V. I.

Lenin

Atthe All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks, with the aid of
the Bundists, secured the adoption of a resolution permitting blocs with the
Cadets. The Cadet press is jubilant, and is spreading the happy tidings to all
ends of the earth, gently pushing the Mensheviks one step lower, one step
further to the right. Elsewhere the reader will find the decisions of the
conference, the dissenting opinion of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, and
their draft election address. [1]

Here we shall attempt to outline the general and fundamental political significance of blocs with the Cadets.

Sotsial-Demokrat ,No. 6, provides good material for such an outline,
especially the editorial entitled “A Bloc of the Extreme Left”. We
shall begin with one of the most characteristic passages in the article:

“Weare told,” writes Sotsial-Demokrat , “that the
Mensheviks, who had set out to push the whole Duma on to the revolutionary path,
abandoned their position after the dissolution of the Duma and formed a bloc
with the revolutionary parties and groups, which was expressed, firstly, in the
issue of two joint manifestoes—to the army and to the peasantry—and,
secondly, in the formation of a committee for co-ordinating action in view of
the forthcoming strike. This reference to precedent is based on a great
misunderstanding. In the instance quoted, our Party concluded with the other
revolutionary parties and groups not a political bloc, but a
fighting agreement, which we have always considered expedient and
necessary.”

Theitalics are those of Sotsial-Demokrat .

... Nota political bloc, but a fighting agreement.... For the
love of God. Menshevik comrades! This is not only nonsensical, it is positively
illiterate. One of two things: either you mean by a bloc only parliamentary
agreements, or you mean other agreements besides parliamentary agreements. If
the first is the case—then a bloc is a fighting agreement for a
parliamentary fight. If the second is the case—then a fighting agreement
is a political bloc, because a “fight” without a political purpose
is not a fight, but merely a brawl.

Comradesof the Central Committee! Watch your editors! You really must, because
they are making us feel ashamed of Social-Democracy.

Butperhaps this rigmarole presented to the reader in the organ of the Central
Committee is simply a slip of the pen, an awkward expression?

Notat all. The Sotsial-Demokrat’s mistake was not the “howler” it committed; on the contrary, the howler arose out of the
fundamental mistake that lies at the bottom of its whole argument and whole
position. The meaningless combination of words “ not a political
bloc but a fighting agreement” [2] is not fortuitous; it followed
necessarily and inevitably from the basic “meaninglessness” of
Menshevism, namely, its failure to understand that the parliamentary fight in
Russia today is entirely subordinate, and most directly so, to the conditions
and character of the fight out side of parliament. In other words: this one
logical blunder expresses the Mensheviks’ general failure to understand the role
and importance of the Duma in the present revolutionary situation.

We,of course, do not intend to copy the methods of the Mensheviks, and of their
leader Plekhanov, in their polemics against us on the question of
“fighting” and “politics”. We shall not reproach them, leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, for being capable of entering into
a non-political fighting agreement.

Wecall attention to the following question: Why did our Mensheviks,
after the dissolution of the Duma, have to form a bloc only with the revolutionary parties and groups? Certainly not because this had been
advocated for a long time (purely out of hatred for the Mensheviks) by some
anarcho-Blanquist named Lenin. Objective conditions compelled the
Mensheviks, in spite of all their theories, to form precisely such a
revolutionary anti-Cadet bloc. Whether the Mensheviks wanted it or not, and
whether they realised it or not , the objective conditions were such
that the dialectical development of the peaceful parliamentary fight in the
First Duma converted it, in the course of a few days , into one that was
altogether unpeaceful and non-parliamentary. The informal political bloc of which the Mensheviks were not aware (because of the Cadet blinkers
on their eyes)— a bloc expressed in common aspirations, common immediate
political efforts and common methods of struggle for immediate political
aims—this unintentional “political bloc” was by the force of circumstances transformed into a “fighting agreement”. And
our wiseacres were so dumbfounded by this unexpected turn of events, unforeseen
in Plekhanov’s letters of the period of the First Duma, [5] that they exclaimed:

“This is not a political bloc, but a fighting agreement!”

