I set forth two fundamental theses: 1) the peasants will never consent to municipalization; 2) municipalization without a democratic republic, without the people's power being fully secured, without the electivity of officials is harmful. In developing these theses, I shall first address the more serious objections against nationalization. Undoubtedly, the most serious objection of this kind is that made by Comrade Plekhanov. Comrade Plekhanov said literally—I recorded his words: "we cannot under any circumstances stand for nationalization." This is an error. I venture to assert that if a genuine peasant revolution is accomplished in our country and if the political upheaval accompanying it leads to the creation of a truly democratic republic, then Comrade Plekhanov will find it possible to stand for nationalization, and if a democratic republic were indeed accomplished in our Russia in the coming upheaval, then the entire situation—not only Russian, but also international—of the movement would thrust [the revolution] toward nationalization. If this condition is not fulfilled, then municipalization too will turn out to be a fiction; then it can be realized only as a new form of redemption. In Comrade John's terminology appears the word "expropriation," and not "confiscation," and, as was evident from his speech, this terminology was chosen by him not by chance, but meanwhile this terminology is simply Cadet, it presupposes anything whatsoever, and with it the Cadets' projected redemption scheme is perfectly compatible. Let us proceed further. Where is the guarantee against restoration? asked Comrade Plekhanov. I do not think that the posing of this question stands in close and indissoluble connection with the program we are discussing, but since this question has been raised, it must be given a completely definite and unambiguous answer. If we speak of a genuine, fully real economic guarantee against restoration—that is, such a guarantee as would create economic conditions excluding restoration—then we must say: the sole guarantee against restoration is a socialist upheaval in the West; no other guarantee, in the proper and full sense of the word, is possible. Outside this condition, under any other solution of the question (municipalization, partition, etc.), restoration is not only possible but directly inevitable. I would formulate this proposition in these words: the Russian revolution can conquer by its own forces, but it cannot under any circumstances hold and consolidate its conquests with its own hands. It cannot achieve this if there is no socialist upheaval in the West; without this condition restoration is inevitable both under municipalization and under nationalization and under partition, because the petty proprietor, under all and every form of ownership and property, will be the mainstay of restoration. After the complete victory of the democratic revolution, the petty proprietor will inevitably turn against the proletariat, and the sooner the faster all common enemies of the proletariat and the proprietor are overthrown, such as: capitalists, landowners, financial bourgeoisie, etc. Our democratic republic has no reserve except the socialist proletariat in the West, and in this connection one must not lose sight of the fact that the classical bourgeois revolution in Europe, namely the great French revolution of the eighteenth century, took place under a completely different international situation from that in which the Russian revolution is taking place. France at the end of the eighteenth century was surrounded by feudal and semi-feudal states. Russia in the twentieth century, carrying out a bourgeois revolution, is surrounded by countries in which the socialist proletariat stands fully armed on the eve of its final clash with the bourgeoisie. If such comparatively negligible phenomena as the promise of freedom in Russia by the tsar on October 17th have already given a mighty impetus to the movement of the proletariat in Western Europe—if it was enough for Austrian workers to receive a telegram from Petersburg about the notorious constitutional manifesto to make them immediately take to the streets, to lead to a series of demonstrations and armed clashes in the largest industrial cities of Austria—then one can imagine how the socialist international proletariat will behave if news from Russia brings them not a promise of freedom but the genuine accomplishment of it and the complete victory of the revolutionary peasantry. If, however, we pose the question of guarantee against restoration on different ground—that is, if we speak of a relative and conditional guarantee against restoration—then we must say the following: a conditional and relative guarantee against restoration exists only insofar as the revolution is carried out as decisively as possible, as it is conducted directly by the revolutionary class, with the least participation of intermediaries, compromisers and all manner of conciliators, as this revolution is truly carried through to the end, and my project gives the maximum of relative guarantees against restoration. As the direct lever of revolutionary peasant movement, as the most desirable form of it, peasant committees are set forth in my project. Peasant committees, in plain language, means a call for peasants themselves immediately and directly to settle accounts with officials and landowners in the most decisive manner. Peasant committees mean a call for the people, oppressed by the remnants of serfdom and police order, to settle accounts with these remnants, as Marx said, "in a plebeian manner"{148}. To Comrade Plekhanov this presupposition of a revolution carried through to the end, implementing the people's choice of officials, recalled anarchism so unpleasant for him, as indeed for all of us, but it is in the highest degree strange that the people's election of officials could recall anarchism; it is in the highest degree strange that at such a moment as the present, the question of the people's choice of officials could or might provoke a smile from any social-democrat, except perhaps Bernstein. It is precisely now that we are living through a time when this slogan—the people's election of officials—acquires the most direct, enormous practical significance. Our entire activity, propaganda and agitation among the peasant masses must consist in considerable degree in the propaganda, dissemination and elucidation of precisely this slogan. To preach a peasant revolution, to speak in any serious sense about an agrarian revolution and not at the same time speak of the necessity of genuine democracy—that is, among other things, the election of officials by the people—this is a glaring contradiction. The reproach of anarchism on this account reminds me only of the German Bernsteinians, who recently, in polemics with Kautsky, reproached him with anarchism.

