V. I.

Lenin

How Not to Write Resolutions [6]

One must thank the Menshevik comrades for publishing in Russkaya Zhizn ,
No. 47 (February 24), the first draft of a resolution (prepared by Comrades
Dan, Koltsov, Martynov, Martov, Negorev and others, with a group of
practicians participating). (It has also been published as a separate
leaflet.)
To prepare seriously for the Party congress, we must publish draft
resolutions beforehand, and analyse them in detail.

The resolution deals with the attitude to the State Duma.

Point 1:

“At the present moment, after seven months’ rule of the most unbridled
dictatorship that has failed to meet with organised counteraction on the part
of the terrorised masses, the activity of the State Duma, by arousing the
interest of those masses in the political life of the country, can and must
facilitate their mobilisation and the development of their political activity.”

What do they mean by this? That it is better with a Duma than without one? Or is
this an approach to the idea that the “Duma must be preserved”? It seems
that this is actually the authors’ idea. Only it is not expressed, but merely
hinted at. Resolutions cannot be compiled of hints.

Point 2:

“The task of the direct struggle for power that is rising to [probably a misprint [1]

–it

should read “is becoming”] the central feature of the
Russian revolution, is, under the existing alignment of social forces, reduced
mainly to the question of the struggle for popular representation.”

It was not for nothing that this point won praise from Rech (the
leading article of February 27: “for Russian

Social-Democracy this is a tremendous step forward... the success of political
consciousness”). And it is, indeed, really a monstrous point.

How can the task of the struggle for power be reduced to the question
of the “struggle for popular representation”?! What is meant by “the
struggle for popular representation”? What is this “existing
alignment of social forces”? The previous point has only just said that the
“seven months’ rule of the most unbridled dictatorship has failed to meet
with organised counteraction on the part of the terrorised masses”. Surely
the absence of the organised resistance of the masses during those seven months,
accompanied by an obvious and extensive swing of the masses to the Left which
was made clear by the elections at the end of the seven months, can tell us
something about the “alignment of social forces”.

This is some sort of almost unbelievable confusion in political thinking.

The alignment of social forces has obviously changed during the past half-year
in the sense that the “Centre”, the liberals, have weakened; the
extremes, the Black Hundreds and the “Lefts” have grown stronger
and more virile. The elections to the Second Duma proved this irrefutably. There
is, therefore a more revolutionary alignment of social forces in
consequence of the sharpening of political contradictions ( and economic contradictions, too—lock-outs, hunger strikes, etc. ). By what
miracle could our Mensheviks draw the opposite conclusion that made them weaken
the revolutionary tasks (“the struggle for power”) and bring them
down to the level of mere liberal tasks (“the struggle for popular
representation”)?

“An unbridled dictatorship” and a Left Duma—obviously the
opposite conclusion is to be drawn from this; the liberal task of
struggling on the basis of popular representation, or for the preservation of
that representation, is a petty-bourgeois utopia because, by force of objective
circumstances, such a task cannot be carried out without “a
direct struggle for power”.

Menshevik political thinking moves forward crabwise.

The conclusion to be drawn from the second point is this: the Mensheviks have
abandoned the revolutionary

Social-Democratic position for the liberal position. The
“nebulosity” of the conclusion of the second point (“the struggle for popular representation”) actually
expresses the idea of the liberal bourgeoisie who pretend that it is not they
who are “terrorised” by the revolution but “the masses of the
people who are terrorised”, and use this as an excuse to reject the
revolutionary struggle (“the direct struggle for power”) in favour of
the allegedly legal struggle (“the struggle for popular
representation”). Stolypin will probably soon teach the Mensheviks the
meaning of “the struggle for popular representation” under
“the existing alignment of social forces!”

Point 3:

“The elections to the Second Duma, by revealing a considerable number of
consistent supporters of the revolution, have shown that among the masses of
the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for this struggle
for power.”

What is this? What does it mean? In Point 2 the substitution of the struggle
for representation for the struggle for power was deduced from the existing
alignment of social forces, and now a growing consciousness among the masses of
the necessity for “ this ” struggle for power is deduced
from the election results!

This, comrades, is muddled. It should be rewritten as something like the
following.

Point Two—“The elections to the Second Duma showed that among the masses
of the people there is a growing consciousness of the necessity for a direct
struggle for power.”

Point Three—“The striving of the liberal bourgeoisie to limit its
political activity to a struggle on the basis of the present popular
representation, therefore, expresses the hopeless stupidity of our liberals on
the ideological side, and, on the material side, their striving (impracticable
at the present moment) to halt the revolution by making a deal with
reaction.” If, in addition to this, our Marxists were to try and define,
in Point I, the economic causes that brought about this sharpening of political
extremes among the people, they could have made something coherent out of it.

