My task is to set forth the question of the participation of social-democracy in a provisional revolutionary government. At first glance, it may seem strange that such a question has arisen. One might think that the affairs of social-democracy are going splendidly, and the probability of its participation in a provisional revolutionary government is very great. In reality, this is not so. To discuss this question from the standpoint of immediate practical implementation would be quixotism. But this question has been thrust upon us not so much by the practical state of affairs as by literary polemics. We must always bear in mind that this question was first raised by Martyanov even before January 9. Here is what he wrote in his pamphlet "Two Dictatorships" (pp. 10-11):

"Imagine for a moment, reader, the realization of Lenin's utopia. Imagine that a party whose membership is narrowed down to the participation in it only of professional revolutionaries managed to 'prepare, designate, and carry out an all-people's armed uprising.' Is it not evident that the all-people's will would immediately appoint precisely this party as a provisional government after the revolution? Is it not evident that the people would entrust the immediate destiny of the revolution precisely to this party and no other? Is it not evident that this party, not wishing to deceive the people's trust shown to it earlier, would be forced, obliged, to take power into its own hands and preserve it until it consolidated the triumph of the revolution through revolutionary measures?"

Such a formulation of the question is incredible, but factually it is this: Martyanov finds that if we had prepared and launched an uprising very well, we would find ourselves in a desperate situation. If we were to explain our dispute to some foreigner, he would never believe in the possibility of such a formulation of the question and would not understand us. Only by knowing the history of the views of Russian social-democracy and knowing the character of the "tailist" views of *Rabochee Delo*, can one understand our dispute. The question has become an urgent question of theory, the clarification of which is necessary. It is a question about the clarity of our goals. I would very much ask the comrades, in expounding our debates before Russian practitioners, to emphasize this formulation of the question given by Martyanov.

In No. 96 of *Iskra* there is published an article by Plekhanov. We have valued and value Plekhanov highly for all those "injuries" he has inflicted on opportunists and which have brought upon him the honorable enmity of a mass of persons. But we cannot value him for the defense of Martyanov. Here we do not see the former Plekhanov. He titles his article: "On the Question of the Seizure of Power." This artificially narrows the question. We have never posed the question in this way. Plekhanov depicts matters as if *Vpered* called Marx and Engels "virtuosos of philistinism." But in reality this is not so, this is a small substitution. *Vpered* specially emphasized Marx's general conception in this question as correct. The words about philistinism referred to Martyanov or L. Martov. However ready we are to value highly all those who work with Plekhanov, nevertheless Martyanov is not Marx. Plekhanov wrongly obscures Martyanovism.

Martyanov asserts that if we accept decisive participation in the uprising, a great danger arises for us: that the proletariat will compel us to take power. In this reasoning there is a peculiar logic, though a backward one. Regarding this peculiar indication of the danger of victory in the struggle against autocracy, *Vpered* asks Martyanov and L. Martov: what is under discussion—a socialist or democratic dictatorship? We are cited the famous words of Engels about the danger of the position of a leader who has received power in the name of a class not yet mature for complete domination{57}. In *Vpered* we explained that Engels points to the danger of a leader's position when he post factum establishes a discrepancy between principles and reality, between words and deeds. Such a discrepancy leads to ruin in the sense of political collapse, not physical defeat[54]. You must (such is Engels's thought) assert that the revolution is socialist, whereas it is in fact only democratic. If we were now to promise the Russian proletariat that we are able immediately to ensure complete domination, we would fall into the error that the Socialist-Revolutionaries make. It is precisely over this error of the S.R.'s, who said that the revolution would be "not bourgeois, but democratic," that we, the S.D.'s, have always made fun. We have always said that the revolution will not weaken but strengthen the bourgeoisie, but will give the proletariat the necessary conditions for successful struggle for socialism.

