V. I.

Lenin

The State Duma and Social-Democratic Tactics [1]

The Law of December 11 [2] has brought up, once again, the question of our tactics
in relation to the Duma. Shall we take part in the Duma elections, or not?
This is the question that is being eagerly discussed in the columns of
our bourgeois-democratic press. And it was on this question that the
conference of organisations of the “Majority” in the
R.S.D.L.P. recently expressed its opinion. This conference, which was
attended by representatives of twenty six organisations (fourteen of them
composed of workers, elected by over four thousand organised members of
the Party), took the place of the proposed Fourth Congress of the Party,
the convocation of which had been announced by the Central Committee. The
Congress could not be held because of the railway strike, the Moscow
insurrection, and various other events in the most far-flung parts of
Russia. But the delegates who had gathered organised a conference of the
“Majority” which, among other things, also discussed the Duma
elections. This question it decided in the negative, that is, in the sense
that the Party should not take part in the elections. The following is the
relevant part of the resolution adopted by the conference:

“ Ever since October 17, the autocratic government has been trampling upon
all the fundamental civil liberties won by the proletariat. The government has
drenched the country in blood, shooting down with artillery and machine-guns the
workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors fighting for liberty. The government
scoffs at the nation-wide demand for the convocation of a constituent assembly,
and by its Law of December 11 is trying once again to deceive the proletariat
and the peasantry, and to stave off its final destruction.

“ The Law of December 11 practically bars the proletariat and the bulk of
the peasantry from the State Duma; and its object is by all sorts of roses and
police restrictions to ensure in advance the predominance in the Duma of the
Black-Hundred elements of the exploiting classes.

“ This conference is convinced that the whole of the class-conscious
proletariat of Russia will reply to this new tsarist law by resolutely fighting against it, as well as against any other travesty of popular
representation.

“ This conference holds that the Social-Democrats must strive to prevent the
convocation of this police Duma, and must refuse to take any part in it.”

The resolution then goes on to recommend all Party organisations to take full
advantage of the election meetings, but not in order to carry out any sort of
elections under police restrictions. They should do so in order to expand the
revolutionary organisation of the proletariat and con duct agitation among all
sections of the people in favour of a resolute struggle against the autocracy;
for only after complete victory has been achieved over the latter will it be
possible to convene representatives of the people elected in a truly free
manner.

Is this decision correct? To answer this question, let us first of all examine
the objections that may be raised against it. What may now be urged in favour of
participating in the Duma is that the workers have obtained some rights in
electing the Duma, and also that there is now somewhat greater freedom to carry
on agitation than in the period of the “first”, Bulygin, Duma
promised by the Law of August 6. These considerations—together with the
suppression of the insurrection in Moscow and elsewhere, after which some period
of lull is necessary to rally and train fresh forces—have naturally been
inclining the “Minority” in the R.S.D.L.P. in favour of
participation in the election of at least the delegates and electors. Such
Social-Democrats believe that we ought not to try to get into the State Duma,
that we ought not to go beyond the stage of electing electors; but that we
ought to use the opportunities offered by the election in the workers’ curia to
carry on agitation, and to organise and politically educate the proletariat.

In reply to these arguments, we will first of all observe that they follow quite
naturally from the general principles of the Social-Democratic world-outlook
and from Social-Democratic tactics. We representatives of the
“Majority” must admit this, to avoid running to factional
extremes that may prove an obstacle to Party unity, which is so absolutely essential now. We must
by all means carefully reconsider the question of tactics. Although events have confirmed the correctness of our tactics towards the 6th of August Duma,
which was really frustrated, boycotted, swept away by the proletariat, it does
not automatically follow that the new Duma can be frustrated in the same
way. The situation has changed, and we must carefully weigh up the arguments for
and against participation.

We have briefly outlined what we believe to be the main arguments in favour of
participation. Let us now pass to the arguments against it.

The new Duma is undoubtedly a caricature of popular representation. Our
participation in the elections will give the masses of the people a distorted
idea of our appraisal of the Duma.

There is no freedom to carry on agitation. Meetings are dispersed. Delegates are
arrested.

If we swallow the bait of Dubasov’s “constitutionalism”, we shall be
unable to unfurl our Party banner before the masses, and shall weaken our Party
forces with little benefit to the cause; for if our candidates come forward
“legally” we shall merely provide the police with ready-made lists
of people to be arrested.

In most parts of Russia civil war is raging. The lull can only be a temporary
one. Continuous preparation is essential. It is both inadvisable and
impracticable for our Party to combine this with elections held under the Law of
December 11. We shall be unable to take part in the elections “legally”, even if we wanted to; the conditions of the
struggle will not permit it. There may be exceptions, of course; but it would
be irrational for their sake to cause confusion, disorganisation and disunity in
our nation-wide proletarian tactics.

