V. I.

Lenin

Thequestion of the attitude of Social-Democracy towards bourgeois parties is
one of those known as “general” or “theoretical” questions, i.e., such that are not directly connected with any definite
practical task confronting the Party at a given moment. At the London Congress
of the R.S.D.L.P., the Mensheviks and the Bundists conducted a fierce struggle
against the inclusion of such questions in the agenda, and they were,
unfortunately, supported in this by Trotsky, who does not belong to either
side. The opportunist wing of our Party, like that of other Social-Democratic
parties, defended a “business-like” or “practical” agenda for the Congress. They shied away from “broad and general”
questions. They forgot that in the final analysis broad, principled politics
are the only real, practical politics. They forgot that anybody who tackles
partial problems without having previously settled general problems, will
inevitably and at every step “come up against” those general
problems without himself realising it. To come up against them blindly in every
individual case means to doom one’s politics to the worst vacillation and
lack of principle.

The Bolsheviks had insisted on including quite a number of “general
questions” in the Congress agenda, but succeeded in getting only one
passed with the aid of the Poles and the Latvians—the question of the
attitude to bourgeois parties. This question not only took first place among the
Congress questions of principle but also among all work in general. It turned
out that way, and it had to turn out that way, because the real source of almost
all differences, certainly all differences of substance, of all disagreements on
questions of the practical politics of the proletariat in the Russian revolution, was a different assessment of our attitude to non-proletarian
parties. Since the very beginning of the Russian revolution there have
appeared two basic views among Social-Democrats on the nature of the
revolution and the role of the proletariat in it. Anyone who attempts to
analyse the tactical differences in the R.S.D.L.P. without going
into the difference of these basic views will get hopelessly entangled in
trivialities and partial problems.

I

Thetwo trends in Russian Social-Democracy on the question of an assessment of
our revolution and the tasks of the proletariat in it, had become perfectly
clear at the very beginning of 1905, and in the spring of that year were given
full, precise and formal expression, recognised by the organisations concerned,
at the Bolshevik Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London and the Menshevik
Conference held simultaneously in Geneva. Both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks
discussed and adopted resolutions that people who have forgotten the history of
their Party or their section of it, or who desire to avoid an analysis of the
real sources of disagreements on matters of principle, are now too inclined to
ignore. In the view of the Bolsheviks the proletariat has had laid upon it the
active task of pursuing the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its consummation
and of being its leader. This is only possible if the proletariat is able to
carry with it the masses of the democratic petty bourgeoisie, especially the
peasantry, in the struggle against the autocracy and the treacherous liberal
bourgeoisie. The inevitability of bourgeois treachery was deduced by the
Bolsheviks even then, before the open activities of the
Constitutional-Democrats, the chief liberal party; the deduction was based on
the class interests of the bourgeoisie and their fear of the proletarian movement. [1]

The Mensheviks were inclined to the-view that the bourgeoisie are the motive
force and that they determine the scope of the bourgeois revolution. The proletariat cannot lead the bourgeois
revolution, but must fulfil only the role of the extreme opposition, and not
strive to win power. The Mensheviks rejected in the most determined manner the
idea of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the
peasantry.

Atthat time, in May 1905 (just two years ago), the differences were of a
purely theoretical and abstract character because no immediate practical task
then confronted our Party. It is therefore particularly interesting—for
the instruction of those people who are so fond of deleting abstract questions
from congress agendas and substituting “business like” practical
questions—to trace the way in which these differences later made
their appearance in practical work.

The Bolsheviks asserted that the Mensheviks’ views would actually lead to the
slogans of the revolutionary proletariat degenerating to the slogans and tactics
of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. In 1905 the Mensheviks tried their
hardest to prove that they alone defended the true proletarian policy and that
the Bolsheviks were dissolving the working-class movement in bourgeois
democracy. That the Mensheviks themselves had a most sincere desire for an
independent proletarian policy can be seen from the following highly instructive
tirade in one of the resolutions of that time, adopted at the Menshevik
Conference in May 1905. “Social Democracy,” says the resolution,
“will continue to oppose hypocritical friends of the people, oppose all
those political parties that raise a liberal and democratic banner and refuse to
give real support to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.”
Despite all these well-meant intentions, the incorrect tactical theories of the
Mensheviks led, in actual fact, to their sacrificing proletarian independence
for the liberalism of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