But since we are speaking of a democratic revolution, we have before us two forces: autocracy and the revolutionary people, i.e., the proletariat as the main fighting force, and the peasantry and all petty-bourgeois elements. The interests of the proletariat do not coincide with the interests of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Social-democracy has always emphasized that this class divergence within the revolutionary people is inevitable. The object of struggle in the heat of struggle can pass from hand to hand. The revolutionary people strive for the autocracy of the people; all reactionary elements defend the autocracy of the tsar. A successful revolution therefore cannot but be a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, whose interests against the tsar's autocracy coincide. On the slogan "march separately, strike together" both *Iskra* and *Vpered* have agreed, but *Vpered* adds: if you strike together, then strike to the finish together and repel together the enemy's attempts to recover what was lost. After the overthrow of autocracy the struggle will not cease but will become more acute. Reactionary forces will then organize themselves for struggle in earnest. If we use the slogan of uprising, we must not frighten social-democracy with the possibility of the uprising's victory. Having conquered the autocracy of the people, we must defend it—and this is precisely a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. There is no reason to fear it. The conquest of a republic is a gigantic conquest for the proletariat, though for a social-democrat the republic is not an "absolute ideal," as it is for a bourgeois revolutionary, but merely a guarantee of freedom for broad struggle for socialism. Parvus says that in no country has the conquest of freedom cost such gigantic sacrifices. This is true. This is confirmed also by the European bourgeois press, which is carefully following Russian events from the side. The resistance of autocracy to the most elementary reforms is incredibly strong, and the stronger the action, the stronger the reaction. Hence the high probability of the complete collapse of autocracy. The entire question of revolutionary democratic dictatorship has meaning only with the complete overthrow of autocracy. It is possible that events of 1848-1850 will be repeated with us, i.e., autocracy will not be overthrown but limited and will become a constitutional monarchy. Then there can be no talk of any democratic dictatorship. But if the autocratic government is truly overthrown, it must be replaced by another. And this other can only be a provisional revolutionary government. It can rely only on the revolutionary people, i.e., on the proletariat and peasantry. It can only be a dictatorship, i.e., an organization not of "order" but of war. Whoever storms a fortress cannot refuse to continue the war after he has taken possession of the fortress. It is one or the other: either we take the fortress in order to hold it, or we do not storm it and declare that we want only a small place near the fortress.

I will turn to Plekhanov. He employs a deeply incorrect method. He evades important principled questions, resorting to petty cavils, employing a certain moment of substitution. (Comrade Barsov's exclamation: "Yes!") *Vpered* asserts that in general Marx's schema is correct (the schema of the replacement of autocracy first by a bourgeois monarchy, then by a petty-bourgeois democratic republic), but if we artificially limit ourselves in advance according to this schema to the bounds to which we will go, then we will be philistines. Thus Plekhanov's defense of Marx is *verlorene Liebesmühe* (lost labor of love). In defending Martyanov, Plekhanov refers to the "Address" of the Central Committee of the Communist League to the members of the League{58}. Plekhanov again expounds this "Address" incorrectly. He leaves in the shadows the fact that this "Address" was written when the complete victory of the people had already failed, despite the victorious uprising of the proletariat in Berlin in 1848. Bourgeois-constitutional monarchy had already replaced autocracy, and consequently there could be no talk of a provisional government relying on the entire revolutionary people. The entire meaning of the "Address" consists in the fact that after the failure of the people's uprising Marx advises the working class to organize itself and prepare. Can these counsels be useful for clarifying the situation in Russia before the beginning of an uprising? Can these counsels explain our disputed question, which presupposes a victorious uprising of the proletariat? The "Address" begins as follows: "… During both revolutionary years, 1848-1849, the Communist League manifested itself in two ways: first, in that its members everywhere energetically participated in the movement… further, in that its views on the movement" (set forth, among other things, in the "Communist Manifesto") "proved to be the only correct ones"… "At the same time the former strong organization of the League significantly weakened. The great majority of members, directly participating in the revolutionary movement, thought that the time of secret societies had passed, and that one open appearance was sufficient. Individual districts and communes let their relations with the Central Committee (Central Administration—Zentralbehörde) fall away and gradually broke them off entirely. Thus, at the time when the democratic party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, was increasingly organizing itself in Germany, the workers' party lost its only firm support, preserved its organized form at most in individual localities for local purposes, and in consequence of this fell entirely under the domination and guidance of petty-bourgeois democrats in the general movement (in der allgemeinen Bewegung)" ("Ansprache"[55], p. 75).