And then, what is meant by “consistent supporters of the revolution”?
Apparently, what is meant here is petty bourgeois democrats, mainly peasant
democrats, i.e., the

Trudoviks (in the broad sense, including the Popular Socialists and the
Socialist-Revolutionaries), since the Second Duma differs from the First
precisely in this respect. But, in the first place, this again is a hint,
and resolutions are not compiled of hints. And, secondly, it is all untrue , comrades! For calling the Trudoviks “consistent
supporters of the revolution” we ought formally to accuse you of
Socialist-Revolutionary heresy . Only the proletariat can be the
consistent (in the strict sense of the word) supporter of the bourgeois
revolution, because the class of small producers, small proprietors, must
inevitably vacillate between the proprietary urge and the
revolutionary urge— for instance, the Socialist-Revolutionaries at the
St. Petersburg elections wavered between the urge to sell them selves to the
Cadets and the urge to give battle to the Cadets.

You will therefore agree with us, comrades, that we must express ourselves more
cautiously—approximately in the way the Bolshevik resolution is worded
(see Novy Luch , February

27): [2] “... the Trudovik parties ... come more or less close to
expressing the interests and viewpoint of the broad masses of the peasantry and
urban petty bourgeoisie, wavering between submission to the leader
ship of the liberals [the elections in St. Petersburg, the election of a Cadet
as Chairman of the Duma] and a determined struggle against landed proprietorship
and the feudal state

Incidentally, we must mention that in this resolution, Comrade Koltsov (with
other Mensheviks) places the Trudoviks among the consistent supporters of the
revolution, but in Russkaya Zhizn , No. 49, that same Koltsov places
them among the rural democrats, which, as distinct from the urban democrats (i.e., from the Cadets) “will in many cases defend old,
outworn modes of production and social organisation”. That doesn’t
sound very coherent, comrades!

Point 4:

“The presence of such consistent supporters of the revolution in the Duma,
arousing and strengthening the confidence of the masses in that institution,
makes it more easily possible for it to become the real centre of the
people’s struggle for liberty and power.”

The conclusion is a “pleasant” one, say what you will. But again the
logic is lame. With this point the Mensheviks conclude the preamble to their
resolution. On this question they do not utter a single word more in
the resolution. And so the conclusion is a lame one.

If the “consistent supporters of the revolution” do not constitute a
majority in the Duma, but only “a consider able number” (as is
said—and rightly so—in Point 3), it is clear that there are also
opponents of the revolution and inconsistent supporters of the
revolution. That means that there is the “ possibility ” of the
Duma as a whole “becoming a real centre” of inconsistent
democratic politics and not of “the people’s struggle for liberty
and power”.

In such a case one of two things would happen:

(1) either the confidence of the masses in that institution would not be aroused
and strengthened, but would be reduced and weakened, or (2) the political consciousness of the masses would be corrupted on account of
their mistaking the policy of inconsistent supporters of the revolution for a
consistent democratic policy.

From this it is perfectly clear that a conclusion, for some reason or other
omitted by them, follows inevitably from the premises put forward by the Mensheviks —the party of the proletariat, of the consistent
supporter of the revolution, must work persistently to ensure that those who are
not fully consistent supporters of the revolution (the Trudoviks, for instance)
should follow the working class against the inconsistent supporters of
the revolution, particularly against the notorious supporters of
stopping the revolution (the Cadets, for instance).

As a result of the absence of this conclusion in the Mensheviks’ draft they are
quite unable to be consistent. It amounts to this: inasmuch as there
are a considerable number of “consistent supporters of the
revolution” in the Duma, votes should be given to ... those who are known
to be in favour of halting the revolution!

This doesn’t sound very good, does it, comrades?

The concluding part of the resolution (taking it point by point) is as follows:

“Social-Democracy, while exposing the illusory conception that the State
Duma is really a legislative body, explains to the masses, on the one hand, the real nature of the Duma, which is actually an advisory
body, and, on the other the possibility and necessity of using that body,
despite its imperfections, to serve the purpose of a further struggle for
popular power, and participates in the legislative work of the Duma,
being guided by the following principles:...”

This is a weaker expression of the idea that was more strongly
expressed in the Fourth (Unity) Congress resolution in the part which speaks of
“converting” the Duma into an “instrument of the revolution”, of making the masses conscious of the “utter
insuitability” of the Duma, etc.

“I. (a) Social-Democracy criticises from the standpoint of the
interests of the urban and rural proletariat and from that of consistent
democratism, the proposals and bills of all non-proletarian parties, and puts
forward its own demands and proposals in opposition to them; in this field it
connects immediate political tasks with the social and economic needs of the
proletarian masses and with the requirements of the working-class movement in
all its forms.

“ Note . Whenever circumstances demand it, Social-Democracy
supports, as a lesser evil, those bills of other parties which, if put into
force, could become an instrument in the hands of the masses for use in the
revolutionary struggle to attain real democratic liberty....”

This note expresses the idea of the necessity for Social-Democrats to
participate in bourgeois-reformist work in the Duma. Is it not too
early for this, comrades? Have you yourselves not said that the concept of the
Duma as a real legislative body is an illusory one? You want to sup port
those bourgeois bills that could be of benefit to the further struggle
if they were put into force .

Think over this condition—“if they were put into force”. The
purpose of your support is to facilitate the implementation of the
“lesser evil”. But it is not the Duma that implements it, but the
Duma plus the Council of

State [7] plus the supreme authority! This means that there is
absolutely no guarantee that by giving your support you are
facilitating the implementation of the “lesser evil”. And by supporting
the “lesser evil”, by voting for it, you are taking upon yourselves , upon the proletarian party, some small part of the
responsibility for half-way bourgeois reformism, for what is, in essence,
the Duma’s work of sham legislation, which you yourselves
admit to be sham legislation!

