Written in the second half of March 1906

Published in early April 1906 in St. Petersburg as a separate pamphlet by the publishing house "Our Thought"

Printed from the text of the pamphlet

Cover of V. I. Lenin's pamphlet "Revision of the Agrarian Program of the Workers' Party." – 1906 (Reduced)

The necessity of revising the agrarian program of the workers' party is recognized at the present time by all. The last conference of the "majority" (December 1905) formally raised this urgent question, which has now been placed on the agenda of the unifying Congress.

We intend first to give the briefest possible sketch of the formulation of the agrarian question in the history of Russian social-democracy, then a review of the various draft programs now proposed by social-democrats, and finally, an outline of the draft we are defending.

1. A Brief Sketch of the Historical Development of Russian Social-Democracy's Views on the Agrarian Question

Russian social-democracy, from its very inception, recognized the enormous importance of the agrarian question and the specific peasant question in Russia, including an independent analysis of this question in all its programmatic constructions.

The opposite opinion, frequently disseminated by Narodniks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, rests upon either complete ignorance or deliberate distortion of the matter.

Already in the first draft of the program of Russian social-democrats, published by the "Emancipation of Labor" group in 1884, there stands the demand for "radical revision of agrarian relations" and the liquidation of all serf-like relations in the countryside (not having at hand the old social-democratic literature published abroad, we are forced to cite from memory, answering for the general sense but not for the exact text of the quotations).

Subsequently, Plekhanov, both in the journal "Social-Democrat"{119} (late 1880s) and in pamphlets: "All-Russian Ruin" and "The Tasks of Socialists in the Struggle against Famine in Russia" (1891–1892), repeatedly and in the most decisive language emphasized the enormous importance of the peasant question in Russia, pointed out even that a "Black Repartition" was possible at the forthcoming democratic overturn and that social-democracy was in no way frightened of or averse to this prospect. While in no way a socialist measure, the "Black Repartition" would give an enormous impetus to the development of capitalism, to the growth of the internal market, to the improvement of the peasantry's well-being, to the decomposition of the commune, to the development of class contradictions in the countryside, to the liquidation of all remnants of the old, serf-like and enslaving Russia.

This indication by Plekhanov of the "Black Repartition" has particular historical importance for us. It shows clearly that the social-democrats immediately gave precisely that theoretical formulation of the agrarian question in Russia which they have steadfastly adhered to and continue to adhere to at the present time.

Three subsequent propositions have always been defended by Russian social-democrats, from the very inception of their party down to the present time. First. The agrarian overturn will inevitably constitute part of the democratic overturn in Russia. The liberation of the countryside from serf-like and enslaving relations will be the content of this overturn. Second. The forthcoming agrarian overturn, in its socio-economic significance, will be a bourgeois-democratic overturn; it will not weaken but will strengthen the development of capitalism and capitalist class contradictions. Third. Social-democracy has every basis to support this overturn in the most decisive manner, outlining one or another immediate task, while not tying its own hands or refusing in any way to support even the "Black Repartition."

Whoever does not know these three propositions, whoever has not read them throughout all the social-democratic literature on the agrarian question in Russia, either does not know the matter or bypasses its essence (as the Socialist-Revolutionaries constantly do).

Returning to the history of the development of social-democracy's views on the peasant question, let us note further from the literature of the late 1890s "The Tasks of Russian Social-Democrats" (1897){127}, where the view of the "indifferent" attitude of social-democrats toward the peasantry is decisively refuted and the general views of social-democracy are repeated; then the newspaper "Spark." In its 3rd issue, which appeared in spring (March and April) 1901, that is, a year before the first major peasant uprising in Russia, an editorial article "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry"{128} was published, emphasizing once again the importance of the peasant question and putting forth, among other demands, the demand for the return of the cut-off lands.

This article may be regarded as the first draft of that agrarian program of the RSDLP which, in the name of the editorial offices of "Spark" and "Dawn"{120}, was published in summer 1902 and at the II Congress of our party (August 1903) became the official program of the party.

In this program the entire struggle against autocracy is considered as the struggle of the bourgeois system against serfdom, and the principled Marxist point of view is imprinted in the most distinct manner in the basic proposition of the agrarian section: "in order to eliminate the remnants of the serf order, which lie as a heavy oppression directly upon the peasants, and in the interests of the free development of class struggle in the countryside, the party demands…"

Critics of the social-democratic program almost all pass over this basic proposition in silence: they do not notice the elephant.

The individual points of the agrarian program adopted at the II Congress, apart from indisputable demands (abolition of class levies, reduction of rent, freedom of land disposition), also contained the demand for the return of redemption payments and the establishment of peasant committees for the return of the cut-off lands and the elimination of remnants of serf relations.

This last point, concerning the cut-off lands, provoked the most criticism within the ranks of social-democrats. This point was criticized by the social-democratic group "Struggle," which proposed (if my memory serves) the expropriation of all landlord land{121}, and it was criticized by Comrade Ikx (his criticism together with my response{129} came out as a separate pamphlet in Geneva in summer 1903, just before the II Congress, whose delegates had it before them). Comrade Ikx proposed instead of cut-off lands and return of redemption payments: 1) confiscation of church, monastery and appanage lands with their transfer "into the possession of the democratic state," 2) "the levying of a progressive tax on the land rent of large landowners, so that this form of income passes into the hands of the democratic state for the needs of the people," and 3) "the transition of part of privately owned lands (large landholding), and if possible, of all lands, into the possession of self-governing large public organizations (zemstvos)."

