Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution

2.

What Can We Learn From the Resolution of the Third
Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on a Provisional Revolutionary
Government?

As is evident from the title, the resolution of the Third
Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, is devoted
wholly and exclusively to the question of a provisional
revolutionary government. Hence, the participation of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government is
included in it as part of that question. On the other hand, it
deals only with a provisional revolutionary government and with
nothing else; consequently, it completely leaves out, for example,
the question of the “conquest of power” in general, etc. Was the
Congress right in eliminating this and similar questions?
Undoubtedly it was right, because the political situation in
Russia does not at all give rise to such questions as immediate
issues. On the contrary, the whole of the issue that has been
raised by the people at the present time is the overthrow of the
autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly. Party
congresses should take up and decide not issues which this or that
writer happened to mention , but those that are of vital political importance by reason of the
prevailing conditions and the objective course of social
development.

Of what importance is a provisional revolutionary government in
the present revolution, and in the general struggle of the
proletariat? The resolution of the Congress explains this by
pointing at the very outset to the need for the “fullest
possible measure of political liberty,” both from the standpoint
of the immediate interests of the proletariat and from the
standpoint of the “final aims of Socialism.” And complete
political liberty requires that the tsarist autocracy be
replaced by a democratic republic, as our Party program has
already recognised. The stress laid in the Congress resolution
on the slogan of a democratic republic is necessary both as a
matter of logic and in point of principle, for it is precisely
complete freedom that the proletariat, as the foremost champion
of democracy, is striving to attain. Moreover, it is all the
more advisable to stress this at the present time because right
now the monarchists, namely, the so-called constitutional-“democratic” party, or party of “liberation,” in
our country, are flying the flag of “democracy.” In order to
establish a republic it is absolutely necessary to have an
assembly of people’s representatives; and it must be a popular
(elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct
elections and secret ballot), and a constituent assembly. This
exactly what is recognised in the Congress resolution, further
on. But the resolution does not stop there. In order to
establish the new order “that will really express the will of
the people” it is not enough to call a representative assembly a
constituent assembly. This assembly must have the authority and
power to “constitute.” Taking this into consideration, the
resolution of the Congress does not confine itself to the formal
slogan of a “constituent assembly,” but adds the material
conditions which alone will enable that assembly really to carry
out its tasks. Such specification of the conditions that will
enable an assembly which is constituent in name to become
constituent in fact is imperatively necessary, for, as we have
pointed out more than once, the liberal bourgeoisie, as
represented by the Constitutional-Monarchist Party, is deliberately distorting the slogan of a popular constituent
assembly and reducing it to a hollow phrase.

The Congress resolution states that a provisional revolutionary government
on its own — one, moreover, that will be the organ of a victorious popular
insurrection — can secure full freedom of agitation in the
election campaign and convene an assembly that will really
express the will of the people. Is this postulate correct?
Whoever took it into his head to dispute it would have to assert
that it is possible for the tsarist government not to side with
the reaction, that it is capable of being neutral during the
elections, that it will see to it that the will of the people is
really expressed. Such assertions are so absurd that no one
would venture to defend them openly; but they are being
surreptitiously smuggled in under liberal colours, by our
liberationists. Somebody must convene the constituent assembly,
somebody must guarantee the freedom and fairness of the
elections; somebody must invest such an assembly with full power
and authority. Only a revolutionary government, which is the
organ of the insurrection, can desire this in all sincerity and
be capable of doing all that is required to achieve this. The
tsarist government will inevitably counteract this. A liberal
government, which will come to terms with the tsar, and which
does not rely in full on the popular uprising, cannot sincerely
desire this, and could not accomplish it even if it most
sincerely desired to. Therefore, the resolution of the Congress
gives the only correct and entirely consistent democratic
slogan.

But an appraisal of a provisional revolutionary government’s
significance would be incomplete and wrong if the class nature
of the democratic revolution were lost sight of. The resolution
therefore adds that the revolution will strengthen the rule of
the bourgeoisie. This is inevitable under the present, i.e.,
capitalist, social and economic system. And the strengthening of
the bourgeoisie’s rule over the proletariat which has secured
some measure of political liberty must inevitably lead to a
desperate struggle between them for power, must lead to
desperate attempts on the part of the bourgeoisie “to take away
from the proletariat the gains of the revolutionary period.”
Therefore the proletariat, which is fighting for democracy in
front of all and at the head of all, must not for a single
moment forget about the new antagonisms that are inherent in
bourgeois democracy and about the new struggle.