So, Marx states in 1850 that petty-bourgeois democracy gained in organization during the revolution of 1848 which had already occurred, while the workers' party lost. Naturally, all of Marx's attention is directed to the fact that the workers' party does not again find itself in the tail of the bourgeoisie. "…At the present time, when a new revolution impends, it is extremely important that the workers' party appear as organized as possible, as united as possible, and as independent as possible, if it does not wish again, as in 1848, to be exploited by the bourgeoisie and drag along in its tail" ("Ansprache", p. 76).

Precisely because of this greater organization of bourgeois democracy, Marx has no doubt that it will obtain absolute predominance if a new revolution occurs immediately. "That petty-bourgeois democracy in the course of the further development of the revolution will in Germany obtain preponderant influence for a time (für einen Augenblick), this is beyond any doubt" ("Ansprache", p. 78). Taking all this into account, we will understand why Marx does not say one word in the "Ansprache" about the participation of the proletariat in a provisional revolutionary government. Plekhanov is therefore completely wrong when he asserts that Marx "did not even entertain the thought that political representatives of the proletariat could labor together with representatives of the petty bourgeoisie on creating a new social order" (*Iskra* No. 96). This is incorrect. Marx does not raise the question of the participation of social-democracy in a provisional revolutionary government, whereas Plekhanov depicts matters as if Marx decides this question negatively. Marx says: we, the S.D.'s, were all in the tail, we are organized worse, we must organize ourselves independently in case petty-bourgeois democracy turns out to be in power after the new revolution. Martyanov draws the following conclusion from these premises of Marx: We, the S.D.'s, now organized better than petty-bourgeois democracy and constituting an absolutely independent party, must fear that in the event of the uprising's success we will have to participate in a provisional revolutionary government. Yes! Comrade Plekhanov, one thing is Marxism, another thing is Martyanovism. To more vividly point out all the difference in the position of Russia in 1905 and Germany in 1850, let us dwell on some other interesting passages from the "Address". Marx did not speak of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat, because he believed in an immediate socialist dictatorship of the proletariat right after the petty-bourgeois revolution. For example, regarding the agrarian question, he says that democracy wants to create a petty-bourgeois peasant class, and the workers must oppose this plan in the interests of the rural proletariat and in their own interests. They must demand that the confiscated feudal land property remain state property and be converted into working colonies in which the associated rural proletariat will enjoy all the means of large-scale agriculture. It is clear that with such plans Marx could not speak of a democratic dictatorship. He wrote not on the eve of a revolution, as a representative of an organized proletariat, but after a revolution, as a representative of organizing workers. Marx emphasizes as the first task that "after the revolution the Central Committee must immediately go to Germany, convene a party congress, and propose to it to take measures for the centralization of workers' clubs." Thus, the idea of an independent workers' party, which has for us become second nature, was then new. We must not forget that in 1848, when Marx edited a free and extremely revolutionary newspaper ("Neue Rheinische Zeitung"{59}), he did not rely on any workers' organization. His newspaper was supported by radical bourgeoisie, who almost failed it when Marx attacked Parisian bourgeoisie in it after the June Days. Therefore so much is said in this "Address" about the independent organization of workers. There is talk in it of the formation alongside the new official government of revolutionary workers' governments, both in the form of workers' clubs and workers' committees, and in the form of communal councils and municipal administrations. There is talk of workers being armed and forming an independent workers' militia. As the second point of the program it is indicated that in them, alongside bourgeois candidates, workers' candidates should be put forward, if possible from among the members of the League. How weak this League was is shown by the fact that Marx had to prove the necessity of putting forward one's own candidates. The conclusion from all this is that Marx did not mention and did not decide the question of participation in a provisional revolutionary government, because this question could then have no practical significance, and all attention was directed entirely to organizing an independent workers' party.

