Published March 20, 1906 in the newspaper "Partiinye Izvestia" No. 2

Printed according to the newspaper text

The eleven resolutions presented to the reader have been compiled by a group of like-minded comrades from former editors and contributors to *Proletariat* and several practical workers. This is not a finished draft but a sketch, which should provide, as far as possible, a complete picture of the entirety of tactical views held by a known section of the party and facilitate systematic discussion, now being opened in all circles and organizations of our party at the invitation of the United Central Committee.

The tactical resolutions have been adapted to the order of business for the congress proposed in a certain circular of the UCC{114}. However, party members are in no way obliged to limit themselves to this order of business. In the interests of a complete exposition of all tactical views, we have considered it absolutely necessary to add two questions not included in the UCC's order of business—namely, "The Present Moment of the Democratic Revolution" and "The Class Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Moment of the Democratic Revolution." Without clarification of these questions, it is impossible to discuss more particular questions of tactics. We therefore propose that the congress place on its agenda a general question: "The Present Moment of the Democratic Revolution and the Class Tasks of the Proletariat."

As regards the agrarian program and the relationship to the peasant movement, a special pamphlet is necessary for this question[26]. Moreover, the UCC has appointed a special commission preparing a report to the congress on this question{115}.

In publishing our draft resolutions, we invite all party members to take part in their discussion, correction, and supplementation. Written reports and draft projects may be sent through the organizations of our party to the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP for transmission to the group that has worked out the draft resolutions.

## The Present Moment of the Democratic Revolution

Taking into consideration:

1) that despite the mass destruction of productive forces and unprecedented ruin of the people, the economic and financial crisis being experienced by Russia not only does not weaken but, on the contrary, expands and intensifies, giving rise to terrible unemployment in the cities and famine in the villages;

2) that although in the circles of the large capitalist and landowning class, frightened by the revolutionary self-activity of the people threatening their privileges and predatory interests, there is occurring a sharp turn from opposition to a deal with the autocracy for the purpose of suppressing the revolution, the demands for the genuine realization of political freedom and socio-economic transformation are spreading and strengthening among new strata of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry;

3) that the present reactionary government, striving in fact to preserve the old autocracy, trampling all the freedoms it has proclaimed, giving merely consultative voice to the upper echelons of the propertied classes, crudely falsifying popular representation, introducing a regime of military repression, brutal executions, and mass killings throughout the country, intensifying police and administrative arbitrariness to unprecedented dimensions, thereby provokes ferment and discontent among broad strata of the bourgeoisie, embitters and enrages the masses of the proletariat and peasantry, and prepares the ground for a new, broader and sharper political crisis;

4) that the course of events in late 1905—mass strikes in the cities, unrest in the villages, and December armed uprising, caused by the desire to defend the freedoms won by the people and seized by the government, followed by merciless military suppression of the liberation movement—has shown the futility of constitutional illusions and has opened the eyes of broad masses of the people to the harm of such illusions in an epoch when the struggle for freedom has reached the intensity of open civil war;

We recognize and propose that the congress adopt:

1) that the democratic revolution in Russia is not only not declining but, on the contrary, is moving toward a new upsurge, and the present period of relative lull should be regarded not as a defeat of revolutionary forces but as a period of accumulation of revolutionary energy, assimilation of political experience gained through previous stages, involvement of new strata of the people in the movement, and, consequently, preparation for a new and even more mighty revolutionary offensive;

2) that the main form of the liberation movement at the present time is not legal struggle on the basis of quasi-constitutional grounds but the directly revolutionary movement of broad popular masses, breaking through police-feudal laws, creating revolutionary law, and destroying by force the organs of the people's oppression;

3) that the interests of the proletariat as the advanced class of contemporary society require ruthless struggle against those constitutional illusions spread by the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie (the party of Constitutional Democrats included), concealing thereby their narrow class interests, and which in the period of civil war exert the most corrupting influence on the political consciousness of the people.

