The social-democrats of the left wing must undertake a revision of the question of boycotting the State Duma. It must be remembered that we have always posed this question concretely, depending on the specific political situation. For example, already "Proletarian" (Geneva) wrote that "it would be absurd to swear off using even the Bulygin Duma,"[60] – if it could come into being. And regarding the Witte Duma in the pamphlet "Social-Democracy and the State Duma" (by N. Lenin and F. Dan) we read in N. Lenin's article: "We must absolutely, in a businesslike manner, discuss anew the question of tactics… The situation is now different" from what it was under the Bulygin Duma (see p. 2 of the cited pamphlet)[61].

The principal distinction between revolutionary and opportunist social-democracy on the question of boycott is the following. The opportunists limit themselves to applying to all cases a general template taken from a particular period of German socialism. We must make use of representative institutions – the Duma is a representative institution – consequently, boycott is anarchism and one must enter the Duma. With this childishly simple syllogism our Mensheviks, and particularly Plekhanov, have always exhausted all their arguments on this subject. The resolution of the Mensheviks on the significance of representative institutions in a revolutionary epoch (see No. 2 of "Party News") shows with extraordinary clarity this template-like, ahistorical character of their reasoning.

On the contrary, revolutionary social-democrats shift the center of gravity of the question precisely to a careful accounting of the concrete political situation. One cannot encompass the tasks of the Russian revolutionary epoch by copying from German templates, taken one-sidedly from recent times, with oblivion of the lessons of 1847–1848. One cannot understand anything in the course of our revolution if one limits oneself to a bare opposition of "anarchistic" boycott to social-democratic participation in elections. Learn, gentlemen, from the history of the Russian revolution!

This history has proved that the boycott of the Bulygin Duma was the only correct tactic, which was completely confirmed by events. Whoever forgets this, whoever speaks of boycott while bypassing the lessons of the Bulygin Duma (as the Mensheviks always bypass them), gives himself a complete testimony to his poverty, testimony to his inability to explain and account for one of the most important and event-filled epochs of the Russian revolution. The tactic of boycott in relation to the Bulygin Duma correctly took into account both the mood of the revolutionary proletariat and the objective particularities of the moment, which made inevitable the imminence of a general explosion.

Let us turn to the second lesson of history – to the Witte Cadet Duma. Nowadays repentant speeches by social-democratic intellectuals concerning the boycott of this Duma are very widespread. The fact that it was convened and indirectly, undoubtedly, rendered service to the revolution, they consider sufficient grounds for repentant acknowledgment of the incorrectness of the boycott of the Witte Duma.

But such a view is extremely one-sided and short-sighted. It does not account for a whole series of facts of tremendous importance from the period before the Witte Duma, during it, and after its dissolution. Recall that the law on elections to this Duma was issued on December 11, during the armed struggle of rebels for a constituent assembly. Recall that even the Menshevik "Nachalo" wrote at that time: "The proletariat will sweep away the Witte Duma just as it swept away the Bulygin Duma." Under such conditions the proletariat could not and should not have surrendered without struggle to the tsar's hand the convening of the first representative institution in Russia. The proletariat had to struggle against the consolidation of autocracy by means of a loan secured by the Witte Duma. The proletariat had to struggle against the constitutional illusions on which the entire electoral campaign of the Cadets in spring 1906 and elections in the countryside were built. At a time of boundless exaggeration of the significance of the Duma, such a struggle was impossible except through boycott. To what degree the spread of constitutional illusions was closely bound up with participation in the electoral campaign and in elections in spring 1906 is most clearly evident from the example of our Mensheviks. It is enough to recall that in the resolution of the IV (Unifying) Congress of the RSDLP the Duma was called an "authority," contrary to the warnings of the Bolsheviks! Another example: Plekhanov, without hesitation, wrote: "The government will fall into the abyss when the Duma is dissolved." How swiftly were vindicated the words spoken against him at that time: one must prepare to cast the enemy into the abyss, not rely, in a Cadet fashion, on its spontaneous "fall" into the abyss[62].

