Notes on Issue No. 1 of *Social-Democrat*. Early October 1906

Comrade Axelrod angrily responds to us in the *S.-D.* regarding our note in No. 1 of *Proletarian*. A page and a half of small print is devoted to bewilderment, exclamations, astonishment, and reproaches directed at us for calling his agitation for a workers' congress "hidden"* from the party.* Axelrod simply cannot understand what this means. And at the same time, he himself says: "in the near future I will avail myself of it (of the opportunity I possess) for bringing the question of a workers' congress onto the arena of political discussion" (emphasis ours). Well, that's what should have been done from the start! One ought to have begun with "bringing the question onto the arena of political discussion," and not with circle-whispered scheming. Then your agitation would have been party-correct, open, worthy of a revolutionary class. Then the bourgeois press would not have been able to sow discord in social-democracy and undermine its prestige by disseminating sensational notes about this circle-whispered scheming and giving rise to thousands of confusions. It is deeply regrettable that even now, in his belated and extremely lengthy "letter to the editors," Axelrod dodges the heart of the matter, saying not a word about what precisely kind of congress he proposes, when, on what basis, by whom convened, for what precisely purpose. Axelrod gets off with phrases like the following: work in preparation for the congress will have a vivifying effect on social-democracy "precisely to the extent that this work is permeated with genuinely social-democratic content, that is, insofar as factional interests and fractional scores will be displaced in it by social-political questions and tasks having the most immediate bearing on the vital interests of the working class."

Spare us, comrade! For this is nothing but empty nonsense dressed up in important words. Preparation of the congress will invigorate social-democracy precisely to the extent that it is genuinely social-democratic! Both novel and clever. "Factional scores" ought to be displaced by social-political questions and tasks—yet it is precisely differing understandings of these questions and tasks that have divided the party into factions! A genuine fairy tale about the white bull.

And alongside this, Plekhanov crudely and vulgarly insinuates things regarding the motives for the struggle for a party congress and equally crudely praises Axelrod's "happy thought" about convening a workers' congress "as soon as possible." Yes, yes... what could be happier indeed than the thought that genuinely social-democratic work invigorates social-democracy?

In the editorial of the *S.-D.* we read: "now, as also after the Second Congress, both factions (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks), are apparently equally strong in numbers" and a little further, a second time: "now, as also after the Second Congress, both factions are equally influential in the party." The author's thought is clear. In an editorial article of the official "publication of the C.C.," it acquires significant importance. The party of the working class must know precisely who constitutes its "factions" and how strong they are. On what then is the opinion of their equality based?

One of two things: either the author has in view only the Russian part of the party (plus the Caucasus) or he includes the Poles, Latvians, and the Bund. If we accept the first interpretation, then it means the author recognizes an enormous strengthening of the "majority" at the expense of the "minority" after the Fourth (Unification) Congress, since at that congress there were represented approximately 13,000 Bolsheviks and approximately 18,000 Mensheviks. But such an interpretation is improbable, since the national S.-D. parties have all united with the R.S.D.R.P. for more than a month already. Consequently, we must take the second interpretation. Then it is evident that the author attributes the Poles and Latvians to the Bolsheviks and the Bund to the Mensheviks. Reckoning, according to data from the last congresses of the national S.-D. parties, approximately 40,000 Poles and Latvians and approximately 33,000 members of the Bund, we then obtain indeed an approximately equal distribution of both factions.

But one must ask: is the attribution of the Bund to the Mensheviks correct? Of course, if the C.C. asserts this, we must believe it. But it is necessary to clarify for ourselves the significance of such a grouping. In the sphere of tactics it is not confirmed by the Bund's resolutions taken in their totality. Consequently, the explanation must be sought in the Bund's organizational position. Evidently, the C.C.'s publication takes into account, as a real fact, the circumstance that the Bund does not demand an extraordinary congress. Whoever wishes actually to change the party's policy as a whole, that is, the C.C.'s policy, must demand a congress; whoever does not demand it does not wish seriously to change—such is the essence of this line of reasoning.

This argumentation is irrefutable, and we consider it our duty to facilitate the clarification and correct evaluation of it by all organizations of our party. Indeed, in a democratic organization neutrality is almost impossible, and abstention often equals action. The result of this "action" is evident. The C.C.'s publication propagandizes the murkiest ideas regarding a "workers' congress" and takes a definite and consistent Menshevik position on questions of tactics. What consequences this threatens for the entire party in the event of an electoral campaign or new calls for uprisings was sufficiently shown by the C.C.'s "slogans" during the Duma and after its dissolution. By its present "abstention," the Bund has indeed made itself a co-participant in the Menshevik tactics and policy of the C.C.