Letus recall on what practical questions of politics the Bolsheviks and the
Mensheviks have differed among them selves during these two years of
revolution. The Bulygin Duma of autumn 1905: the Bolsheviks were for
the boycott, the Mensheviks for participation. The Witte Duma—the same
again. Policy in the First Duma (summer 1906): the Mensheviks were in favour of
the slogan of “a responsible ministry”—the Bolsheviks were against
it and in favour of an executive committee of the Lefts, i.e., the Social-Democrats and
Trudoviks. The dissolution of the Duma (July 1906): the Mensheviks brought
forward the slogan “for the Duma as an organ of power for the
convocation of a constituent assembly”; the Bolsheviks rejected that
liberal distortion of a revolutionary slogan. The elections to the Second
Duma (end of 1906, beginning of 1907): the Mensheviks were for
“technical blocs” with the Constitutional-Democrats (and
Plekhanov was for a political bloc with the platform of “a Duma with
full powers”). The Bolsheviks were against blocs with the
Constitutional-Democrats and in favour of an independent campaign,
allowing the possibility of a Left bloc. Compare these important facts
from the history of Social-Democratic tactics during the past two years,
with the basic differences on matters of principle outlined above. You
will immediately see that the general theoretical analysis of the
Bolsheviks has been confirmed by the two years of revolution. Social-Democracy was compelled to go against treacherous
liberalism, was compelled “to strike together” with the
Trudoviks and the Narodniks; the Second Duma definitely established this
preponderance, by a majority vote. The Menshevik good intentions to expose,
as hypocritical friends of the people, all those who refused to support the
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat paved the road to the hell of
political blocs with the liberals, up to and including the
acceptance of their slogans.

Onthe basis of a theoretical analysis, the Bolsheviks forecast in 1905 that the
pivot of Social-Democratic tactics in the bourgeois revolution is the question
of the treachery of liberalism and the democratic capacity of the peasantry. All
subsequent practical differences on the policy of the workers’ party
have revolved precisely around this pivot. The Menshevik policy of dependence on
the liberals actually has developed historically from the false basis of their
tactics.

Priorto the Stockholm Unity Congress in 1906, the Bolsheviks and the
Mensheviks put forward two substantially different resolutions
on bourgeois parties. The Bolshevik resolution in its entirety was imbued with
the basic idea of the treachery of liberalism and of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, merely providing
fresh illustrations to this idea in the form of the facts and events of the
post-October period (the split between the Octobrists and the Cadets; the
formation of the Peasant Union and radical associations of intellectuals,
etc.). The Bolsheviks analysed the class content of the basic types of bourgeois
parties and filled out, so to say, the skeleton of their old abstract scheme,
with concrete data. In their resolution for the Stockholm Congress, the
Mensheviks refused to analyse the class content of various parties, on the
grounds of their “instability”. This meant actually evading an
answer on the substance of the matter. This evasion was clearly demonstrated
when the Mensheviks, who had gained a victory at the Stockholm Congress,
themselves withdrew their resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties in
Russia. In the spring of 1905, a Menshevik resolution proposed exposing, as
hypocritical friends of the people, all liberals and democrats who refused to
support the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. In the spring of 1906, it
was the Bolsheviks and not the Mensheviks who, in a resolution, spoke of the
hypocrisy of a definite liberal party, the Constitutional-Democrats to
be precise, while the Mensheviks preferred to leave the question open. At the
London Congress, in the spring of 1907, the Mensheviks revealed themselves still
more completely; the old demand that the liberals and democrats support the
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat was completely abandoned. The
Menshevik resolution (see the draft in Narodnaya Duma , 1907,
No. 12—an extremely important document ) openly and frankly
advocates “ combining ” the activities—in plainer words, making them agree—of the proletariat with those of bourgeois
democracy in general!

Downthe ladder, rung by rung. The socialist’s good intentions and bad
theory in 1905. No theory and no intentions in 1906. No theory and an openly
opportunist policy in 1907. “The combining” of Social-Democratic and
liberal-bourgeois policy—such is Menshevism’s last word. And it
could have been no other, after blocs with the Cadets, voting for Golovin,
private meetings with Cadets, the attempt to remove the
confiscation of landed estates from our list of imperative demands, and other
gems of Menshevik policy.

