between a certain philosopher and a reader:

"Reader: There must exist a system of things (according to conventional philosophy), and from things consciousness must be derived."

"Philosopher: Now you are speaking after the professional philosophers... and not from the point of view of sound human Understanding and actual consciousness...

Tell me and think well before you answer: does any thing appear in you or before you otherwise than together with consciousness of that thing or through consciousness of it?..."

"Reader: If I have thought the matter through carefully, I must agree with you."

"Philosopher: Now you are speaking from yourself, from your soul, from your soul. Do not strive, then, to jump out of yourself, to embrace more than you can embrace (or grasp), namely: consciousness and (italics of the philosopher) thing, thing and consciousness; or more precisely: neither one nor the other separately, but that which only subsequently decomposes into one and the other, that which appears absolutely subjective-objective and objective-subjective."

Here you have the entire essence of empirio-critical principial coordination, the latest defense of "naive realism" by the latest positivism! The idea of "indissoluble" coordination is set forth here with complete clarity and precisely from the point of view as if this were a genuine defense of the ordinary human outlook, not distorted by the sophistry of "professional philosophers." And yet, the cited conversation is taken from a work published in 1801 and written by the classical representative of objective idealism—Johann Gottlieb Fichte[42].

There is nothing else in the doctrine of Mach and Avenarius under discussion but a paraphrase of subjective idealism. Their pretense that they have risen above materialism and idealism, that they have eliminated the opposition between the point of view proceeding from thing to consciousness and the opposite point of view—this is an empty pretense of rejuvenated Fichteanist. Fichte too imagines that he has "indissolubly" linked "I" and "environment," consciousness and thing, that he has "solved" the question by reference to the fact that man cannot jump out of himself. In other words, Berkeley's argument is repeated: I sense only my sensations, I have no right to assume "objects in themselves" outside my sensation. The various modes of expression of Berkeley in 1710, Fichte in 1801, Avenarius in 1891–1894 do not in the slightest change the essence of the matter, i.e., the fundamental philosophical line of subjective idealism. The world is my sensation; the not-I is "posited" (created, produced) by our I; the thing is indissolubly bound to consciousness; the indissoluble coordination of our I and the environment is empirio-critical principial coordination;—this is all one and the same proposition, the same old rubbish with a somewhat retouched or repainted signboard.

The reference to "naive realism," allegedly defended by such philosophy, is sophistry of the cheapest sort. The "naive realism" of any healthy person, who has not been in a madhouse or in the school of idealist philosophers, consists in this: that things, the environment, the world exist independently of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our I and of man in general. The very experience (not in the Machist, but in the human sense of the word), which has created in us the firm conviction that there exist independently of us other people, and not merely complexes of my sensations of tall, short, yellow, hard, etc.,—this very experience creates our conviction that things, the world, the environment exist independently of us. Our sensations, our consciousness are merely an image of the external world, and it is self-evident that the image cannot exist without the imaged, but the imaged exists independently of the imaging. The "naive" conviction of mankind is consciously made by materialism the foundation of its theory of knowledge.

Is this evaluation of "principial coordination" the result of materialist prejudice against Machism? Not in the slightest. Professional philosophers, alien to any partiality toward materialism, even hating it and adopting one or another system of idealism, agree that Avenarius's principial coordination and Co. is subjective idealism. For example, Wundt, whose curious assessment was not understood by Mr. Yushkevich, directly states that Avenarius's theory, that it is impossible to have a complete description of the given or found without some I, without an observer or describer, is a "false confusion of the content of actual experience with reasoning about it." Natural science, says Wundt, abstracts entirely from any observer. "And such abstraction is possible only because the necessity of seeing (hinzudenken, literally—adding in thought) the individual who experiences the experience in every content of experience, this necessity accepted by empirio-critical philosophy in agreement with the immanent, generally, is an assumption empirically unfounded and flowing from a false confusion of the content of actual experience with reasoning about it" (cited article, p. 382). For the immanentists (Schuppe, Rehmke, Leclaire, Schubert-Soldern), themselves noting—as we shall see below—their warm sympathy for Avenarius, proceed precisely from this idea of the "indissoluble" connection of subject and object. And W. Wundt, before analyzing Avenarius, demonstrated at length that immanent philosophy is merely a "modification" of Berkeleyanism, that no matter how the immanentists disclaim Berkeley, in reality verbal differences should not obscure from us the "deeper content of philosophical doctrines," namely: Berkeleyanism or Fichteanism[43].