We must tell the peasant directly and definitively: if you want to carry the agrarian revolution through to the end, then you must also carry the political revolution through to the end; without carrying the political revolution through to the end there will be either no agrarian revolution or no agrarian revolution of any durability whatsoever. Without a complete democratic upheaval, without the people's choice of officials we will have either agrarian disturbances or Cadet agrarian reforms. We will not have what would deserve the grand word used by Plekhanov: a peasant revolution. Let us proceed further. Municipalization opens up a broad arena for class struggle, said Plekhanov; I have attempted to reproduce this assertion of his as literally as possible and I must decisively declare that this assertion is simply false; it is false both in the political and in the economic sense. All other things being equal, a municipality and municipal landownership is undoubtedly a narrower arena for class struggle than the entire nation, than nationalization of land. Nationalization of land under a democratic republic creates unconditionally the broadest field for class struggle—the broadest field that is possible and that is at all conceivable under the existence of capitalism. Nationalization means the abolition of absolute rent, the lowering of bread prices, the assurance of maximum freedom of competition and freedom of capital's penetration into agriculture. Municipalization, on the contrary, narrows the all-national class struggle, not clearing all production relations in agriculture from absolute rent, exchanging our common demand for particular ones; municipalization in any case obscures class struggle. From this standpoint the question posed by Plekhanov can be decided only in one sense. From this standpoint municipalization unconditionally does not withstand criticism. Municipalization is a narrowing and obscuring of class struggle. Plekhanov's next objection concerns the question of the seizure of power. Plekhanov discerned in my project an agrarian program a seizure of power, and I must say that the idea of the seizure of power by revolutionary peasantry is indeed present in my project of an agrarian program[66], but to reduce this idea to the Narodovolts' idea of the seizure of power is the greatest error. In the 1870s and 1880s, when the idea of the seizure of power was cultivated by the Narodovolts{149}, they represented a group of intellectuals, and in reality there was no sufficiently broad, genuinely mass revolutionary movement. The seizure of power was the wish or phrase of a handful of intellectuals, not an inevitable further step of an already developing mass movement. Now, after October, November and December 1905, after the broad masses of the working class, semi-proletarian elements and peasantry showed the world unprecedented forms of revolutionary movement—now, after the struggle of the revolutionary people for power flared up both in Moscow and in the South and in the Baltic region—now to reduce the thought of the conquest of political power by the revolutionary people to Narodovoltsm means to be lagging behind by a full twenty-five years, means to strike from the history of Russia an entire enormous period. Plekhanov said: one need not be afraid of an agrarian revolution. It is precisely this fear of the conquest of power by revolutionary peasantry that is the fear of an agrarian revolution. An agrarian revolution is an empty phrase if its victory does not presuppose the conquest of power by the revolutionary people. Without this latter condition it will not be an agrarian revolution but a peasant disturbance or Cadet agrarian reforms. I will recall only, to conclude the examination of this point, that even the resolution of the comrades from the minority, printed in the 2nd issue of "Party News," says that the task is now raised before us of wresting power from the hands of the government.

