V. I.

Lenin

Report to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the St. Petersburg Split and the Institution of the Party Tribunal Ensuing Therefrom [5]

As you will have learned from bourgeois newspapers ( Tovarishch , et
al.), the Central Committee of our Party has instituted a Party tribunal to
examine my activities, specifically, my pamphlet The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks , [1] which appeared at the time of the split in the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic
organisation during the elections to the Second Duma.

The tribunal has been constituted of three members representing me, three from
the thirty-one Mensheviks, and three members of a Presidium nominated by the
central committees of the Latvian and Polish Social-Democratic parties and the
Bund. I have submitted to that tribunal a counter-charge of impermissible
conduct against the thirty-one Mensheviks and against Comrade Dan (a
member of the editorial board of the Central Organ and, through the Central
Organ, a member of the Central Committee). The counter-indictment was supported
on the one hand by a meeting of 234 St. Petersburg Bolshevik members of the
Party (their resolution, together with their report giving a
résumé of the whole matter, was published in Proletary , No. 13), and on the other hand by
the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic Conference (minus the seceding
Mensheviks). The resolution of this conference was published in
Proletary , No. 14. [6]

In its capacity of an institution set up by the Central Committee, the
tribunal did not consider itself justified in indicting the thirty-one
Mensheviks and Comrade Dan, and turned to the same Central Committee for a
definition of its competency on the question of the counter-indictment. At
a special session the Central Committee again examined this question, and
confirmed that the present tribunal had been instituted exclusively for
the examination of Lenin’s case and that the arraignment of other persons
before the tribunal depended entirely on the Central Committee, which, of
course, deemed it its duty to arraign before the tribunal all persons
against whom the present tribunal would formulate a charge of
impermissible conduct. The composition of the new tribunal was again left
entirely to the discretion of that same Central Committee.

Thus we get a tangle of glaring incongruities and contradictions. The Menshevik
Central Committee is playing the role of an institution that brings up for trial
and also determines both the composition of the tribunal and its competency. A
counter-indictment has been submitted against the leader of the Menshevik
section of the Central Committee. The very same persons, it seems, appoint the
tribunal, are themselves prosecutors and also decide the question of what to do
with a counter-indictment against themselves !

Obviously such arrangements are not capable of inspiring respect for the
Party. Only the Party Congress can unravel this tangle of incongruities. I
therefore appeal to the Congress with a request: grant the tribunal full
judicial powers directly from the Congress; make the tribunal in every way
independent of the Central Committee, which (its Menshevik section) is clearly
interested in the case; grant the tribunal the right to examine the case in all
its aspects, without any restrictions and to indict any Party members and any
Party institutions, not excluding the Menshevik section of the Central
Committee, etc.

For an explanation of the case to members of the R.S.D.L.P. Congress, I append (1) the full text of my speech for the defence (or for the prosecution of the
Menshevik section of the Central Committee) that I delivered at the first
session of the tribunal. (The tribunal held only two sessions and examined only three of several dozen witnesses. The tribunal was interrupted by
the Congress.)

(2) A brief summary of the real history of the St. Petersburg split.

I. Speech for the Defence (or for the Prosecution of the
Menshevik Section of the Central Committee) Delivered at the Party
Tribunal

Comrade judges, the Central Committee has charged me with having made a statement (in the press) impermissible in a Party member . That is
what is said in the decision of the Central Committee instituting the Party
tribunal. I shall begin directly with the substance of the matter: I shall read
out in full the “declaration” which the Central Committee
“submits for consideration by the tribunal”.

“The Central Committee declares that the pamphlet, The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks , signed by Comrade
Lenin, directly charges the thirty-one members of the St. Petersburg
organisation with having entered into negotiations with the Cadet Party ’for
the purpose of selling workers’ votes to the Cadets’ and the Mensheviks with
having ’bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma, in spite of
the workers, with the aid of the Cadets’.

“The Central Committee declares that the appearance of such an accusation
in the press, particularly on the eve of the elections, was certain to cause
confusion in the ranks of the proletariat, cast suspicion upon the political
integrity of Party members, and will be utilised by the enemies of the
proletariat in their struggle against Social-Democracy.

“Being of the opinion that such a statement is impermissible in a Party
member, the Central Committee submits Lenin’s conduct to consideration by
a Party tribunal.”