The proletariat had to defend with all its strength its independent tactic in our revolution, namely: together with the conscious peasantry against the shaky and traitorous liberal-monarchical bourgeoisie. And this tactic was impossible under the elections to the Witte Duma owing to a whole series of conditions, both objective and subjective – conditions which brought about the fact that participation in elections equaled, for the vast majority of localities in Russia, silent support of the Cadets by the workers' party. The proletariat could not and should not have accepted a half-hearted and artificially invented, based on "cunning" and confusion, tactic of elections for who knows what purpose, elections to the Duma not for the Duma. But this is a historical fact, which no concealment, no evasions and tricks of the Mensheviks can eliminate – it is a fact that not one of them, not even Plekhanov, could call in print to enter the Duma. It is a fact that not a single appeal to go to the Duma was heard in print. It is a fact that the Mensheviks themselves in a leaflet of the united Central Committee of the RSDLP officially acknowledged the boycott and reduced the dispute only to the question of at what stage one should boycott. It is a fact that the Mensheviks shifted the center of gravity not to elections to the Duma, but to elections themselves, even to the electoral process, as to an organization for insurrection, for sweeping away the Duma. And yet events have proved precisely the impossibility of mass agitation during elections and a certain possibility of agitation in the masses only from within the Duma itself.

Whoever attempts truly to take into account and weigh all these complex facts, both objective and subjective in character, will see that the Caucasus was merely an exception that proved the general rule. He will see that repentant speeches and the explanation of boycott by "youthful ardor" represent the narrowest, most superficial and short-sighted assessment of events.

The dissolution of the Duma has now vividly shown that the boycott in the conditions of spring 1906 was undoubtedly the correct tactic, generally speaking, and brought benefit. Only through boycott could social-democracy under the circumstances of that time fulfill its duty: namely, to give the people the necessary warnings concerning the tsarist constitution, the necessary criticism of Cadet charlatanry during the elections, which (criticism and warnings) were brilliantly confirmed by the dissolution of the Duma.

Here is a small example to illustrate what has been said. Mr. Vodovozo, this half-Cadet, half-Menshevik, stood ardently in spring 1906 for elections and for support of the Cadets. Yesterday (August 11) he wrote in "Tovarishch"{131} that the Cadets "wished to be a parliamentary party in a country without a parliament, and a constitutional party in a country without a constitution," that "the entire character of the Cadet party was determined by a fundamental contradiction between a radical program and a completely non-radical tactic."

The Bolsheviks could not have wished for a greater triumph than this acknowledgment by a left Cadet or a right Plekhanovite.

But, categorically rejecting the faint-hearted and short-sighted repentant speeches, rejecting the silly explanation of boycott by "youthful ardor," we are far from the thought of denying the new lessons of the Cadet Duma. It would be pedantry to fear openly acknowledging and accounting for these new lessons. History has shown that when a Duma is convened, there emerges the possibility of useful agitation from within it and around it; – that the tactic of drawing closer to the revolutionary peasantry against the Cadets is possible within the Duma. This seems a paradox, but such is, undoubtedly, the irony of history: precisely the Cadet Duma most vividly demonstrated to the masses the correctness of this "anti-Cadet," let us say for brevity, tactic. History mercilessly refuted all constitutional illusions and all "faith in the Duma," but history absolutely proved a certain, though modest, usefulness of such an institution for the revolution, as a tribune for agitation, for exposure of the true "nature" of political parties, etc.

From this follows the conclusion. It would be absurd to close one's eyes to reality. Now precisely is the time when revolutionary social-democrats must cease to be boycottists. We shall not refuse to enter the second Duma, when (or: "if") it is convened. We shall not refuse to use this arena of struggle, in no way exaggerating its modest significance, but, on the contrary, wholly subordinating it, on the basis of experience already given by history, to other forms of struggle – by means of strike, insurrection, and the like. We shall convene the Fifth Congress of the party; we shall resolve there that in the event of elections an electoral agreement for several weeks with the Laborites is necessary (without convening the Fifth Congress of the party, a unified electoral campaign is impossible, and all "blocs with other parties" are absolutely forbidden by the resolution of the Fourth Congress). And we shall defeat the Cadets utterly.

But this conclusion is still far, far from exhausting all the complexity of the task confronting us. We deliberately emphasized the words: "in the event of elections," and the like. We do not yet know whether a second Duma will be convened, when elections will take place, what the electoral law will be; what the situation will be then. Our conclusion therefore suffers from extreme generality: it is needed in order to sum up the past, in order to account for the lessons of that past, in order to give a correct formulation to the future questions of tactics, but it is entirely insufficient for the resolution of the concrete tasks of the immediate tactic.

Only Cadets and all manner of "Cadet-like" persons can at the present time be satisfied with such a conclusion, can create themselves a "slogan" from sighing for a new Duma, can prove to the government the desirability of its prompt convening, and the like. Only conscious or unconscious traitors to the revolution can now direct all their efforts to ensuring that the inevitable new upsurge in mood and excitement flows precisely into elections, and not into struggle by means of a general strike and insurrection.