Thus, the section of the resolution which we have just reviewed
fully appraises the significance of a provisional revolutionary
government in its relation to the struggle for freedom and for a
republic, in its relation to a constituent assembly and in its
relation to the democratic revolution, which clears the ground
for a new class struggle.

The next question is that of the proletariat’s attitude in
general towards a provisional revolutionary government. The
Congress resolution answers this first of all by directly
advising the Party to spread among the working class the
conviction that a provisional revolutionary government is
necessary. The working class must be made aware of this
necessity. Whereas the “democratic” bourgeoisie leaves the
question of overthrowing the tsarist government in the shade, we
must push it to the fore and insist on the need for a provisional revolutionary government. More than that, we must
outline for such a government a program of action that will
conform with the objective conditions of the historic period
through which we are now passing and with the aims of proletarian democracy. This program is the entire
minimum program of our Party, the program of the immediate
political and economic reforms which, on the one hand, can be
fully realised on the basis of the existing social and economic
relationships and, on the other hand, are requisite for the next step forward, for the achievement of Socialism.

Thus, the resolution fully clearly defines the nature and aims
of a provisional revolutionary government. In its origin and
fundamental nature such a government must be the organ of the
popular insurrection. Its formal purpose must be to serve as the
instrument for convening a popular constituent assembly. The
content of its activities must be to put into effect the minimum
program of proletarian democracy, the only program capable of
safeguarding the interests of the people which has risen against
the autocracy.

It might be argued that being only provisional, a provisional
government cannot carry out a constructive program which has not
yet received the approval of the entire people. Such an argument
would merely be the sophistry of reactionaries and “absolutists.” To abstain from carrying out a constructive
program means tolerating the existence of the feudal regime of
the putrid autocracy. Such a regime could be tolerated only by a
government of traitors to the cause of the revolution, but not
by a government which is the organ of a popular insurrection. It
would be mockery for anyone to propose that we should refrain
from exercising freedom of assembly pending the confirmation of
such freedom by a constituent assembly, on the plea that the
constituent assembly might not confirm freedom of assembly! It
is equal mockery to object to the immediate execution of the
minimum program by a provisional revolutionary government.

Finally, we will note that the resolution, by making implementation of the minimum program provisional revolutionary
government’s task eliminates the absurd, semi-anarchist ideas
about giving immediate effect to the maximum program, and the
conquest of power for a socialist revolution. The degree of
economic development of Russia (an objective condition) and the
degree of class consciousness and organisation of the broad
masses of the proletariat (a subjective condition inseparably
connected with the objective condition) make the immediate
complete emancipation of the working class impossible. Only the
most ignorant people can ignore the bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution which is now taking place; only the most
naive optimists can forget how little as yet the masses of the
workers are informed about the aims of Socialism and about the
methods of achieving it. And we are all convinced that the
emancipation of the workers can be effected only by the workers
themselves; a socialist revolution is out of the question unless
the masses become class conscious and organised, trained and
educated in open class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie. In answer to the anarchist objections that we are
putting off the socialist revolution, we say: we are not putting
it off, but we are taking the first step towards it in the only
possible way, along the only correct road, namely, the road of a
democratic republic. Whoever wants to reach Socialism by a
different road, other than that of political democracy, will
inevitably arrive at conclusions that are absurd and reactionary
both in the economic and the political sense. If any workers ask
us at the given moment why we should not go ahead and carry out
our maximum program, we shall answer by pointing out how far the
masses of the democratically-minded people still are from
Socialism, how undeveloped class antagonisms still are, how
unorganised the proletarians still are. Organise hundreds of
thousands of workers all over Russia; enlist the sympathy of
millions for our program! Try to do this without confining
yourselves to high-sounding but hollow anarchist phrases—and you will see at once that in order to achieve
this organisation, in order to spread this socialist enlightenment, we must achieve the fullest possible measure of
democratic reforms.