I criticized this program, calling it an "inferior and contradictory formulation of the demand for nationalization of land," and emphasized that peasant committees have significance as a fighting slogan raising up an oppressed estate; – that social-democracy should not tie its own hands by renouncing even the "sale" of confiscated lands; – that the return of cut-off lands does not at all limit the aspirations of social-democracy but rather limits only the possibility of putting forward general tasks to both the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie. I emphasized that "if the demand for all land becomes the demand for nationalization or for transfer of land to the present economic peasantry, then we shall evaluate this demand from the point of view of the interests of the proletariat, taking into account all the circumstances of the matter (emphasis ours); we cannot say in advance, for example, whether our economic peasantry, when revolution awakens it to political life, will emerge as a democratically-revolutionary party or as a party of order" (pp. 35–36 of the named pamphlet){130}.

The same thought, that cut-off lands in no way limit either the scope of peasant movement or our support for it, if it goes further, I developed also in "The Rural Poor" (published in 1903, before the II Congress), where the "cut-off lands" are called not a "barrier" but a "door"{131}, and the thought of the transition of all land to the peasantry is in no way rejected but even greeted as appropriate under certain political conditions.

Regarding the Black Repartition, I wrote in August 1902 ("Dawn" no. 4, p. 176), defending the draft of the agrarian program:

"In the demand for Black Repartition there is reactionary utopianism in attempting to generalize and perpetuate small peasant production, but in it there is (apart from the utopianism that the 'peasantry' can be the bearer of a socialist overturn) also a revolutionary side, namely: the desire to sweep away through peasant uprising all remnants of the serf order"{132}.

Thus, reference to the literature of 1902–1903 proves irrefutably that the demand for cut-off lands was never understood by the authors of this point in the sense of limiting the scope of peasant movement and our support for it. Yet nonetheless the course of events showed that this point of the program was unsatisfactory, because the movement of the peasantry was growing in breadth and depth with enormous rapidity, and our program was giving rise to perplexity in the broad masses, and the party of the working class must reckon with the broad masses and cannot confine itself to commentaries explaining provisions that are obligatory for the party.

The necessity of revising the agrarian program was ripening. In early 1905, in one of the issues of the "Bolshevik" social-democratic newspaper "Forward"{122} (published weekly from January to May 1905 in Geneva), a draft for changing the agrarian program was set forth, with the removal of the point on cut-off lands and its replacement by "support of peasant demands up to the confiscation of all landlord land"{133}.

But at the III Congress of the RSDLP (May 1905) and at the simultaneous conference of the "minority," the question of revising the program itself was not raised. The matter was limited to the drafting of a tactical resolution. Both halves of the party agreed on support of peasant movement up to the confiscation of all landlord land.

Properly speaking, these resolutions settled in advance the question of the revision of the RSDLP's agrarian program. At the last conference of the "majority" (December 1905), my proposal was adopted to express the wish to remove the points on cut-off lands and the return of redemption payments and to replace them with an indication of support of peasant movement up to the confiscation of all landlord land{134}.

Thus we shall conclude the brief sketch of the historical development of the RSDLP's views on the agrarian question.

II. Four Currents within Social-Democracy on the Question of the Agrarian Program

At the present time, apart from the mentioned resolution of the "Bolshevik" conference, we have two ready drafts of the agrarian program – by Comrades Maslov and Rozhkov – and incomplete remarks and considerations by Comrades Finn, Plekhanov, and Kautsky, that is, ones not providing a ready draft program.

Let us briefly set forth the views of these writers.

Comrade Maslov proposes a somewhat modified draft of Comrade Ikx. Namely, from Ikx's draft he removes the progressive tax on land rent and corrects the requirement for the transfer of privately owned lands into the hands of the zemstvo. Maslov's correction consists, first, in that he strikes out Ikx's words: "if possible and all lands" (i.e., so that all lands pass into the possession of zemstvos); secondly, Maslov completely strikes out the mention of "zemstvos" present in Ikx, saying instead of "large public organizations – zemstvos" – "large regional organizations." The entire corresponding point in Maslov reads as follows:

"Transfer of privately owned lands (large landholding) into the possession of self-governing large regional organizations. The minimum size of land parcels to be expropriated is determined by regional popular representation." Consequently, Maslov decisively refuses the conditional allowance made by Ikx for complete nationalization and demands "municipalization" or, more precisely, "provincialization." Against nationalization, Maslov puts forward three arguments: 1) nationalization would be an encroachment on the self-determination of nationalities; 2) the peasants, especially peasants with fixed homesteads, will not agree to nationalization of their lands; 3) nationalization will strengthen bureaucracy, inevitable in a class, bourgeois-democratic state.

Maslov criticizes the division of landlord lands ("division") only as pseudo-socialist utopianism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, not evaluating this measure by comparison with "nationalization."