Thereason why your policy is no good at all, dear comrades, is that you have
in mind agreements for that “fight” which is unreal, fictitious and of no decisive importance, and overlook the conditions of
that “fight” which is being irresistibly brought to the
fore by the whole course of the Russian revolution; the fight which arises even
from conditions that at first sight seem to be the most peaceful,
parliamentary and constitutional imaginable, and even from such conditions as those
which the Rodichevs of the Duma exalted in their speeches about the
dearly-beloved, blameless monarch.

Youare committing the very error of which you groundlessly accuse the
Bolsheviks. Your policy is not a fighting policy. Your fight is not a genuine
political fight, but a sham constitutional fight; it is parliamentary
cretinism. For the “fight” which circumstances may make necessary
tomorrow you have one line of agreements; for “politics”
you have another line of agreements. That is why you are no good either for “fights” or for “politics”, but only for the role of
yes-men of the Cadets.

Thereis considerable controversy in our Party at the present time as to the
meaning of the word “blocs”. Some say that a bloc, means a joint
list of candidates; others deny this and say that it means a common
platform. All these disputes are silly and scholastic. It does not make the
slightest difference whether the narrower or the wider agreements are called
blocs. The central issue is not whether wide or narrow agreements are
permissible. Whoever thinks so is immersing himself in petty and trivial
parliamentary technique and forgetting the political substance of that
technique. The central issue is: on what lines should the socialist
proletariat enter into agreements, with the bourgeoisie, which, generally
speaking, are inevitable in the course of a bourgeois revolution. The
Bolsheviks may differ among themselves in regard to details, e.g., whether
electoral agreements are necessary with this or that party of the revolutionary
bourgeoisie, but that is not the central issue between the Bolsheviks and the
Mensheviks. The central issue remains the same:

should the socialist proletariat in a bourgeois revolution follow in the wake of
the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, or should it march in front of the
revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie.

Thearticle “A Bloc of the Extreme Left” gives numerous instances of
how the ideas of the Mensheviks are side-tracked from the political essence of
the disagreement to petty trifles. The author of the article himself describes
(p. 2, col. 3) both a common platform and a joint list as bloc tactics. At the
same time he asserts that we are advocating a “bloc” with the
Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, while the Mensheviks advocate, not
a bloc, but only “partial agreements” with the Cadets. But this is
childishness, my dear comrades, and not argument!

Comparethe Menshevik resolution adopted by the All-Russian Conference with the
Bolshevik resolution. The latter imposes stricter conditions for agreements with
the Socialist-Revolutionaries than the former does for agreements with the
Cadets. This is indisputable, for, in the first place, the Bolsheviks permit
agreements only with parties which arc fighting for a republic and which
recognise the necessity of an armed uprising, whereas the Mensheviks permit agreements with
“democratic opposition parties” generally. Thus, the Bolsheviks
defined the term “revolutionary bourgeoisie” by means of clear
political characteristics, whereas the Mensheviks, instead of a
political definition, presented merely a technical parliamentary catchword. A republic and an armed uprising are definite
political categories. Opposition is a purely parliamentary term. This term is so
vague that it can include the Octobrists, and the Party of Peaceful Renovation,
and, in fact, all who are dissatisfied with the government. True, the addition
of the word “democratic” introduces a political element, but it is
indefinite. It is supposed to refer to the Cadets but this is exactly where it
is wrong. To apply the term “democratic” to a monarchist
party, to a party which accepts an Upper Chamber, proposed repressive laws
against public meetings and the press and deleted from the reply to the address
from the throne the demand for direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot, to a
party which opposed the formation of land committees elected by the whole
people—means deceiving the people . This is a very strong
expression, but it is just. The Mensheviks are deceiving the people about the
democracy of the Cadets.

Secondly,the Bolsheviks permit agreements with the bourgeois republicans only
as an “exception”. The Mensheviks do not demand that blocs with the
Cadets should be only an exception.