Atthe London Congress, Menshevik policy in respect of liberalism suffered its
fullest defeat. The Mensheviks did not risk submitting their first
resolution as printed in Narodnaya Duma (No. 12). They withdrew
it without even submitting it to the commission in which all five Party
groups were represented by fifteen members (four Bolsheviks, four
Mensheviks, two Poles, two Latvians and three from the Bund). Probably the
slogan of “combining”, the concord of socialist policy with that
of the liberals repelled, not only the Bundists, but even many
Mensheviks. The Mensheviks appeared in the commission after having
“cleaned themselves up a little”; they wrote a new resolution,
and deleted “combining” altogether. Instead of “combining”
they inserted “use of other parties by the proletariat for its own
ends”, the recognition of the establishment of a republic, etc., as a
political aim of the proletariat. But nothing could help them. It was far
too obvious to every body that they had deliberately dressed up in this
bright raiment as a cover for the same policy of “combining”. The practical conclusion to be drawn from the
resolution was the same—“enter into agreements with those parties
[with both the liberals and the Narodniks] in definite, individual
cases”. Of the fifteen members of the commission only four—
i.e., only the Mensheviks!—consented to accept such a resolution as a
basis for discussion. There could not have been a fuller defeat for
Menshevik policy as such. The Bolshevik resolution was taken as a basis at
the Congress and then adopted in its totality after some insignificant
amendments, by 158-163 votes against a little over a hundred (106 in one
case), with from ten to twenty abstaining. Before we proceed with an
analysis of the basic ideas of this resolution and the significance of the
amendments proposed by the Mensheviks, we must mention another episode, not
without interest, which took place when the resolution was under discussion
in the commission.

Nottwo, but three draft resolutions were submitted to the commission—the
Bolshevik, the Menshevik and the Polish drafts. The Poles agreed with the
Bolsheviks in their basic ideas but rejected our type of resolution with an
analysis of each separate group of parties. The Poles thought this a mere
literary exercise, and considered our resolution too cumbersome. They constructed their draft as a brief formulation
of two general principles of proletarian policy in respect of bourgeois parties—(1) the class individuality of the proletariat, as distinct from
all other parties, for the purpose of its socialist aims, no matter how
revolutionary and how determinedly republican those other parties may be; (2) alliance with the Trudovik parties against the autocracy and against the
treachery of liberalism.

Itcannot be disputed that these two significant ideas in the Polish resolution
cover the point at issue splendidly. Nor can it be disputed that the plan to
give a brief, definite directive for the proletariat of all nationalities in
Russia, without a “sociological” discussion of the different types
of parties, is an attractive one. Experience nevertheless showed that the
Congress would not have been able to arrive at a full, clear and definite
solution to the problem, on the basis of the Polish resolution. In order to
refute Menshevism, it was necessary to determine, in great detail, the positive
view of Social-Democracy in respect of the different parties; otherwise there
would have been room for vagueness.

The Mensheviks and the Bundists immediately seized on the Polish resolution
while it was still in the commission, in order to take advantage of the
opportunity provided by such vagueness. The commission accepted the Polish
resolution as a basis, by seven votes (four Mensheviks, two Poles and one
Bundist) against seven (four Bolsheviks, two Latvians and one Bundist; the
fifteenth member of the commission abstained or was absent). The commission then
began tacking on to the Polish resolution such “amendments” that it
was distorted beyond all recognition. Even an amendment on the permissibility of
“technical” agreements with the liberals was accepted. Naturally
the Poles withdrew their draft after it had been mutilated by the Mensheviks. It
turned out that, besides the Poles, neither the Mensheviks nor the Bundists
would consent to submit such a draft to the Congress. All the
commission’s work was wasted, and the Congress had to vote on the
Bolshevik draft that had been accepted as a basis for a resolution.

Itmay now be asked: what is the significance, in principle, of the Congress
having accepted the Bolshevik draft as a basis for a resolution? What were the
basic points in proletarian tactics that mobilised the Congress for this draft and led it to reject
the Menshevik draft?

Ifwe read the two drafts attentively we can quite easily pick out two such
basic points. First, the Bolshevik resolution really effects a socialist
criticism of the non-proletarian parties. Secondly, the resolution gives a
precise definition of proletarian tactics in the present revolution, giving a
perfectly clear and concrete content to the concept of “leader” in
the revolution, and showing with whom we can and must “strike
together”, and at whom and under what circumstances to strike.

Thebasic fault of the Menshevik resolution is that it provides neither the one
nor the other, and by its emptiness opens wide the doors to opportunism, i.e.,
in the final analysis, to Social-Democratic politics being replaced by liberal
politics. Just take a glance at the Mensheviks’ socialist criticism of the
non-proletarian parties. Their criticism amounts to this: “the
socio-economic conditions and historic situation in which this [i.e., our]
revolution is proceeding hamper the development of the bourgeois-democratic
movement, at one pole engendering indecision in the struggle and the illusions
of a constitutional, peaceful abolition of the old order, and at the other
pole—the illusion of petty-bourgeois revolutionism and agrarian
utopias”.

Firstof all, we have before us a resolution on parties, which does not name the
parties. Secondly, we have before us a resolution that does not give an analysis
of the class content of the different “poles” of bourgeois
democracy. Thirdly, this resolution does not even hint at a definition of what
the attitude of the various classes to “our revolution” should
be. Summing up all these shortcomings we must say that the Marxist theory of the class struggle has disappeared from the resolution.