Such is the full text of the indictment. First of all I will observe that there
is an important error of fact, which I shall ask the tribunal to
correct on the basis of the text of the pamphlet incriminating me.
Specifically: in the pamphlet it is stated plainly and definitely that I accuse
not only the thirty-one Mensheviks, but also Comrade Dan, i.e., a member of the Central Committee.

In drawing up its decision the Central Committee must have known that
Comrade Dan is a member of the Central Committee (he may even have taken part in
the discussions of the question, or in the decision to indict me for accusing him), and that I accuse not only the thirty-one, but Dan as well. It appears,
therefore, that the Central Committee deliberately excluded
its own member from the number whom I accused. Here, in addition to
the error of fact, the indictment contains something worse, something
intolerable, and I shall later make a detailed appraisal of this
aspect of the case, and shall try to explain precisely this aspect ,
using all of the material that comes before the tribunal in the course of
the trial.

I now pass on to the substance of the charge.

The Central Committee quotes two passages from my pamphlet, and I must analyse
each of them as fully as possible. I am aware, of, course, that the question at
issue is the whole of the above-mentioned pamphlet, and not merely
these passages. But, following the example of the Central Committee, I take
these as the main and principal parts.

The first passage is taken from the very beginning of the pamphlet. I shall take
the liberty of reading a whole page to show the context of this passage.

“The newspaper Tovarishch has today (January 20)
published”—I want to remind you that this took place five days
before the formation of the Left bloc in St. Peters burg and sixteen days before the elections to the State Duma in the city of
St. Petersburg—“lengthy excerpts from the manifesto of the thirty-one
Mensheviks who seceded from the socialist organisation on the eve of the
St. Petersburg elections.” [2]

I emphasise that the very first sentence in the pamphlet brings to the fore the
fundamental fact of the split in St. Petersburg on the eve of the
elections. I lay stress on this circumstance, because I shall have to refer to
its importance many times later on.

I continue the quotation:

“First of all, let us briefly recall the actual history of what the
Menshevik seceders from the Social-Democrats have done since they walked out of
the Conference....” A few days before the’ pamphlet we are now discussing
appeared, I published another pamphlet entitled Social-Democracy and the St. Petersburg Elections and also a pamphlet

When You Hear the Judgement of a Fool (From the Notes of a Social-Democrat Publicist ). [3]

Almost the whole issue of the latter pamphlet was confiscated by the
police. Only a few copies were saved, and I am referring to it so that the
tribunal may study the picture of the events of the time in their entirety, and
not in fragments.

“(1) After breaking away from the Social-Democrat workers, they entered
into a bloc with the petty bourgeoisie (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the
Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists) in order jointly to bargain with the
Cadets for seats. The written agreement under which the seceding
Social-Democrats joined the petty-bourgeois bloc was concealed from the workers and from the public.

“However, we still had hopes that this agreement would eventually be
published, and the secret revealed.”

I draw the attention of the tribunal to the fact that in the pamphlet in which I
accuse Dan and the thirty-one Mensheviks, I emphasise from the very beginning
that the written agreement was concealed from the workers.

Let us proceed:

“(2) As a constituent part of the petty-bourgeois bloc (incorrectly styled
the ’Left bloc’ by the newspapers), the breakaway Mensheviks bargained with the
Cadets for three places out of the six for this bloc. The Cadets offered two
seats. They could not come to terms. The meeting between the petty -bourgeois
’conference’ (this expression is not ours—we borrow it from the
newspapers) and the Cadets was held on January 18 . Both Rech
and Tovarishch reported it. Rech announces today that no
agreement was reached (although we must, of course, be prepared to hear that
negotiations are still being conducted behind the scenes).

“So far the Mensheviks have made no announcement in the press concerning
their ’ operation ’ for the sale of workers’ votes to the Cadets.”

That is the position regarding the first passage. I wrote these words against
the Mensheviks on the very day that I for the first time learned from
the newspapers that the attempt of the Mensheviks and the Narodniks to form a
bloc with the Cadets against the majority of the St. Petersburg
Social-Democratic organisation had failed; but I at once made the reservation
that I could not regard the agreement as having been finally abandoned
and that it was necessary to be prepared for the worst —the
continuation of the negotiations “ behind the scenes ”. Why did I consider
then (and I still think that the view I then held was correct) that it was
necessary to be prepared for the worst? Because it was a wrong step to
conceal from the public a written agreement between the Mensheviks and the
petty-bourgeois bloc, a step unworthy of a socialist and inevitably giving
rise to the worst suspicions .