For what reason should you extend this risky “support”? There
is the risk that it will cause a direct enfeeblement of that
revolutionary consciousness of the masses to which you are yourselves
appealing—and its practical value is “illusory”!

You are not writing a resolution on reformist work in general (in which
case it would be necessary to say merely that Social-Democracy does not renounce
it); you are writing about the Second Duma . You have already said that
there are a considerable number of “consistent supporters of the
revolution” in this Duma. You therefore have in mind a Duma with
a party composition that is already defined . That is a fact. You know
that in the present Duma there are not only “ consistent [3] supporters of the revolution” but also “inconsistent supporters of
reforms”—not only Lefts and Trudoviks but also Cadets, these last-named
in themselves being stronger than the Rights (Cadets and their allies,
the Narodowci among them, being about 150 against 100 Rights). With this
situation in the Duma, there is no need for you to support the
“lesser evil” for the sake of its implementation; it is quite enough
for you to abstain in the struggle between the reactionaries and the
“inconsistent supporters of reforms”. The practical result (as far
as the implementation of laws is concerned) will be the same, but as far as the
ideological and political aspect is concerned, your undoubted gain will be the
integrity, purity, consistency and conviction of your position as a party of
the revolutionary proletariat.

Is this a circumstance that revolutionary Social-Democracy can afford to
ignore?

The Mensheviks are looking upward instead of looking downward. They are looking
more to the feasibility of the “lesser evil” by means of a deal
between the “inconsistent supporters of reforms” and the
reactionaries (for such is the real meaning of the implementation of bills) than
to the development of political consciousness and of potentialities for
struggle in the “consistent supporters of the revolution”, of whom,
according to their own words, “there are a considerable number” in the Duma. The Mensheviks themselves are
looking, and are teaching the people to look , for an agreement
between the Cadets and the autocracy (the implementation of the
“lesser evil”, of reforms), and not to the possibility of
turning the attention of the more or less “consistent supporters of
the revolution” to the masses . This is a liberal, not a
proletarian policy. This means that in word you are announcing the illusory
nature of the Duma’s legislative powers, and in deed are strengthening
the people’s faith in legislative reforms through the Duma and
weakening their faith in revolutionary struggle.

Be more consistent and more honest, Meusbevik comrades! If you are convinced
that the revolution is over, if absence of faith in the revolution results from
this conviction of yours (perhaps arrived at along scientific lines?), then
there is no need to talk of revolution, then you must reduce your
immediate aims to the struggle for reforms.

If you believe what you say, if you really believe that “a considerable
number” of deputies to the Second Duma are “consistent supporters of
the revolution”, you should give priority , not to support
(support that is useless in practice and harmful ideologically) for reforms, but
to raising the level of the revolutionary consciousness of those supporters, to
consolidating their revolutionary organisa tion and determination under the
direct pressure of the proletariat.

Otherwise you would arrive at the height of illogicality and confusion; in the name of the development of the revolution , a working-class
party does not, by a single word , define its tasks in respect of the
more or less “consistent supporters of the revolution”, but instead
devotes a special note to the task of supporting the “lesser evil”,
the incon sistent supporters of reforms !

The “note” should be rewritten something like this:

“In view of the fact that there are a considerable number of more or less
consistent supporters of the revolution in the Duma, the Social-Democrats in the
Duma must, when dis cussing those bills which the inconsistent supporters of
reforms wish to implement, pay critical attention chiefly to the half-and-half
nature and unreliability of those bills, to the agreement therein contained
between the liberals and the reactionaries, and to explaining to the more or less consistent
supporters of the revolution the necessity for a decisive and ruthless
revolutionary struggle. During the voting on those bills which constitute the
lesser evil, the Social-Democrats abstain from voting and leave the liberals
themselves to ’conquer’ reaction on paper and to answer to the people for the
implementation of ’liberal’ reforms under the autocracy.”

“...(b) The Social-Democrats make use of the discussion on various bills and
on the state budget in order to expose, not only the negative sides of the
existing regime, but also all the class contradictions of bourgeois
society....”

An excellent aim. In order to expose the class contradictions of bourgeois
society, the parties must be associat ed with classes. We must struggle against
the “non-party”, “single opposition” spirit in the Duma,
and ruthlessly expose the narrow class character of, for instance, the
Cadets, who claim more than anybody to conceal “class contradictions” by the catchword of “people’s freedom”.

We would like the Mensheviks not only to speak of ex posing the class
contradictions of bourgeois society (and “ not only ” of the
infamy of the autocracy), but also to do that ....

“...(c) On the question of the budget the Social-Democrats are guided by
the principle: ’not a kopek for a non-responsible government’....”

A good principle, which would be really excellent if, instead of
“non-responsible” some other word were used indicating, not
the government’s responsibility to the Duma (a fiction under the present
“constitution”), but its “responsibility” to the supreme authority (this is not fiction but reality , since the people
have no actual power, and the Mensheviks themselves speak of the impending
“struggle for power”).

It should read: “not a kopek for the government until all power is vested
in the people”.