Thirdly,the Bolsheviks absolutely forbid agreements in the workers’ curia
(“ with any other party ”). The Mensheviks permit blocs in the workers’ curia as well , for they only forbid agreements with groups and
parties which “do not adopt the standpoint of the proletarian class
struggle”. Thus is no accident, for at the Conference there were some
Mensheviks with proletarian class intuition, who opposed this stupid formula,
but they were defeated by the Menshevik majority. The outcome was something very
indefinite and nebulous, leaving plenty of scope for all sorts of adventurist
moves. Moreover, the outcome was an idea that is altogether reprehensible for a
Marxist, namely, that a party other than a Social-Democratic Party may
be recognised as “adopting the standpoint of the proletarian class
struggle”.

Afterthis, how can one describe as other than childish, to say the least, the
attempts to prove that the Bolsheviks permit a closer bloc with
the republican bourgeoisie, i.e., the Socialist-Revolutionaries, than the
Mensheviks permit with the monarchist bourgeoisie, i.e., the Cadets??

Theabsolutely false argument about closer or less close blocs serves to obscure
the political question: with whom and for what purpose are blocs
permissible. Take the “Draft Election Platform” published in No. 6
of Sotsial-Demokrat . This document is one of a mass of documents
defining Menshevik policy which are proof of the existence of an
ideological bloc between the Mensheviks and the Cadets. The resolution
of the conference on the “amendments” required to this draft
election platform clearly demonstrates this. Just think: a conference of
Social-Democrats had to remind its Central Committee that it must not omit the
slogan of a republic from an illegal publication; that it must not confine
itself to vague platitudes about petitions and struggle, but must accurately
name and characterise the different parties from the proletarian standpoint;
that it must point to the need for an uprising and emphasise the class character
of social-Democracy! Only some deep-seated abnormality, some fundamental error
in the views held by the Central Committee could have made it necessary to
remind the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party that it must
emphasise the class character of the Party in its first election
manifesto.

Wedo not know yet whether practical agreements with the Cadets will be
concluded, or what their scope will be; but an ideological agreement, an
ideological bloc, already exists: in the draft election platform the difference
between the standpoint of the proletariat and that of the liberal-monarchist
bourgeoisie is glossed over. [3]

The Bolshevik draft election address, on the contrary, not only points out this difference, but also
the difference between the standpoint of the proletariat and that of the class
of small proprietors.

Itis these principles and ideas that must be brought to the fore in the
question of election blocs. It is useless for the Mensheviks to attempt to
justify themselves by saying: we shall be independent throughout the election
campaign, which we shall in no way curtail, and we shall put our candidates in
the Cadets’ list only at the last minute!

Thatis not true . We are sure, of course, that the best of the
Mensheviks sincerely desire it. But it is not their desires that count,
however—it is the objective conditions of the present political
struggle. And these conditions are such that every step the Mensheviks
take in their election campaign is already tainted by Cadetism, is
already marked by obscuring the Social-Democratic point of view. We have
demonstrated this by the example of the draft election platform and shall now do
so by a number of other documents and arguments.

The Mensheviks’ main argument is the Black-Hundred danger. The first and
fundamental flaw in this argument is that the Black-Hundred danger cannot be
combated by Cadet tactics and a Cadet policy. The essence of this policy lies
in reconciliation with tsarism, that is , with the
Black-Hundred danger. The first Duma sufficiently demonstrated that the Cadets do
not combat the Black-Hundred danger, but make incredibly despicable speeches about
the innocence and blamelessness of the monarch, the known leader of the Black Hundreds . Therefore, by helping to elect Cadets to the Duma, the
Mensheviks are not only failing to combat the Black-Hundred danger, but are
hoodwinking the people, are obscuring the real significance of the Black-Hundred
danger. Combating the Black-Hundred danger by helping to elect the Cadets to the
Duma is like combating pogroms by means of the speech delivered by the lackey
Rodichev:

“It is presumption to hold the monarch responsible for the pogrom.”

Thesecond flaw in this stock argument is that it means that the
Social-Democrats tacitly surrender hegemony in the democratic struggle to
the Cadets. In the event of a split vote that secures the victory of a
Black Hundred, why should we be blamed for not having voted for
the Cadet, and not the Cadets for not having voted for us?