What was meant by the “sale” of workers’ votes to the Cadets? Some
jokers told me that they understood me to have said sale for money . This jest is not devoid of wit. But a literate person who read in
earnest the whole of the pamphlet, and not disjointed passages from it, would,
of course, see at once from the context, from all the preceding and subsequent
passages, that what is referred to is a sale not for money, but for seats in the Duma . The “bargaining” and “sale” imply, of
course, a barter of political and not economic equivalents, of seats for votes,
not of money for votes.

The question arises: was it worth while bothering with such a clear and obvious
circumstance?

I am profoundly convinced that it was, for this point brings us squarely to the
elucidation of the question presented by the Central Committee—of
statements that are permissible and impermissible in the press.

If the passage in the pamphlet we are examining had read: the thirty-one were
selling workers’ votes to the Cadets for money—that would have been
imputing shameful and criminal acts to an opponent. Anyone making such an
imputation would deserve to be tried, and certainly not for “carrying
confusion into the ranks of the proletariat”, but for libel . That
is perfectly clear.

On the other hand, if the passage in question had stated:

the thirty-one spoke in favour of adding workers’ votes to Cadet votes
on the condition that the Social-Democrats were assured seats in the Duma that
would be an example of loyal and properly conducted polemics, permissible in
Party members.

What is the difference between this last-quoted wording and the one I
chose? The difference is in the tone, that tone which makes the whole
music. Exactly. The wording is calculated to evoke in the reader hatred,
aversion and contempt for people who commit such deeds. Such wording is calculated not to
convince, but to break up the. ranks of the opponent, not to correct the mistake
of the opponent, but to destroy him, to wipe his organisation off the face of
the earth. This wording is indeed of such a nature as to evoke the worst
thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent and indeed, as contrasted with
the wording that convinces and corrects, it “carries confusion into the
ranks of the proletariat”.

I may be asked: well, do you admit that such wording is impermissible ?
I shall answer, Yes, certainly, but only with the following little
proviso—impermissible in members of a united party. This proviso
represents the crux of the matter. The accusation which the Central Committee
advances against me is wrong. I shall say more, it is dishonest, precisely
because the Central Committee remains silent about the fact that at the time
the pamphlet was written a united party did not exist in the
organisation from which it emanated (not formally, but in essence), and whose
aims it served. It is dishonest to advance a charge of publishing statements in
the press “impermissible in a Party member” at a time when a
split has taken place in the Party.

A split means a rupture of all organisational ties between the two party groups
concerned; it shifts a conflict of ideas from within the bounds of a single
organisation to some where outside it, from correcting and convincing comrades
to destroying their organisation, to inciting the masses of the workers (and the
masses of the people generally) to oppose the breakaway organisation.

What is impermissible in members of a united party is permissible and obligatory
for sections of a party that has been split. It is wrong to write about Party
comrades in a language that systematically spreads among the working masses
hatred, aversion, contempt, etc., for those who hold other opinions. But one may and must write in that strain about an organisation that has seceded.

Why must one? Because when a split has taken place it is one’s duty to wrest the masses from the leadership of the seceding section. I am
told—you carried confusion into the ranks of the proletariat. My answer
is—I purposely and deliberately carried confusion into the ranks of that
section

of the St. Petersburg proletariat which followed the Mensheviks who seceded on
the eve of the elections, and I shall always act in that way
whenever a split occurs .

By my sharp and discourteous attacks on the Mensheviks on the eve of the
St. Petersburg elections, I actually succeeded in causing that section of the
proletariat which trusts and follows the Mensheviks to waver. That was
my aim. That was my duty as a member of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic
organisation which was conducting a campaign for a Left bloc; because, after the split, it was necessary , in order to conduct that campaign, to rout
the ranks of the Mensheviks who were leading the proletariat in the footsteps of
the Cadets; it was necessary to carry confusion into their ranks; it
was necessary to arouse among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for these
people who had ceased to be members of a united party, had become
political enemies, and were trying to put a spoke in the wheel of our
Social-Democratic organisation in its election campaign. Against such
political enemies I then conducted—and in the event of a repetition or
development of a split shall always conduct —a struggle of
extermination .

If, after the split which the Mensheviks engineered in St. Petersburg, we had
not carried confusion into the ranks of that section of the proletariat which
followed the lead of the Mensheviks , we should not have been able to
carry on our Left bloc election campaign. My only regret is that, being away
from St. Petersburg, I did not sufficiently contribute to this cause of
wresting the masses from the influence of the breakaway Mensheviks;
for given a more zealous and rapid execution of this task, the Left bloc would
have gained a victory in St. Petersburg. The statistics of the election results
prove this.