“II. The Social-Democrats make use of the right to interpellation in order
to expose to the people the true nature of the present government and the fact
that all its actions are contradictory to the interests of the people; to
explain the condition of the working class in town and countryside, and the conditions of that class’s struggle for
the improvement of its political and economic position; to throw light on
the role played, in respect of the working class, by the government and
its agents and by the propertied classes and the political parties that
represent them

A very good point. Only it is a pity that till now (March 19) our
Social-Democrats in the Duma have made little use of the right to
interpellation.

“...III. By maintaining the closest contact with the working-class masses in
the course of this work, and striving, through their legislative
activities, to give expression to the organised working-class movement, the
Social-Democrats foster organisation of the workers, and of the masses of the
people in general, to support the Duma in its struggle against the old regime
and to create conditions enabling the Duma to carry its activities beyond the
bounds of the fundamental laws that hamper it

First: one cannot speak of the “legislative” activities of the
Social-Democrats. One should say “Duma activities”.

Secondly; the slogan—“support the Duma in its struggle against the old
regime”—does not in any way accord with the premises of the resolution,
and is incorrect in essence.

The preamble to the resolution speaks of the revolutionary struggle for power and of the presence in the Duma of “a considerable number of
consistent supporters of the revolution”.

Why is the perfectly clear, revolutionary category of “struggle for
power” changed here to a diffuse “struggle against the old
regime”, that is, to an expression that actually includes the
reformist struggle? Should not the motives in the preamble be changed
so that, in place of an “illusory” struggle for power, “the
task of struggling for reforms” should be advanced?

Why should you speak here of the masses giving support to “the
Duma” and not to the “consistent supporters of the revolution”? It
appears that the Mensheviks call on the masses to support the
inconsistent supporters of reforms! It doesn’t sound very good,
does it, comrades?

Lastly, the words about supporting the “Duma” in its struggle
against the old regime in effect engender completely incorrect ideas. To support the Duma means to support the majority
in the Duma. The majority is the Cadets plus the Trudoviks. Which means that you, by implication, i.e., without saying so
directly, are providing a characteristic for the Cadets—they
“are struggling against the old regime”.

This characteristic is untrue and incomplete. Such things are not said by
dropping half a hint. They have to be stated clearly and directly. The Cadets
are not “struggling against the old regime”, but are trying
to reform that old regime , to renew it, by coming to an agreement , as is now perfectly clear and obvious, with the old authorities.

Saying nothing about this in the resolution, keeping it in the shade, means
lapsing from the proletarian into the liberal point of view.

“... IV. By this activity of theirs the Social-Democrats aid the development
of the popular movement aimed at winning a constituent assembly, and will
support, as a stage in this struggle of the people, all the efforts of the
State Duma to subordinate the executive power to itself, in this way clearing
the soil for the transfer of all state power into the hands of the people...”

This is the most important point in the resolution, and it contains the
notorious slogan of a “Duma”, or “responsible” ministry. This point must be examined from the standpoint of its wording and of
its meaning.

The point is worded in an extremely peculiar way. The Mensheviks must know that
this is one of the most important questions. And they must know that this
slogan has once already been proposed by the Central Committee of our
Party—at the time of the First Duma—and that at that time the Party did not accept the slogan . This is so perfectly true that not even
the Social-Democratic group in the First Duma—consisting, as we
know, exclusively of Mensheviks and having as its leader such an
outstanding Menshevik as Comrade Jordania—even that group did not accept
the slogan of a “responsible ministry”, and did not once
include it in any Duma speech!

It would seem that this is more than enough for a particularly attentive
attitude to the question. But instead, we have before us the most carelessly
worded point in a resolution, on the whole, insufficiently considered.

Why has this new, far more hazy formulation been selected instead of a
clear-cut slogan of a “responsible ministry” (Plekhanov in Russkaya Zhizn ) or a “ministry of
the Duma majority” (the resolution of the C.C. in the period of the
First Duma)? Is this only a rephrasing of that same responsible
ministry”, or is it something different? Let us examine these
questions.

How could the Duma subordinate executive power to itself? Either legally, on the
basis of the present (or a slightly changed) monarchist constitution, or
illegally, “carrying its activities beyond the bounds of the fundamental
laws that hamper it”, overthrowing the old power, turning it self into a
revolutionary convention, into a provisional government, etc. The first
possibility is precisely that which is usually expressed by the words “a
Duma, or responsible, ministry”. The second possibility means active
participation on the part of the “Duma” (i.e., the majority in the
Duma) in the direct revolutionary struggle for power. There can be no other way
of subordinating executive power to the Duma, and there is no sense in here
raising the particular question of how the different ways could be interwoven;
we are not confronted with the academic, scientific question of what situations
are, in general, possible, but with the practical political question of what the
Social-Democrats should, and should not, support in the Duma.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is obvious. The new wording seems to have
been deliberately planned to conceal the essence of the point at issue,
the real will of the congress, of which the resolution should be an
expression. The slogan of a “responsible ministry” has been and
still is the cause of sharp disputes between Social-Democrats. Support for revolutionary
Duma measures has not only never given rise to sharp disputes, but has probably
never led to any differences among Social-Democrats. What should be said about
people who have proposed a resolution that glosses over differences by
uniting the disputed and the indisputable in one general, diffuse formulation?
What is to be said about people who have proposed that a decision of the
congress should be recorded in words that do not decide anything but enable some
readers to understand these words as meaning revolutionary measures by the Duma,
“beyond the bounds”. etc., and others to understand by them a deal concluded between Milyukov and Stolypin on the Cadets
joining the ministry?