## Armed Uprising

Taking into consideration:

1) that the entire history of the contemporary democratic revolution in Russia shows us, on the whole, an undeviating ascent of the movement toward ever more massive, embracing the entire country, decisive and offensive forms of struggle against the autocracy;

2) that the October political strike, rejecting the Bulygin Duma, compelling the autocratic government to proclaim the principles of political freedom, demonstrated the gigantic power of the proletariat and the possibility of unanimous all-Russian action even with all the deficiencies of class organizations;

3) that a peaceful general strike proved, with the further growth of the movement, to be insufficient, and partial application of it—to be ineffectual and destructive of proletarian forces;

4) that the entire revolutionary movement with spontaneous force led subsequently to the December armed uprising, when not only the proletariat but also new forces from the urban poor and peasantry took up arms to defend the freedoms won by the people against the encroachments of the reactionary government;

5) that the December uprising introduced a new barricade tactic and proved in general the possibility of open armed struggle of the people even against modern troops;

6) that in the popular masses, thanks to the introduction, despite constitutional promises, of a military-police dictatorship, there is ripening the consciousness of the necessity to struggle for real power, which the revolutionary people can seize only in open struggle with the forces of the autocracy;

7) that the autocracy weakens and demoralizes its military forces by employing them to subjugate, by armed force, that very population of which they form a part, failing to carry out the urgent reforms in military affairs demanded by all honest elements of the army, taking no measures to alleviate the desperate situation of the reserves, and answering the demands of soldiers and sailors only by intensifying police-barracks severity;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that armed uprising is at the present time not only a necessary means of struggle for freedom but already a factually achieved stage of the movement, which, by virtue of the growth and intensification of the new political crisis, opens the transition from defensive to offensive forms of armed struggle;

2) that a general political strike should be regarded at the present stage of the movement not so much as an independent means of struggle as auxiliary to the uprising; that consequently, the choice of moment for such a strike, the choice of localities and branches of labor it should encompass, should be desirably subordinated to the moment and conditions of the main form of struggle—armed uprising;

3) that in the party's propaganda and agitation work intensified attention should be devoted to the study of the practical experience of the December uprising, to military criticism of it, and to drawing direct lessons for the future;

4) that there should be developed even more energetic activity for increasing the number of combat squads, improving their organization, and supplying them with all kinds of weapons; moreover, in accordance with the indications of experience, not only party combat squads but also those affiliated with the party and entirely non-party squads should be organized;

5) that it is necessary to intensify work in the troops, bearing in mind that for the success of the movement ferment in the troops is insufficient; rather, direct agreement with organized, revolutionary-democratic elements of the army is necessary, for the purpose of the most decisive offensive action against the government;

6) that in view of the growing peasant movement, which may in the very near future flare up into a general uprising, it is desirable to direct efforts toward unifying the action of workers and peasants for the organization of, as far as possible, joint and simultaneous combat actions.

## Partisan Combat Actions

Taking into consideration:

1) that since the December uprising almost nowhere in Russia has complete cessation of military actions occurred; these actions now express themselves on the part of the revolutionary people in separate partisan attacks on the enemy;

2) that such partisan actions, inevitable given the existence of two hostile armed forces and given the raging of temporarily victorious military repression, at the same time serve to disorganize the enemy and prepare the coming open and mass armed actions;

3) that such actions are also necessary for the combat education and military training of our combat squads, which during the December uprising proved in many localities to be practically unprepared for this new undertaking;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that the party should recognize partisan combat actions by squads entering or affiliated with it as principally permissible and expedient in the present period;

2) that partisan combat actions should be adapted in their character to the task of educating cadres of leaders of the working masses during an uprising and developing experience in offensive and sudden military actions;

3) that the chief immediate task of such actions should be recognized as the destruction of the governmental, police, and military apparatus and ruthless struggle against actively Black Hundred organizations resorting to violence against the population and its intimidation;

4) that combat actions for the seizure of monetary means belonging to the enemy—that is, the autocratic government—and for use of these means for the needs of the uprising are also permissible, and it is necessary to pay serious attention to the fact that the interests of the population be disturbed as little as possible;

5) that partisan combat actions should be carried out under party control and in such a manner that proletarian forces not be wastefully expended and that account be taken of the conditions of the workers' movement in the given locality and the mood of the broad masses.