The basic logical (and, of course, not only logical) error in the indictment is
that the question of the split is craftily evaded, the fact of the split is
hushed up, and attempts are made to apply demands, legitimate from the
standpoint of party unity, to conditions in which there is no unity,
no united party, and what is more—I shall prove this later
on— when absence of unity and of a united party lies at the door of the
accusing Central Committee itself, which organised and covered up the split.

If anyone were to use what is permissible in an internal Party struggle as a
measure of struggle based on a split, a struggle directed against the Party from
without or (in case of a local split) against the given Party organisation, he
would have to be regarded either as being childishly naive or a hypocrite. From
the organisational point of view, a split signifies a rupture of all
organisational ties, i.e., the transition from a struggle to convince comrades
within the organisation, to a struggle to destroy the hostile
organisation, destroy its influence over th& masses of the proletariat. From
the psychological standpoint it is perfectly obvious that the severance of all
organisational ties between comrades already signifies an extreme degree of mutual bitterness and hostility, which has grown into hatred.

Moreover, in the St. Petersburg split there were two special circumstances which
intensified the sharpness and the ruthlessness of the struggle tenfold.

The first circumstance was the role of the Party’s Central
Committee. According to Party Rules, its duty is to unite, and any local split
should lead, not to a struggle on the basis of that split, but to a complaint
being lodged with the Central Committee, or, more broadly speaking, to an appeal
to the Central Committee for help in getting unity restored. In reality , on the eve of the elections in St. Petersburg, the Central
Committee acted as the initiator of and participant in the split. It is
precisely this circumstance, worked out in detail and supported by documentary
evidence in the preamble to the decision of the Conference to present a
counter-indictment, that compels us to regard the St. Petersburg split as a
dishonest split. I shall refer to this separately later on, and I
shall insist that the tribunal take up the questions which follow from the
juridical nature of this indictment presented by the accused against the
accuser.

The second circumstance is the election campaign in St. Petersburg at the time
of the split. If a split occurs at a time when there is no immediate, open, mass
political action, or when the Party generally is not engaged in some political
action, it may not always be necessary to wage an immediate and
merciless war of extermination. But if such mass action is in
progress—elections, for instance—and if it is necessary at all costs immediately to intervene in the elections and conduct them in one
way or another, a split must immediately and unfailingly call forth a war
of extermination, a war to determine who is to conduct the
elections—the local Social-Democratic organisation or the group that
has seceded from it. Given such a split, it is impossible even for a moment
to postpone the task of wresting the masses from the influence of the
secessionists, of smashing their organisation, and of politically nullifying
them. It is only thanks to the ruthless force of the Bolshevik onslaught
against the Mensheviks after the latter had seceded on January 6,
that we achieved an election campaign in the capital that was relatively
unit ed, conducted more or less on Party lines, and bore at least some
semblance to a Social-Democratic campaign.

They say—fight, but not with a poisoned weapon. This is a very fine and
striking expression, to be sure. But it is either a fine platitude or else it
expresses in a vague and nebulous fashion the very same idea of a struggle, one
that sows in the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for the opponents—of
a struggle that is impermissible in a united party, but inevitable and necessary
when a split has occurred, because of the very nature of the split, i.e., the
idea I set forth in the beginning of my speech. However much you twist this
sentence or metaphor, you will not be able to squeeze a grain of real sense out
of it besides this very difference between the loyal and properly conducted
method of fighting by means of argument within the organisation, and the method
of fighting by means of a split, i.e., by destroying the enemy organisation, by
rousing among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for this organisation. It
is the dishonest splits that are poisoned weapons and not the war of
extermination which results from a split that has already taken place.

Are there any limits to a permissible struggle stemming from a split? No Party
standards set limits to such a struggle, nor can there be such limits, for a
split implies that the Party has ceased to exist. It is ridiculous even to think
it possible to fight by Party methods, by means of Party decisions, etc.,
against the methods of struggle that arise out of a split in the Party. The
limits of a struggle stemming from a split are not Party limits, but general
political limits, or rather general civil limits, the limits set by criminal law and nothing
else. If you have broken away from me, you cannot demand more of me than you
demand of the Cadet, the Socialist-Revolutionary, or any man in the street, etc.