We have come to the crux of the question of contemporary social-democratic tactic. The matter does not at all turn on whether to participate in elections in general. To say "yes" or "no" here means to say nothing at all about the fundamental task of the moment. The political situation in August 1906 externally resembles the situation in August 1905, but in this time a tremendous step forward has been taken: the forces fighting on both sides are more precisely defined, as are the forms of struggle, and certain timelines, necessary for one or another, if one may so express it, strategic movement.

The government's plan is clear. It has calculated correctly by determining the date for convening the Duma while not determining, contrary to law, the date for elections. The government does not want to bind its hands and reveal its cards. First, it gains time to deliberate on changing the electoral law. Second – and this is the main point – it keeps in reserve the setting of the date for elections for such a moment when the character and force of the new upsurge can be fully determined. The government wants to appoint new elections at precisely such a time (and perhaps in such a form, i.e., such or other elections), so as to fragment and weaken the beginning insurrection. The government reasons correctly: if all is calm, we perhaps will not convene the Duma at all or will revert to the Bulygin laws. And if there is a strong movement, it will be possible to try to fragment it by temporarily setting elections, by enticing with these elections this or that coward or simpleton away from direct revolutionary struggle.

Liberal blockheads (see "Tovarishch" and "Rech") are to such a degree unable to understand the situation that they themselves crawl into the nets being laid by the government. They are straining every nerve, "proving" the necessity of the Duma and the desirability of the upsurge being directed toward elections. But even they cannot deny that the question of the form of the immediate struggle remains still open. Today's "Rech" (August 12) confesses: "what word will the peasants speak in the autumn… is not yet known." "Until September – October, while the mood of the peasants is completely clarified, it is difficult to make any general predictions."

Liberal bourgeois are true to themselves. Actively to promote the choice of forms of struggle, the determination of peasant mood in one direction or another, they do not want and cannot. The interests of the bourgeoisie require not the overthrow of the old power, but only its weakening and the appointment of a liberal ministry.

The interests of the proletariat require the complete overthrow of the old, tsarist power and the convening of a fully empowered constituent assembly. Its interests require the most active intervention in determining peasant mood, in the choice of the most decisive forms of struggle and the best moment for it. We in no case should either abandon or obscure the slogan: convening of a constituent assembly by revolutionary means, i.e., through the intermediary of a temporary revolutionary government. We must direct all efforts to clarifying the conditions of insurrection – its union with strike struggle, the consolidation and preparation of all revolutionary forces for this purpose, etc. We must with full determination embark on that path which is outlined by the well-known appeals "To the Army and Navy" and "To All Peasantry," appeals signed by a "bloc" of all revolutionary organizations, including the Labor group. We must, finally, in particular take care that the government in no case succeeds in fragmenting, stopping, or weakening the beginning insurrection by means of setting elections. In this respect for us the lessons of the Cadet Duma must be absolutely binding, lessons consisting in the fact that the Duma campaign is a subordinate, secondary form of struggle, while the chief form – in virtue of the objective conditions of the moment – remains the directly revolutionary movements of the broad popular masses.

Of course, such subordination of the Duma campaign to the main struggle, the relegation of this campaign to second place in the event of a bad outcome of battle or its postponement until experience of the second Duma – this tactic can be called, if you like, the old boycottist tactic. Formally such a designation can be defended, since "preparation for elections" – apart from the always obligatory work of agitation and propaganda – amounts to the most minor technical preparations, which very rarely can be accomplished long before elections. We do not wish to quibble over words, but in substance this is – a consistent development of the old tactic, but not a repetition of it, a conclusion from the former boycott, but not the former boycott itself.

Let us sum up. One must account for the experience of the Cadet Duma and disseminate its lessons among the masses. One must prove the "unsuitability" of the Duma, the necessity of a constituent assembly, the shakiness of the Cadets, demand the liberation of the Laborites from beneath the yoke of the Cadets, support the former against the latter. One must at once acknowledge the necessity of an electoral agreement between social-democrats and Laborites in the event of new elections. One must with all strength oppose the government's plan to fragment the insurrection by means of setting elections. Supporting with even greater force its tested revolutionary slogans, social-democracy must apply all efforts to tighten the consolidation of all revolutionary elements and classes, in order to transform the probable upsurge in the near future into a nationwide armed insurrection against the tsarist government.

Written August 12 (25), 1906

Published August 21, 1906 in the newspaper "Proletarian" No. 1

Printed according to the newspaper text