The article "Unsuccessful Maneuver" is a summary of correspondences from military observers in the foreign press,
devoted to Kuropatkin's attempt to go on the offensive against the Japanese at Hun-Ho. As can be seen from the document printed above *L? 7/7 (p. 45), Lenin initially planned to give this
summary the title: "Diversion on the Hun-ho." The article was intended
for J\S 5 "Vperyod" of February 7 (January 25) 4905, but
was not printed.
UNSUCCESSFUL MANEUVER.
[February, before 7, 1905. Geneva.] "The transition to attack (on the offensive) by the army on
the Hun-ho a few days after the bloody suppression of the workers' demonstration in St. Petersburg prompts much
reflection. Military considerations could hardly have caused this
transition to attack (on the offensive), unless one assumes a
tremendous overestimation of the strength of the Russian generals. From a purely
military point of view, the disadvantages of such a step are enormous and obvious: our military correspondent shows this in detail in
his article today. General Kuropatkin is not the kind of person
to throw fresh troops, who have just arrived to him, into
an attack known to be hopeless against an enemy equal in strength or even
stronger, having especially hardened fighters and possessing very strong fortifications. These fresh
troops were his most important resource for the upcoming campaign. Why then demoralize them before the start of this
campaign, subjecting them to all the hardships of an offensive in a terribly
difficult winter time, being morally certain that the attack would be
repulsed with heavy losses? The answer to this question is given by a comparison
of dates and a moment's reflection on the urgent needs of the autocracy
in its internal politics. On Sunday, January 9 (22), the workers of the capital were shot on the streets. On Wednesday,
January 12 (25), newly arrived reinforcements were thrown into
an attack against the Japanese on the Hun-ho. Obviously, they wanted to divert
the attention of the Russian people as soon as possible from the events that
made the whole world shudder in horror. Before the blood had stopped flowing in St. Petersburg, news began to arrive
of alarming popular unrest in many major provincial cities. How could it be under these conditions, that

UNSUCCESSFUL MANEUVER
the court clique with its allies from the bureaucracy did not desire
passionately to give the popular masses some other absorbing
object of interest? The court clique could hardly flatter
itself with a particular hope for victory; but a military event,
no matter what it might be, even a defeat, could in any case give the public new food for conversation.
Let them talk about the repulsed attack on the Hun-hog rather than about the massacre on Nevsky Prospekt. Of course, we cannot
assert for sure that this is exactly how the higher spheres reasoned,
preparing the military movement, which, according to calculations from Tokyo,
added another 10,000 people * to the huge list of Russian soldiers, lost on such enterprises, which any military man would consider
hopeless. But this fatal predominance of politics over strategy,
which has already shown itself more than once before, when the
need to divert attention from internal affairs was much less
urgent, fully justifies the suspicion that the unfortunate
Kuropatkin was once again condemned to sacrifice his troops on operations
known to be hopeless by order from St. Petersburg."
That is what the respectable Times newspaper wrote on Tuesday, January 31 (18),
usually very and very soberly discussing Russian events from a "reasonably
conservative" bourgeois point of view. This newspaper was so sober, ** that it recently wrote about the "hysterical"
exaggerations of the St. Petersburg massacre (I), that it even
warned the English public about the "lack of tact" of collecting
money in England to help Russian fighters for freedom.
All the more valuable for us are the cool-headed judgments of this faithful interpreter
of the interests of big capital about the significance of recent military
events.
In Russia there is so little opportunity to obtain reliable
information about these events, it is so incredibly difficult to hear
any conscientious military assessment of them, it is so difficult
to assess the political and politicking significance of various "maneuvers" of the tsarist gang, that we will also cite the reviews of that military
correspondent to whom the Times refers. The authority
*
We
have just read in Temps that the correspondent of Novoye
Vremya estimates Russian losses in the last battle on the Hun-ho at
43,000 people. Ed. [Lenin's note. Ed.]
** In the manuscript a typo: "soberly" is written. Ed.
*