Let us continue. Once we are clear about the importance of a
provisional revolutionary government and the attitude of the
proletariat toward it, the following question arises: is it
permissible for us to participate in it (action from above) and,
if so, under what conditions? What should be our action from
below? The resolution supplies precise answers to both these
questions. It emphatically declares that it is permissible in principle for Social-Democrats to
participate in a provisional revolutionary government (during
the period of a democratic revolution, the period of struggle
for a republic). By this declaration we once and for all
dissociate ourselves both from the anarchists, who answer this
question in the negative on principle, and from the khvostists among the Social-Democrats (like Martynov
and the new Iskra -ists) who have tried to frighten us with the prospect of a situation wherein it
might prove necessary for us to participate in such a government. By this declaration the Third Congress of the
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party rejected, once and for
all, the idea expressed by the new Iskra that the participation of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary
government would be a variety of

Millerandism , [1] that it is impermissible in principle, as sanctifying the
bourgeois order, etc.

It stands to reason, however, that the question of permissibility in principle does not solve the question of
practical expediency. Under what conditions is this new form of
struggle—the struggle “from above” recognised by the Party
Congress—expedient? It goes without saying that at the present time it is impossible to speak of concrete conditions,
such as relation of forces, etc., and the resolution, naturally,
refrains from defining these conditions in advance. No intelligent person would venture at the present time to prophesy
anything on this subject. What we can and must do is determine
the nature and aim of our participation. This is precisely what
is done in the resolution, which points out two objectives of
our participation: 1) a relentless struggle against counter-revolutionary attempts, and 2) the defence of the
independent interests of the working class. At a time when the
liberal bourgeoisie is beginning to talk assiduously about the
psychology of reaction (see Mr. Struve’s most instructive “Open
Letter” in the Osvobozhdeniye , No. 71) in an attempt to
frighten the revolutionary people and induce it to show
compliance towards the autocracy—at such a time it is particularly appropriate for the party of the proletariat to
call attention to the task of waging a real war against
counterrevolution. In the final analysis, force alone settles
the great problems of political liberty and the class struggle,
and it is our business to prepare and organise this force and to
employ it actively, not only for defence, but also for attack. The long reign of political reaction in Europe, which
has lasted almost uninterruptedly since the days of the Paris Commune , has too greatly accustomed us to the idea that
action can proceed only “from below,” has too greatly inured us
to seeing only defensive struggles. We have now, undoubtedly,
entered a new era: a period of political upheavals and revolutions has begun. In a period such as Russia is passing
through at the present time, it is impermissible to confine
ourselves to old, stereotyped formulae. We must propagate the
idea of action from above, we must prepare for the most
energetic, offensive action, and must study the conditions for
and forms of such actions. The Congress resolution puts two of
these conditions into the forefront: one refers to the formal
aspect of Social-Democratic participation in a provisional
revolutionary government (strict control by the Party over its
representatives), the other to the very nature of such participation (never for an instant to lose sight of the aim of
effecting a complete socialist revolution).

Having thus explained from all aspects the Party’s policy with
regard to action “from above”—this new, hitherto almost
unprecedented method of struggle—the resolution also provides for the eventuality that we shall not be able to act
from above. We must exercise pressure on the provisional
revolutionary government from below in any case. In order to be
able to exercise this pressure from below, the proletariat must
be armed—for in a revolutionary situation matters develop
with exceptional rapidity to the stage of open civil war—and must be led by the Social-Democratic Party. The
object of its armed pressure is that of “defending, consolidating and extending the gains of the revolution,” i.e.,
those gains which from the standpoint of the interests of the
proletariat must consist in the fulfilment of the whole of our
minimum program.

With this we conclude our brief analysis of the resolution of
the Third Congress on a provisional revolutionary government. As
the reader can see, the resolution explains the importance of
this new question, the attitude of the Party of the proletariat
toward it, and the policy the Party must pursue both inside a
provisional revolutionary government and outside of it.

Let us now consider the corresponding resolution of the
“Conference.”

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Notes:
[1]
PLACEHOLDER

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