I shall further illustrate my idea with a graphic example. The next issue of
Proletary will contain a report on the elections in the city of Kovno,
sent by a local correspondent. The correspondent is very much dissatisfied with
the bloc concluded by the Bund with the

Dostizhentsi , [7] against the Lithuanian Social-Democrats, and
sharply criticises the Bund. What sort of criticism is permissible for
members of a united party? The dissatisfaction should have been expressed
somewhat as follows: the Bundists acted incorrectly by forming a bloc with
the Jewish bourgeoisie against the socialists of another nation; this
behaviour reveals the influence of petty-bourgeois nationalist ideas,
etc. As long as we belong to the same party as the Bund, a pamphlet
directed against them and distributed in large quantities on the eve of an
election and describing the Bundists as traitors to the proletariat would
be absolutely impermissible. But what if the case of 1903 were
repeated—generally speaking, history does not repeat itself, and I am
only taking a hypothetical case—and the Bund secedes from the
Party. Could anyone then seriously raise the question of the
impermissibility of pamphlets calculated to instil in the Bundist working
masses hatred, aversion and contempt for their leaders, and describing
these leaders as bourgeois in disguise, as those who had sold themselves to
the Jewish bourgeoisie and were trying to get their men into the Duma with
the latter’s assistance, etc.? Anyone who made such a complaint would
be ridiculed to his face—do not cause splits, do not use I he “poisoned
weapon” of a split; but if you do, then do not complain if he who raises
the poisoned sword perishes by the poisoned sword!

After all that has been said above, there is no need to dwell at length on the
second passage quoted. It reads:

“The Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma,
in spite of the workers, with the aid of the Cadets—such is the simple
explanation of all these peregrinations from the Social-Democrats to the
petty-bourgeois bloc and from the petty-bourgeois bloc to the

Cadets.” [4]

If you analyse this passage formally, and superficially, from the standpoint of a
united party, you will certainly say—in referring to Party
members you should have said “conducting negotiations” and not
“bargaining”, “to secure the election of” instead of “get”, a “Social-Democrat deputy” instead of
“their man”, and so on. But would such an “analysis” of the quotation, or such an “opinion” of the
method of expression, evoke anything but a smile? Is it not clear that the
use of the most offensive and contemptuous mode of expression, which puts
everything in the worst light, not in the best, is a method of fighting that
stems from a split, of fighting for the extermination of the
organisation which disrupts the political campaign of the local
Social-Democratic proletariat? To complain about the offensive, insulting,
and insidious character of the expressions used would be the same as if a
strike-breaker were to complain of the bitterness displayed
towards him by strikers. To discuss complaints or accusations on this plane
would be the same as if we were to condemn the word “strike-breaker” as being impermissible, without going into
the essence of the question of whether the behaviour of the person
concerned was actually that of a strike-breaker or not.

There are different kinds of splits. I have repeatedly used the expression a
“dishonest” split. I shall now dwell on this aspect of the case. The
Central Committee states in its indictment that I cast suspicion on the
political integrity of Party members. This is put too mildly and is wrongly
applied to the above quotations. I not only “cast suspicion on the
political integrity” of the thirty-one and Dan; by the whole content of my
election pamphlets I accuse them of causing a politically dishonest split, or one that is dishonest from a Party standpoint . And I insist on this accusation. All attempts to shift the
weight of this accusation from the general, basic and fundamental question of
the organisers of the split, to petty, particular and subsidiary questions will
be of no avail.

Every split is a great crime against the Party, for it destroys the Party, and
breaks Party ties. But there are different kinds of splits. The expression “dishonest split” which I have
used on several occasions, cannot be applied to every split. I shall quote an
example to illustrate this.

Let us assume that two trends have long been contending in the Party, one of
which, let us say, is in favour of supporting the policy of the Cadets, and the
other is opposed to this. A big political event occurs which accentuates the
Cadet tendencies and brings nearer a deal between them and reaction. Those in
favour of supporting the Cadets break with those who are opposed to such
support. Such a split, like any other split, will inevitably give rise to a very
acute and bitter struggle, which will rouse hatred, etc.; but we cannot regard
such a split as being dishonest, for there is nothing else behind such a split
than the sharpening of differences on matters of principle.

Now imagine another kind of split. Let us assume that the two trends in the
Party have agreed to apply varying tactics in various localities. If this
general agreement is broken in one of the localities, broken in a secret,
underhand fashion, by behaving treacherously towards comrades—then
everyone will certainly agree that such a split is a dishonest split.