As for Rozhkov, he wants neither division nor nationalization, demanding only the replacement of the point on cut-off lands with a point of this kind: "Transfer to the peasants without redemption of all those lands which serve as an instrument for their economic enslavement" (see the collection "The Present Moment"{123}, p. 6 of the article by Comrade N. Rozhkov). Comrade Rozhkov demands the confiscation of church and other lands without an indication of "their transfer into the possession of the democratic state" (as Comrade Maslov wishes).

Further, Comrade Finn, in his incomplete article ("The World of God"{124}, 1906), rejects nationalization and inclines, apparently, toward the division of landlord lands into private peasant property.

Comrade Plekhanov, in no. 5 of the "Diary," similarly does not touch with a single word the question of specific changes in our agrarian program. Criticizing Maslov, he defends only "flexible tactics" in general, rejects "nationalization" (citing the old arguments of "Dawn") and inclines, as it were, toward the division of landlord lands among the peasants.

Finally, K. Kautsky, in his excellent work "The Agrarian Question in Russia," sets forth the general foundations of social-democratic views on the question, expressing his complete sympathy for the division of landlord lands, apparently allowing, under certain conditions, even nationalization, but completely refraining from touching in a single word either the old agrarian program of the RSDLP or the drafts for its change.

Bringing together the opinions that have emerged in our party on the question of the RSDLP's agrarian program, we obtain the following four basic types of these opinions:

1) the RSDLP's agrarian program should require neither nationalization nor confiscation of landlord lands (here belong the defenders of the present program or small corrections to it, such as those proposed by Comrade N. Rozhkov);

2) the RSDLP's agrarian program should require the confiscation of landlord lands, without requiring nationalization of land in any form (here apparently belong Comrade Finn and, perhaps, Comrade Plekhanov, although his opinion is unclear);

3) expropriation of landlord lands along with a distinctive and limited nationalization ("zemstvofication" and "provincialization" of Ikx, Maslov, Groman and others);

4) confiscation of landlord lands and, under certain political conditions, nationalization of land (the program proposed by the majority of the commission appointed by the Unified Central Committee of our party; this program, which the author of these lines defends, is printed below, at the end of the pamphlet){135}.

Let us examine all these opinions.

The supporters of the present program or a program such as that proposed by Comrade Rozhkov, proceed either from the view that the confiscation of large estates, leading to their division into small ones, generally cannot be defended from a social-democratic point of view, or from the view that confiscation has no place in the program, only in a tactical resolution.

Let us begin with the first view. We are told that large estates are – an advanced capitalist type. Their confiscation and division is a reactionary measure, a step backward toward small holdings. Social-democrats cannot be in favor of such a measure.

Such a view seems to us to be incorrect.

We must take into account the general and ultimate result of the present peasant movement, and not drown it in individual cases and particulars. In general and on the whole, the present landlord economy in Russia is maintained more by the serf-like and enslaving system of economy than by the capitalist system. Whoever denies this will not be able to explain the present broad and deep revolutionary peasant movement in Russia. Our error in putting forward the demand to return cut-off lands consisted in an insufficient evaluation of the breadth and depth of the democratic, namely bourgeois-democratic, movement in the peasantry. It is unreasonable to insist on this error now, when the revolution has taught us much. For the development of capitalism, the confiscation of all landlord land will give an incomparably greater plus than the minus that would result from the division of large capitalist holdings. Division will not destroy capitalism or push it backward, but in a huge degree will clear, generalize, broaden and strengthen the ground for its (capitalism's) new development. We have always said that it is not the business of social-democrats to limit the scope of peasant movement, and at the present time refusal to demand the confiscation of all landlord lands would be a clear limitation of the scope of a social movement already defined.

Therefore, those comrades who are now fighting against the demand for the confiscation of all landlord lands are making an error just as the English coal miners, who have less than an 8-hour working day and fight against the legislative introduction of an 8-hour working day throughout the country, make an error.

Other comrades make a concession to the "spirit of the times." In the program – cut-off lands or the expropriation of lands serving for enslavement, – they say. In the tactical resolution – confiscation. One must not, they say, confuse the program with tactics.

We answer to this that the attempt to draw an absolute line between program and tactics leads only to scholasticism and pedantry. The program determines the general, basic relations of the working class to other classes. Tactics – particular and temporary relations. This, of course, is true. But one cannot forget that all our struggle against the remnants of serfdom in the countryside is a particular and temporary task in comparison with the general socialist tasks of the proletariat. If a "constitutional regime" in the Shvanovsk taste holds out in Russia for 10–15 years, these remnants will disappear, causing incalculable suffering to the population, but will still disappear, will die out of their own accord. A somewhat strong democratic peasant movement will become impossible then; one will not be able to defend any agrarian program "for the purpose of eliminating the remnants of the serf order." Thus, the distinction between program and tactics is only relative. But the disadvantage for a mass party, which is now appearing more openly than before, is very great, if the program contains something particular, limited and narrow, while the tactical resolution contains a general, broad and all-embracing demand. Our party will have to revise its agrarian program again fairly soon in any case: both if the Dubasov-Shvanovsk "constitution" takes hold and if the peasant and workers' uprising triumphs. Consequently, there is no particular point in rushing to build a house for all eternity.