## Temporary Revolutionary Government and Local Organs of Revolutionary Power

Taking into consideration:

1) that the revolutionary movement against the autocratic government, passing into armed struggle, has thus far assumed the form of scattered local uprisings;

2) that in this open struggle the elements of the local population capable of decisive action against the old authorities (almost exclusively the proletariat and the advanced strata of the petty bourgeoisie) were brought to the necessity of creating such organizations as were in fact the embryos of new revolutionary power—Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities, Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies in Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk, and so forth, railway committees in Siberia and the south, peasant committees in Saratov province, urban revolutionary committees in Novorossiysk and other cities, and finally, elected rural organs in the Caucasus and the Baltic region;

3) that in correspondence with the initial, embryonic form of the uprising, these organs were equally scattered, haphazard, irresolute in their actions, and did not rely on an organized armed force of the revolution—and therefore were inevitably doomed to destruction at the first offensive actions of counterrevolutionary armies;

4) that only a temporary revolutionary government, as the organ of a victorious uprising, is capable of breaking all resistance of reaction, ensuring complete freedom of pre-electoral agitation, convening on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot a Constituent Assembly capable of genuinely realizing the rule of the people and implementing the minimum of socio-economic demands of the proletariat;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that before the proletariat, in the interests of bringing the revolution to completion, there now stands the pressing task of contributing, together with revolutionary democracy, to the unification of the uprising and to the creation of a unifying organ of this uprising in the form of a temporary revolutionary government;

2) that one of the conditions for the successful fulfillment of the task of the revolutionary government is the creation of organs of local revolutionary self-administration in all cities and communities joining the uprising, on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot;

3) that the participation of representatives appointed by our party in the temporary revolutionary government together with revolutionary bourgeois democracy is permissible depending on the correlation of forces and should be formally conditioned by party control over its representatives, but in substance should consist of the defense of the independent interests of the working class and the undeviating protection of the independence of social democracy, striving for complete socialist transformation and therefore irreconcilably hostile to all bourgeois parties;

4) that independently of whether social democracy's participation in the temporary revolutionary government is possible, the idea should be propagandized among the broadest strata of the proletariat of the necessity for constant pressure on the temporary government from the side of the armed proletariat guided by social democracy, for the purpose of protecting, consolidating, and expanding the conquests of the revolution.

## Soviets of Workers' Deputies

Taking into consideration:

1) that Soviets of Workers' Deputies spontaneously arise on the ground of mass political strikes as non-party organizations of broad working masses;

2) that these Soviets inevitably change in the course of struggle, both in their composition, coming to include the most revolutionary elements of the petty bourgeoisie, and in the content of their activity, transforming from purely strike organizations into organs of general revolutionary struggle;

3) that insofar as these Soviets are embryos of revolutionary power, their strength and significance depend entirely on the strength and success of the uprising;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that in the non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party should participate, necessarily forming as strong groups of party members as possible within each Soviet and directing the activity of these groups in close connection with the general activity of the party;

2) that the creation of such organizations, for the purpose of expanding and deepening the influence of social democracy on the proletariat and of the proletariat on the course and outcome of the democratic revolution, can, under certain conditions, be the task of local organizations of our party;

3) that to participation in non-party Soviets of Workers' Deputies there should be attracted the broadest possible strata of workers, as well as representatives of revolutionary democracy, especially from peasants, soldiers, and sailors;

4) that with the expansion of the activity and sphere of influence of Soviets of Workers' Deputies it is necessary to point out that such institutions, not relying on a revolutionary army and not overthrowing the governmental authorities (that is, not transforming into temporary revolutionary governments), are inevitably condemned to fall; therefore, the arming of the people and the strengthening of the military organization of the proletariat should be regarded as one of the chief tasks of such institutions at every revolutionary moment.