The politest thing that can be said about people who act in this way is that
they are retreating, casting a veil over the once openly expressed and clear-cut
programme of support for a Cadet ministry.

In future, therefore, we shall disregard this muddled wording, which hopelessly
confuses the issue. We shall speak only of the essence of the question,
that of supporting the demand for a “responsible” (or a
Cadet—which is the same thing) ministry.

How does the resolution motivate this necessity to support the demand for a
Duma or responsible ministry? By the statement that “it is a stage in the
people’s struggle for a constituent assembly”, that it is “a
basis for the transfer of all power into the hands of the people”. This
is the whole of the motive. We shall answer it with a brief summary of
our arguments against Social-Democracy supporting the demand for a Duma
ministry.

(1) It is absolutely impermissible for a Marxist to confine himself to the
abstract juridical contraposition of a “responsible” to a
“non-responsible” ministry, a “Duma” ministry to an autocratic ministry, etc., in the way Plekhanov does in Russkaya Zhizn and in the way the Mensheviks have always done in their analysis
of this question. It is a liberal-idealist, not proletarian-materialist,
argument.

The class significance of the measures under discussion must be studied. If this
is done, it will be understood that their content is a bargain, or an attempt at
a bargain, between the autocracy and the liberal bourgeoisie to put an end to
the revolution. That is precisely the objective economic significance of a Duma
ministry. The Bolsheviks, therefore, had every right and reason to say that a
Duma, or responsible, ministry is in actual fact a Cadet ministry. The
Mensheviks were angry and shouted about trickery, juggling, etc. But they were
angry because they did not want to understand the Bolshevik arguments,
which reduced the juridical fiction (a Duma ministry would be
“responsible” to the monarch rather than to the Duma, to the
liberal landlords rather than to the people!) to its class basis. And no matter
how angry Comrade Martov may get, no matter how vehemently he may argue that even now the Duma is not a Cadet Duma,
he cannot by a jot lessen the indisputable conclusion: in essence , the case is precisely one of a Cadet ministry,
since that bourgeois liberal party is the gist of the matter. A
possible coalition Duma ministry (Cadets, plus Octobrists, plus
“non-party”, plus, even, any kind of “Trudovik” or alleged “Left”, etc.) would not in any way change the essence of
the matter. To evade the essence of the matter in the way the Mensheviks and
Plekhanov do means to evade-Marxism.

Support for the demand for a Duma, or “responsible”, ministry is, at
bottom, support for Cadet policy in general and a Cadet ministry in particular
(as was said in the first Bolshevik draft resolution for the Fifth
Congress). Whoever is afraid to admit this is thereby admitting the weakness of
his position, the weakness of the arguments in favour of Social-Democratic
support for the Cadets in general.

We have always maintained, and still maintain, that the Social-Democrats cannot
support a deal between the autoc racy and the liberal bourgeoisie, a deal that
aims at putting an end to the revolution.

(2) The Mensheviks always regard a Duma ministry as a step for the better, as
something that will make the further struggle for the revolution easier, and
the resolution under discussion clearly expresses this idea. But in this the
Men sheviks are making a mistake, are being one-sided. A Marx ist cannot
guarantee the full victory of the present bour geois revolution in Russia;
to do so would be bourgeois-democratic idealism and utopianism. Our task is
to strive for the full victory of the revolution, but we have no right to
forget that there have been in the past, and there still can be, unfinished,
half-and-half bourgeois revolutions.

The Mensheviks word their resolution as though a Duma ministry were an
essential stage in the struggle for a constituent assembly, etc.,
etc. This is quite untrue . A Marxist has no right to examine
a Duma ministry from this angle alone , ignoring the objective
possibility of two types of economic development in Russia. A
bourgeois-democratic coup is inevitable in Russia. But it is possible if the
land lord system of economy is retained and gradually changed into a
Junker-capitalist (Stolypin’s and liberal agrarian reform); it is also possible if the landlord system of economy is abolished and
the land handed over to the peas antry (the peasant revolution, supported by
the Social-Democratic agrarian programme).

The Marxist must examine the Cadet ministry from both angles and not from one
alone—as a possible stage in the struggle for a constituent
assembly, and as a possible stage in the liquidation of the bourgeois revolution . It is the in tention of the Cadets and of Stolypin that the
ministry should play the latter role; objective conditions are such
that it can play both the latter and the former role . [4]

By forgetting the possibility (and the danger) of the liberals cutting short and
stopping the bourgeois revolution, the Mensheviks are lapsing from the viewpoint
of the class struggle of the proletariat into that of liberals, who paint the
monarchy, land redemption payments, two chambers, the cessation of the
revolution, etc., in such bright colours.