“Weare in a minority,” answer the Mensheviks, in a spirit of
Christian humility. “The Cadets are more numerous. You cannot expect the
Cadets to declare themselves revolutionaries.”

Yes! But that is no reason why Social-Democrats should declare themselves
Cadets. The Social-Democrats have not had, and could riot have had, a majority
over the bourgeois democrats anywhere in the world where the outcome of the
bourgeois revolution was indecisive. But everywhere , in all countries,
the first independent entry of the Social-Democrats in an election
campaign has been met by the howling and barking of the liberals, accusing the socialists of wanting to let the Black Hundreds in .

Weare therefore quite undisturbed by the usual Menshevik cries that the
Bolsheviks are letting the Black Hundreds in. All liberals have shouted
this to all socialists. By refusing to fight the Cadets you are leaving
under the ideological influence of the Cadets masses of proletarians and semi
proletarians who are capable of following the lead of the

Social-Democrats. [4]

Now or later, unless you cease to be socialists, you will have to fight
independently, in spite of the Black-Hundred danger. And it is easier and more
necessary to take the right step now than it will be later on. In the elections
to the Third Duma (if it is convoked after the Second Duma) it will be even more
difficult for you to dissolve the bloc with the Cadets, you will be still more
entangled in unnatural relations with the betrayers of the revolution. But the
real Black-Hundred danger, we repeat, lies not in the Black Hundreds
obtaining seats in the Duma, but in pogroms and military courts; and you are
making it more difficult for the people to fight this real danger by putting Cadet blinkers on
their eyes.

Thethird flaw in this stock argument is its inaccurate appraisal of the Duma
and its role. In that delightful article “A Bloc of the Extreme
Left”, the Mensheviks had to acknowledge, contrary to all the
assertions they usually make, that the central issue lies not in technical
agreements, hut in the radical political difference between two tactics.

Inthis article we read the following:

“Thetactics of a ’bloc’ are consciously or unconsciously directed towards
the formation in the next Duma of a compact revolutionary minority of a faded
Social-Democratic hue, a minority that would wage systematic war on the Duma
majority as well as on the government, and, at a certain moment, would
overthrow the Duma and proclaim itself a provisional government. The tactics of
partial agreements are directed towards making use, as far as possible, of the
Duma as a whole, i. e., the Duma majority, for the purpose of fighting the
autocratic regime while retaining all the time in the Duma the extreme position of
an independent Social-Democratic Group.”

Asregards the “faded hue” we have already shown that it is the
Mensheviks who are to blame for this—by their conduct in the elections in
the workers’ curia, by their wider latitude for blocs, and by their ideological
substitution of Cadetism for Social-Democracy. As for “proclaiming”
a provisional government, the Mensheviks’ assertion is equally ridiculous, for
they forget that it is not a matter of proclaiming, but of the whole course and
of the success of the uprising . A provisional government which is not
the organ of an uprising is an empty phrase, or a senseless adventure.

Buton the central issue, the Mensheviks inadvertently blurted out the real
truth in the above-quoted passage. Indeed, the whole thing boils down to this:
shall we or shall we not sacrifice the independence of the
Social-Democratic election campaign for the sake of a “solid”
liberal Duma (“the Duma as a whole”)? And indeed, the most important thing
for the Bolsheviks is complete independence in the election campaign and the
completely (not semi-Cadet) Social-Democratic character of our policy and of our
Duma Group. But for the Mensheviks the most important thing is a solid Cadet
Duma with a large number of Social-Democrats elected as semi-Cadets! Two types
of Duma: 200 Black Hundreds, 280 Cadets and 20 Social-Democrats; or 400

Cadets and 100 Social-Democrats. We prefer the first type, and we think it is
childish to imagine that the elimination of the Black Hundreds from the
Duma means the elimination of the Black-Hundred danger.

