V. I.

Lenin

Apropos of the Minutes of the November Military and Combat Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party [3]

No.20 of Narodnaya Duma (April 3, 1907) carried the following item:
“The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. has addressed the following
letter to Party organisations. ’A few days ago a—booklet was published
under the title of Minutes of the First Conference of Military and Combat Organisations . [1]

To prevent all possible misunderstanding, the Central Committee deems it
essential to make the following explanations on this matter.

(1) The conference was called by representatives of a number of military and
combat organisations, not only without the consent of the Central Committee but
even in spite of its vehement protest, that body being of the opinion that the
unification of combat organisations in any form whatsoever would be
impermissible.

(2) The Technical Group at the Central Committee was not given the
consent of that body for participation in the “conference”, and the
member of the group who went so far as to participate has been soundly
reprimanded by the Central Committee for doing so without its knowledge. To this
must be added that the military organisations of the Baltic Area took part in
the conference contrary to a decision of the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of the Latvian Area."’

Thereader will see from this that our Central Committee is very angry and
anxious to denigrate a certain conference in the eyes of the Party, and to
conceal the point at issue behind a list of formal discrepancies.

Weadvise all Party members to acquaint themselves with the exceedingly
interesting Minutes of the Military and Combat Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. so as to convince themselves of the amusing nature of the
Central Committee’s wrath and dissatisfaction. We, for our part, deem it
essential to give at least a brief assessment of this book (and of the
“conflict” arising out of it).

Letus begin with the formal aspect of the matter mentioned in the Central
Committee’s wrathful statement. The conference was called despite its
protest, for the Central Committee was “of the opinion that the
unification of combat organisations in any form whatsoever would be
impermissible”. This is very wrathful, but illogical to the point of
incoherence. If it does not, in general, regard the conference as a
“form of unification”, then it completely misses the target. If a
meeting (“conference”) of combat organisations is also impermissible as a “form of unification”, then we ask ourselves in
perplexity—how can representatives of Party organisations be
forbidden to confer so long as they are Party organisations
that have not been dissolved either by the Party Congress or the Central
Committee? Apparently the Central Committee is afraid to express its real idea
(the desire to dissolve all combat organisations), and is therefore wrathful in
an amusing manner. Would it really not have been natural to expect objections
in substance to certain steps or decisions taken by the
conference instead of the outcry: “The meeting is not permitted”? This
outcry is meant to prevent the presentation of the problem as it really
stands?—that is a thought that occurs to one of its own accord.

Letus now look into the history of the way the conference of military and
combat organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. was convened. Last autumn there was a
conflict on this issue between the St. Petersburg military organisation and the
Central Committee, The former called the conference of military and combat organisations , and in doing so referred to
“the right to call conferences granted to local organisations by
Party

Rules”. [2]

The Central Committee opposed the initiative of the St. Petersburg military
organisation, and was against allowing combat organisations to attend. It so
turned out that two conferences were held:

(1) the October conference of military organisations only , at
which representatives of the Central Committee were present; (2) the November Conference of military and combat
organisations without the participation of a Central Committee representative
(although the Central Committee appointed one of its members to attend
that conference as well). Representatives of eight military
organisations participated in the October conference. The November
conference was attended by eleven military and eight combat
organisations. Representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the
R.S.D.L.P. and other Party officials attended both conferences in a
consultative capacity.

Theresolutions of the October conference were published by the Central
Committee in the above-mentioned pamphlet ( Brief Extract ). The
resolutions of the November conference were published in
Proletary , No. 9, and were later included in the publication
Minutes , issued as a separate booklet. The Central Committee’s
protest, with which we opened this article, refers to the November
conference.

Itstands to reason that the fact of there having been two conferences should be
condemned. That is undoubtedly an undesirable event in a single party. Leaving
the formal aspect aside, we pose the question of the substance of the
conflict that was responsible for two conferences; was the
participation of combat organisations in the conference useful or harmful? We
read in the resolution of the October conference: “... there is an urgent
need for the Party to call a conference devoted specifically to military
organisations, to discuss the question of preparing the troops to participate in
the armed struggle of the people, a conference that has nothing to gain from
the participation of representatives of combat groups” (page 4 of the Central Committee’s
pamphlet). That was all. Those were the motives in their entirety.