Plekhanov further says in *Iskra* that *Vpered* provides no proof in essence, limiting itself to repeating several favorite little words, that *Vpered* supposedly wants to criticize Marx. Is this so? Do we not see, on the contrary, that *Vpered* poses the question on concrete ground, taking into account the actual social forces participating in Russia in the struggle for a democratic revolution? Plekhanov, meanwhile, does not say one word about concrete Russian conditions. His entire arsenal is limited to a couple of citations cited out of place. This is monstrous, but it is so. The Russian situation differs so much from that of Western Europe that Parvus could even pose the question of where we have revolutionary democracy. Unable to prove that *Vpered* wants to "criticize" Marx, Plekhanov drags in Mach and Avenarius by the ears. I decidedly do not understand what relation these writers, toward whom I feel not the slightest sympathy, bear to the question of social revolution. They wrote about individual and social organization of experience, or something of that sort, but really did not think about democratic dictatorship. Is it not known to Plekhanov that Parvus became an adherent of Mach and Avenarius? (Laughter.) Or perhaps the state of affairs with Plekhanov is such that he is forced, neither here nor there, to create himself a target out of Mach and Avenarius. Plekhanov further says that Marx and Engels soon lost faith in the imminence of social revolution. The Communist League broke up. Began the emigrant squabbles which Marx and Engels explained by saying that there were revolutionaries, but there was no revolution. Plekhanov writes in *Iskra*: "The political tasks of the proletariat would have been determined by them" (by Marx and Engels, who had lost faith in the imminence of social revolution) "already on the assumption that the democratic order would remain dominant for a fairly prolonged period. But precisely for this reason they would have condemned even more decisively the participation of socialists in a petty-bourgeois government" (*Iskra* No. 96). Why? There is no answer. Plekhanov substitutes socialist dictatorship for democratic dictatorship again, i.e., falls into Martyanov's error, against which *Vpered* has warned many times with energy. Without a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry a republic in Russia is impossible. *Vpered* has put forward this assertion on the basis of analysis of the real situation. Unfortunately, Marx did not know this situation and did not write about it. And therefore one cannot confirm or refute the analysis of this situation with citations from Marx alone. And about concrete conditions Plekhanov does not say one word.

Even less successful is the second citation from Engels. First of all, it is extremely strange that Plekhanov refers to a private letter without indicating where and when it was published{60}. We would be very grateful for the publication of Engels's letters, but would wish to see their complete text. However, we have some data to judge the true meaning of Engels's letter.

Second, we know precisely that the situation in Italy in the nineties was completely unlike the Russian. Italy had enjoyed freedom for more than forty years already. In Russia the working class cannot even dream of such freedom without a bourgeois revolution. In Italy, consequently, the working class had long been able to develop independent organization for a socialist revolution. Turati is the Italian Millerand. It is quite possible, therefore, that even then Turati came forward with Millerandist ideas. Such a supposition is fully confirmed by the fact that, according to Plekhanov's own words, Engels had to explain to Turati the difference between a bourgeois-democratic and a socialist revolution. This means Engels was precisely afraid that Turati would find himself in the false position of a leader who does not understand the social meaning of the revolution in which he participates. As for Plekhanov, we must once again repeat that he confuses democratic and socialist revolution.

But perhaps one can find an answer in Marx and Engels not about the concrete Russian situation, but about general principles of revolutionary struggle of the proletariat? At least *Iskra* has posed one such general question.

In No. 93 it writes: "The best path for the organization of the proletariat into a party in opposition to the bourgeois-democratic state is the path of development of the bourgeois revolution from below through pressure of the proletariat on the democracy standing at power." *Iskra* says: "*Vpered* wants the pressure of the proletariat on the revolution (?) to go not only from below, not only from the street, but also from above, from the chambers of the provisional government." This formulation is correct; *Vpered* indeed wants this. Here before us is truly a general principled question: is revolutionary action from below admissible, or also from above? To this general question one can find an answer in Marx and Engels.