Itis not the fundamental interests of the various classes of capitalist society
that engender the different types of bourgeois parties; it is not class
interests that give rise to peaceful illusions or “conciliatory
tendencies” in some and “revolutionism” in others. Definitely
not! It is some sort of unknown socio-economic conditions and an historical
situation that hamper the development of the bourgeois-democratic movement in general . And so the conciliatory tendency of capital and the revolutionism of the muzhik do not arise out of the position of
the bourgeoisie and the peasantry in a capitalist society that is emancipating
itself from feudalism, but out of some sort of conditions, out of the situation
in all “our revolution” in general. The next point even says that
“these negative tendencies, hindering the development of the
revolution”, come more strongly “to the fore at the present moment
of a temporary lull”.

Thatis not a Marxist, but a liberal theory, seeking the roots of different
social tendencies outside the interests of the different classes. This
is a Left-Cadet, not a socialist resolution; the extremism of both poles is
condemned, the opportunism of the Cadets and the revolutionism of the Narodniks
are condemned and thereby something in between the two is actually
praised. One cannot help wondering whether we are not confronted with
Popular Socialists , who seek the golden mean between the Cadets and the
Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Ifour Mensheviks had not departed from the Marxist theory of the class
struggle, they would have realised that the different class positions of the
bourgeoisie and the peasantry in the struggle against the “old
order” explains the different types of parties—liberal on the one
hand, and Narodnik on the other. All these parties, groups and political
organisations, which differ in much or in little and have arisen in such
abundance in the course of the Russian revolution, always and inevitably
gravitate to one of these two types (with the exception of the reactionary
parties and the party of the proletariat)—this is beyond all doubt and
needs no proof. If we limit ourselves to indicating the “two poles”
in a single bourgeois-democratic movement, we offer nothing but
platitudes. Always and in everything, two extremes, two “poles” are
to be seen. In any social movement of any extent there are always the
“poles” and there is always a more or less “golden” mean. To characterise bourgeois democracy in this way is to reduce the
Marxist postulate to an empty phrase instead of applying it to an analysis of
the class roots of the types of party in Russia . The
Mensheviks do not offer a socialist criticism of the bourgeois parties, because
giving the name bourgeois-democratic to all oppositional, non-proletarian
parties does not at all imply socialist criticism. If you do not show the interests of which classes and
which particular interests are dominant at the moment in determining the
nature of the various parties and their politics, you are not really
applying Marxism and have, in fact , rejected the theory of the
class struggle. Therefore, the term “bourgeois-democratic”, as
you use it, is nothing but a platonic declaration of respect for Marxism,
since your use of the term is not accompanied by the association of
such-and-such a type of liberalism or democracy with such-and-such
self-interests of definite strata of the bourgeoisie. No wonder our
liberals, beginning with the Party of Democratic Reform and the Cadets and
ending with the non-party Bez Zaglaviya group from
Tovarishch , seeing that the Mensheviks apply Marxism in such a way ,
enthusiastically seize on the “idea” of the harmfulness of extremes
of opportunism and revolutionism in democracy— seize on it because it is
not an idea at all, but a banal platitude. It is, of course, not the
term “bourgeois democracy” that scares the liberal. What
scares him is an exposure, before the people, of what material interests of
precisely which wealthy classes liberal programmes and phrases boil down
to. That, and not the term “bourgeois democracy”, is the gist of
the matter. Not he who persistently uses the term “bourgeois
democracy” to protect himself, as though he were crossing himself, is
applying the theory of the class struggle, but he who shows, in practice, how
the bourgeois character of a party manifests itself.

Ifthe concept “bourgeois democracy” implies only condemnation of
the extremes of both opportunism and revolutionism, then it is a concept that
degrades Marxist theory to the level of banal liberal phraseology. The liberal,
we repeat, does not fear such use of the concept, for it is deeds that he fears,
not words . He may consent to accept a term that is, to him, unpleasant
and “reeking of Marxism”. But neither the liberal, nor the
“intellectual” from Tovarishch , who apes the Bernsteinians,
will agree to accept the view that he, the Cadet, expresses the interests of the
bourgeois who is selling out the revolution to someone or other. It is precisely
because in their application of Marxism the Mensheviks reduce that theory to an
empty and meaningless phrase committing them to nothing, that the Bez Zaglaviya group, the Prokopoviches and Kuskovas, the Cadets and others, seize with both
hands at the idea of supporting Menshevism. Menshevik Marxism is Marxism recut
to the measurements of bourgeois liberalism.