(3) Going over from the economic, class aspect of the question to the state,
juridical aspect, it must be said that the Mensheviks regard a Duma ministry
as a step towards parliamentarianism, as a reform that perfects the
constitutional system and facilitates its use by the proletariat for its
class struggle. This, again, is a one-sided point of view, one that sees only what
pleases the eye. In the act of appointing ministers from the Duma majority
(which is precisely what the Cadets wanted in the First Duma) one very
significant feature of the reform is absent—there is no
legislative recognition of certain general , changes in the
constitution. The act is to a certain extent individual, even personal. It
depends on bargains, negotiations and conditions behind the scenes . No wonder Rech now (March 1907!) admits that in June
1906, there were negotiations between the Constitutional-Democrats and the
government that are still not (!) subject to publication. Even the
Cadet Tovarishch , which sings the Cadet tune, admitted
the impermissibility of this game of hide and seek. And it is not surprising that
(according to newspaper reports) Pobedonostsev could propose this
measure—appoint liberal, Cadet ministers and then dissolve the Duma
and replace the ministry! This would not be an abolition of the reform,
or a change in the law—it would be a fully “constitutional
act” by the monarch. By supporting the Cadet desire for a Duma
ministry the Mensheviks were, against their own wishes and their own
conscience, in fact supporting negotiations and deals behind the
scenes, behind the backs of the people.

In so doing, the Mensheviks did not and could not obtain any
“commitments” from the Cadets. They gave them support, on
credit, and brought confusion and corruption into the consciousness of the
working class.

(4) Let us make another concession to the Mensheviks. Let us imagine the best
possible case, i.e., that the act of appointing the Duma ministers is not
only a personal act, is not merely done for show, to deceive the people, but
is the first step in real constitutional reform, which actually does improve the proletariat’s conditions of struggle.

Even so the Social-Democrats cannot be justified in coming out with a slogan
supporting the demand for a Duma ministry.

You say that it is a stage on the way towards improvement, that it provides the
ground for the future struggle? Let us suppose that it is. But would not
universal, bat indirect , suffrage also be a probable stage on
the way to wards improvement? Then why not announce that Social-Democrats
support the demand for universal, but indirect , suffrage, as a
“stage” in the struggle for the “tetrad formula”, as “ground for the transition” to that formula? Not only would the
Cadets be with us in this, but even the Party of Democratic

Reform [8] and part of the Octobrists! An “all-national” stage towards
the people’s struggle for a constituent assembly—that is what
Social-Democratic support for universal suffrage, but indirect and not by secret ballot , would mean!

In principle, there is absolutely no difference between supporting the demand
for a Duma ministry and supporting the demand for universal suffrage that is
indirect and not by secret ballot.

To justify the issue of the slogan of a “responsible ministry” by
saying that it is a stage towards the better, etc., means failure to understand
the fundamentals of the attitude of Social-Democracy to bourgeois reformism.

Every reform is a reform (and not a reactionary and not .a conservative measure)
only insofar as it constitutes a certain step, a “stage”, for the
better. But every reform in capitalist society has a double
character. A reform is a concession made by the ruling classes in order
to stem, weaken, or conceal the revolutionary struggle, in order to split the
forces and energy of the revolutionary classes, to befog their consciousness,
etc.

Therefore, revolutionary Social-Democracy, while by no means renouncing the use
of reforms for the purpose of developing the revolutionary class struggle
(“we accept payments on account”— wir nehmen auch Abschlagszahlung , said Frederick

Engels [9] ), will under no circumstances make half-way
bourgeois-reformist slogans “their own”. [5]

To do so would be acting exactly as Bernstein would (Plekhanov will
have to rehabilitate Bernstein in order to defend his present policy!
No wonder Bernstein’s periodical, Sozialistische Monatshefte ,
has such high praise for Plekhanov!); it would mean turning Social-Democracy
into “a democratic-socialist party of reform ” (Bernstein’s
notorious statement in his Premises of Socialism ).

Social-Democracy regards reforms, and makes use of them, as a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat.

And now we come to the last of our arguments against the slogan under
discussion:

(5) In what way can Social-Democracy actually bring nearer the
implementation of all kinds of reform in general, constitutional reforms in
Russia in particular, and especially a Duma ministry with results beneficial
to the proletariat? Can it do so by making the slogans of the bourgeois
reformists “its own”, or by decisively refusing to make such
slogans “its own” and by continuing unswervingly to conduct the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat under the banner of complete,
uncurtailed slogans? It is not difficult to answer this question.

By making bourgeois-reformist slogans that are always half-baked, always
curtailed and always two-faced “our own”, we are actually not strengthening but weakening the probability, possibility
and proximity of the implementation of the reform. The real force giving rise
to reforms is the force of the revolutionary proletariat, of its consciousness,
solidarity and unwavering determination in the struggle.

These are the qualities of the mass movement that we weaken
and paralyse by giving our bourgeois-reformist slogans to the masses. The usual
bourgeois sophistry says that by conceding something from our revolutionary
demands and slogans (for instance, by demanding a “Duma ministry”
instead of “sovereignty of the people”, or a constituent assembly
as a “stage”, etc.), we are making it more probable that
this lesser measure will be implemented , since both the proletariat and
part of the bourgeoisie will be in favour of it.