Theincorrectness of these motives is palpable. Let us assume that everything
bad that can be said against combat organisations is true. But it is a fact that
they did participate in former attempts at an insurrection. For that reason
alone it would be useful and even necessary to consult them. It would be useful
to make their harmful tendencies known to the Party, and expose such-and-such activities of theirs at a conference attended
by them. The Central Committee and every member of the conference could
and should have done this. The decisions of the conference were not in any way binding upon anybody, and were certainly not obligatory either for the
Central Committee or for the local committees. Under such conditions,
fear of a joint meeting is simply ridiculous.

Andif the Central Committee now forthrightly condemns a conference with
representatives of combat organisations participating, without condemning any one of the resolutions of the conference with equal
forthrightness, that must mean that the conference disproved the
Central Committee’s assumptions!

Todeal immediately with the decisions of the conference, let us take, for
instance, its resolution on the tasks of combat organisations . Here we
read: “The Conference of Military and Combat Organisations recognises the
main tasks of combat organisations to be (1) dissemination of a correct conception of an armed uprising and explanation
of the concrete conditions under which an armed uprising may arise, proceed,
and be successfully consummated, because even among Party officials there exist
the vaguest and most incorrect conceptions of an armed uprising; (2) the technical preparation of everything necessary for the successful conduct
of an armed uprising; (3) the organisation, for bold action, of cadres of politically conscious
workers, grouped around the R.S.D.L.P.; (4) assistance in the organisation, for combat purposes, of the
revolutionary-democratic sections of the population, and in strengthening the
fighting leadership of Social—Democracy among those sections.

Thus,the main task of the combat organisations is declared to be, first and
foremost, “ the dissemination of a correct conception of an armed uprising ”. This idea is repeated in much
sharper form in the resolution on the role of military and combat organisations
during an armed uprising: “the role of the combat organisations is to
develop a correct conception of the armed uprising among the masses of the
people”.

Andso our Menshevik Central Committee considers a conference on this
to be impermissible? Or was it anxious to hide behind the bureaucratic
screen— “no collective activities are permissible, or even a
conference”—in order to rid itself of the unpleasant duty of
giving the Party a definite explanation of which of the tasks
of the combat organisations it considers correct, and which incorrect?

Thefact of the matter is that a truly pharisaic attitude to the combat
organisations is prevalent among the Mensheviks; they have nothing against
taking advantage of any of the “results” of the activities of
non-Party combat organisations, but they spread old wives’ tales about
Party combat organisations that enable them to evade altogether the question of methods of disseminating among the masses the
correct conception of the armed uprising, etc.

Amongsuch tales there is, for example, the one now current that the combat
groups (following in the wake of the Bolsheviks) exaggerate the significance of
the technique of insurrection.

Excellent,gentlemen! You accuse us of exaggerating the significance of
“technique”, do you? Would you care to read two resolutions—those of the Menshevik (October) and the Bolshevik (November)
military Social-Democratic conferences—to get at the truth of the matter?

Onwork among officers . Resolution of the Menshevik (October) conference:

“Theconference recognises that revolutionary propaganda among officers is
an important task both because the work of the Social-Democratic
military-revolutionary organisation among officers can greatly facilitate our
work among the troops in peace-time, and also because at the time of an armed
uprising revolutionary officers can serve as the technical leaders of the
insurrection. The conference, therefore, recommends to the
military-revolutionary organisation that it devote great attention to work
among officers, striving as far as possible to convert them into politically
conscious supporters of the Social-Democratic Party” (p. 13 of the Central
Committee’s pamphlet).

Theresolution of the Bolshevik (November) conference:

“Whereas:
(1) the class, social composition of the corps of officers and their
interests as a professional military caste compel them to strive for the
retention of the regular army and the under-privileged position of the
people;

(2) in view of this, the officers, as a body, play a reactionary part in the
present bourgeois-democratic revolution; (3) the existing oppositionally-minded groups of officers do not play an
active part and (4) at the same time it is possible that individual officers
may come over to our Party and they may, in view of their specialised
knowledge and special military training, render considerable services during
an uprising of the army and its defection to the side of the people, and also
in technical preparations for an armed uprising, “theconference of military and combat organisations recognises:

(1) that they cannot build up an independent Social-Democratic military
organisation among the officers; (2) that it is essential to use the existing oppositionally-minded groups of
officers for purposes of information and in order to draw into our Party
military and combat organisations individuals who can serve as instructors
and practical leaders” ( Minutes , p. 132).