We turn to the second type of views. Confiscation of landlord lands, their division – yes, but in no way nationalization, we are told. They cite Kautsky in defense of division, they repeat the earlier arguments of all social-democrats (compare "Dawn" no. 4) against nationalization. We fully and unconditionally agree that the division of landlord lands would be, at the present time, in general and on the whole, a decidedly progressive measure both in the economic and political sense. We agree, further, that in bourgeois society the class of small proprietors, under certain conditions, is "a more solid bulwark of democracy than the class of tenants, dependent on the police-class, albeit constitutional, state" (Lenin. "Reply to Ikx," p. 27){136}.

But we think that to limit ourselves to these considerations at the present moment of democratic revolution in Russia, to limit ourselves to defending the old position of 1902 – would mean unconditionally not to take into account the essentially changed socio-class and political situation. "Dawn" indicated in August 1902 (no. 4, article by Plekhanov, p. 36) that the "Moscow Gazette" defends nationalization, and carried forward the undoubtedly correct thought that the demand for nationalization of land is far from everywhere and not always revolutionary. This last is, of course, true, but in the same article by Plekhanov (p. 37) it is indicated that "in a revolutionary epoch" (emphasis by Plekhanov) the expropriation of large landowners may prove to be a necessity for us and that under certain circumstances the question about it will need to be raised.

It is undoubted that now the situation has essentially changed compared to 1902. The revolution rose high in 1905 and is now preparing forces for a new rise. There can be no talk (in any serious sense) of defense of nationalization of land by the "Moscow Gazette." On the contrary, the defense of the inviolability of private property in land has become the main motif of both the speeches of Nicholas II and the howls of Gringmut and Company. Peasant uprising has already shaken serf-like Russia, and all the hopes of dying autocracy now rest exclusively on a deal with the landlord class, frightened to death by peasant movement. Not only the "Moscow Gazette," but also "The Word," the organ of the Shvanovsk faction, attacks Witte and the "socialist" project of Kutler, who proposed not nationalization but only compulsory purchase of part of the lands. The fierce reprisals of the government against the "Peasant Union" and the fierce "dragonades" against the rebelling peasants show as clear as day that the revolutionary-democratic character of peasant movement has become fully delineated.

This movement, like any profound popular movement, has already provoked and continues to provoke enormous revolutionary enthusiasm and revolutionary energy in the peasantry. In their struggle against landlord property in land, against landlord landholding, the peasants necessarily arrive at and have already arrived, in the persons of their most advanced representatives, at the demand for the abolition of all private property in land in general{137}.

That the idea of the people's common property in land is now extremely widely circulating in the peasantry, this can be in no way doubted. And it is equally undoubted that, despite all the darkness of the peasantry, despite all the reactionary-utopian elements of its desires, this idea, in general and on the whole, bears a revolutionary-democratic character{138}.

Social-democrats must purify this idea of its reactionary and petty-bourgeois-socialist distortions – there is no dispute about this. But social-democrats would be making a profound error if they threw overboard this entire demand, unable to distinguish its revolutionary-democratic aspect. We must say with complete frankness and decisiveness to the peasant that nationalization of land is a bourgeois measure, that it is useful only under certain political conditions, but to come forward with a bare negation of this measure in general before the peasant masses would be short-sighted politics for us, socialists. And not only short-sighted politics but also a theoretical distortion of Marxism, which has established with complete precision that nationalization of land is possible, conceivable, even in bourgeois society, that it will not delay but will strengthen the development of capitalism, that it is the maximum of bourgeois-democratic reforms in the sphere of agrarian relations.

And can anyone really deny that at the present time we must come forward before the peasantry precisely with the maximum of bourgeois-democratic transformations? Can one still not see the connection between the radicalism of the peasant's agrarian demands (abolition of private property in land) and the radicalism of his political demands (republic, etc.)?

No, the position of social-democrats on the agrarian question can be at the present time, when it is a question of bringing the democratic overturn to completion, only the following: against landlord property for peasant property while private property in land exists in general. Against private property in land for nationalization of land under certain political conditions.

Here we approach the third type of views: the "zemstvofication" or "provincialization" of Ikx, Maslov and others. Against Maslov it is necessary to repeat in part what I said in 1903 against Ikx, namely: that he gives an "inferior and contradictory formulation of the demand for nationalization of land" {Lenin. "Reply to Ikx," p. 42){139}. "The transfer of land," I wrote there, "is desirable (generally speaking) into the hands of the democratic state, not into those of small public organizations (like a present or future zemstvo)."

What does Maslov propose? He proposes a mixture of nationalization plus zemstvofication, plus private property in land without any indication of the different political conditions under which nationalization or that form of land arrangement is advantageous (comparatively) for the proletariat. In fact, in point 3 of his draft Maslov demands "confiscation" of church and other lands with "transfer into the possession of the democratic state." This is a pure form of nationalization. The question arises: why are the political conditions not stipulated that neutralize nationalization in bourgeois society? Why is zemstvofication not proposed here instead of nationalization? Why was such a formulation chosen that excludes the sale of confiscated lands?{140} Maslov has no answer to all these questions.