The English writer Norman Smith, analyzing Avenarius's *Philosophy of Pure Experience*, expounds this conclusion far more directly and decisively:

"Most of those acquainted with Avenarius's *Human Conception of the World*, probably agree that, however convincing his criticism (of idealism), the positive results of his work are entirely illusory. If we attempt to interpret his theory of experience as they wish to represent it, namely as genuinely realistic, then it escapes any clear exposition: all its significance is exhausted in the negation of the subjectivism which it is alleged to overthrow. But when we translate Avenarius's technical terms into more ordinary language, then we shall see where the real source of this mystification lies. Avenarius diverted attention from the weak points of his position by directing his main attack precisely at that weak point which is fatal to his own theory"[44]. "Throughout Avenarius's reasoning, the indefiniteness of the term 'experience' does good service to him. Now this term (experience) means the one who experiences; now it means that which is experienced; the latter meaning is emphasized when the discussion is of the nature of our I (of the self). These two meanings of the term 'experience' in practice coincide with his important division of absolute and relative consideration" (above I have indicated the significance of this division in Avenarius); "and these two points of view are not actually reconciled in his philosophy. For when he allows, as legitimate, the premise that experience is ideally complemented by thought" (a complete description of the environment is ideally complemented by thought of the observing I), "then he makes an assumption which he is unable to unite with his own assertion that nothing exists outside relation to our I (to the self). The ideal complementation of given reality, which is obtained from the decomposition of material bodies into elements inaccessible to our senses" (the reference is to material elements discovered by natural science, to atoms, electrons and the like, and not to those invented elements concocted by Mach and Avenarius), "or from the description of the earth at such times when not a single human being existed upon it,—this, strictly speaking, is not a complementation of experience, but a complementation of that which we experience. This complements only one of those links of coordination of which Avenarius said they are inseparable. It leads us to that which has never been experienced (has not been the object of experience, has not been experienced), but to that which never, in no way whatsoever, can be experienced by beings such as ourselves. But here precisely the ambiguity of the term: experience, comes to Avenarius's rescue. Avenarius reasons that thought is as truly (genuine) a form of experience as sensory perception, and thus he arrives back at the old time-worn argument of subjective idealism, namely, that thought and reality are inseparable because reality can be perceived only in thought, and thought presupposes the existence of the one who thinks. Thus, not some original and profound restoration of realism, but simply the restoration of subjective idealism in its crudest form—such is the final result of the positive reasoning of Avenarius" (p. 29).

Avenarius's mystification, wholly repeating the error of Fichte, is splendidly exposed here. The notorious elimination by means of the little word "experience" of the opposition between materialism (Smith wrongly says: realism) and idealism immediately proved to be a myth as soon as we began to pass to definite concrete questions. Such is the question of the existence of the earth before man, before any sentient being. We shall speak of this in detail presently. For now, let us note that the mask is torn from Avenarius, from his fictitious "realism," not only by N. Smith, an opponent of his theory, but also by the immanentist W. Schuppe, who warmly greeted the appearance of the *Human Conception of the World* as confirmation of naive realism[45]. The point is that W. Schuppe agrees entirely with such "realism," i.e., with such a mystification of materialism as Avenarius presented. On such "realism," wrote Schuppe to Avenarius, I have always laid claim with as much right as you, hochverehrter Herr College (most esteemed Mr. Colleague), for me, an immanentist, has been slandered as though I were a subjective idealist. "My concept of thinking...agrees excellently (verträgt sich vortrefflich) with yours, most esteemed Mr. Colleague, 'Theory of Pure Experience'" (p. 384). The "connection and indissolubility of the two members of coordination" is actually given only by our I (das Ich, i.e., the abstract, Fichtean, self-consciousness, thought severed from the brain). "That which you wanted to eliminate, that you silently presupposed," wrote Schuppe to Avenarius (p. 388). And it is difficult to say who tears the mask from the mystifier Avenarius more painfully—Smith with his direct and clear refutation, or Schuppe with his ecstatic review of Avenarius's concluding work. In philosophy—the kiss of Wilhelm Schuppe is no better than in politics the kiss of Peter Struve or Mr. Menshikov.