The Mensheviks do not say a word about the class composition of the
corps of officers, or about its role during the whole course of the
bourgeois revolution. The central feature of the Bolshevik resolution
is an assessment of both the one and the other. That is the first point. The
Mensheviks have nothing but technique , since all proof of the
“ importance ” of work among the officers is reduced to
nothing but the fact that such work “could facilitate” our
activities among the troops (provide us with quarters? or with legal cover?) and
could then provide technical leaders. The Bolsheviks give subordinate
place to technique, as services rendered by “individual officers”,
and give prominence to proof that the workers’ party cannot build up an
“ independent Social-Democratic organisation ” among the
officers. That is the second point. The ideas of the
Mensheviks—petty-bourgeois in nature because they fear to show the class
connections between the corps of officers and the bourgeoisie—are
complemented by the timidity of the conclusion drawn—“as far as possible convert them into politically conscious supporters of the
Social-Democratic Party”. The Bolsheviks give a frank proletarian
assessment of a stratum that is, on the whole , reactionary, and this
leads to a decisive conclusion: use oppositionally minded officers “for
purposes of information” and draw only “individual officers” into our Party military and combat
organisations. That is the third point.

Afterthat, it may well be asked what else but old wives’ tales can one call the
Menshevik chatter about the exaggeration of the significance of technique by
the Bolsheviks in general, and the Bolshevik combat groups in particular? As we
have seen, this chatter has actually served, on the one hand, to cover up the
narrow Menshevik view concerning the corps of officers, and, on the other hand,
the purely intellectualist, opportunist fear of assessing the
bourgeois class character of the composition of the corps of officers and of
introducing into the work among the troops the idea of the class difference
between the mass of “rank-and-file” soldiers drawn from the peasants
and workers, and the handful of sons of the aristocracy or of the bourgeoisie,
who worm themselves into the aristocracy through military service.

Itwas not only the Menshevik participants in the tiny October conference who
displayed this “technical” and petty-bourgeois opportunist view of
the corps of officers. We find that our Menshevik Central Committee shares this
view; we have only to recall the famous fourth letter to organisations
(the period when the Duma was dissolved) where the slogan “for the
Duma” as an organ of power that could convene a constituent assembly, was
justified by an effort at adaptation to the interests and level of political
consciousness “of the middle bourgeoisie and corps of officers ”. In that letter, the Central Committee went so far as to
say that the victory of the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies in the
struggle for power would lead only to the military dictatorship of the army
that had gone over to the side of the people! For, you see, without the
“liberal” officers, the troops would not be able, even jointly with
the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, to ensure anything else but a military
dictatorship!

Thispetty-bourgeois view with regard to the corps of officers is also displayed
by Plekhanov, the ideological leader of the Mensheviks. Throughout 1906 we saw
the efforts he made to accuse the Bolsheviks of exaggerating the significance of
the technical tasks of the uprising. What aspect of the uprising did our
esteemed Comrade Plekhanov write about during that time? Was it about the
insurrection’s roots in the masses, or the role of the peasant and proletarian elements in
the insurrection? Nothing of the sort. All that time Comrade Plekhanov
wrote only about one letter from one liberal officer, in Dnevnik , No. 7 (August

1906), [4] whom he with the greatest politeness “corrected” for his
bourgeois views on the “men” and on the “tranquil” nature of the period
of Witte’s Ministry, etc. “I even think,” wrote Comrade Plekhanov,
“that only [note that “only”!] the participation of officers in the
military organisations will put an end to these outbreaks [of
soldiers and sailors] that are an unplanned and unproductive waste of
energy needed by the revolution.” You see the strength behind
it— only the participation of officers will put an end to the
outbreaks! Without the officers there will be no end to the
“ unplanned ” waste of energy by the foolish muzhik. And when the
Bolshevik combat groups meet in conference and wish to give the
Social-Democratic Party a modest piece of advice—let the main
task of the combat organisations be that of imparting military knowledge to
the masses , of teaching them to understand the course of the
insurrection and the conditions for its planned conduct—then the
Pharisees of hidebound Menshevism begin to shout, What a narrowly technical
conception of “planning”! What an “impermissible” conference of combat
groups, contrary to the will of the Central Committee!