By proposing nationalization of church, monastery and appanage lands while at the same time arguing against nationalization in general, Maslov defeats himself. His arguments against nationalization are partly incomplete and imprecise, partly entirely weak. The first argument: nationalization encroaches on the self-determination of nationalities. One cannot from Petersburg dispose of the territory of the Caucasus. – This is not an argument but pure confusion. First, the right of nationalities to self-determination is recognized by our program, and consequently the Caucasus is "entitled" to determine itself, separating from Petersburg. Does Maslov object to the four-tailed formula{125} on the ground that "the Caucasus" might not agree! Second, both local and regional, broad self-government are recognized in general by our program, and consequently to speak of "Petersburg bureaucracy disposing of the land of the mountain peoples" (Maslov, p. 22) is simply ridiculous! Third, the law on the "zemstvofication" of Caucasian lands will still have to be enacted by the Petersburg Constituent Assembly, because Maslov does not want to allow any frontier region the freedom to preserve landlord landholding! Thus, Maslov's entire argument collapses.

The second argument: "Nationalization of land presupposes the transfer of all lands into the hands of the state. But will the peasants agree to transfer their lands to someone voluntarily, especially peasants with fixed homesteads?" (Maslov, p. 20).

First, Maslov plays with words or confuses concepts. Nationalization means the transfer of the right of property in land – the right to receive rent – and in no way means the land itself. Nationalization in no way means the forced transfer by all peasants of their lands to anyone. Let me clarify this for Maslov with an example. The socialist overturn means the transfer not only of property in land but of the land itself, as an object of economy, into the hands of all society. Does this mean that socialists want to take from small peasants their lands against their will? No, no reasonable socialist has ever proposed such nonsense.

Does anyone consider it necessary to stipulate this specially in a socialist program, where it speaks of the replacement of private property in land by public property? No, no social-democratic party makes such a stipulation. All the less do we have grounds for inventing imaginary horrors concerning nationalization. Nationalization is the transfer of rent to the state. Peasants in most cases receive no rent from the land. Consequently, under nationalization they will have to pay nothing, and the peasant-democratic state (silently presupposed by Maslov with his zemstvofication and not precisely defined by him) will introduce a progressive income tax and reduce the payments of small holders. Nationalization will ease the mobilization of lands, but it in no way means the seizure of land from small peasants against their will.

Second, if we argue against nationalization from the point of view of "voluntary consent" of peasants with fixed homesteads, we shall ask Maslov: will the peasant proprietors "voluntarily agree" to the fact that the best, namely the landlord, church and appanage lands, will be given to them only in lease by that "democratic state" in which the peasants will be the force? What does this mean: poor, allotted lands – here they are in your property, and the good, landlord lands – lease them. Black bread take for free, and pay money for white. Never will the peasants agree to this. One or the other, Comrade Maslov: either economic relations necessitate private property and it is advantageous – then one must speak of the division of landlord lands or of confiscation in general. Or nationalization of all land is possible and advantageous – and then there is no need to make a special exception for peasants. The combination of nationalization with provincialization, and provincialization with private property in land is simply confusion. One can wager that even with the complete victory of the democratic revolution such a measure could never be carried out.

III. The Main Error of Comrade Maslov

Here it is necessary to pause on one more consideration, flowing from the preceding but requiring more detailed examination. We just said that one can wager on the impossibility of Maslov's program even with the complete victory of the democratic revolution. Generally speaking, the "impossibility" of certain program demands in the sense of their improbability of fulfillment given the present state of affairs or in the near future cannot be considered an argument against these demands. K. Kautsky noted this extremely clearly in his article against Rosa Luxemburg on the question of Poland's independence{141}. R. Luxemburg spoke of the "impossibility" of this independence, while K. Kautsky objected that the matter is not "possibility" in the indicated sense but rather the correspondence of a given demand to the general direction of society's development or the general economic and political situation in the entire civilized world. Take, for example, the demand of the German social-democratic program for the election of all officials by the people, Kautsky said. Of course, this demand is "impossible" from the point of view of the present state of affairs in Germany. But nevertheless this demand is entirely correct and necessary, because it is an inseparable component part of a consistent democratic overturn, toward which all social development tends and which social-democracy is fighting for, as a condition of socialism and as a necessary component element of the political superstructure of socialism.

