V. I.

Lenin

The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers’ Party [4]

The Russian Social-Democratic Party is passing through a very difficult
time. Martial Law, shootings and floggings, overcrowded prisons, a proletariat
worn out by starvation, chaos in organisation, aggravated by the destruction of
many of the underground centres and by the absence of legal centres, and lastly
the controversy over tactics, coinciding with the difficult task of restoring
Party unity, are all inevitably causing a certain disarray of Party forces.

The formal way out of this disarray is the convening of the unity congress of
the Party; and it is our profound conviction that all Party workers should do
their utmost to hasten this event. But while the work of convening the congress
is proceeding, we must bring to everybody’s notice, and very seriously discuss,
the extremely important question of the more profound causes of this
disarray. Strictly speaking, the question of boycotting the State Duma is only a
minor part of the big question of revising the whole tactics of the Party. And
this question, in its turn, is only a minor part of .the big question of the
present situation in Russia and of the significance of the present moment in the
history of the Russian revolution.

We can see two lines of tactics, which are due to two different appraisals of
the present moment. Some (see, for example, Lenin’s article in Molodaya Rossiya [1]

)

regard the suppression of the insurrection in Moscow and
elsewhere merely as preparing the ground and the conditions for another, more
decisive, armed struggle. They see the real significance of the present moment
in the dispelling of constitutional illusions. They regard the two great months of the revolution
(November and December) as the period in which the peaceful general strike
grew into an armed uprising of the whole people. The possibility of such an
uprising has been proved; the movement has been raised to a higher plane; the
broad masses have acquired the practical experience needed for the success of
the future uprising; peaceful strikes have spent themselves. This experience
must be very carefully collected; the proletariat must be given an opportunity
to recuperate; all constitutional illusions and all idea of participating in the
Duma must be emphatically discarded. We must more perseveringly and patiently
prepare for a new insurrection and establish closer links with the organisations
of the peasantry, which in all probability will rise in greater strength towards
the spring.

Others appraise the situation differently. Comrade Plekhanov, in No. 3, and
particularly in No. 4 of his

Dnevnik [2] has formulated this other appraisal more consistently than anybody, although, unfortunately, he has not
everywhere fully set forth his ideas.

“ The political strike, inopportunely begun,” says Comrade Plekhanov,
“resulted in ’armed uprising in Moscow, Rostov, and elsewhere. The
strength of the proletariat proved inadequate for victory. It was not difficult
to fore see this. And therefore it was wrong to take up arms.” The practical
task of the class-conscious elements in the working-class movement “is to
point out to the proletariat its mistake, and to explain to it how risky is the
game called armed uprising”. Plekhanov does not deny that he wants to put
a brake on the movement. He recalls that, six months before the Commune, Marx
warned the proletariat of Paris against untimely outbreaks. [5] “The facts of life have shown,” says Plekhanov, “that the
tactics our Party has pursued during the past months are unsound. On pain of
further de feats, we must learn to adopt new tactics.” ... “The main thing
is immediately to pay much more attention to the workers’ trade union
movement.” “A very large number of our comrades have become too engrossed
with the idea of armed uprising to devote any serious attention to the task of
helping the trade union movement.”... “We must value the support of the non-proletarian opposition parties, and not repel them by
tactless actions." Quite naturally, Plekhanov also declares against
boycotting the Duma (without saying definitely whether he is in favour of
taking part in the Duma, or of the electors forming “organs of
revolutionary local self-government”, the pet idea of the
“Mensheviks”). “Election agitation in the rural districts
would sharply bring up the question of the land.” Confiscation of the land
has been approved by both sections of our Party and “it is now high
time to put their resolutions into effect”.

Such are Plekhanov’s views, which we have outlined almost entirely as the
author himself formulated them in his Dnevnik .

We hope that this outline has convinced the reader that the question of the
tactics to be adopted towards the Duma is only part of the general question of
tactics, which, in its turn, is subordinate to the question of how the present
revolutionary moment as a whole should be appraised. The roots of the
disagreement on tactics may be summed up as follows. Some say it was wrong to
take up arms, and urge that the risks involved in insurrection be explained and
that the emphasis be shifted to the trade union movement. Both the second and
third strikes and the insurrection were blunders. Others say it was necessary
to take up arms, for otherwise the movement would not have risen to a higher
plane, it would not have obtained the necessary practical experience of
insurrection ·nor freed itself from the narrow limits of the peaceful
strike alone, which had spent itself as a weapon in the struggle. Thus for some
the question of insurrection is shelved, at all events until a new situation
arises that will compel us to revise our tactics once again. The logical
conclusion that inevitably follows from this is that we must adjust ourselves to
the “constitution” (participate in the Duma and work vigorously in
the legal trade union movement). For others, on the contrary, it is now that the
question of insurrection comes to the forefront, on the basis of the practical
experience which has been acquired, which has proved that it is quite possible
to fight against regular troops, and which has suggested the immediate task of a
more persevering and more patient preparation for the next outbreak. Hence the
slogan “Away with constitutional illusions!” and the assignment to the legal trade union
movement of a modest, at any rate not the “principal”, place.