## Relation to Bourgeois Parties

Taking into consideration:

1) that social democracy has always recognized the necessity of supporting every oppositional and revolutionary movement directed against the existing social and political order in Russia;

2) that at the present time, when the revolution gives rise to open action by various classes and on this basis political parties begin to take shape, the pressing task of social democracy is to determine their class content, to take account of the interrelation of classes at the present moment, and, in accordance with this, to determine its relation to various parties;

3) that the chief task of the working class in the present moment of democratic revolution is to bring it to completion, and therefore social democracy, in determining its relation to other parties, should especially take into account how far one or another party is capable of actively contributing to this goal;

4) that from this point of view all existing non-social-democratic parties in Russia (excluding the reactionary) fall into two main groups: liberal-monarchist parties and revolutionary-democratic parties;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that the right wing of liberal-monarchist parties (the Union of October 17, the Party of Legal Order, the Commercial-Industrial Party{116}, and so forth) represents class organizations of landowners and large commercial-industrial bourgeoisie, openly counterrevolutionary, but not yet having concluded a final deal concerning the division of power with the autocratic bureaucracy; that the party of the proletariat, utilizing for its purposes this not yet concluded conflict, should at the same time conduct the most ruthless struggle with such parties;

2) that liberal-monarchist parties of the left wing (the Party of Democratic Reforms{117}, Constitutional Democrats, and the like), not being definite class organizations, constantly waver between democratic petty bourgeoisie and counterrevolutionary elements of the large, between the desire to rely on the people and fear of its revolutionary self-activity, and do not go beyond the limits of orderly bourgeois society, protected by monarchy and a bicameral system from the encroachments of the proletariat; social democracy should utilize, in the interests of the political education of the people, the activity of these parties, opposing to their hypocritically democratic phraseology the consistent democratism of the proletariat and ruthlessly exposing the constitutional illusions they spread;

3) that revolutionary-democratic parties and organizations (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the Peasant Union, parts of semi-professional unions and semi-political unions, and so forth) most closely express the interests and viewpoint of the broad masses of peasantry and petty bourgeoisie, decisively acting against landlord land ownership and the feudal state, striving consistently to carry through democratism and clothing their essentially bourgeois-democratic tasks in more or less nebulous socialist ideology; social democracy recognizes the possibility and necessity of combat agreements with such parties, while undeviatingly exposing their pseudo-socialist character and struggling against their striving to obscure the class antagonism between the proletarian and the small proprietor;

4) that the immediate political goal of such temporary combat agreements between social democracy and revolutionary democracy is the convening by revolutionary means of an all-national, possessing the fullness of power, Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot;

5) that temporary combat agreements are possible and expedient at the present moment only with elements recognizing armed uprising as a means of struggle and actively contributing to it.

## Relation to National Social-Democratic Parties

Taking into consideration:

1) that in the course of the revolution the proletariat of all nationalities of Russia is increasingly rallying in common struggle;

2) that this common struggle leads to ever greater rapprochement of the various national social-democratic parties of Russia;

3) that in many cities united committees of all national social-democratic organizations of the given locality are already being formed instead of the former federal ones;

4) that the majority of national social-democratic parties no longer insist at the present time on the principle of federation, justly rejected by the II Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that it is necessary to adopt the most energetic measures for the speedy unification of all national social-democratic parties of Russia into a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party;

2) that the basis of unification should be the complete merger of all social-democratic organizations in each locality;

3) that the party should in fact ensure the satisfaction of all party interests and needs of the social-democratic proletariat of each given nationality, taking account of its cultural and everyday peculiarities; the means of such provision can be: the arrangement of special conferences of social democrats of the given nationality, representation of national minorities in local, regional, and central party institutions, the creation of special groups of writers, publishers, agitators, and so forth.

## Trade Unions

Taking into consideration:

1) that social democracy has always recognized economic struggle as one of the constituent parts of the class struggle of the proletariat;

2) that, as the experience of all capitalist countries shows, the most expedient organization of the working class for economic struggle is broad trade unions;

3) that at the present time a widespread striving of working masses in Russia is being observed to rally into trade unions;

4) that economic struggle can lead to lasting improvement in the condition of the working masses and to the strengthening of their genuinely class organization only on the condition of a proper combination of it with the political struggle of the proletariat;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that all party organizations should promote the formation of non-party trade unions and encourage all representatives of the given profession who are party members to join them;

2) that the party should in every way strive to educate workers participating in trade unions in the spirit of a broad understanding of class struggle and the socialist tasks of the proletariat, to secure through its activity the actual leading role in such unions, and finally, to enable these unions, under certain conditions, to affiliate directly with the party, while in no way excluding non-party members from their composition.

