Yesterday we published the main resolutions of the fifth congress of Polish social-democracy{107}. The Polish comrades who have now entered our party, numbering from 25 to 30 thousand party members, decisively spoke out against the tactics of the CC regarding the State Duma. Having condemned these tactics in general, they did not even consider it necessary to dwell on the individual mistakes flowing from the incorrect tactics, such as the notorious support of the Cadet ministry. But it goes without saying – and those who were at the Polish congress know this perfectly well – that the Polish social-democrats regard this "support" with absolute negation. The Conference of all Petersburg social-democrats likewise decisively rejected support for the Cadet ministry{108}. The regional conference of social-democrats of the central Moscow district equally spoke out against it{109}.

The Petersburg Conference represented approximately 4 thousand party members, the Moscow regional one – approximately 14 thousand. Thus, approximately 20 thousand party members, that is, a large half of it (at the last congress there were represented 31–33 thousand members), condemned the tactics of the CC on the question of supporting the Duma ministry. The majority of the party – against support. Our internal-party ministry, that is, the CC of our party, has ceased to express the will of the party: its elementary political obligation is to hasten the convening of an immediate emergency congress. Otherwise it will find itself in the position of a clique of people clinging to party power by means of formal pretexts and obstruction, contrary to the already expressed will of the party. In any case, the party will now be able to achieve a congress.

The tactics of supporting the Duma, that is, the Cadet, ministry – condemned by the majority of the party – continue to be defended by the Mensheviks (although some of them, as the discussions in Petersburg showed, have managed to take an independent position on this question and turn away from opportunism). Let us stop once more to examine the current arguments of the right wing of social-democracy.

To achieve a Duma ministry, they tell us, means to "wrest power from the hands of the camarilla," to "make the executive power responsible to the popular representation"; this is a "transition from a sham-constitutional order to a genuine constitution" ("Golos Truda," No. 5).

This is the greatest lie. A Duma, that is, a Cadet, ministry will be appointed (if the Cadets' demand is satisfied) precisely by the camarilla. But can one call it wresting power when the camarilla appoints liberal ministers? By appointing ministers at its own discretion, the camarilla can remove them at any moment: the camarilla does not surrender power, but plays at dividing power; the camarilla tries out whether these liberal lackeys will suit it or not. Intelligent members of the camarilla, such as, for example, Pobedonostsev and Trepov (according to reports from certain newspapers), calculate this straight: it will be most convenient for us to appoint liberal ministers. By this we will pacify not only the Cadets (that is, the majority of the Duma), but also the Cadet-minded social-democrats. And with unpleasant ministers it will be much easier to deal than, say, with the Duma. We will gain time, we will muddy the waters, we will introduce the greatest chaos, mutual distrust, squabbling over ministerial portfolios into the right, that is, the larger half of the Duma, we will stir things up, we will lead the Cadets by the nose just as we led them in the question of aid to the starving. We made them there "voluntarily" play the role of police witnesses – in exactly the same way we will make them in ministerial posts play the role of police lackeys.

Whoever is at all familiar with the history of Russian Cadets, and also "Cadets" in other countries, knows that the camarilla has always managed to lead liberal-monarchist bourgeois by the nose. To prevent this, there is only one means: the development of independent political consciousness among the proletariat and the revolutionary peasants. And it is precisely this consciousness that the right social-democrats obscure and befoul. It is precisely in order to preserve complete clarity of political consciousness and complete militant independence in the revolutionary classes that we social-democrats must leave the Cadets alone to fumble at the feet of the camarilla over ministerial posts. To entangle the proletariat in this affair would be a betrayal of the interests of the proletariat and the interests of the revolution.

If the camarilla were to appoint Cadets as ministers, would it thereby make "the executive power responsible to the popular representation" ("Golos Truda").

This is the greatest lie. When Cadet professors say it – God forgive them. When social-democrats repeat it, it is unforgivable. The executive power is responsible, esteemed echoing voices, not to the "popular representation," but to the legislative power. Remember this. Now we will clarify it further for you. Who now possesses the legislative power in Russia? 1) The Supreme Power; 2) The State Council; 3) The State Duma.

Do you now understand your blunder? Cadet ministers will be responsible both to the Duma and to the State Council and to the camarilla. To present the matter as though they are responsible only to the Duma means to lie to the people.

Let us continue. What will be the position of ministers responsible to such various institutions? A false position. Ministers will have to observe and uphold all existing laws until they are changed by all three legislative instances listed above. Not for nothing, therefore, do Cadet demagogues, like Rodichev, now declaim in the Duma, crying out that they are the shield of the dynasty. The Cadets know where the crayfish winters. But the right social-democrats sing with another's voice, and do not understand the matter.

Why has the ministry now become the center of agitation for the Cadets? Why do they not cry out with the same zeal, and so often, and so loudly: down with the State Council? down with such and such laws that prevent the popular representation from becoming the legislative power? Why do they agitate a thousand times more weakly for a full amnesty, for complete freedom, for universal suffrage, than for ministerial posts? Have you given this thought? No, you have not given it thought. The Cadets knock first and foremost at the back door, because they do not want complete freedom (recall their bills on assemblies), do not want the complete abolition of the State Council (recall the upper chamber in their program), before which they too will be responsible and just as much as before the Duma, and so on. The Cadets do not want to put forth the demand first to grant a full amnesty, first to abolish the State Council, first to establish complete freedom, first to grant universal and so on suffrage, and then to appoint them as ministers. Why do the Cadets not want this? Because they know where the crayfish winters, while the Cadet echoing voices do not know it.

The Cadets say: just when we become ministers, then we will fight for all these freedoms! It cannot all be done at once, after all. And the echoing voice believes and tries…

A Cadet understands that a minister is responsible under the same old, police, Russian law, responsible both to the Duma and to the camarilla and to the State Council. Therefore the minister is in the clear: I would be glad, with all my soul, but there "over there" they do not agree, but the State Council still clings a little. Be patient, gentlemen: surely no one will persuade the camarilla or the State Council better than I, a Cadet. I will earn you time, and we shall say that the State Council objects a bit.

Remember this, echoing voice: in order to fight this traitorous tactic of the Cadets, you must not sing along with them, but preserve complete independence, that is, warn the proletariat and peasantry against trusting the Cadets, against repeating Cadet slogans. By your very tactics you make difficult the independent struggle of the working class and the revolutionary peasantry. You sell the revolutionary birthright for a mess of pottage of Cadet reformism.

We have no need to explain in such detail the third lie, that the appointment by the camarilla of Cadet ministers is a "decisive turning point," a transition to a "genuine constitution." The reader himself now sees that the appointment of Rodichev by Trepov as minister will not change even a written constitution. To speak of a change in genuine constitution by such an appointment – that means already, as they say, getting completely carried away.

Next time we will examine another current argument: "but still, a Cadet ministry will be better. There is nothing to choose from. One must support what is better." We shall see whether this argument is social-democratic and what it is worth.

"Echo," No. 5, June 27, 1906

Printed according to the text of the newspaper "Echo"