Andso the first basic fault of the Mensheviks’ stand on the present question
lies in their failure to offer a real socialist criticism of the
non-proletarian parties. In point of fact, Menshevism departs from Marx’s
theory of the class struggle. The London Congress has put an end to this
distortion of Social-Democratic policy and theory. The second basic fault is
that
Menshevism does not actually recognise the independent policy of the proletariat
in the present revolution, and does not offer the proletariat any definite
tactics. Avoid extremes of opportunism and revolutionism— such is one of
the commandments of Menshevism as taken from their resolution. From time to
time, conclude agreements with the liberals and democrats—that is another
of their commandments. Combine your politics (make it agree) with those of the
liberals and democrats—that is the third commandment expressed in
Narodnaya Duma and the Menshevik resolution of the time. Delete from
here all mention of the third commandment; add desires and demands—
“proletarian politics must be independent”, add the demand for a
republic (as the Mensheviks did at the London Congress)—by these means
you will in no way get rid of the second basic fault of Menshevism. The
independence of proletarian politics is not determined by writing the word
“independent” in the right places, and not by including mention of a
republic; it is determined only by a precise definition of a path that is really independent . And that is what the Mensheviks do not offer.

Theobjective alignment of classes and social forces being as it is, we are
actually confronted with a struggle between two tendencies—liberalism is
striving to stop the revolution, and the proletariat—to carry it on to
its culmination. If the proletariat is unaware of this tendency of liberalism,
if the proletariat is unaware of its task to engage in a direct struggle against
liberalism, if it does not struggle to liberate the democratic peasantry from
the influence of liberalism, then the politics of the proletariat are not actually independent . It is precisely these non-independent politics that
the

Mensheviks are legalising; for that is the significance of admitting the
possibility of agreements from occasion to occasion, without defining
the line of those agreements, without defining the line of
demarcation that divides the two tactics in our revolution. “Agreements from occasion to occasion” is a formula
that actually serves to conceal the bloc with the Cadets, the “Duma
with full powers” and the responsible ministry, in other words, the
entire policy of making the workers’ party dependent on liberalism. In the
present historical situation there can be no question of an independent
policy for the workers’ party, if that party does not set itself the direct
task of struggling to carry the revolution through to its consummation, if
it does not struggle, not only against the autocracy, but also against
liberalism, for influence over the democratic peasantry. The historical
situation in the bourgeois revolution in Europe at the beginning of the
twentieth century is such that any other policy on the part of
Social-Democracy would actually mean its subordination to the politics of
the liberals.

The London Congress’s adoption of the Bolshevik resolution on
non-proletarian parties means that the workers’ party decisively rejects all
deviations from the class struggle, and recognises, in point of fact, the
socialist criticism of non-proletarian parties and the independent revolutionary
tasks of the proletariat in the present revolution.

Therejection of the Menshevik amendments to the resolution adds further weight
to this.

II

Whenthe Bolshevik draft was accepted by the Congress as the basis for the
resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties, a shower of amendments came
pouring from the Mensheviks and the Bundists. In several statements of protest
submitted to the Bureau of the Congress, the total number of such amendments was
estimated at 70 or more. I shall not waste time discussing all the ins and outs
of the struggle to stop this obstruction, which left Akimov’s famous
twenty-two amendments at the Second Congress far behind, nor shall I list the mass of absolutely empty and trivial
amendments. I shall mention only five amendments that are highly
significant in principle. Here they are in the order in which they were
discussed at the Congress.

Point Three of the preamble of our resolution speaks directly of the task of the
proletariat as filling “the role of leader in the bourgeois-democratic
revolution”. The Mensheviks proposed an amendment—change the word
“leader” for “vanguard”, “advanced contingent” or the words “main motive force”. All those
amendments were rejected. Repeat as often as you will that the proletariat must
retain its class independence—the Bolsheviks have nothing against
that. But to weaken the words on the role of leader in the
revolution would mean opening the doors to opportunism. The proletariat could be
the “main motive force” in a curtailed, landlord-bourgeois
revolution. It is possible to be the main motive force of the victory of another
class without being able to defend the interests of your own
class. Revolutionary Social-Democracy, if it is to remain true to itself, has no
right to confine itself to that. It must help the proletariat to rise from the passive
role of main motive force to the active role of leader—to rise from the
dependent position of a fighter for curtailed freedom to the most independent
position of a fighter for complete freedom, a freedom that is to the advantage
of the working class. The basic difference in the tactics of the opportunist and
the revolutionary tactics of Social-Democracy in the bourgeois revolution is,
one might say, that the former is reconciled to the role of the proletariat as
the main motive force, while the latter is directed towards giving the
proletariat the role of leader and by no means that of a mere “motive
force”.

Theexpression “advanced contingent” would also weaken the
recognition of the task of the proletariat as that of leading the other
democratic classes, or could, at least, be interpreted in that way.