In St. Petersburg, the Mensheviks engineered precisely such a split on the eve
of the elections. At the All-Russian Conference both trends solemnly promised,
in the first place, to submit to the local tactics of the local organisations
during the elections. The St. Petersburg Mensheviks were the. only ones in the
whole of Russia who broke that promise. That is dishonest. It is treachery to
the Party.

Secondly, instead of uniting the Party, the Central Committee pursued a
factional policy to such a degree that it positively assisted the Menshevik
split, and Dan, a member of the Central Committee, took a most active part in
this. That is dishonest. It is tantamount to using against the Party the power
delegated by the Party. It is tantamount to driving a poisoned knife stealthily
into the back of the Party, while professing to be a defender of Party unity.

These are the two main facts which have compelled me to describe the
thirty-one and Dan as being politically dishonest. The whole of my
pamphlet is imbued with the spirit of contempt for such people.

And I have upheld my accusation before this tribunal, I have directed all my
efforts to making the tribunal proceedings reveal to the judges all the
attendant circumstances of the St. Petersburg split, enabling them to
decide with complete conviction the question of whether this split was an
honest split or not, whether “poisoned weapons” were used by
those who engineered the split or by those who waged a ruthless war of
extermination against the organisers of the split.

If this question is cleared up in full, to its very depth and core , if
it is cleared up by the delegates of the national Social-Democratic parties,
who for the first time have become really affiliated with the
R.S.D.L.P., it may have enormous effect in establishing real Party relations in
our Party in stead of a thinly disguised split.

The subject of the present trial is not of a formal or strictly juridical
nature. Surely the crux of the matter is not whether, in a united party, one
should write, bargain or con duct negotiations, elect or place deputies, sell
votes for seats or give votes on condition of obtaining seats, etc.; such a
conception of the question can, of course, only call forth a smile.

The crux of the matter is whether we attach any real value to the unity of our
Party, or whether we are to become reconciled to splits, write about them, and
cover up these ulcers with formal subterfuges. Comrade judges, your judgement
will determine, and determine, perhaps, to no small degree, whether the
St. Petersburg split will be the last one, the really final echo of a bygone
general Party split, or ... whether it will be the beginning of a new split and,
consequently, of a new, general struggle with poisoned weapons.

Your judgement will determine whether the shaken unity of the Russian
Social-Democratic Labour Party will be weakened or strengthened.

II. A Brief Summary of the Real History of the St. Petersburg Split

At the November (1906) conference of the R.S.D.L.P. it was unanimously decided
that everybody would submit to the decisions of local Social-Democratic
organisations in election matters.

At that same conference Lenin stated: “Let there be no contravention of
the St. Petersburg Committee decision by the Vyborg District either”
(report of the Menshevik section of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic
organisation), thereby giving warning, as it were, of the mutuality of the
commitment.

A special article in Proletary , No. 8 (November 1906), called on
Bolsheviks sharply to criticise blocs with the Constitutional-Democrats, but to
remain subordinated to the local organisations.

Also in November 1906, Comrade Dan, a member of the Central Committee,
participated “ entirely in a personal capacity ” (as he
stated at the tribunal) in a meeting arranged by Engineer Fedorovich, at which
were present Milyukov and Nabokov (leaders of the Cadet Central and St. Peters
burg Committees), one leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Peshekhonov
(leader of the Popular Socialists). They spoke about the elections, but
(according to Comrade Dan) not those in St. Petersburg . Comrade Dan did
not find it necessary to report this meeting either to the Central Committee or
to the St. Petersburg Committee.

In December 1906, Comrade Dan appeared at an informative meeting on the
election question, attended by representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee
of the R.S.D.L.P., as well as of the Constitutional-Democrats, Popular
Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Dan stated that he represented the
Central Committee, but was expressing his “ own personal views ” on the desirability of agreements, according to district , in St. Petersburg.

At a meeting of the Central Committee on January 4, 1907, a decision was taken
to demand, in the form of an ultimatum, that the conference of the
St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation divide into an urban and a gubernia conference . The Bolshevik members of the Central Commit tee
(Maximov, Zimin, and

Stroyev) [8] submitted a protest against this step, which actually
amounted to the Central Committee splitting the St. Petersburg
organisation.

