V. I.

Lenin

The Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (“Third All-Russian”) [1]

From a Newspaper Report

I

Report on the Tactics of the Social-Democratic Group in the Third State
Duma

Comrade Lenin proceeded from the premise that the objective aims of the Russian
revolution have not been achieved and that the period of reaction which has set
in imposes upon the proletariat the task of defending the cause of democracy and
the cause of the revolution more firmly than ever in face of the widespread
vacillation. Hence the view that the Duma should be used for the purposes of the
revolution, should be used mainly for promulgating the Party’s political
and socialist views and not for legislative “reforms”, which, in any
case, would mean supporting the counter-revolution and curtailing democracy in
every way.

In the words of Comrade Lenin, the “crux” of the Duma question must
lie in an explanation of the following three points:

(a) what is the class composition of the Duma?

(b) what should be and will be the attitude of the Duma centres towards the
revolution and democracy?

(c) what is the significance of Duma activity for the progress of the
Russian revolution?

On the first question, on the basis of an analysis of the Duma composition
(according to data on the party affiliations of the deputies), Lenin stressed
that the views of the famous so-called “opposition” could secure
endorsement in the Third Duma only on one condition, that no less than 87
Octobrists co-operated with the Cadets and the Left.

Cadets and the Left were short of 87 votes for obtaining a majority in the
voting on a Bill. Consequently, effective legislative activity in the Duma
was possible only if the bulk of the Octobrists participated in it. What
this kind of legislative activity would lead to and what disgrace
Social-Democracy would incur by such a link-up with the Octobrists were
all too obvious. This was not a matter of abstract principle. Speaking,
abstractly, one could and sometimes should support the representatives of
the big bourgeoisie. But in this case it was necessary to consider the
concrete conditions of development of the Russian bourgeois-democratic
revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie had long embarked on the path of
struggle against the revolution and of compromises with the autocracy. The
recent Cadet congress had finally stripped off all the fig-leaves with
which the Milyukovs and Co. had been covering them selves, and was an
important political event inasmuch as the Cadets had declared with cynical
frankness that they were going, into the Octobrist-Black-Hundred Duma to
legislate and that they would fight the “enemies on the
Left”. Thus, two possible majorities in the Duma—the
Octobrist-Black-Hundred and the Cadet-Octobrist—and both, in
different ways, would work towards tightening the screw of reaction: the
first, by trying to restore the autocracy, the second, by making deals with
the government and introducing illusory reforms that disguise the counter
revolutionary aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Social-Democracy could
not lend its support to legislative reforms, as this would be tantamount to
supporting the government , Octobrist, party. The way of
“reforms” on the present political basis and with the present
balance of forces would not mean improving the condition of the masses, or
expanding freedom, but bureaucratically regulating the non-freedom and
enslavement of the masses. Such, for example, were the Stolypin agrarian
reforms under

Article 87. [2] They were progressive in clearing the way for capitalism,
but it was the kind of progress that no Social-Democrat could bring himself
to support. The Mensheviks were harping on one string, namely, the class
interests of the bourgeoisie are bound to clash with those of the
autocracy! But there was not a grain of historic truth in this vulgar
would-be

Marxism. Did not Napoleon III and Bismarck succeed for a time in appeasing
the appetites of the big bourgeoisie? Did they not, by their
“reforms”, tighten the noose round the neck of the working people
for years to come? What grounds then were there for believing that the Russian
government, in its deal with the bourgeoisie, was likely to agree to any other
kind of reforms?

[ Proletary , No, 20, November 19, 1907]

2

Resolution on the Tactics of the Social-Democratic Group in the Third
State Duma

In pursuance of the resolution of the London Congress on the State Duma and on
non-proletarian parties, the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. deems it
necessary, in elaboration of these resolutions, to state the following:

(1) In the Third Duma, which is the outcome of the coup d’état of
June 3, there are two possible majorities: that of the Black-Hundreds-Octobrists and that
of the Octobrists Cadets. The first, expressing chiefly the interests of the
semi-feudal landlords, is counter-revolutionary and stands mainly for
protecting landlord interests and increased repression going to the length
of striving for complete restoration of the autocracy. The second majority,
expressing chiefly the interests of the big bourgeoisie, is likewise
definitely counter-revolutionary, but inclined to cover up its struggle
against the, revolution with certain illusory bureaucratic reforms; (2) such a situation in the Duma is extremely favourable to a double political
game being played by both the government and the Cadets. The government,
while intensifying repression and continuing its “conquest” of
Russia by military force, seeks to pose as a supporter of constitutional
reforms. The Cadets, while actually voting with the counter-revolutionary
Octobrists, seek to pose not only as an opposition, but as spokesmen of
democracy. Under these conditions the Social-Democrats have a particular
responsibility for ruthlessly exposing this game, laying bare before the
people both the oppression of the Black-Hundred landlords and the government
and the counter-revolutionary policy of the Cadets. Direct or indirect support for the Cadets by the
Social-Democrats—whether in the form of an Information Bureau with the
participation of the Cadets or by adapting our actions to their policy,
etc.—would now directly harm the cause of class education of the mass of
the workers and the cause of the revolution; (3) while upholding their socialist aims and criticising all the bourgeois
parties from this standpoint, the Social-Democrats, in their propaganda,
should give prominence to the task of making it clear to the broad masses
that the Third Duma fails completely to meet the interests and demands of
the people, and in this connection conduct widespread and vigorous
propaganda for the idea of a constituent assembly based on universal,
direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot; (4) one of the principal tasks of Social-Democracy in the Third Duma is to
expose the class nature of the government’s and the liberals’
proposals and to systematically oppose to them the demands of the
Social-Democratic minimum programme without any whittling-down, with
special attention to questions affecting the economic interests of the
broad masses (the labour and agrarian questions, the budget, etc.)—the more
so as the composition of the Third Duma promises exceptionally abundant
material for the propaganda activities of Social-Democrats (5) the Social-Democratic group should take special care that no outward
coincidence between Social-Democratic voting and the voting of the
Black-Hundred-Octobrist or Octobrist-Cadet blocs should be used in the sense
of sup porting one bloc or the other; (6) the Social-Democrats in the Duma should introduce Bills and use their right
to make interpellations, for which purpose they should co-operate with other
groups to the left of the Cadets without in any way retreating from the
programme and tactics of Social-Democracy and without entering into any kind
of blocs. The Social-Democratic group should immediately propose to the Left
deputies of the Duma the formation of an Information Bureau which would not
bind its participants but would enable the workers’ deputies to exert
systematic influence upon democratic elements in the spirit of
Social-Democratic policy; (7) among the first concrete steps of the Social-Democratic group in the
Duma the Conference deems it necessary to place special emphasis on the
need:

(1) to come forward with a special declaration; (2) to make an interpellation concerning the coup d’état of June 3; (3) to raise in the Duma, in the most advisable form, the question of the
trial of the Social-Democratic group in the Second Duma.

[ Proletary , No. 20, November 19, 1907]

---
Notes:
[1]
The Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (“ Third All-Russian ”) was held in Helsingfors (Helsinki) November 5-12
(18-23), 1907, shortly after the elections to the Third Duma. Twenty-seven
delegates attended the Conference: ten Bolsheviks, four Mensheviks, five
Polish S.D.’s five Bundists, and three Lettish S.D.’s.

The agenda of the Conference contained the following questions:

the tactics of the S.D. group in the Duma, the question of group centres,
and the strengthening of the C.C.’s contacts with the local organisations,
and the participation of Social-Democrats in the bourgeois press. The
Conference also discussed the question of giving a name to
Social-Democratic representation in the Duma. The report on the tactics of
the S.D. group in the Third Duma was made by Lenin. His evaluation of the
June-the-third regime and the tasks of the Party was challenged by the
Mensheviks and the Bundists, who spoke in favour of supporting the Cadets
and the “Left” Octobrists in the Duma. By a majority of votes,
the Conference adopted the Bolshevik resolution proposed on behalf of the
St. Petersburg City Conference. It also adopted the Bolshevik resolution on
the inadmissibility of S.D. participation in the bourgeois press, directed
against the Menshevik publicists, especially Plekhanov, who had criticised
the decisions of the Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the “Second
All-Russian”) in the Left Cadet newspaper Tovarishch . The
Conference named S.D. representation in the Duma “the
Social-Democratic group”.

In view of the fact that the Menshevik centre, behind the back of the
Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., was making contacts with the local
committees, the Conference outlined measures for strengthening contacts
between the C.C. of the Party and the local

By adopting Leninist decisions on fundamental issues, The Fourth
Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. equipped the Party with correct, Marxist
tactics in the struggle to win the masses during the period of reaction.

The minutes of the Conference have not been found. The proceedings and
decisions were extensively reported by the Bolshevik news paper
Proletary , No. 20, November 19, 1907.

[2]
Lenin is referring to the agrarian laws drafted by Stolypin and
promulgated by the tsarist government in November 1906. A ukase, “On
Amendments to Certain Enactments Regarding Peasant Land Tenure and
Ownership”, was issued on November 9 (22), 1906; after being passed
by the Duma and the Council of State, it became known as the Law of June
14, 1910. Another ukase was issued on November 15 (28), 1906, “On the
Issue of Loans by the Peasant Land Bank on Security of Allotment
Lands”. Under these laws the peasant was given the right to take
possession of his allotment as private property and withdraw from the village commune to his
otrub or khutor . The otrub or khutor peasant could receive a loan from the Peasant Bank to acquire his
property. The object of Stolypin’s agrarian reforms was to create a
mainstay for the autocracy in the countryside in the shape of a class of
kulaks, while preserving landlord ownership and destroying the village
communes. This policy hastened capitalist evolution of agriculture by the
most painful, “Prussian” method, while p reserving the power,
property, and privileges of the semi-feudal landlords; it intensified the
forcible expropriation of the bulk of the peasants,and accelerated the
development of a peasant bourgeoisie, which was enabled to buy up the
allotments of the poor peasants for a song.

Lenin called the Stolypin agrarian legislation of 1906 (and the Law
promulgated on June 14 1271, 1910) the second step, after the 1861 Reform,
towards converting tsarism into a bourgeois monarchy. “The ‘delay’
granted to the old order. and the old semi-feudal landlordism by
Stolypin,” wrote Lenin, “opened another, and last , safety valve without expropriating the whole landownership of the
landlords” (see present edition, Vol. 18, “The Last
Valve”). Despite the government’s propaganda drive to encourage
the peasants to withdraw from the communes, only some 2,500,000 peasant
house holds withdrew from the communes in European Russia in the nine years
1907-15. Those most interested in this arrangement were the rural
bourgeoisie, for it enabled them to build up their farms. Some poor
peasants, too, left the communes in order to sell their allotments and have
done with village life. The bulk. of the small impoverished peasants,
however, continued the same old miserable existence on their backward
farms.

Stolypin’s agrarian policy did not do away with the fundamental
antagonism between the peasantry as a whole and the landlords, and led to
the still greater impoverishment of the peasant masses and the aggravation
of class contradictions between the kulaks and the rural poor.