Therefore, in speaking of the impossibility of Maslov's program, we underscore the words: with the complete victory of the democratic revolution. We are saying nothing about Maslov's program being impossible from the point of view of the present political relations and conditions. No. We assert that precisely with the complete and consistent to the end democratic overturn, that is, precisely under such political conditions as will be most distant from the present and most favorable for fundamental agrarian reforms, it is precisely under such conditions that Maslov's program is impossible not because it is, so to speak, too great, but because it is too small from the point of view of these conditions. In other words: if the matter does not come to the complete victory of the democratic revolution, then there can be no serious talk of the destruction of landlord landholding, or of the confiscation of appanage and other lands, or of any municipalization, etc. On the contrary, if the matter comes to the complete victory of the democratic revolution, then the overturn cannot limit itself to just the municipalization of part of the lands. The overturn sweeping away all landlord landholding (and this is precisely the kind of overturn presupposed by both Maslov and all those standing for the division or confiscation of landlord estates) – such an overturn demands revolutionary energy and revolutionary scope reaching a degree unprecedented in history. To suppose the possibility of such an overturn without the confiscation of landlord landholding (Maslov speaks in his program draft only of "expropriation" and not of confiscation), without the broadest dissemination among the "people" of the idea of nationalization of all land, without the creation of the most advanced politically democratic forms – this is to suppose nonsense. All sides of social life are closely connected with each other and are entirely subordinated in the final analysis to the relations of production. A fundamental measure of the destruction of landlord landholding is unthinkable without a fundamental change in state forms (and this change, given this economic reform, is possible only in the direction of democracy), unthinkable without "popular" and peasant thought, demanding the destruction of the largest variety of private land property, not also revolting against private property in land in general. In other words: such a decisive overturn as the destruction of landlord landholding, by itself inevitably gives the mightiest impetus forward to all social, economic and political development. A socialist putting the question of such an overturn on the order of the day must necessarily think through and the new questions flowing from it, must regard this overturn not only from the point of view of its past but also from the point of view of its future.

It is precisely from this side that Comrade Maslov's draft becomes especially unsatisfactory. This draft formulates incorrectly, first, those slogans which now, at this very moment and immediately should kindle, strengthen, spread and "organize" the agrarian revolution: such slogans can be only the confiscation of all landlord lands and the establishment for this purpose necessarily of peasant committees, as the only appropriate form of organs of local, close to the people and strong revolutionary authority. This draft is, second, incorrect in that it does not indicate precisely those political conditions without which "municipalization" is a measure not only not necessarily useful but even certainly harmful for the proletariat and peasantry, namely it gives no precise and unambiguous definition of the concept: "democratic state." This draft, third – and this is one of the most essential and most rarely noticed shortcomings of it – does not regard the present agrarian overturn from the point of view of its future, does not indicate the tasks immediately flowing from this overturn, suffers from a lack of correspondence between the economic and political presuppositions on which this draft is built.

In fact, look more carefully at the very strongest (third) argument by which it is possible to defend Maslov's draft. This argument states: nationalization will strengthen the power of the bourgeois state, whereas municipal and generally local organs of such a state are usually more democratic, not burdened with expenses for the army, do not directly carry out tasks of police oppression of the proletariat, etc., and so on. It is easy to see that this argument presupposes not a fully democratic state, namely one where precisely the most important point, the central authority, preserves the greatest proximity to old military-bureaucratic orders, where local institutions, being secondary and subordinate, are better and more democratic than central institutions, that is, this argument presupposes a democratic overturn not brought to completion. This argument silently presupposes something between Russia in the time of Alexander III, when the zemstvos were better than central institutions, and France in the time of the "republic without republicans," when reactionary bourgeoisie, frightened by the strengthening of the proletariat, created an anti-democratic "monarchical republic," with central institutions which are far worse than local ones, less democratic, more permeated by the spirit of militarism, bureaucratism, police-ism. Maslov's draft, in essence, silently presupposes that the demands of our political minimum program are not fully carried out, that the autocracy of the people is not ensured, that a standing army is not destroyed, that the electability of officials is not introduced, etc. – in other words: that our democratic revolution has not reached its conclusion just as the majority of European democratic revolutions have not, is just as curtailed, distorted, "turned back" by reaction as all of these latter. Maslov's draft is specially adapted to the half-hearted, inconsistent, incomplete or curtailed and "neutralized" by reaction democratic overturn{142}.

It is precisely this circumstance that makes Maslov's draft completely artificial, mechanical, impossible in the sense indicated above, internally contradictory and shaky, finally, one-sided (because the transition from the democratic overturn is thought of only to anti-democratic bourgeois reaction, and not to the intensified struggle of the proletariat for socialism).

It is absolutely impermissible to silently presuppose that the democratic overturn is not brought to completion, that the fundamental demands of our political minimum program are not carried out. Such a thing must obligatorily not be hushed up but pointed out with complete precision. If Maslov wished to be true to himself, if he wished to eliminate any element of lack of candor, internal falsity in his draft, then he would have had to say: since the state that will come out of our present overturn will be, "probably," very little democratic, it is better not to strengthen its power with nationalization but to limit ourselves to zemstvofication, because the zemstvos will be, "we must think," better and more democratic than the central state institutions. Such is and only such is the silent presupposition of Maslov's draft. Therefore, when he uses in his draft the expression "democratic state" (point 3) and moreover without any reservations, he tells the greatest lie, misleads himself and the proletariat and all the people, because in fact he is "fitting" his draft precisely to a non-democratic state, to a reactionary state, which arose from democracy not brought to completion or "taken back" by reaction.