The conference of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation, which
decided the question of the elections, was held on January 6, 1907. There were 39
Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks present. The Mensheviks walked out of the conference for two formal reasons—(1) because they considered the
mandates incorrectly distributed and (2) because the conference refused to
split into urban and gubernia conferences as demanded by the Central
Committee.

To assess the value of these reasons for the split, I cite three facts—(1) at the January 6 conference 42 mandates for the Bolsheviks and
28 for the Mensheviks were confirmed. In the pamphlet issued by the Mensheviks they stated that 35 mandates for the Bolsheviks and 32 for t.he
Mensheviks should have been recognised, that is, they admitted the
preponderance of Bolsheviks; (2) because of the split the next conference of the St. Petersburg
Social-Democratic organisa tion was elected under the supervision of a control
commission especially appofnted by the Central Committee. The elections to the
March 25 conference produced 92 Bolsheviks and 41 Mensheviks. The new elections
confirmed a still greater preponderance of Bolsheviks; (3) the Central Com mittee did not demand the division of the conference in any
other city in Russia, be it Wilno, Odessa, or Baku. This demand in the form of
an ultimatum was unlawful and directed, for patently factional reasons, only
against St. Petersburg.

After walking out of the conference, the Mensheviks elected their own executive
body and began issuing their own pamphlets (with the participation of Central
Committee Menshevik members, Comrade Dan among them) and con ducted an
independent election campaign. Without the Bolsheviks they entered into
agreements with the Narodnik parties (Popular Socialists,
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks) for a joint agreement with the
Constitutional-Democrats.

The bourgeois press in St. Petersburg ( Rech, Strana, Tovarishch and
others) gave hearty praise to the Mensheviks for the split, styled them “a
moderate socialist party”, called for a bold struggle against the
Bolsheviks, were jubilant over the isolation of these “Blanquists”,
etc. The Bolsheviks who, on January 6, had proposed to the Narod niks a bloc
against the Constitutional-Democrats, took no part in any of the
negotiations.

On January 14, a Rech editorial promised the Mensheviks a seat from the worker curia in the event of the bloc being successful against the
Bolsheviks.

At a meeting held on January 17, the Mensheviks decided to place all seats
obtained by them at the disposal of the worker curia. Tovarisheh wrote
about this on January 19.

On January 15, Milyukov was received in audience by Stolypin, after which the
Constitutional-Democrats shifted clearly to the Right.

On January 18, there was a conference of Mensheviks, Narodniks and Cadets. The
Cadets offered two seats, but three were demanded of them. A break with the
Cadets.

On January 20, Tovarisheh published extracts from a Menshevik pamphlet
directed against the Bolsheviks and undermining their election campaign. That
same day I wrote the pamphlet The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks , which appeared some three days later.

On January 25, a Left bloc was set up in St. Petersburg. On January 28, there
was a meeting of delegates elected (January 7 and 14) by the factories for the
worker curia of the city of St. Petersburg. Between 200 and 250 out of
the 271 were present. The majority, against ten or twelve, adopted a resolution
in favour of the Left bloc . The resolution made a special
appeal to the Mensheviks “ not to give support to the Cadets even in covert form ”.

The Mensheviks, who on January 17 had promised to givc “their”
places to the worker curia, not only gave no heed to the voice of a meeting of
all delegates, but straightaway called it “a
Socialist-Revolutionary-Bolshevik witches’ sabbath”.

On January 30 a meeting of Social-Democratic delegates was held. The
candidates of the St. Petersburg Committee were nominated as electors.

On January 29 the Left bloc called on non-party progres sive voters in the
Kolomna Ward to tear up their written agreement with the Mensheviks,
because in that agreement (as well as in the printed Menshevik
pamphlet) there was the proviso: “ Menshevik electors do not consider themselves bound by the conditions of the Narodnik-Bolshevik bloc insofar as the distribution of deputies’ seats is concerned ” (Point II, Subsection
3). This proviso is an obvious attempt to leave open for themselves an
opportunity to vote with the Cadets against the Left bloc at the second
stage of the elections.

On February 7, the elections were held in St. Petersburg. The Black-Hundred
danger was completely disproved. The Cadets obtained 28,798 votes, the
Left bloc—16,703, the Octobrists—16,613 and the monarchists—5,270. The Left bloc had only to capture 1,673
votes from the Cadets in five wards to have been victorious throughout
St. Peters burg. In the Kolomna Ward the Left bloc obtained only
199 votes less than the Cadets.