Likewise, O. Ewald, who praises Mach for not succumbing to materialism, says of principial coordination: "If we declare the correlativity of the central member and counter-member to be an epistemological necessity from which there can be no departure, then—no matter how loudly and large the word 'empirio-criticism' stands on the signboard—this means taking up a point of view which in no way differs from absolute idealism." (The term is incorrect; one should have said: subjective idealism, for Hegel's absolute idealism is reconciled with the existence of the earth, nature, the physical world without man, regarding nature merely as the "otherness" of the absolute idea.) "On the contrary, if one does not hold consistently to this coordination and grants the counter-members their independence, then all metaphysical possibilities at once come to the surface, especially in the direction of transcendental realism" (cited work, pp. 56–57).

By metaphysics and transcendental realism Mr. Friedländer, hiding under the pseudonym Ewald, means materialism. Himself defending one of the varieties of idealism, he is entirely in agreement with the Machists and with Kantians in that materialism is metaphysics, "from beginning to end the wildest metaphysics" (p. 134). As to the "transcensus" and metaphysicality of materialism—he is a fellow-thinker of Bazarov and all our Machists, and we shall have to speak of this separately hereafter. Here it is important to note once again how the empty scholastic pretense of transcending idealism and materialism actually evaporates, how the question is posed with inexorable uncompromingness. To "grant independence to the counter-members," this means (if we translate from the affected language of the grimacing Avenarius to simple human language) to regard nature, the external world as independent of human consciousness and sensation, and this is materialism. To build a theory of knowledge on the premise of the indissoluble connection of the object with human sensation ("complexes of sensations" = bodies; "elements of the world" identical in the psychical and the physical; Avenarius's coordination and the like) means inevitably to slide into idealism. Such is the simple and inevitable truth which, with some attention, one can easily discover beneath the heap of the most labored, deliberately obscuring and philosophy-repelling, quasi-scientific terminology of Avenarius, Schuppe, Ewald and others.

The "reconciliation" of Avenarius's theory with "naive realism" eventually awakened doubts even in his pupils. R. Willy says, for example, that the usual assertion that Avenarius came to "naive realism" should be understood cum grano salis[46]. "As a dogma, naive realism would be nothing other than faith in things-in-themselves, existing outside man (außerpersönliche), in their sensually-tangible form"[47]. In other words: the only theory of knowledge actually created at present, not fictive, in genuine agreement with "naive realism," is, in Willy's opinion, materialism! And Willy, of course, rejects materialism. But he is forced to recognize that Avenarius restores the unity of "experience," the unity of "I" and environment in the *Human Conception of the World* "by means of a series of complex and in part extremely artificial auxiliary and mediating concepts" (171). The *Human Conception of the World*, being a reaction against Avenarius's initial idealism, "bears entirely the character of a compromise (eines Ausgleiches) between the naive realism of common sense and the epistemological idealism of school philosophy. But that such a compromise could restore the unity and integrity of experience (Willy says: Grunderfahrung, i.e., fundamental experience; yet another new little word!), this I would not assert" (170).

A valuable admission! Avenarius's "experience" failed to reconcile idealism with materialism. Willy apparently rejects school philosophy of experience, in order to replace it with a thrice-confused philosophy of "fundamental" experience...