It goes without saying that we must examine this point of dispute in the light
of the present objective conditions and of an assessment of social forces, not
from the point of view of whether any particular line of action is desirable. We
think that Plekhanov’s views are wrong. His appraisal of the Moscow
insurrection, summed up in the words, “it was wrong to take up
arms”, is extremely one-sided. Shelving the question of insurrection
virtually means admitting that the revolutionary period has drawn to a close,
and that a “constitutional” period of the democratic revolution has
set in, i.e., it means placing the suppression of the December uprisings in
Russia on a par, for example, with the suppression of the insurrections in
Germany in 1849. Of course, it is by no means impossible for our revolution to
end like that; and in the light of the present moment, when reaction is becoming
rampant, it is quite easy to draw the conclusion that such a finale has already
set in. Nor can there be any doubt that it is more advisable fully to abandon
the idea of insurrection, if objective conditions have made it impossible, than
to waste our forces on new and fruitless attempts.

But that would mean making too hasty a generalisation about the state of affairs
at the present moment, and elevating it to a law for a whole period. Have we
not seen reaction raging in all its fury after nearly every important advance
of our revolution? And has not the movement risen again after a time with
mightier force despite the reaction? The autocracy has not yielded to the
inexorable demands of all social development; on the contrary, it is
retrogressing, and is now evoking protests even among the bourgeoisie, which
welcomed the suppression of the insurrection. The strength of the revolutionary
classes, the proletariat and the peasantry, is far from exhausted. The economic
crisis and financial dislocation are growing and becoming more acute, rather
than diminishing. The probability of a fresh outbreak even now, when the first
insurrection has not yet been completely crushed, is admitted even by the
“law abiding” bourgeois press, which is certainly hostile
to

insurrection. [3]

The farcical character of the Duma is becoming clearer and clearer, and the hopelessness of the Party attempting to
participate in the elections more and more unquestionable.

It would be short-sightedness, slavish acquiescence in the present situation, if
we shelved the question of insurrection in these circumstances. See how
Plekhanov contradicts himself when, on the one hand, he strongly advises us to
put into effect the resolutions on agitation among the peasantry in favour of
confiscating the land, and, on the other hand, warns us against repelling the
opposition parties by tactless actions, and dreams about the question of the
land coming up “sharply” in the course of election agitation in the
countryside. It is safe to say that the liberal landlords will forgive you a
million “tactless” actions, but they will never forgive you for
advocating the confiscation of the land. No wonder even the Cadets say that
they, too, are in favour of suppressing peasant revolts with the aid of troops,
provided they, and not the bureaucracy, are in command of the troops (see Prince
Dolgorukov’s article in Pravo [6] ).

We can be quite sure that the question of land will never come up as “sharply” in
election agitation as it did come, is coming, and will come up outside the Duma
and outside elections conducted with the aid of the police.

We have whole-heartedly accepted the slogan of confiscating the land. But this
slogan is merely a hollow sound if it does not imply the victory of armed
uprising; for the peasants are now confronted not only by regular troops, but
also by volunteers hired by the landlords. When we preach the confiscation of
the land, we are actually calling upon peasants to revolt. And unless we want to
indulge in revolutionary phrase-mongering, have we a right to do this if we do
not count on a workers’ insurrection in the towns, on the workers supporting the
peasants? It would be cruel mockery if, when the peasants rise in a body and begin to confiscate the land,
the workers were to offer them the co operation of trade unions that were under
the tutelage of the police, instead of the co-operation of fighting
organisations.

We really have no grounds for shelving the question of insurrection. We must not
revise our Party tactics to suit the conditions of the present moment of
reaction. We cannot, and must not, give up hope of at last merging the three
separate streams of insurrection—workers’, peasants’ and military—into
a single victorious insurrection. We must prepare for this, without, of
course, renouncing any “legal” means of extending propaganda,
agitation and organisation: but harbouring no illusions about the durability
and importance of these means. We must collect the experience of the Moscow,
Donets, Rostov and other uprisings and spread knowledge of them far and wide; we
must perseveringly and patiently prepare new fighting forces, train and steel
them in a series of fighting guerrilla operations. The new outbreak may not take
place in the spring; but it is approaching, and in all probability is not very
far off. We must meet it armed, organised. in military fashion, and prepared
for determined offensive operations.

We will make a slight digression here about the guerrilla operations by the
fighting squads. We think it is wrong to put these operations on a par with the
old type of terrorism. Terrorism consisted in acts of vengeance against
individuals. Terrorism was a conspiracy by groups of intellectuals. Terrorism
in no way reflected the temper of the masses. Terrorism never served to train
fighting leaders of the masses. Terrorism was the result—and also the
symptom and concomitant—of lack of faith in insurrection, of the absence
of conditions for insurrection.

