V. I.

Lenin

The Fifth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

April 30-May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907

3

Speech on the Report on the Activities of the Duma
Group

May 8 (21)

Ishould like once again to bring the discussion back to an appraisal, from the
standpoint of principle, of the policy of the Duma group. Comrade Tsereteli
stated: “Even though we may have made blunders, we were not guilty of
political vacillation”. I believe that it would be absolutely wrong to
blame a young Duma group, which is only just beginning to function, for its
mistakes. But the fact of the matter is that there was vacillation in
the very policy of the group. And we must frankly admit this vacillation, and
make it our business to get rid of it, not for the purpose of condemning
individuals, but in order to educate the proletarian party as a whole.

Comrade Tsereteli referred to the history of Europe. “The year ’48,”
he said, “not only taught us that the conditions for socialism were not
yet ripe, but also that it is impossible to fight for freedom without some sort
of alliance with bourgeois democracy.” Comrade Tsereteli’s argument
is revisionism of the first water. On the contrary, both the revolution of 1848
and subsequent historical experience have taught international Social-Democracy
the very opposite, namely, that bourgeois democracy takes its stand more and
more against the proletariat, that the fight for freedom is waged consistently
only where it is led by the proletariat. The year 1848 does not teach us to make
alliances with bourgeois democrats, but rather the need to free the least
developed sections of the masses from the influence of bourgeois democracy,
which is incapable of fighting even for democracy. When Comrade Tsereteli referred to the experience of 1848 in the
spirit of Bernsteinism, he was demonstrating the very revisionism that
Plekhanov had without good reason assured us was weak in our Party. Comrade
Tsereteli’s statement about the food relief commission was also typical of
his wavering on matters of principle. “We have not sufficiently stressed
the legality of our proposal to investigate the case on the
spot,” stated Tsereteli. “We were distracted by general discussions
and missed the chance to convince others with arguments on the legality of our
plan. The next time we shall correct this error.”

Thispresentation of the question throws vivid light on the whole shakiness of
our group’s position. Just imagine — people are saddened by the
insufficiency of their reasoning in favour of legality! Can they really not see
that the point at issue is not one of reasons for or references to legality, or
“ convincing ” the Cadets or anyone else? Surely it must be
clear to them that by the very nature of things , the government could
not and would not have allowed investigation on the spot, since it saw in it
(and justly so) a direct appeal to the masses.

Nomatter how many references to legality we might make, it would not change the
essence of things. And in stead of looking down—convincing the masses of
the people, showing them the truth—Tsereteli looks up, desiring to
convince the liberals, to attract them with legality.... That is real bourgeois
parliamentarianism. And the fruitlessness of such petty, miserly, wretched
playing at politics strikes one immediately, for it is clear that neither the
Mensheviks nor the Cadets can budge Stolypin from his policy, by any
parliamentary ruses. Isolation from the masses is a self-evident, fact;
advantages to be derived from legal persuasion of the Stolypins and the Cadets
are but idle dreams of an idle intellectual.

Isee the same vain opportunist efforts in the negotiations with the Narodowci;
reference to Bebel as a defence of them is most feeble. Bebel, they say, stated:
If the cause requires it, we will have dealings with the devil’s own
grandmother. Bebel was right, comrades: if the cause requires it , then,
of course, you may have dealings even with the devil’s grandmother. But
can you tell me for what cause your dealings with the Narodowci were necessary? For none whatever. The advantages of
such relations are nil. And so it seems that what Bebel said was correct,
but you understand him incorrectly.

Allthis going to the Narodowci, votes for Golovin, attempts to delete the
demand for confiscation are simply component parts of a single incorrect
line. They are not manifestations of inexperience, but manifestations of
political vacillation . And from this point of view inviting Mr
Prokopovich was likewise no trifle. We have been told here that Mr. Prokopovich
is not present and that without him we cannot condemn his action. This is merely
sending us from Pontius to Pilate. At the St. Petersburg conference we were told
that we should put it off until the congress, that we could not get to the
bottom of it without a congress. Now at the congress we are told that we cannot
do anything without Prokopovich—let us put it off and refer it to the
St. Petersburg organisation. That is sophistry.