International Social-Democracy says that this is bourgeois sophistry, because
we thereby lessen the probability of a reform being implemented; because, in
trying to win the sympathies of the bourgeoisie, which continually makes
concessions against its will, we are lessening the revolutionary consciousness
of the masses, are blunting and corrupting that consciousness. We are adapting
ourselves to the bourgeoisie, to its deal with the monarchy, and
thereby harming the development of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. In
consequence of all this, the reforms are either non-existent on account of these
tactics or they are an unadulterated deception. The only sound basis
for re forms, the one serious guarantee that they will not be fictitious, will
be used for the benefit of the people, is the independent revolutionary struggle
of the proletariat that does not lower the level of its slogans.

Since June 1906, the Mensheviks have been offering the masses a slogan in
support of the demand for a Duma ministry. By so doing, they weaken and blunt
the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, reduce the scope of agitation, decrease the probability of this reform being implemented and the
possibility of its being used.

We must increase revolutionary agitation among the masses; we must give wider
scope to our full-fledged, uncurtailed slogans; we must develop them
clearly—in this way , we shall at best bring nearer the full
victory of the revolution, and at worst we shall capture some hill-concessions
(such as a Duma ministry, universal, but indirect, suffrage, etc.) and give
ourselves the possibility of turning them into a weapon of the
revolution. Reforms are a by product of the class struggle of the
revolutionary proletariat. To make it “our own” business to obtain
this by-product would mean lapsing into liberal bourgeois reformism.

*     * *
The last point of the resolution:

“V. Regarding activities in the Duma as one of the forms of class struggle,
the Social-Democratic group in the Duma retains complete independence, in each
individual case entering into agreement with those parties that are interested
in the struggle against the old regime for the triumph of political liberty,
for aggressive action with those parties and groups whose aims at a given moment
coincide with the aims of the proletariat, and for defensive action intended to
preserve popular representation itself and its rights.”

The second part of this is as bad and outlandish as the first part (as far as
the word “entering”) is good.

What is this ridiculous differentiation between “aggressive” and
“defensive” action? Are our Mensheviks not recalling the language
of Russkiye Vedomosti in the nineties of the last century, when the
liberals tried to prove that liberalism in Russia does the
“protecting” and that reaction is “aggressive”? Just imagine:
instead of the “old” division of political action into revolutionary
and reformist, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary, Marxists are offering us a new classification—“defensive” action “protects” what we
have, “aggressive” action goes farther! Have you got a shred of
conscience, Menshevik comrades? To what extent must one lose all feeling for the
revolutionary class struggle before one can fail to notice the vulgar
flavour of this differentiation between the “aggressive” and the
“defensive”!

And how amusingly, like an object in a distorting mirror, does this
helpless formulation reflect the bitter truth (bitter for the
Mensheviks) that they will not openly admit! The Mensheviks are in the
habit of talking about parties in general, and are afraid to name them or
clearly delineate them; they are in the habit of casting the veil of
generic names over them—“oppositional-democratic parties”— over Cadets
and Lefts alike. Now they feel that a change is coming. They feel that the
liberals are now actually capable of doing nothing more than
protect (by means of genuflexion, in the same way as Russkiye Vedomosti “protected” the

Zemstvos [10] in the eighties!) the existing Duma and the existing (pardon
the word) “constitution” of ours. The Mensheviks feel that the liberal
bourgeoisie cannot and does not want to go farther (be “aggressive”—since such nasty terms exist!). And the Mensheviks have
displayed this vague consciousness of the true in amusing and extremely
confused wording that means literally that the Social-Democrats are
capable, at some time , of entering into an agreement for action
“whose aims” do not coincide with the aims of the proletariat!

This final chord of the Menshevik resolution, this amusing fear of telling
the truth openly and clearly—i.e., that the liberal bourgeoisie,
the Constitutional-Democrats, have completely ceased to help the
revolution—magnificently expresses the whole spirit of the resolution
under consideration.

Instead of an Afterword

The above lines had been written when I received the resolution passed by the
February (1907) Conference of the League of the Estonian Area of the

R.S.D.L.P. [11]

Two Menshevik comrades, M. and A., spoke (presumably from the Central Committee)
at this conference. During the discussion on the question of the State Duma they
apparently tabled that very resolution that I have analysed above. It
will be extremely instructive to see what amendments the Estonian
Social-Democrat comrades made to this resolution. Here is the resolution in
full, as passed by the conference:

On the Attitude to the State Duma “The State Duma has neither the authority nor the force to satisfy the
needs of the people because power is still in the hands of the enemies of the
people, the tsarist autocracy, the bureaucracy and a handful of landlords. The
Social-Democrats, therefore, must ruthlessly destroy the illusory hopes of the
present State Duma having legislative powers, and make it clear to the people
that only an authoritative all-national constituent assembly, freely elected by
the people after the tsarist autocracy has been overthrown, will be capable of
meeting the people’s demands.