Butenough of the Pharisees—let us get back to the minutes. In
one place we found, not “modest advice” to the
Social-Democratic Party, but pretentious and clumsy project-mongering. That was
in the report made by Comrade

Izarov [5] on the role of the Party during the armed uprising. Here
Comrade Izarov really did go to absurd extremes, such as the division of
Party organisations into three main types— military, combat and
proletarian! He even went so far as to offer “plans” to form
“military-combat councils” with an equal number of delegates
from the three types of organisation (p. 95), etc. It goes without saying
that we Bolsheviks will always hold aloof in the most decisive manner from such “ combatism ”. The unconditionally
dominant character and deciding voice belong to the general proletarian
organisation; the complete subordination of all military and
combat organisations to it, the necessity to base those same
combat

organisations entirely on cadres of workers who are Social-Democratic
Party members (or, perhaps, even replace the combat organisation by a Party militia ) — to us there is no shadow of doubt
in all this.

Butif Comrade Izarov’s absurd excesses are brought against us for
factional purposes, we would ask such “critics” to remember that the
Bolshevik military and combat conference did not accept Izarov’s extremes . The best refutation of the calumnies directed against our combat
groups is the fact that they themselves at their own conference, simply
pushed Izarov’s project-mongering aside. In order that their
voice on the question of the role of the Social-Democratic Party in an
insurrection should not be regarded as pretentious imposition or
dictating, etc., they themselves turned their conference on this point
into a private meeting (see Proletary , No. 9, and
Minutes , p. 116). It was only at this private meeting that they passed
a resolution without a suggestion of project-mongering à la
Izarov, but with only a point about “ensuring the closest connection and
co-operation between general-proletarian, military and combat
organisations”. In addition, the resolution on the tasks of military
organisations particularly stresses “ the subordination of all the work ” to “the political leadership of
general-proletarian organisations” ( Proletary , No. 9,
Minutes , p. 137). If the Bolshevik combat organisations alone were able
to correct Izarov, one may well realise that the Central Committee had good
reason for apprehension when confronted with a general meeting of the military
and combat organisations of the whole Party.

Spacedoes not permit us to deal in such detail with other aspects of the work
of the conference. We must mention that almost half of this thick book
is devoted to work among the troops (pp. 10-49) and former attempts at an armed
uprising (pp. 53-59, 64-79). This is very valuable material, and all politically
conscious Social-Democratic workers will thank the military and combat
conference for its initiative in gathering and preparing this material. We note
the report made by Comrade

Varin [6] “on former attempts at an armed uprising”; in this report
prominence is given to a study of the armed uprising as a specific form of the mass movement , a special form of the class struggle of the
proletariat.

Stress is laid on the historic moment when the struggle between certain
classes is sharpened to the extreme, as a condition for the uprising. The
role of various classes is examined—the dependence of the movement among
the troops upon the alignment of social forces, the indivisibility of the
political and military aspects of the uprising, the significance of “broad
democratic organisation of the masses of the people” as a prerequisite for
a provisional revolutionary government, etc. The study of such
problems is, of course, rather more difficult than the writing of
“tactical platforms” containing Cadet phrases about “faith of the
proletarian masses in the miracle of a spontaneous insurrection” (see the
“Tactical Platform” of Martov & Co.).

Lastly,let us note the discussion on current affairs, with the
splendid speech by Comrade

Ilyan [7] who, in November 1906, at the military and combat
conference, proved able to express a view on the Second Duma that
has been fully confirmed by events. “I shall permit myself to touch upon
the Duma,” he said. “We shall have a composition that will differ
completely from that of the past Duma. What we shall have is mobilised
revolution and mobilised reaction. Particularly in view of its expectations
not having been fulfilled, the peasantry will send a more revolutionary
element than it did to the First Duma. No doubt the proletariat will do the
same.... Our trouble is that some Social-Democrats are striving to fill up
the Duma with some sort of intermediate stratum of liberals” (p. 84 of the
Minutes ).

Atthe combat conference they were better able to assess
politics than were Plekhanov and the Menshevik Central Committee in
November 1906.

Itgoes without saying that in a newspaper article we cannot deal fully with the
contents of the Minutes . We shall conclude by giving readers our
earnest advice to study them—advice to those Social-Democrats who
are capable of discussing questions of an insurrection without any liberal
sniggering.

