V. I.

Lenin

The report we published the other day of the resignation of the Goremykin
Ministry is officially denied. But the newspapers which have some access to
“reliable” sources of information do not believe this denial. The
Novoye Vremya campaign in favour of a Cadet Ministry is now more
cautious, but is going on. Novoye Vremya has discovered a Japanese
diplomat who believes that “the Cadet Party is pursuing state
aims”. It even assures its readers, in an article by Mr. Rozanov, that
“the Cadets will not relinquish civilisation even for the
revolution”, and that “this is all that can be expected at the
moment”. Rech believes that “the resignation of the
Goremykin Cabinet can be considered a foregone conclusion, and the only question
is, who is to be its successor”. In short, the question of a Cadet
Ministry is still on the order of the day.

The Cadets realise this, and perhaps something more. They have come to a dead
stop and are “standing rigid” like setters. They are clutching with
both hands at even the shadow of support from the left that would help them to
execute their plans. It is significant that Rech , the chief organ of
the Cadet Party, devoted the leading article in its last issue to the question
of the Social-Democrats’ attitude towards the idea of a Cadet Ministry. We
publish elsewhere the full text of that article as a most instructive sign of
the times.

The authors of the article sum up their main idea as follows: to create
“common ground on which the liberation movement could take its stand with
complete unanimity, without distinction of shades”. This, in
fact, is the principal aim of the Cadets’ entire policy. Moreover, this, in fact, is the principal aim
of all the liberal-bourgeois policy in the Russian revolution in general. To
eliminate the “different shades” in the liberation movement means
eliminating the difference in the democratic demands of the bourgeoisie, the
peasantry and the proletariat. It means recognising with “complete
unanimity” the liberal bourgeoisie as the medium of expression and
champion of the aspirations of the whole liberation movement. It means
converting the proletariat into a blind tool of the liberal bourgeoisie. But
since everybody knows that the supreme political ideal of the liberal
bourgeoisie—dictated by its most pro found class interests—is a deal
with the old authority, we may formulate our last thesis differently. We can say
that the bourgeois Rech wants to convert the proletariat into a blind
accessory to the deal that the liberals want to make with the old authority. But
the main target against which this deal will be directed will be the
proletariat, and the next, of course, the revolutionary peasantry.

This is what a Cadet Ministry really means. The recent conflict in the State
Duma over the question of instituting local land committees threw a glaring
light on Cadet pol icy. The committees should have been the local authority,
while the Ministry is to be the central authority; but in substance the Cadets’
policy remains unchanged, always and everywhere. They are opposed to the
election of local committees by universal suffrage: they are in favour of
“equal representation of the landlords and the peasants, under the
supervision of the old authorities”. They have been compelled to
admit this, against their own will, be cause for a long time they concealed the truth , tried to befog the issue and asserted that, “in
general”, they were whole heartedly in favour both of local land
committees and of universal suffrage. Similarly, the Cadets are opposed to the
convocation of a constituent assembly: they are in favour of a Cadet Ministry to
be appointed by the supreme authority. Such a Ministry, as the instrument of
central authority, will be quite on a par with local committees established on
the vaunted principle of equal representation, etc.

The tactics the proletariat must adopt in face of this Cadet policy are
clear. The proletariat must ruthlessly expose the true meaning of this policy, tolerating no ambiguities, no attempts to
obscure the political consciousness of the workers and peasants. The
proletariat must fully use all the vacillations in the policy of the
“powers that be” and of the would-be “sharers of power” to enlarge and strengthen its own class
organisation, and to strengthen its contacts with the revolutionary
peasantry as the only class that is capable of carrying the liberation
movement beyond the Cadet “darn”, beyond a Cadet deal with the old authorities.

But should not the proletariat support the demand of the liberal
bourgeoisie that the supreme authority should appoint a Cadet Ministry? Is it
not the duty of the proletariat to do so since the appointment of a Cadet
Ministry would facilitate the struggle for freedom and for socialism?

No, such a step would be a gross mistake, and betrayal of the interests
of the proletariat. It would mean sacrificing the fundamental interests of the
proletariat in the revolution for the sake of a momentary success. It would
mean chasing a shadow and advising the proletariat to “lay down its
arms”, without even the slightest real guarantee that its
struggle will really be facilitated. It would be the worst kind of
opportunism.

The appointment of a Cadet Ministry by the supreme authority will not shake the
foundations of the old authorities in the least. It will not necessarily change
the real alignment of force.s in favour of the truly revolutionary classes. Such
a “reform” will not eliminate the struggle between the people and
the old authorities in the least. There have been cases in the history of
revolutions where such liberal Ministries appointed by the old authorities (for
example, in Germany in 1848) served only as a screen for autocracy, and did more
to stamp out the revolution than many a bureaucratic Ministry.

The Russian proletariat has no reason to fear a Cadet Ministry, which, at all
events, will help the people to realise the true nature of the Cadets; but it
must under no circumstances support the appointment of such a Ministry, for, in
essence, this is a most ambiguous, sinister and treacherous measure.

Since the Duma was not swept away, it was to the proletariat’s advantage that
the Cadets obtained a majority in the elections. They will “exhaust” themselves much sooner than they
would have done had they been in the minority. But the proletariat refused to
render the Cadets any sup port during the elections, and the Unity Congress of
the R.S.D.L.P. endorsed this decision by prohibiting all blocs (agreements,
alliances) with other parties. A Cadet Ministry will be to the proletariat’s
advantage in the sense that, if one were formed, the Cadets would the
sooner “spend” themselves, become “played out”, “winded”, and reveal themselves in their true colours. But the
proletariat will never support a deal between the bourgeoisie and
Trepov for the purpose of carving up the people’s freedom.

The only real way of “supporting” the liberation movement and
really developing it is to stimulate the growth of the political and industrial
organisations of the proletariat and to strengthen its ties with the
revolutionary peasantry. This alone will really sap the strength of the old
authority and prepare for its downfall. The bargaining of the Cadets is a
dubious game. It would be both useless to support it, with a view to achieving
some truly lasting gains for the revolution, and harmful to do so, because of
the effect it would have on the development of the political consciousness,
solidarity and organisation of the revolutionary classes.

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