## Relation to the State Duma

Taking into consideration:

1) that the State Duma is a crude falsification of popular representation, since:

a) the electoral law is not universal, not equal, is multi-stage; the mass of workers and peasants are in fact excluded from participation in the State Duma; and the correlation of the number of electors from different population groups is adapted to police purposes;

b) in the scope of its rights and in relation to the State Council, the Duma is a powerless appendage of the autocratic bureaucracy;

c) the circumstances of the elections entirely preclude the possibility of genuine expression of the people's will owing to the absence of freedom of agitation, military repression, mass executions, arrests, and police and administrative arbitrariness;

d) the sole purpose for the government in convening such a State Duma is to deceive the people, to strengthen the autocracy, to facilitate new financial frauds, and to make a deal with reactionary elements of the exploiting classes, to whom predominance in the State Duma is ensured;

2) that participation in elections to the State Duma, giving nothing for the development of the class consciousness of the proletariat, for the strengthening and expansion of its class organization and combat readiness, is capable rather of disorganizing and corrupting the proletariat, since:

a) the participation of social democracy in elections would inevitably sustain constitutional illusions among the people, faith that elections can give any correct expression of the people's will, and the impression that the party is taking the false constitutional path;

b) the colleges of electors from workers and the electors themselves, in view of their small number and in view of the short-term and specialized nature of their functions, can give nothing for the genuinely revolutionary organization of the proletariat;

c) participation in elections transfers the center of gravity of the proletariat's attention from the revolutionary movement proceeding outside the Duma to the governmental farce, transfers the center of gravity of wide agitation among the masses to petty circles of electors;

d) our participation in elections cannot help social-democratic education of the most backward strata of the masses going into the Duma, and that exclusively by legal means, a path on which the RSDLP cannot now stand;

e) the withdrawal of some electors from provincial electoral assemblies could neither abort the Duma nor call forth a broad popular movement;

3) that participation in elections under the given political situation would force social democrats either to stand aside, bringing no benefit to the movement, or to actually descend to the role of voiceless auxiliaries to the Constitutional Democrats;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that the RSDLP should decisively refuse to participate in the State Duma;

2) that the RSDLP should decisively refuse to participate in elections to the State Duma at whatever stage;

3) that the RSDLP should in the most energetic manner utilize all meetings connected with the elections for the exposition of social-democratic views in general, for ruthless criticism of the State Duma in particular, and for the call to struggle for the revolutionary convening of an all-national Constituent Assembly in especial;

4) that the RSDLP should also utilize agitation concerning the Duma for acquainting the broadest possible masses of the people with all the tactical views of the party on the entire revolutionary moment being experienced and all tasks flowing from it.

## Foundations of Party Organization

Taking into consideration:

1) that the principle of democratic centralism in the party is at the present time universally recognized;

2) that its realization under the existing political conditions, though difficult, is nonetheless possible within certain limits;

3) that the mixing of the conspiratorial and open apparatus of party organization has proved extremely harmful to the party and has played into the hands of governmental provocation;

We recognize and propose that the congress recognize:

1) that the elective principle in party organizations should be carried through from bottom to top;

2) that deviations from this principle—for example, two-stage elections or cooptation into elective institutions, and so forth—are permissible only in the face of insuperable police obstacles and in exceptional specially foreseen cases;

3) that it is urgently necessary to preserve and strengthen the conspiratorial core of party organization;

4) that for open action of every kind (in the press, at meetings, in unions, especially in trade unions, and so forth), special departments of the organizations should be established, which in no case could harm the integrity of the conspiratorial cells;

5) that the central institution of the party should be unified, that is, the general congress of the party should elect a single Central Committee, which appoints the editorial board of the party's central organ, and so forth.