Prokopovichis a man of letters whose works are known to everyone. He is the
type of bourgeois intellectual who has penetrated into our Party with definite,
opportunist aims. His joining the Party in the Railway District was sheer
hypocrisy. It was a screen for work in the Duma milieu . And our C.C. is
to blame for his having used such a screen. Our Duma group is to blame for
having made it easy for liberal writers collaborating with Tovarishch ,
who do not work in the Party and who are hostile in principle to the Party, to
enter our Party by the back door, making use of the Duma.

Cherevaninhas here defended the policy of the Duma group; granted the Cadets
are backward at present, that they are reactionary at present, he says. But that
is not for ever. There is no need to regard it as permanent. The Cadets are no
good in a period of decline, but they may be of use during a period of upsurge
when they will rapidly swing to the Left.

Thisis the usual Menshevik line of reasoning, only expressed with particular
directness and sharpness. As a result, its falsity becomes more obvious. Take
two major land marks of the revolution—October 1905, when the peak was
reached, and the spring of 1907, the period of greatest decline. Were the Cadets of any use to democracy in 1905? No. The Mensheviks
themselves admitted this in Nachalo . Witte is an agent of the stock
exchange, and Struve is Witte’s agent—that is what the Mensheviks
wrote at the time, and correctly so. At that time the Mensheviks agreed with us
that we should not support the Cadets, but expose them and lower their prestige
among the democrats.

Now,in the spring of 1907, once again you are all beginning to agree with us
that the Cadets are worthless democrats? And so it seems that the Cadets are no
good either in the period of upsurge or in the period of decline. Any historian
would call the interval between these periods a period of wavering, when even a
section of the Social-Democratic movement veered towards a petty-bourgeois
policy, when that section, vainly endeavouring to “support” the
Cadets, brought nothing but harm to the workers’ party, and in the end realised
its mistake.

Afew words about Trotsky. He spoke on behalf of the “Centre”, and
expressed the views of the Bund. He fulminated against us for introducing our
“unacceptable” resolution. He threatened an outright split, the
withdrawal of the Duma group, which is supposedly offended by our resolution. I
emphasise these words. I urge you to reread our resolution attentively.

Isit not monstrous to see something offensive in a calm acknowledgement of
mistakes, unaccompanied by any sharply expressed censure, to speak of a split in
connection with it? Does this not show the sickness in our Party, a fear of
admitting mistakes, a fear of criticising the Duma group?

Thevery possibility that the question can be presented in this way shows that
there is something non-partisan in our Party. This non-partisan something is the
Duma group’s relations with the Party. The Duma group must be more of a
Party group, must have closer connections with the Party, must be more
subordinate to all proletarian work. Then wailings about insults and threats of
a split will disappear.

When Trotsky stated: “Your unacceptable resolution prevents your right
ideas being put into effect,” I called out to him: “Give us
your resolution!” Trotsky replied: “No, first withdraw yours.”

Afine position indeed for the “Centre” to take, isn’t it?
Because of our (in Trotsky’s opinion) mistake (“tactlessness”), he punishes the whole Party, depriving it of
his “tactful” exposition of the very same principles! Why did
you not get your resolution passed, we shall be asked in the
localities. Because the Centre took umbrage at it, and in a huff refused to
set forth its own principles! ( Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre .) That is a position based not on principle, but on the
Centre’s lack of principle.

Wecame to the Congress with two tactical lines which have long been known to
the Party. It would be stupid and unworthy of a workers’ party to cover up
differences of opinion and conceal them. We must compare the two points of view
more clearly. We must express them in their application to all questions of our
policy. We must sum up our Party experience clearly. Only in this way shall we
be doing our duty and put an end to vacillation in the policy of the
proletariat. ( Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre .)

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