Everywherewe have a single policy: in the election fight, in the fight in the
Duma, and in the fight in the streets—the policy of the armed
struggle. Everywhere our policy is: the Social-Democrats with the revolutionary
bourgeoisie against the Cadet traitors. The Mensheviks, however, wage their
“Duma” fight in alliance with the Cadets (support for the Duma as a
whole and a Cadet Cabinet); but in the event of an uprising they will change
their policy and conclude “ not a political bloc, but a
fighting agreement”. Therefore, the Bolshevik was quite right who remarked
at the conference:

“By supporting blocs with the Cadets, the Bundists have smuggled in support
for a Cadet Cabinet.”

Theabove quotation excellently confirms the fact that blocs with the Cadets
convert into empty phrases all the fine words in the Menshevik resolution on
slogans in the election campaign. For example: “to organise the forces of
the revolution in the Duma” (is it not rather to organise an appendage to
the Cadets by disorganising the actual forces of the revolution?); “to
expose the impotence of the Duma” (is it not rather to conceal from the
masses the impotence of the Cadets?); “to explain to the masses that hopes
of a peaceful issue of the struggle are illusory” (is it not rather to
strengthen among the masses the influence of the Cadet Party, which is fostering
illusions?).

Andthe Cadet press has perfectly understood the political
significance of Menshevik-Cadet blocs. We said above:

either in the rear of the liberals or in front of the revolutionaries. In
support of this we shall cite our political press.

Canyou find any serious or mass confirmation of the assertion that the
Bolsheviks are following in the wake of the bourgeois revolutionaries and are
dependent on them? It is ridiculous even to speak of such a thing. The whole
Russian press clearly shows, and all the enemies of the revolutionaries admit,
that it is the Bolsheviks who are pursuing an independent political line, and
are winning over various groups and the best elements of the bourgeois
revolutionaries.

Butwhat about the bourgeois opportunists? They own a press ten times larger
than that of the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries put
together. And they are pursuing an independent political line, converting the
Mensheviks and Popular Socialists into mere yes-men.

The whole Cadet press quotes only those parts of the
Menshevik resolutions which refer to blocs; it omits “the impotence
of the Duma”, “the organisation of the forces of the revolution in
the Duma”, and other things. The Cadets not only omit these things, they
openly rail against them, now talking about the “phrase-mongering” or the “inconsistency” of the
Mensheviks, now about the “inconsistency of the Menshevik slogans”,
and at another time about “the baneful influence of the Bolsheviks over
the Mensheviks”.

Whatdoes this mean? It means that, whether we like it or not, and in spite of
the wishes of the better sort of Mensheviks, political life absorbs their
Cadet deeds and rejects their revolutionary phrases .

The Cadet coolly accepts the help of the Mensheviks, slaps Plekhanov on the back
for his advocacy of blocs, and at the same time shouts contemptuously and
rudely, like a merchant who has grown fat on ill-gotten gains: Not enough,
Menshevik gentlemen! There must also be an ideological understanding! (See the
article in Tovarishch on Plekhanov’s letter.) Not enough, Menshevik
gentlemen, you must also stop your polemic, or at any rate change its tone! (See
the leading article in the Left-Cadet Vek on the resolutions of our
Conference.) Not to mention Rech , which simply snubbed the Mensheviks
who are yearning for the Cadets by bluntly declaring: “We shall go into
the Duma to legislate ”, not to make a revolution!

Poor Mensheviks, poor Plekhanov! Their love letters to the Cadets were read with
pleasure, but so far they are not being admitted further than the antechamber.

Read Plekhanov’s letter in the bourgeois-Cadet newspaper Tovarishch .
How joyfully he was greeted by Mr. Prokopovich and Madame Kuskova, the very
people whom Plekhanov, in 1900, drove out of the Social-Democratic Party for at
tempting its bourgeois corruption. Now Plekhanov has accepted the tactics of
the famous Credo [6] of Prokopovich and Kuskova; and these followers of Bernstein are impudently blowing kisses to him and shouting: We bourgeois democrats have always
said this!

Andin order to be admitted to the antechamber of the Cadets, Plekhanov had
publicly to withdraw the statements he made bat yesterday .