Once this is so – and it undoubtedly is – then the complete artificiality and "inventedness" of Maslov's draft becomes clear. In fact, if we presuppose a state with a central authority more reactionary than local authorities, a state like the third French republic without republicans, then it becomes directly absurd to entertain the thought of the possibility to destroy landlord landholding under such a state or even to maintain under it the destruction of landlord landholding accomplished by revolutionary force. Every such state in that part of the globe called Europe, in the century which is called the XX, would inevitably, by force of the objective logic of class struggle, have to begin with the protection of landlord landholding or with its restoration, if it had been partly already destroyed. For the entire meaning, the objective meaning, of every such semi-democratic, and in fact reactionary, state consists in defending the fundamental bases of bourgeois-landlord and bureaucratic power, sacrificing only the least essential prerogatives. For the coexistence in such states of a reactionary central authority and comparatively "democratic" local institutions, zemstvos, municipal administrations, etc., is explained exclusively, solely by the fact that these local institutions occupy themselves with business harmless to the bourgeois state – "polishing bowls," water supply, electric tramways and so forth and so on – measures incapable of undermining the foundations of what is called "the existing social order." It would be childish naivete to extend observations made on the activity of zemstvos in water supply and lighting to the possible "activity" of these institutions in the destruction of landlord landholding. This would be equivalent to if a city duma elected entirely of social-democrats in some French backwater took it into its head to "municipalize" throughout all of France the private property in land covered with buildings built by private parties. That is precisely the point: the measure destroying landlord landholding is somewhat different in character from measures improving water supply, lighting, sanitation, etc. That is precisely the point: the first "measure" "touches" in the boldest manner the very foundations of the entire "existing social order," shakes and undermines these foundations with gigantic force, facilitates the onslaught of the proletariat on the entire bourgeois system in an unprecedented historical scope. Yes, here every bourgeois state will first of all and more than anything have to take care of preserving the foundations of bourgeois rule: all rights and privileges regarding the autonomous "polishing of bowls" will in one instant be destroyed, all municipalization will fly to the devil at once, every shadow of democracy in local institutions will be eradicated by "punitive expeditions," the moment the fundamental interests of the bourgeois-landlord state are touched. To presuppose with an innocent air municipal-democratic autonomy under a reactionary central authority and to extend this "autonomy" to the destruction of landlord landholding – this is to give unparalleled examples of manifest absurdities or infinite political naivete.

IV. The Tasks of Our Agrarian Program

The question of the RSDLP's agrarian program would be substantially clarified if we tried to set forth this program in the form of simple and clear advice that social-democracy should give to the proletariat and peasantry in the epoch of democratic revolution.

The first piece of advice will inevitably be this: direct all efforts toward the complete victory of peasant uprising. Without such a victory, one cannot even speak seriously of "taking land away" from the landlords or of creating a genuinely democratic state. And the slogan calling the peasants to uprising can be only one: confiscation of all landlord lands (in no way expropriation in general or confiscation in general, leaving the question of redemption in the shade) and necessarily confiscation by peasant committees until the Constituent Assembly.

Any other advice (including the slogan of "expropriation" advanced by Maslov, and his entire municipalization scheme) amounts to a call for resolving the question not by insurrection, but by bargaining with the landlords, bargaining with the reactionary central authority—a call to resolve the question not by revolutionary means, but by bureaucratic means, since even the most democratic regional and zemstvo organizations cannot help but be bureaucratic compared with the revolutionary peasant committees, which must right here, on the spot, immediately deal with the landlords and seize rights that ought to be sanctioned by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

The second piece of advice will inevitably be this: without the complete democratization of the political order, without a republic and without ensuring in practice the sovereignty of the people, there is no point in even thinking either about retaining the conquests of peasant insurrection or about taking any further step whatsoever. We must formulate this advice to workers and peasants with particular clarity and precision, so that there can be no doubts, no ambiguities, no distortions, no tacit assumptions of such nonsense as the possibility of eliminating landlord land-ownership under a reactionary central authority. And therefore, in forcefully advancing our political advice, we must tell the peasant: having seized the land, you must move forward, otherwise you will inevitably be crushed and thrown back by the landlords and the large bourgeoisie. One cannot seize land and hold onto it without new political conquests, without dealing a new and even more decisive blow to all private property in land generally. In politics, as in all social life, not to move forward means to be thrown backward. Either the bourgeoisie, having grown strong after the democratic revolution (which naturally strengthens the bourgeoisie), will wrest all the conquests from both the workers and the peasant masses—or the proletariat and peasant masses will force their way forward. And this means—a republic and complete sovereignty of the people. It means: on condition of the conquest of a republic, the nationalization of all land as the possible maximum of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, as the natural and necessary step forward from the victory of bourgeois democracy to the beginning of the genuine struggle for socialism.

The third and final piece of advice: organize yourselves separately, proletarians and semi-proletarians of city and countryside. Trust no master, however petty, however "laboring." Do not be seduced by small-scale farming under the preservation of commodity production. The closer the peasant insurrection comes to victory, the closer comes the turn of peasant-proprietors against the proletariat; the more necessary becomes independent proletarian organization, the more energetically, persistently, decisively, and loudly must we call for the complete socialist revolution. We support the peasant movement to the end, but we must remember that it is a movement of another class, not the class that can and will accomplish the socialist revolution. Therefore, we set aside the question of what to do with the land in the sense of its distribution as an object of husbandry—this question can be and will be decided in bourgeois society only by proprietors and small proprietors. We are concerned entirely (and after the victory of peasant insurrection, almost exclusively) with the question: what is the rural proletariat to do? We shall occupy ourselves, and shall continue to occupy ourselves, primarily with this question, leaving it to the ideologues of petty bourgeoisie to compose schemes of equitable land-use and all such things. We shall answer this question—the cardinal question of the new, bourgeois-democratic Russia: the rural proletariat must independently organize itself together with the urban proletariat to struggle for the complete socialist revolution.