Thesecond amendment—remove from the third point of the resolution proper
(the characteristic of the liberal parties) the reference to the
democratic petty bourgeoisie being deceived by the liberals. The
Mensheviks said that it was necessary to remove or change it in the name of

Marxism, for, they said, it is unworthy of materialists to explain by
“deceptions” the social composition of parties. The sophistry
of this argument had too bad a smell for the Congress to fall for it. To
deny, in the name of Marxism, the role of deception in the politics of the
bourgeoisie would be the same as denying all forms of violence in the name
of the “economic factor”. Only the Davids, Vollmars and
similar pillars of opportunism understand Marxism in this way. In
particular, to deny or attempt to lessen the part played by deception in
the Cadets’ present policy towards the peasantry and urban petty
bourgeoisie in Russia would be attempting to make liberalism more
attractive, and distorting the facts for its benefit. That is because the
Cadets’ direct deception of the electors from among the peasantry and
urban petty bourgeoisie is the most indisputable of facts. It is wrong to
speak of parties deceiving their electors, in cases when the interests of
a class engender certain theoretical illusions, i.e., deceptive concepts
(for instance, when the interests of the peasantry engender illusive
expectations of endless benefits following the expropriation of the
landlords). It is necessary to speak openly, for all to hear, of the
deception of certain strata of the people by their parliamentary
representatives when those representatives sacrifice the direct interests
of those strata to their exploiters (the peasants are betrayed to the
landlords, etc.). The German bourgeoisie have betrayed the peasants,
wrote Marx in 1848. If, in 1907, we in Russia do not risk saying the same
about our bourgeoisie and about our Cadets, if we cannot prove this to the
masses, we shall be trampling the great banner of Social-Democracy in the
mud.

Thethird amendment—to recognise, as an addendum to that selfsame third
point, the permissibility of “technical agreements” with the
Cadets. This amendment was rejected, with the Congress delegates voting by
name. We announced that if it was accepted we should be compelled to withdraw
our resolution as a whole; we had the right to do this if amendments distorted
the basic idea of the resolution. We do not say anything about specifically
forbidding all agreements with the Cadets, we announced. The point at issue is
not one of forbidding or permitting specific cases, but of a general political
line. One who wants in good faith to apply the Congress resolution will not enter into election agreements with the Cadets
or put out common slogans with them, although a case of joint voting in the Duma
may possibly occur. It would, in general, be useless to try to
“ensnare” with any sort of wording those who do not conscientiously
fulfil the resolution of the Congress. Our whole Party knows well enough from
experience what our Mensheviks under stand by “technical agreements”
with the liberals.

Thefourth amendment—an addendum to Point Four indicating the necessity to
struggle against the agrarian utopianism and revolutionism of the Narodniks;
this was submitted several times by the Mensheviks, with constant changes of
individual words in its text or of the place in the resolution to which it
should belong. All these amendments were rejected by the Congress. The debate
on these amendments was undoubtedly on matters of principle. The Mensheviks
again tried at this point to introduce under the Marxist flag something most
hostile to Marxism. There is no doubt that Marxism rejects the agrarian
utopianism of the Narodniks and the methods of petty-bourgeois
revolutionism. If that is so, argued the Mensheviks, then say it here, in
this resolution. “Excuse us, dear comrades,” we answered,
“everything here is said as it should be. Your addendum, irrespective of
your will and knowledge, acquires here the significance of a sally against the
confiscation of landed estates. We have not forgotten that this
confiscation has been called “utopianism” and “revolutionism” by all the liberals and also by many non-party
Social-Democrats, such as the Prokopoviches and Kuskovas, and by several
(fortunately, not many) party Social-Democrats, who proposed that the Duma group
and the Central Committee should not make an ultimatum of their insistence on
confiscation.