Guerrilla operations are not acts of vengeance, but military operations. They
no more resemble adventurous acts than the harassing of the enemy’s rear by
raiding parties of huntsmen during a lull on the main battlefield resembles the
killing of an individual in a duel or by assassination. Guerrilla operations
conducted by fighting squads—formed long ago by Social-Democrats of both
factions in all the important centres of the movement and consisting mainly of workers—undoubtedly reflect, clearly and directly, the temper of the
masses. Guerrilla operations by fighting squads directly train fighting
leaders of the masses. The guerrilla operations of the fighting squads
today do not spring from lack of faith in insurrection, and are not
conducted because insurrection is impossible; on the contrary, they are an
essential component of the insurrection now in progress. Of course,
mistakes may be made in all things and always:

premature and unnecessary attempts at insurrection are possible; so also are
over-zealousness and excesses, which are always and definitely harmful, and may
injure even the best of tactics. But the fact is that in most of the purely
Russian centres we have so far been suffering from the other extreme, namely,
insufficient initiative among our fighting squads, lack of fighting experience,
and insufficient determination in their activities. In this respect we have
been outstripped by the Caucasus, Poland and the Baltic Provinces, i. e., the
centres where the movement has left the old terrorism farthest of all behind,
where preparations for insurrection have been made best, and where the
proletarian struggle most clearly and vividly bears a mass character.

We must catch up with these centres. We must not re strain but encourage the
guerrilla operations of the fighting squads if we want to prepare for
insurrection not merely in words, and if we recognise that the proletariat is
seriously ready for insurrection.

The Russian revolution started with petitions to the tsar to grant
freedom. Shootings, reaction and Trepovism [7] did not stamp out, but fanned the
flames of the movement. The revolution took a second step forward. It forcibly
compelled the tsar to recognise freedom. It defended this freedom arms in
hand. It did not succeed at the first attempt. Shootings, reaction and
Dubasovism will not stamp out the movement, they will fan its flames. Taking
shape before our eyes is the third step, which will decide the outcome of the
revolution: the struggle of the revolutionary people for an authority that
will really introduce freedom. In this struggle, we must count on the support of
the revolutionary-democratic parties, and not of the opposition
parties. Shoulder to shoulder with the socialist proletariat will march the
democratic and revolutionary peasantry. It will be a great and arduous struggle, a struggle for the completion, for the complete victory,
of the democratic revolution. But all the signs now are that such a struggle is
being brought near by the course of events. Let us see to it that the new wave
finds the proletariat of Russia at a new stage of fighting preparedness.

---
Notes:
[1]
See pp. 93-96 of this volume.—Ed.

[2]
Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata ( Diary of a Social-Democrat )—a
non-periodical organ published by G. Plekhanov. See present edition,
Vol. 11, Note 88. p. 113— Lenin

[3]
This, for example, is what the conservative bourgeois Slovo
(No. 364 of January 25) writes: “Among the most convinced adherents of the
Centre, one more and more often hears the opinion, hesitant and timid
though it still is, that unless there is another outbreak, prepared by the
revolutionary parties, reform will not be brought about with the necessary
fulness and completeness.... There is now hardly any hope that reforms will
be brought about peacefully from above.”— Lenin

[4]
The article “The Present Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers’ Party” appeared in Partiiniye Izvestia (Party News ), No. 1.

Partiiniye Izvestia was the organ of the Joint Central Commit tee of
the R.S.D.L.P. formed after the merger of the Bolshevik Central Committee and
the Menshevik Organising Committee by decision of the Tammerfors Conference. It
was published illegally in St. Petersburg before the Fourth (Unity) Congress of
the Party. Its editorial board consisted of equal numbers of editors of the
Bolshevik and Menshevik organs ( Proletary and the new Iskra ,
respectively). The Bolsheviks were represented on the board by Lenin,
Lunacharsky and others. Two issues appeared—in February and March
1906. Issue No. 2 carried Lenin’s article “The Russian Revolution and the
Tasks of the Proletariat”, signed “A Bolshevik”.

The publication of Partiiniye Izvestia was discontinued following the
Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., as the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had
begun to publish their separate news papers.

[5]
The reference is to the “Second Address of the General Council of the
International Working Men’s Association on the Franco Prussian War. To the
Members of the International Working Men’s Association in Europe and the United
States”, September 9, 1870 (Marx and Engels, Selected Works ,
Vol. I, Moscow, 1958,
p. 491).

[6]
Pravo ( Law )—a juridical bourgeois-liberal daily published in
St. Petersburg from the end of 1898 to 1917.

[7]
Trepov, D. F. (1855-1906)—Chief of Police in Moscow from 1896
to 1905. In January 1905 he was appointed Governor General of
St. Petersburg, and later became Vice-Minister of the Interior.
He inspired Black-Hundred pogroms.