The expression "popular creativity," which, it seems, is not in our resolutions, but which I used, if Comrade Plekhanov's memory serves him correctly, in my speech, seems to him a reminder of old acquaintances among the Narodovolts and Socialist-Revolutionaries. This recollection of Comrade Plekhanov seems to me again to be lagging behind by twenty-five years. Recall what took place in Russia in the last quarter of 1905: strikes, Soviets of workers' deputies, uprisings, peasant committees, railway committees, etc.—all this testifies precisely to the transition of the popular movement into the form of uprising, all this shows unmistakable germs of organs of revolutionary power, and my words about popular creativity had a completely definite and concrete content; they referred precisely to these historical days of the Russian revolution, they characterized precisely this method of struggle not only against the old power but of struggle through revolutionary power, a method first applied by the broad masses of Russian workers and peasants in the famous October and December days. If our revolution is buried, then these embryonic forms of revolutionary power of peasants and workers are also buried; but if your words about a peasant revolution are not a phrase, if we will have a genuine agrarian revolution in the proper sense of the word, then we will see, undoubtedly, a repetition of the October and December events on immeasurably wider scales. Revolutionary power not of intellectuals, not of a group of conspirators, but of workers and peasants has already taken place in Russia, has already been realized in fact in the course of our revolution. It was crushed owing to the victory of reaction, but if we have genuine grounds to be convinced in the upsurge of the revolution, then we must inevitably also expect the upsurge, development and success of new, even more decisive, even more connected with the peasantry and proletariat organs of revolutionary power. Consequently, Plekhanov by means of the hackneyed and ridiculous bugbear of "Narodovoltsm" simply evaded an analysis of the October-December forms of movement.

Finally, let us examine the question of the flexibility and four-square solidity of my program. I think that in this respect too my agrarian program is the most satisfactory as compared to all the others. What if the course of revolution goes badly? What if without the realization of all the "ifs" set forth in my project one cannot speak of carrying through our democratic revolution to the end? Then, undoubtedly, one will have to take account of those conditions of peasant farming and peasant land use which exist even now. In this connection I will refer to such a phenomenon of paramount importance as tenancy. After all, if one speaks of the possibility that the course of revolution might go badly, that it might not reach completion, then in that case one must undoubtedly take account of the existence and ineliminability of such a phenomenon, and on this contingency, on the contingency of the absence of all allegedly utopian "ifs," the tasks of the party are foreseen by me more fully, more precisely and far more soberly than by Comrade Maslov. Thus my program gives practical slogans both under the present conditions of peasant farming and peasant land use and under the best perspectives of the further development of capitalism. Comrade John attempted to joke that my program has too many programs, that I have both confiscation and tenancy, which exclude one another; the joke fell flat because the confiscation of landowners' lands does not exclude tenancy, which takes place also on peasant lands. Consequently, Comrade Plekhanov was particularly mistaken when he advanced his particularly striking argument against me. It is not difficult, he said, to write a program for the case if everything works out in the very best manner. Anyone will write such a program, but you write a program for the case when precisely the best conditions will not be at hand. And I assert in response to this argument that precisely in the case of the worst possible course or outcome of our revolution, my program, which speaks of the confiscation of landowners' lands and foresees such questions as the question of tenancy, is particularly sober and particularly well four-square, whereas as for Comrade John, his project, saying nothing of these worst conditions—that is, of conditions of the absence of a genuinely carried-through political democracy—gives us only municipalization, but meanwhile municipalization, without the electivity of officials by the people, without the abolition of a standing army, etc., presents such a danger and even a greater danger than nationalization. This is why I insist on the posing of those "ifs" which Plekhanov so unjustly condemned.