Aresolution must be written in unmistakable language. It must consider all
existing political tendencies in actual politics, and not the good intentions of
some section or another of Social-Democracy (always allowing that the intentions
are of the best). In our resolution we have recognised, forthrightly
and definitely, the “pseudo-socialism” of the Narodniks. We have
called their “socialist” ideology simply “ vague” , and have declared it absolutely imperative for
Social-Democracy to fight against their concealment of the class antithesis between the proletariat and the petty
proprietors. Everything has been said in these words, which condemn the
really utopian element in Narodism, condemn petty-bourgeois “extra-class”
revolutionism. Moreover, our resolution does not merely condemn or refute;
it also states what is positive in these parties. “The struggle against
land ed proprietorship and the feudal state”, is the way we define the
positive content. And he is not a Marxist who forgets this on account of
the struggle against the vagueness of petty-bourgeois socialism. This real
content has much greater significance in the present revolution than the
Narodniks’ vague dreaming of the morrow. It is on account of this actual
struggle that liberal and proletarian politics now differ radically. The
liberals consider the complete abolition of landed proprietorship and the
feudal state to be utopian and empty revolutionism ; such a
débâcle is not to the advantage of the bourgeoisie, and dangerous to it. In the real politics of our times it
is this self-interest of the bourgeoisie as a class, and nothing but that
self-interest, that finds expression in attacks on the utopianism and
revolutionism of the Narodniks. Proletarian politics, on the contrary,
separate utopianism, revolutionism and the general vagueness of
“equalitarian” dreams of non-class socialism, from the reality
of the decisive struggle against the landlords and serf-owners. That which
the liberals consider a harmful utopia, we consider to be the vital
interest of the proletariat at the present moment—the complete abolition
of landed proprietorship and the feudal state. On these grounds we must now
pursue the most intense, immediate and practical struggle against
liberalism, a struggle to emancipate the democratic peasantry from its
influence.

Theamendments under discussion have reflected one of the most widespread errors
of Menshevism—the equating of the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie in
the present revolution (that is, reactionary in the struggle against the
landlords and the autocracy) with the reactionary nature of the peasantry (which
is reactionary from the viewpoint, not of the struggle against the landlords and
the autocracy, but of the struggle against capital, i.e., it is reactionary, not
in respect of the tasks of the present, bourgeois revolution, but in respect of
the future, socialist revolution).

This radical Menshevik error was rejected by the Congress. The practical
significance of this error is very great because it conceals a policy that
allows equally joint action by the proletariat with the liberals and with
peasant democracy.

Thelast Menshevik amendment of any interest also refers to Point Four, to its
end. The Mensheviks proposed removing from this point reference to the struggle
against the Cadets (“... side with the Social-Democrats against the Black
Hundreds and the Constitutional-Democrats ”). To give this
amendment, which is quite unacceptable to the present Congress, a
semblance of something acceptable, they proposed replacing the words
objectionable to them by an indication that the democratic revolution must be
carried through to its consummation. This was an original attempt at sweetening
the pill, an attempt to carry through a policy unacceptable to the
Bolsheviks (not to struggle directly against the Cadets) under cover of a
slogan particularly acceptable to the Bolsheviks. Your flag and our
cargo—that is what the Mensheviks, like the true opportunist politicians
they are, were actually saying by their proposal.

The Mensheviks’ innocent stratagem was, of course, immediately exposed, amid
laughter from the Bolshevik benches (in the London church we actually sat on
benches so that the expression is not figurative). And then came truly Homeric
laughter and a thunder of ironic applause from those same benches when one of
the Poles, after the defeat of the Menshevik amendment, proposed
another—to retain the words about the struggle against the
Cadets, and at the same time add recognition of a struggle to carry through the
revolution to its consummation. The Congress, of course, accepted that
amendment. The Mensheviks particularly deserved ironic applause for voting in
favour of it ( noblesse oblige !) after L. Martov had called down thunder
and lightning upon us in Otgoloski (No. 5) for the allegedly
bourgeois-republican idea of carrying through the revolution to its
consummation.

The Mensheviks’ unsuccessful ruse rendered us very good service, because on
account of this amendment the Congress understood the very important idea in
another of our resolutions which had not been presented to the
Congress—the resolution on the class tasks of the proletariat.

III

Thereis no need to record the present attitude to the Cadets, said a prominent
Menshevik (Martynov, I believe) at the Congress, who wanted, one might say, to
enable the Mensheviks to turn their flight into an orderly retreat. The Cadets
are not worth anything at the moment; all right, but do not record it for they
may yet be worth something.

Thesewords are an unfortunate formulation of a very significant Menshevik idea,
which it is worth while dealing with to conclude our analysis of the question of
the attitude to bourgeois parties. The wording is unfortunate because the
resolution defining the class roots of present counter revolutionary policy does
not preclude the possibility of using everything that can be of
“value”. The important thing is the idea that, if the Cadets do not
today justify the confidence of the Mensheviks, there was a time when they did.

Thisidea is fallacious. The Cadets have never justified Menshevik confidence in
them. To convince ourselves of this, we have only to take the greatest upsurge
of our revolution, the period between October and December 1905, and compare it
to the present period, probably the period of greatest decline. Neither at the
time of the greatest upsurge nor at the time of the greatest decline did the
Cadets justify the confidence of the Mensheviks; they did not confirm the
correctness of Menshevik tactics but disproved it by their behaviour. In the
period of upsurge the Mensheviks themselves engaged in an active struggle
against the liberals (recall Nachalo ), and at present the totality of
voting in the Second Duma speaks most clearly in favour of a “Left
bloc” policy, and against the policy of support for the Cadets.