“For the purpose of developing the class-consciousness of the proletariat,
for the political education of the masses of the people, for the development and
organisation of the revolutionary forces, Social-Democracy must make use even of
this impotent, helpless State Duma. In view of this, Social-Democracy
participates in the activities of the State Duma on the following terms:

“I. Proceeding from the interests of the urban and rural proletariat and
from the principles of consistent democratism, Social-Democracy criticises all
proposals and hills submitted by the government and the bourgeois parties and
also the state budget, and opposes them with its own demands and bills, and in
so doing proceeds always from the demands and needs of broad masses of the
people, and by such activity exposes the effeteness of the existing system and
the class contradictions of bourgeois society.

“II. Social-Democracy uses the right of interpellation in order to lay bare
the essence and nature of the present government and to show the people that all
the latter’s activity is contrary to the interests of the people, in
order to make clear the underprivileged position of the working class and throw
light on the role played by the government and the ruling classes and by the
parties they support, in respect of the working class. Among other things,
Social-Democracy must struggle against the Cadet Party, with its compromises
and treachery, and unmask its half-heartedness and hypocritical democratism in
order to liberate the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie from its leadership and
influence and compel them to follow the proletariat.

“III. In the State Duma, Social-Democracy, as the party of the working
class, must always act independently. Social-Democracy must conclude no
permanent agreements or pacts that might hamper its freedom of action with other
revolutionary or opposition parties in the Duma. In individual cases, when the
aims and measures of other parties coincide with those of Social-Democracy, the
latter can and must enter into negotiations with other parties on those
measures.

“IV. Insofar as the people cannot come to any agreements with the present
feudal-minded government, and insofar as only an authoritative constituent
assembly would be in a position to meet the people’s demands and needs,
the conference is of the opinion that the struggle for a ministry responsible to
the present impotent Duma Is not the task of the proletariat. The proletariat
must fight under the flag of a constituent assembly and not under that of a responsible ministry.

“V. While conducting this struggle, the Social-Democratic group in the
State Duma must bind itself by the closest ties to the proletarian and other
masses outside the Duma and, by assisting these masses to organise, must build
up a revolutionary army for the over throw of the autocracy.”

No comment is required. In my article I have tried to show how resolutions like
the one I have dealt with should not be written. In their resolution the
Estonian revolutionary Social-Democrats have shown how unsuitable resolutions
should be amended.

---
Notes:
[1]
The two words are somewhat similar in Russian, one having the prefix
voz- and the other the prefix vy- .— Tr .

[2]
See pp. 137-38 of this volume— Ed .

[3]
I ask the reader to bear in mind the necessity for the correction to
this word I made earlier in the article.— Lenin

[4]
We make the very best assumption for Plekhanov and the
Mensheviks, i.e., that the Cadets will put forward the demand for a Duma
ministry. It is more probahie that they will not do so . Then
Plekhanov (and the Mensheviks) will he as ridiculous on account of his
“sup port” for a slogan the liberals have not advanced, as he was with
his “Duma with full powers”.— Lenin

[5]
Plekhanov in Russkaya Zhizn: “.... Social-Democratic deputies must make the above demand [“a responsible ministry”]
their own in the interests of the people, in the interests of the
revolution.— Lenin

[6]
“How Not To Write Resolutions” was published in the second issue of the symposium Questions of Tactics .

These pamphlets were published by the Bolsheviks in April 1907 in
St. Petersburg at the Novaya Duma Publishing House. Lenin was an active
collaborator in their publication as part of the preparations for the Fifth
Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Two issues appeared.

The second issue of the Questions of Tactics was sequestered by the
St. Petersburg Press Committee.

[7]
Council of State —one of the highest state bodies in pre-revolutionary Russia. It was founded in 1810 by M. M. Speransky as ass
advisory legislative body whose members were appointed or approved by the
tsar. By the law of February 20 (March 5), 1906, the Council of State was
reconstituted and granted the formal rights of an “upper legislative
chamber” which examined and approved bills after they had been discussed
in the State Duma. The right to amend basic laws and promulgate a number of
especially important laws was, however, retained by the tsar.

From 1906 onwards half of the Council of State consisted of elected members from
the nobility, the clergy and the big bourgeoisie, and the other half of
high-ranking government officials was appointed by the tsar. On account of this
composition the Council of State was an extremely reactionary body which
rejected even the moderate bills passed by the State Duma.

[8]
See Note 59.

[9]
This quotation is taken from Engels’s letter to F. Turati on
“The Future Italian Revolution and the Socialist Party” (see Marx and
Engels, Selected Correspondence , Moscow, 1955, p. 553).

[10]
Zemstvo —the name given to the local government bodies formed in the central provinces of tsarist
Russia in 1864. They were dominated by the nobility and their powers were
limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building,
statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the
Provincial Governors and by the Ministry of the Interior, which could rescind
any decisions of which the government disapproved.

[11]
The League of the Estonian Area of the R.S.D.L.P. held its conference in the second half of
February 1907. It was attended by

18 delegates with the right to vote from the Social-Democratic organisations in
the towns of Bevel and Narva and the Estonian rural Social-Democratic
organisations. There were also three delegates from St. Petersburg and Riga
with the right to vote on questions of propaganda and agitation in the Estonian
language.

The conference adopted resolutions on: military organisations and combat groups,
the agrarian question, the trade unions, the attitude to other local parties,
the attitude to the State Duma and the Rules of the League of the Estonian Area
of the R.S.D.L.P.