Hereare the facts.

In Dnevnik , No. 6, of July 1906, after the dissolution of the Duma
Plekhanov wrote that the parties that are participating in the
movement must come to an understanding. To be able to strike together, they must
first come to an agreement . “The parties hostile to our
old regime must ... come to an agreement about what is to he the main idea in
this propaganda. After the dissolution of the Duma the only idea that can serve
this purpose is the idea of a constituent assembly....”

“ Only ”the idea of a constituent assembly. Such was
Plekhanov’s plan for a political bloc and for a fighting agreement in July
1906.

Fivemonths later, in November 1906, Plekhanov changes his policy on
agreements. Why? Has there been any change since then in the relations between
the parties which demand a constituent assembly and those which do not?

Itis generally admitted that since then the Cadets have shifted still further
to the right. And Plekhanov goes to the Cadet press but says
nothing about the constituent assembly; for it is forbidden to speak
about this in liberal antechambers.

Isit not clear that this Social-Democrat has slipped? But this is not all. In
the same No. 6 of Dnevnik , Plekhanov referred directly to the
Cadets. At that time (that was such a long time ago!) Plekhanov
explained the selfish class character of the Cadets’ distrust towards the idea
of a constituent assembly. Plekhanov at that time wrote about the Cadets
literally as follows:

“Whoeverrenounces the propaganda of this idea [a constituent assembly] on
whatever pretext will clearly indicate that he is not really seeking a worthy
answer to the actions of Stolypin & Co., that he, though reluctantly, is becoming reconciled to these actions , that he is rebelling against them
only in words, only for the sake of appearances ” (italics ours).

Havingnow gone over to a Cadet newspaper, Plekhanov began his advocacy of an
election bloc by establishing an ideological bloc. In the Cadet newspaper
Plekhanov did not want to tell the people that the Cadets are becoming reconciled to the Stolypin gang, that they are rebelling only for the sake of appearances .

Whydid Plekhanov not want to repeat in November 1906 what he said in July 1906?

This,then, is what “technical” blocs with the Cadets mean, and that
is why we are waging a relentless struggle against Social-Democrats who sanction
such blocs.

Isnot your joy premature, gentlemen of the Cadet Party? Social-Democrats will
vote in the elections without blocs in the Caucasus, in the Urals, in Poland, in
the Lettish Territory, in the Moscow Central Region, and probably in
St. Petersburg.

Noblocs with the Cadets! No conciliation with those who are becoming reconciled
to the Stolypin gang!

---
Notes:
[1]
See pp. 299-801 of this volume.— Ed .

[2]
And, as luck would have it, we now have the curious situation that the
Mensheviks, who have always reproached us with contrasting “fighting” to
“politics”, have themselves based their entire argument
on this meaningless contrast.— Lenin

[3]
This is not the first time the Mensheviks have made this mistake. They
made the same mistake in the famous Duma declaration of the R.S.D.L.P. They
accused the Bolsheviks of Socialist-Revolutionary tendencies, while they
themselves obliterated the differences between the views of the
Social-Democrats and those of the Trudoviks to such an extent that the
Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers of the Duma period called the Duma
declaration of the Social-Democrats a plagiary of Socialist-Revolutionary
ideas! In our counter-draft of the Duma declaration, [7] on the contrary, the difference between us and the petty bourgeois was
clearly shown.— Lenin

[4]
The Cadets themselves are beginning to acknowledge that in the
elections they are threatened by a danger from the Left (the exact
words used by Rech in a report on the St. Petersburg Gubernia). By
their outcry against the Black-Hundred danger, the Cadets are leading the
Mensheviks by the nose in order to avert the danger from the Left!!— Lenin

[5]
This refers to G. V. Plekhanov’s “Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness”, which defined Menshevik tactics in regard to the State
Duma.

[7]
The Bolshevik draft of the Duma declaration was written
by Lenin; he quotes it in the article “Concerning the Declaration of Our
Duma Group” (see pp. 33-36 of this volume).

[6]
See pp. 448-49 of this volume.