of him in military affairs has long been recognized by both the European and Russian
somewhat honest press.
"The battle that began on Wednesday between significant parts
of the enemy Manchurian armies has all the signs of a popular
performance staged on the orders of the Tsarskoye Selo prisoner
for the purpose of political distraction.
"Shortly after the last big battle, which would be more accurately called the battle at Yenshai than on the Sha-
ho, the Japanese stretched their left flank to the Hun-ho, and the last
battle was limited to a line of several fortified villages
around this river. Of these villages, the main points of attack
were Sandepu and the village of Hei-kau-tai (or Keigutaiya or Chei-
gutai, depending on the transcription). The Russian forces consisted, according to
Oyama's information, of the 8th European army corps, sh
one division of the 10th corps, of the 61st reserve division and two
divisions of the 1st East Siberian army corps, in addition to
a significant detachment of cavalry under the leadership of the enterprising
Mishchenko.
"Tokyo reports determine the number of Russians at 65,000 people,
but this calculation must be lower than reality, if all the listed military units participated in the battle.
According to Oyama's report, the 8th and 10th Russian corps attacked
Chen-chieh-pu, and the remaining forces attacked Hei-kau-tai.
The latter village, according to Kuropatkin's first dispatch from
January 26 (13), was taken after a brave defense between 10 and
11 o'clock in the evening on Wednesday. But Sandepu held firm, although
part of this village was occupied by the Russians, and two Russian corps, losing from 1,600 to 4,000 people (according to unofficial
data) retreated and limited themselves to bombarding the village
of Sandepu. General Sakharov should be congratulated on a very successful
turn of phrase in his description of this affair. He expressed
himself precisely that the Russians could not remain in Sandepu without
risking defeat. Until now, indeed, the usual phenomenon was that one of the warring armies at the
end of the battle leaves the battlefield, but until now they thought
usually that this army leaving the battlefield does so not in order to avoid the danger of suffering defeat, but because it has already suffered defeat.
"As soon as the Russian offensive unfolded (outlined), Oyama, following the example of the previous battle on the Sha-ho, quickly

A FAILED MANEUVER
has passed over to the offensive on his left flank. The battle has turned into a series of skirmishes for possession of various villages, especially the village of Hei-kau-tai. At the end of the skirmishes, both this village and other important positions remained in the hands of the Japanese. The Russians were repelled and driven north, losing 500 prisoners and a mass of killed and wounded»... (Currently, the severity of these losses is becoming increasingly clear. The wounded suffered terribly from the severe cold, and many died, as is known from the newspapers. Ed.)
«Among Russian society, there are educated people who fervently desire victory, hoping that only after victory can the Tsar be induced to think about peace. But, no matter how much the Japanese also desire peace, it is hardly to be expected that they will contribute to the realization of these laudable Russian desires. Besides, it remains entirely problematic whether a Russian victory would lead to peace; it is much more likely that it* would, on the contrary, strengthen the grand-ducal party with its jingoism and desire to continue the war. In any case, this latest fruitless attempt by Kuropatkin ended in the same failure as all the previous ones during the entire year of the war. This year has now ended with another heavy defeat for the Russians.
«Kuropatkin has not yet deigned to give a final report on the battle, apart from his childish message telegraphed today, of the loss of three killed and 35 wounded, and it is possible that new trials await him. But, if the Japanese victory on Sunday was the conclusion of this battle,—this remains still in doubt,—then the specifically military considerations that could have prompted the Russian offensive are completely incomprehensible. How could the Russians expect success? To go on the offensive in such climatic conditions as now, against an enemy equal in strength or even stronger, an enemy who had three months to strengthen his positions, means to sacrifice one's army mercilessly on the altar of patriotism. Judging by the composition of the troops that participated in the battle, these were troops not only from Grippenberg, but from all three armies, i.e., perhaps the best, elite troops were sent? In one respect, Kuropatkin undoubtedly demonstrated outstanding abilities during this campaign. No general was able to send fresh troops to certain defeat so quickly, as soon as they arrived in the army, as Kuropatkin. His ability to squander young forces is undoubtedly (His success in blooding his «young entry» is beyond dispute). The 8th Army Corps, the 61st Reserve Brigade, and both rifle brigades, which participated in the battle on the Hun-ho, all of these were fresh troops, not yet having been in action. The state of affairs, it would seem, demanded that these fresh troops not be subjected to the demoralizing influence of defeat and be saved for a serious blow in a major battle. Instead, they are subjected to all the hardships of a march in the snow, in terrible cold, for four whole days; their energy is undermined by entrusting them with the most difficult of all field operations: an attack on localities (villages), well fortified, an operation that experienced generals avoid as much as possible, because it invariably leads to the loss of the best officers and soldiers.
«Russian writers have often stated that in the deep winter Russian soldiers have a better chance of victory than the Japanese. Anyone who knows the living conditions of the Russian peasant and the Japanese peasant has always doubted the correctness of this assertion. The Japanese are more accustomed to working outdoors in cold weather
than peasants who spend the winter lying on stoves in sheepskins. Besides, winter maneuvers and troop movements to harden the soldiers played an important role in the preparation of Japanese soldiers. To demand from the Russian soldier, with his unpreparedness (unwieldy movements), in his heavy (cumbrous) clothing, with unskilled leaders (?? the most indifferent leading),—that he go on the offensive in winter, when silhouettes are particularly prominent in the snow, and attack the Japanese, comfortably settled in pre-fortified positions, this has always seemed to us like outright madness (act of folly).
«Reports of the great battle on the Sha-ho in October are still far from complete. As more detailed descriptions arrive, they all reinforce the impression of the enormous differences in the military capabilities of the two armies. General Kuropatkin, apparently, personally directed the entire battle on the Sha-ho not only in terms of overall leadership, but often also in the detailed movements. As a result, various military units received contradictory orders from various generals, or received no orders at all and wasted time in useless waiting.
*
they (troops russian) have had the edge taken off their keenness by the most difficult of all field operations.