Such is a brief list of the facts. It is clear from them that, in point of fact , the election campaign in St. Peters burg was disrupted by the
Mensheviks. In point of fact, the conspiracy to effect a split was begun as early as November , and was begun by member of the Central Committee Dan . In point of fact, it was precisely Dan, plus the Menshevik members of
the Central Committee , who in St. Petersburg effected the
split contrary to the wishes of the majority of the local organisation....

---
Notes:
[1]
See pp. 33-44 of this volume.— Ed .

[2]
See p. 33 of this volume.— Ed .

[3]
See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 431-55 and pp. 456-74.— Ed .

[4]
See p. 39 of this volume.— Ed .

[5]
This was published in pamphlet form in April 1907 in the
Proletary press in Vyborg; it bore the instruction on the cover
“For Delegates to the Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Only”. The first
and last parts of the pamphlet were written in April 1907; “Speech for the
Defence (or for the Prosecution of the Menshevik Section of the Central
Committee) Delivered at the Party Tribunal” was written by Lenin in
February and read at the first session of the tribunal at the end of March
1907.

[6]
The conference referred to was a meeting of 234 Bolsheviks of the
St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. working in various districts of
that city; it passed the following resolution on the conduct of the Mensheviks
in St. Petersburg at the time of the campaign for the elections to the Second
State Duma and on the Party tribunal set up on the initiative of the Menshevik
Central
Committee:

“1. The Menshevik comrades were wholly to blame for the split in the
St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation at the time of the election
campaign.

“2. The negotiations between the Menshevik group and the Cadets before the
split and after were, in effect, impermissible bargaining for seats in the Duma,
bargaining that took place against the wishes of the Social-Democratic
proletariat in St. Petersburg.

“3. Particularly impermissible were the activities of Comrade Dan, who
played a most active part throughout the split and in the negotiations with the
Cadets, for the conduct of which ho was not authorised by any Party
organisation.

“4. The conduct of the group of Mensheviks after their rupture with the
Cadets, and particularly after the conclusion of the agreement between the Left
parties in St. Petersburg—the demonstrative protests against that
agreement and the appeal to electors in some St. Petersburg districts not to
support it, the obstruction in compiling the Left election lists, etc
—this conduct as a whole is direct subversion of the proletarian and
common Party cause to the advantage of the Cadets.

“The meeting therefore expresses the wish that the Bolshevik section of the
St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation that remained after the Mensheviks
had quit the Conference should participate in the Party tribunal organised on
the initiative of the Central Committee and submit a counter-indictment of
politically impermissible conduct against the group of Mensheviks and against
Comrade Dan.

“The meeting proposes to all Party workers, to counteract the campaign
launched by the Central Committee against N. Lenin by informing broad sections
of the St. Petersburg proletariat of the course taken by the Social-Democratic
election campaign and the role played by the Menshevik group”
( Proletary , No. 13, February 11, 1907).

The Conference of the St. Petersburg (City and Regional) Organisation, held in
February 1907, confirmed the resolution passed by the meeting of 234 Bolsheviks
of St. Petersburg, and added a fifth point to it: “The Conference supports
the substance of the accusation made in N. Lenin’s pamphlet ( The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks )
and, therefore, considers that it has the right to attend the tribunal as a
contending p arty. In putting forward its counter-indictment against Comrade Dan
and the thirty-one Mensheviks, the Conference instructs its representatives at
the tribunal to hand it to the judges examining Lenin’s case”
( Proletary , No. 14, March 4, 1907).

Similar resolutions were passed at meetings of district committees and by the
meeting of the Okruzhnoi District of St. Petersburg.

[7]
Dostizhentsi (from dostizheniye—attainment)—members of the League for the Attainment of
Full Rights for the Jewish People in Russia. The League was organised in 1905 at
a meeting of Jewish “public” men in Wilno. It was made up of Cadet
and Zionist elements; the leader of the League was M. M. Vinaver. The
“dostizhentsi” put forward demands for bourgeois civil liberties,
the annulment of laws imposing restrictions on Jews, and the granting of the
same rights to Jews as to the remainder of the population. The League played
scarcely any political role; its activities, even in the period of greatest
revolutionary upsurge, were confined to the organisation of petitions and
protests. On all questions the League adopted the Cadet position. By the end of
1907 it had ceased to exist.

[8]
Maximov-Malinovsky —better known by his pseudonym of A. A. Bogdanov.

Zimin —L. B. Krasin.

Stroyev —pseudonym of V. A. Desnitsky.