So, peasants will not accept municipalization. Comrade Kartvélov said that in the Caucasus peasants fully agree with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but ask at the same time: will they have the right to sell the land that has come to them through partition or through socialization? Quite right, Comrade Kartvélov! Your observation fully corresponds to peasant interests in general and to peasant understanding of their interests, but it is precisely because peasants view every agrarian transformation from the standpoint of whether they will have the right to sell the additional land coming to them, it is precisely for this reason that peasants will be absolutely opposed to municipalization, opposed to zemstvization. Peasants even now still confuse the zemstvo with the zemstvo official and they have far deeper grounds for this than the majestic Cadet law professors, who laugh at peasant ignorance, suppose. Therefore, before speaking of municipalization, it is necessary, absolutely necessary, to speak of the electivity of officials by the people. Now, while this democratic demand is not realized, it is appropriate only to speak of confiscation in general or of partition. This is why, in order to simplify the fundamental question for the congress, I proceed as follows: since Comrade Borisov's program has a number of features in common with my program and is built precisely on partition rather than on nationalization, I am withdrawing my program and leaving it to the congress to decide the question: partition or municipalization. If you reject partition—or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say, "when" you reject partition—then of course I will have to withdraw my project as hopeless, finally, but if you accept partition, then I will introduce my program in its entirety as an amendment to Comrade Borisov's project. I will remind [you] in response to reproaches that I am imposing nationalization on peasants, that my program contains "Variant A," in which it specifically says that there is no intention of imposing anything whatsoever on peasants against their will. Consequently, the replacement of my project with Borisov's project in the initial vote will not change anything whatever in the essence of the matter and will only facilitate and simplify the clarification to us of the congress's actual will. In my opinion, municipalization is erroneous and harmful—partition is erroneous but not harmful.

I will dwell briefly on this distinction: the "partitionists" correctly interpret the facts, but they forget Marx's dictum about old materialism: "the materialists explained the world, but the point is not only to explain it but to change the world"{150}. The peasant says: "the land is God's, the land is the people's, the land is nobody's." The "partitionists" explain to us that he says this not consciously, that he says one thing but thinks another. The actual strivings of peasants, they say, consist wholly and exclusively in the addition of land to peasants, in the increase of small farming and in nothing else. All this is completely true. But our disagreement with the "partitionists" does not end there, it only begins there. Precisely these words of the peasants, despite all their economic unsoundness or emptiness of content, we must use as hooks for propaganda. You say that everyone should use the land? You want to give land to the people? Excellent, but what does it mean to give land to the people? Who disposes of popular property and popular wealth? Officials, Trepovsand others. Do you want to give land to Trepov and officials? No. Every peasant will say that he does not want to give them land. Do you want to give land to Petrunkévitch and Rodichers, who perhaps will be sitting in municipal self-government? No. The peasant surely will not want to give land to these gentlemen. Consequently, we will explain to the peasants, in order for the land to be given to all the people with benefit to the peasants, it is necessary that the electivity of all officials without exception by the people be assured. Consequently, the project of nationalization put forward by me, conditioned by the full assurance of a democratic republic, gives precisely the correct line of conduct for our propagandists and agitators, showing them clearly and graphically that the examination of peasant land demands should serve as soil for political and in particular republican propaganda. The peasant Mishin, for example, who was elected a deputy to the Duma from the Stavropol peasants, brought a mandate from the electors, printed in full in the "Russian State"{151}. In this mandate there is a demand both for the abolition of zemstvo officials and for the arrangement of elevators, and for the transfer of all lands to the treasury. A demand for such a transfer is undoubtedly a reactionary prejudice, because the treasury of present and future constitutional Russia is the treasury of police and military despotism, but we must not simply reject this demand as a harmful prejudice, we must "hook" onto it in order to explain to Mishin and those like him how things stand in essence. We must tell Mishin and those like him that the demand for the transfer of land to the treasury expresses, albeit very poorly, an extraordinarily important and useful idea for peasants. The transfer of land to the treasury can be very beneficial to peasants and will be very beneficial to them exclusively when the state becomes a fully democratic republic, when the electivity of officials is fully carried through, when a standing army is abolished, etc. It is for all these reasons that I think that if you reject nationalization, you will thereby inevitably provoke such same errors among our practical workers, propagandists and agitators as were provoked by our erroneous cutoff program of 1903. Just as then our cutoffs were interpreted more narrowly than the authors of this point understood them, so now the negation of nationalization and the replacement of this demand by partition, to say nothing of the altogether muddled municipalization, will inevitably lead to such a series of errors among our practical workers, propagandists and agitators that we will very soon have cause to regret the "partitionist" or municipalizer program we have adopted.

I will conclude by repeating once more my two fundamental theses: first, peasants will never consent to municipalization; second, municipalization without a democratic republic, without the electivity of officials by the people is harmful.