---
Notes:
[1]
The real title, abridged by the Central Committee, reads:
“... organisations of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party , (Conference) held in November 1906” (St. Petersburg,
1907. Price 60 kopeks. 168 pp.+IV).— Lenin

[2]
See the Central Committee’s publication Brief Extract from the Minutes of the First Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Organisations Conducting Activities Among the Troops , a pamphlet of thirteen pages
issued by the Central Committee Press.— Lenin

[3]
This refers to the First Conference of Military and Combat
Organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held between November 16 and 22
(November 29-December 5), 1906, in Tammerfors (Finland). The Conference was
called on the initiative of the St. Petersburg and Moscow organisations, and
also of the Bolshevik section of the Central Committee. Lenin approved the
Conference and took part in the preparations for it. He wrote a letter to the
conference delegates in which he warned them against rash decisions that deviated from the principles of the Bolshevik line. Lenin’s letter was read to the
Conference.

The Conference was attended by 19 delegates with a vote and 8 with consultative
voice, representing 11 military and 8 combat organisations, including
representatives of the R.S.D.L.P. committees in St. Petersburg and
Moscow. Military organisations in St. Petersburg, Kronstadt, Riga, Moscow,
Finland, Sevastopol, Libau, Nizhni-Novgorod, Kaluga, Voronezh, and Kazan were
represented, as were the combat organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow,
Saratov, and the Urals. In addition, the Conference was attended by
representatives of the Technical Bureau of the Central Committee, the Southern
Technical Bureau and the revolutionary section of Finnish
Social-Democrats. Among the delegates were Y M. Yaroslavsky, H.
S. Zemlyachka, I. A. Sammer (Lyubich, Ostapchenko), I. Kh. Lalayants, and
M. N. Lyadov.

The Conference discussed the following questions:

(1) report of the organising bureau; (2) reports of delegates; (3) on past attempts at insurrection; (4) assessment of the situation obtaining; (5) the nature of an armed uprising; (6) the tasks of the military and combat organisations; (7) the nature of the work of military organisations; (8) the attitude to combat organisations of other parties and of non-party
people;

(9) the establishment of military and combat centres in connection with the
organisation of an armed uprising; (10) the attitude of military and combat organisations to general-proletarian
organisations; (11) report to the Party Congress; (12) rates of representation at the Congress; (13) the Central Organ and literature; (14) the attitude to the Conference of military organisations convened by the
Central Committee; (15) elections.

The Conference adopted a number of resolutions—on the situation obtaining;
on the role of the Party in an armed uprising (this resolution was adopted
unanimously at a private session as representing only the opinion of Party
members present at the Conference); tasks of the military organisations; tasks
of the combat groups; on the attitude to combat organisations of other parties
and those composed of non-party people; on the role of the military and combat
organisations in an insurrection; on work among officers; on expropriations; on
the attitude to the Conference convened by the Central Committee; on the
report to the Congress; on the rate of representation at the Congress; on the
provisional bureau of military and combat organisations; on the literary organ
and publishing; on local and regional literature; on the establishment of an
all-Russian military and combat organisation; on the absence of a representative
from the Central Committee. The Conference elected a Provisional Bureau to
convene an all-Russian military conference which existed for only two months.

Theresolutions of the Conference were published in
Proletary , No. 9, on December 7, 1906 and the minutes were
published in St. Petersburg in 1907.

[4]
Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata ( A Social-Democrat’s Diary )—a
journal published irregularly by Plekhanov in Geneva from March

1905 to April 1912, with long intervals between issues. Sixteen issues
appeared. Publication was resumed in 1916 in St. Petersburg, but only one
issue appeared. In the first eight issues (1905-06) Plekhanov pursued an
extreme-Right Menshevik opportunist policy, defending a bloc between
Social-Democrats and the liberal bourgeoisie, denying the alliance of the
proletariat and the peasantry, and condemning the December armed
uprising. In the period 1909-12, Plekhanov came out in defence of Party
under ground organisations against the Menshevik liquidators (issues 9 to
16 of the Dnevnik ). On basic tactical questions, however, he
retained his Menshevik views. In issue No. I of the Dnevnik for
1916, Plekhanov’s social-chauvinist views were clearly expressed.

Lenincriticised Plekhanov sharply for his opportunism and deviation from
revolutionary Marxism.

[5]
Izarov —I. Kh. Lalayants.

[6]
Varin —V. Y. Fridolin, who supported the Bolsheviks in 1907.

[7]
Ilyan —Y. M. Yaroslavsky.