I have in mind an interesting article by Engels: "The Bakunists at Work"{61} (1873). Engels briefly describes the Spanish revolution of 1873, when the country was seized by an uprising of intransigents, i.e., extreme republicans. Engels emphasizes that then there could be no talk of the immediate liberation of the working class. The task consisted in accelerating for the proletariat the passage through the preliminary stages preparing the social revolution, in eliminating the obstacles standing in its path. The republic provided the possibility of achieving this goal. The Spanish working class could use this possibility only by actively participating in the revolution. Such participation was then hindered by the influence of Bakunists and among other things their idea of a general strike, criticized very cleverly by Engels. Engels describes, among other things, events in the city of Alcoy with 30,000 factory workers. The proletariat turned out to be master of the situation there. What did it do then? Contrary to the principles of Bakunism it had to participate in a provisional revolutionary government. "The Bakunists," says Engels, "for many years preached that all revolutionary action from above downward is harmful; everything must be organized and carried out from below upward."

So here is how Engels answered the general question posed by *Iskra* about "from above and from below." The principle of *Iskra*: "only from below and in no case from above" – this is an anarchist principle. Drawing a conclusion from the events of the Spanish revolution, Engels says: "The Bakunists had to act contrary to their own principles, contrary to the principle that the establishment of a revolutionary government is a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class" (as Plekhanov now wants to assure you). "Contrary to these principles the Bakunists had to sit in governmental committees of individual cities and moreover as a powerless minority, outvoted and politically exploited by the bourgeoisie." So, Engels did not like only that the Bakunists were in the minority, not that they sat there. Concluding the pamphlet, Engels says that the example of the Bakunists "shows us how not to conduct a revolution."

If Martov had limited his revolutionary work exclusively to action from below, he would have repeated the error of the Bakunists.

But *Iskra*, having invented principled disagreements with *Vpered*, itself falls into our point of view. Thus Martyanov says that the proletariat together with the people must compel the bourgeoisie to carry the revolution to completion. But this is nothing other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the "people," i.e., the proletariat and peasantry. The bourgeoisie does not want at all to carry the revolution to completion. And the people must want this according to the social conditions of its life. Revolutionary dictatorship will enlighten it and draw it into political life.

*Iskra* writes in No. 95:

"But if, independent of our will, the internal dialectic of the revolution should finally bring us to power anyway, when the national conditions for the realization of socialism have not yet ripened, we would not retreat. We would set ourselves the goal of breaking the narrow national limits of the revolution and pushing the West onto the path of revolution, as a hundred years ago France pushed the East onto this path."

So, *Iskra* itself acknowledges that if such a misfortune should occur, that we won, then we would have to act precisely as *Vpered* indicates. Consequently, on the practical question *Iskra* follows behind *Vpered* and undermines its own position. I only do not understand how one can drag Martov and Martyanov to power against their will? This is utter nonsense.

*Iskra* brings France as an example. But this is Jacobin France. To frighten people with Jacobinism at the moment of revolution is the greatest vulgarity. Democratic dictatorship, as I have already noted, is not an organization of "order," but an organization of war. Even if we had conquered Petersburg and guillotined Nicholas, we would have before us several Vendées{62}. And Marx understood this excellently when in 1848 in the "New Rhenish Gazette" he recalled the Jacobins. He said: "The Terror of 1793 is nothing other than the plebeian way of dealing with absolutism and counterrevolution"{63}. We too prefer to deal with Russian autocracy in the "plebeian" way and leave *Iskra* the Girondin ways. Russian revolution has before it an unprecedented favorable situation (an unpopular war, the Asian conservatism of autocracy, etc.). And this situation allows us to hope for a successful outcome of the uprising. The revolutionary mood of the proletariat is growing not by the day but by the hour. And at such a moment Martyanovism is not only stupidity but a crime, because it undermines the scope of the proletariat's revolutionary energy, cuts off its revolutionary enthusiasm. (Lyadov: "Absolutely right!") This is the very error that Bernstein made in the German party in different circumstances, on the question not of democratic but of socialist dictatorship.