Consequently, our agrarian program must consist of three basic parts: first, the formulation of the most decisive appeal for revolutionary peasant assault on landlord land-ownership; second, the precise indication of the further step which the movement can and must take to consolidate peasant conquests and to pass from the victory of democracy to the direct proletarian struggle for socialism; third, the indication of the class proletarian tasks of the party, which press upon us with ever greater urgency and demand ever more insistently their clear formulation, the closer comes the victory of peasant insurrection.

Maslov's program does not resolve any one of those fundamental tasks which must now be resolved by the RSDLP: this program does not give such a slogan as would now, immediately, in the epoch of the most anti-democratic state, direct the peasant movement toward victory—this program does not give a precise definition of the political transformations necessary to complete and consolidate agrarian transformations—it does not give an indication of the measures necessary in the sphere of land reform under conditions of the most complete and consistent democratism—it does not characterize the proletarian position of our party in relation to all bourgeois-democratic transformations. This program determines neither the conditions of the "first step" nor the tasks of the "second step," but mixes everything into one heap, starting with the transfer of appanage lands into the hands of a non-existent "democratic state" and continuing with the transfer of landlord lands into the hands of democratic municipalities out of fear of the non-democratic character of the central authority! Non-revolutionary in its practical significance at the present moment, constructed on the assumption of a completely artificial and completely improbable bargain with the semi-reactionary central authority, this program cannot provide guidance for the workers' party under any of the possible and conceivable paths of development of the democratic revolution in Russia.

Let us sum up: the only correct program under conditions of democratic revolution will be this: confiscation of landlord lands and the establishment of peasant committees[43]—we must demand these immediately and impose no restrictive reservations upon this demand. Such a demand is revolutionary and advantageous from the standpoint of both the proletariat and the peasantry under all conditions, even the worst. Such a demand inevitably entails the collapse of the police state and the strengthening of democracy.

But we cannot limit ourselves to confiscation. In the epoch of democratic revolution and peasant insurrection, we cannot in any case absolutely reject the nationalization of land. We need only condition this demand with a completely precise indication of certain political arrangements, without which nationalization might harm the proletariat and peasantry.

Such a program will be complete and integral. It will give the absolute maximum of what is at all conceivable under any bourgeois-democratic revolution. It will not tie the hands of social-democracy, allowing both partition and nationalization under different political circumstances. It will in no way introduce discord between the peasantry and proletariat as fighters for democracy[44]. It will advance now and immediately, under police-autocratic political arrangements, absolutely revolutionary and revolutionary-transforming slogans regarding these arrangements, while also presenting further demands under conditions of complete victory of the democratic revolution—that is, under conditions in which the completion of the democratic revolution will open new perspectives and new tasks.

A precise indication of the special proletarian position of our party in the entire democratic agrarian revolution is absolutely necessary in the program. There is no reason to be troubled by the fact that such an indication has a place in the tactical resolution, or that it represents a reiteration of the general part of the program.

For the sake of clarity of our position and its explanation to the masses, it is worth sacrificing a neat schema of division of topics into programmatic and tactical ones.

The corresponding draft agrarian program, worked out by the majority of the "agrarian commission" (the "agrarian commission" was appointed by the United Central Committee of the RSDLP to draw up a draft of the new agrarian program), we hereby propose.

V. Draft Agrarian Program

For the purpose of eliminating the remnants of the serf system, which press as a heavy yoke directly upon the peasantry, and in the interests of the free development of class struggle in the countryside, the party demands:

1) The confiscation of all church, monastic, appanage, state, cabinet, and landlord lands;

2) The establishment of peasant committees for the immediate elimination of all traces of landlord authority and landlord privileges and for the actual disposal of confiscated lands until the All-Russian Constituent Assembly establishes a new land system;

3) The abolition of all taxes and obligations currently falling upon the peasantry as a taxable estate;

4) The abolition of all laws restricting the peasant in the disposition of his land;

5) The granting to elected people's courts of the right to reduce excessively high rental payments and to declare null and void transactions of a usurious character.

If, however, the decisive victory of the present revolution in Russia ensures completely the sovereignty of the people—that is, creates a republic and a fully democratic state order—then the party will[45] strive for the abolition of private property in land and the transfer of all lands to the common ownership of the whole people.

While doing so, the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party will in all cases and under any conditions of democratic agrarian transformations set itself the task of striving undeviatingly toward the independent class organization of the rural proletariat, explaining to it the irreconcilable antagonism between its interests and those of peasant bourgeoisie, warning it against being seduced by the system of small-scale farming, which can never, under conditions of commodity production, eliminate the destitution of the masses, and, finally, pointing to the necessity of a complete socialist revolution as the only means of eliminating all destitution and all exploitation.