Thefuture historian of Social-Democracy in Russia will have to call the period
between the greatest upsurge and the greatest decline of our revolution an epoch
of vacillation. At that time, Social-Democracy, as personified by the
Mensheviks, wavered in the direction of liberalism. The year of disputes (end of
1904-end of 1905) was the historical preparation of disputed questions and of a
general assessment of them. A year and a half of revolution (end of 1905-mid

1907) was the practical test of those disputed questions in the realm
of practical politics. In practice, this test demonstrated the complete fiasco
of the policy of support for liberalism; this test led to the recognition of
the one and only revolutionary policy of the proletariat in the bourgeois
revolution—the struggle to carry the revolution through to its
consummation, winning over the democratic peasantry to the proletariat, against
the treachery of liberalism.

Itwould be risky to say that the London Congress has put an end to that period
of Social-Democratic hankering after liberalism. However, a serious step has, in
any case, been taken towards putting an end to it.

P.S. The bourgeois press is making excessive use of the forced silence of the
Social-Democrats and the “semi-legality” of the London Congress, to
malign the Bolsheviks as though they were dead. It stands to reason that without
a daily newspaper we cannot think of keeping pace with the non-party
Tovarishch , in which the former Social-Democrat,
A. Brahm, and also Mr. Yuri Pereyaslavsky and tutti quanti are
performing a real cancan; thank goodness there were no minutes, and they can lie
with impunity. These articles by the Brahms, Pereyaslavskys & Co., contain
nothing but the usual spitefulness of non-party bourgeois intellectuals, so
that mere mention of these articles is enough for them to be treated with the
contempt they deserve. The interview with Mr. Struve is another matter; it was
reported in Birzheviye Vedomosti and, I believe, has not yet been
refuted. Besides contempt it deserves a scientific study of
that—er—specimen. His gravitation towards the Octobrists and his
hatred of the Lefts are a truly classic expression of the innate tendencies of
liberalism. Mr. Struve admits the truth of the old rumours that he voted for the
Octobrist during the election to the bureau (of the Duma) and that he, in
general, conducted negotiations and took part in conferences with the
Octobrists. He favours unification with the Octobrists! Thank you,
Mr. Struve, for your splendid confirmation of what was said last autumn
in Proletary (No. 5—“An Attempt at a Classification of the
Political Parties of

Russia”) [2] about the Octobrists and the Cadets! Mr. Struve senses the
impotence of the bourgeois intelligentsia and wants to shift
liberalism’s centre of gravity closer to the propertied classes . An agreement with the Crown will not come off with liberals
of the Cadet type—so down with the Cadets, let it come off at least
with “liberals” of the Octobrist type. That is consistent. And
it is to our advantage, for it brings clarity and definiteness into the
situation. A new landlord Duma; a new election law that separates,
splendidly and with all desirable precision, the reliable land lords and
bourgeois tycoons from the unreliable peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and
workers. A new trend in liberalism; Mr. Struve’s war against
“the adventurous politics of the Lefts” with their “ exploitation of the dark social instincts of the undeveloped peasant masses ” (“social instincts” is illiterate
but is all the clearer in its illiteracy. Mr. Struve’s writing will
apparently be the more illiterate and clearer, the closer that gentleman
approaches to the Union of the Russian People, which already stands quite
close to him).

Thiswas by no means fortuitous. As an intellectualist party, bourgeois
liberalism is impotent. It is impotent outside the struggle against the
revolutionary (“dark social instincts”) peasantry. Liberalism is
impotent outside a close alliance with the moneybags, with the mass of the
landlords and factory owners,... with the Octobrists . There’s no
getting away from the truth. We said to the Cadets long ago: “That thou
doest, do quickly.” Those in favour of an agreement with the
Crown—go to the Octobrists, to the Stolypins, to the Union of the Russian
People.

Thosein favour of the people—follow the Social-Democrats, who alone have
conducted and are now conducting a ruthless struggle against liberalism’s
influence over the Trudoviks.

Therewere some people who thought that precisely the Mensheviks’ policy was
capable of splitting the Cadets. A naïve illusion! Only the
Left-bloc policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy has and will split the
Cadets. Only that policy will accelerate the inevitable
demarcation—bourgeois liberals to the Octobrists, bourgeois democrats to the Trudoviks. In future as
heretofore, Social-Democracy will compel these latter to choose between
consistent proletarian democracy and liberalism.

Goboldly onward, politicians à la Struve!

---
Notes:
[1]
The full victory of the revolution, said the Bolsheviks, is possible
only as a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the
peasantry.— Lenin

[2]
See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 225-31.— Ed .