To give you a concrete picture of what these so-called "chambers" of a provisional revolutionary government actually are, I will refer to one more source. In Engels's article "Die Reichsverfassungskampagne"[56] there is a description of how he participated in the revolution around these "chambers"{64}. He describes, for example, the uprising in Rhenish Prussia, which was one of the most industrial centers of Germany. The chances for the success of the democratic party, he says, were especially favorable here. The task consisted in throwing all available forces onto the right bank of the Rhine, spreading the uprising to a broader arena, and attempting to create here through the Landwehr (militia) the nucleus of a revolutionary army. Precisely such a proposal was made by Engels when he went to Elberfeld to do what he could for the realization of his plan. And Engels attacks the petty-bourgeois leaders for not knowing how to organize the uprising, for not having stored money, for example, for the maintenance of workers fighting on the barricades, etc. It was necessary to act more energetically, says Engels. The first step should have been the disarming of the Elberfeld civil militia and the distribution of its weapons to the workers, then the collection of a compulsory tax for the maintenance of the workers armed in this way. But this proposal, says Engels, came solely and exclusively from me. The most honorable Committee of Public Safety had not the slightest inclination for such "terrorist undertakings."

Thus, at the very time when our Marx and Engels (that is, Martyanov and Martov) (Homeric laughter) frighten us with Jacobinism, Engels castigated revolutionary petty bourgeoisie for disdain for the "Jacobin" manner of action. Engels understood that to gather for war and refuse to use the state treasury and state power—in time of war—means to play with words in an unworthy manner. Where, then, will you get money for an uprising if it becomes all-people's, gentlemen of the new *Iskra*? Surely not from the state treasury? That is bourgeois! That is Jacobinism!

Regarding the uprising in Baden Engels writes: "The insurrectionary government had in its hands all the chances of success: a ready army, filled arsenals, a rich state treasury, a united population." Everyone and each person understood afterward what should have been done under such conditions. It was necessary to organize an army for the defense of the national assembly, throw back the Austrians and Prussians, spread the uprising to neighboring states, and "place the feeble German, so-called national assembly under the terrorist influence of the risen people and risen army; it was further necessary to organize the forces of the uprising, place at its disposal abundant monetary sums, interest the agricultural population in the uprising through the immediate abolition of all feudal obligations. And all this had to be done immediately in order to give the uprising an energetic character. A week after the appointment of the Baden Committee it was already too late."

We are convinced that revolutionary S.D.'s will at the moment of the uprising in Russia, following Engels's example, enrolling as soldiers of the revolution, give such same "Jacobin" advice. Our *Iskra*, meanwhile, prefers to write about the color of envelopes of electoral ballots, pushing to the background the question of a provisional revolutionary government and revolutionary guards of the constituent assembly. Our *Iskra* has no intention whatever of acting "from above."

From Karlsruhe Engels went to the Palatinate. In the provisional government sat his friend D'Ester (who had once freed Engels from arrest). "About official participation in a movement which was alien to our party, there could be no question," says Engels. "I had to occupy in the movement the place which only the workers of the 'New Rhenish Gazette' could occupy—the place of a soldier." We have already spoken of the dissolution of the Communist League which left Engels outside of almost any connection with workers' organizations. This makes understandable the citation we have given: "I was offered many civil and military posts," writes Engels, "posts which I would not have hesitated for a moment to accept with a proletarian movement. Under the given conditions I declined them all."

As you see, Engels was not afraid to act from above, was not afraid of too great organization and strength of the proletariat, which might lead it to participation in a provisional government. Engels regretted, on the contrary, that the movement was insufficiently successful, insufficiently proletarian because of the complete disorganization of the workers. But even under these conditions Engels accepted a post: he served in the army as the adjutant of Willlich, took it upon himself to deliver ammunition, transported with incredible difficulty powder, lead, cartridges, etc. "To die for the republic, such was my goal then," writes Engels.

I leave it to you, comrades, to judge whether this picture of a provisional government, drawn from Engels's own words, resembles those "chambers" which the new *Iskra* is trying to frighten workers away from us with. (Applause.) (The speaker reads his proposed resolution and comments on it.)