Duma elections held under the Law of December 11 and under the rule of the
Dubasovs and Durnovos [3] are mere playing at parliamentarism. It is
beneath the dignity of the proletariat to be a party to such a game.

The tactics of the mass party of the proletariat must be simple, clear and
straightforward. The proposal to elect delegates and electors, without electing
deputies to the Duma, however, is a confused and ambiguous solution of the
problem. On the one hand, it accepts the legal form of elections under the law. On the other hand, it “frustrates” the
law, for the proposed elections will not be con ducted for the purpose of
carrying out the law, of electing deputies to the Duma. On the one hand,
an election campaign begins; on the other, it breaks off at the most
important stage (in the elections as a whole), just when the actual
composition of the Duma is to be decided. On the one hand, the workers are to
restrict their elections (of delegates and electors) within the absurd and
reactionary limits of the Law of

December II.

On the other hand, these workers’ elections, which avowedly give an incomplete and distorted
picture of the progressive aims of the proletariat, are expected to
achieve these aims outside the Duma (in the shape of some sort of illegal
representation or illegal Duma, or popular Duma, etc.). The result is an
absurdity: elections on the basis of a non-existent franchise to a
non-existent parliament. The Soviets of Workers’ Deputies in St. Peters
burg and Moscow were elected by the workers themselves, not in accordance
with “legal forms” prescribed by the police. And the arrest
of the members of these Soviets taught the workers a very important
lesson. These arrests showed how dangerous it is to trust
pseudo-constitutionalism, how insecure “revolutionary local
self-government” without the victory of the revolutionary forces,
how inadequate a temporary non-party organisation, which can sometimes
supplement, but cannot in any sense replace a solid, lasting militant
party organisation. The Soviets of Workers’ Deputies in the two capitals
fell because they lacked firm support in the shape of militant proletarian
organisation. If we replace these Soviets by meetings of electors or of
delegates, we shall be substituting verbal support for militant support,
would-be parliamentary support for revolutionary support. This will be
the same as trying to replace a missing gun by one drawn on cardboard.

Furthermore, if we participate in the elections, we put the proletariat in a
false relation to the bourgeois democrats. The latter are splitting up
again. The moderate liberals (Cadets) are staunchly in favour of participating
in the elections. The radicals are prone to boycott them. The class background
of this split is clear: the Right wing of the bourgeoisie is prone to come to
terms with reaction through the Duma. The Left wing of the bourgeoisie is prone to form an alliance with the
revolution, or at any rate to back it (recall how the Union of Unions associated
itself with the manifesto on the financial bankruptcy of the government issued
by the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’
Deputies [4] ).

The boycott tactics provide a clear and correct expression of the proletariat’s attitude towards the revolutionary and the
opportunist bourgeoisie. The tactics of participation would cause utter chaos,
and prevent the proletariat from distinguishing between its immediate allies and
its enemies.

Lastly, the practical objects of participation can be attained to an equal, if
not greater, degree by the boycott. An assessment of the strength of the
proletariat, agitation and organisation, and the predominance of the
Social-Democrats in the workers’ curia can all be achieved by the
revolutionary use of election meetings instead of formal participation in them; for this there is no
need whatever to elect “delegates” and “electors”. There
is less chance of achieving all this if forces are diverted to these ridiculous
legal elections; for we ourselves reject the objects of these elections, and it
is not in the least to our advantage to inform the police about them. In
practice, what will happen probably in nearly every case will be the
revolutionary use of the election meetings, and not participation in them; for
the workers will not submit to the police restrictions, will not eject
“unauthorised persons” (i.e., the Social-Democrats), and will not
abide by the election regulations. By the force of circumstances, of the
revolutionary situation, there will be no elections at the
“election” meetings; they will be transformed into meetings for
party agitation outside of and despite the elections; in other words, the result
will be what is called “active boycott”. Whatever view we take of
things, however we interpret our views, and whatever reservations we make, our
participation in the elections will inevitably tend to foster the idea of
substituting the Duma for a constituent assembly, the idea of convening a
constituent assembly through the Duma, etc. The tactics of exposing the
fraudulent and fictitious character of representation in the Duma, of demanding
the convocation of a constituent assembly by revolutionary means and yet participating in the Duma, can only con fuse the proletariat at a
revolutionary moment: they can only strengthen the position of the least
class-conscious elements of the mass of the workers, and of those
working-class leaders who are least scrupulous and least principled. We may
declare that our Social-Democratic candidates are completely and
absolutely independent, and that we are participating in the elections on
the strictest possible Party lines: but the political situation is more
potent than any number of declarations. Things will not, and cannot, turn
out in keeping with these declarations. Whether we like it or not, if we
participate now in the present Duma elections, the result will inevitably
be neither Social-Democratic nor workers’ party policy.

The tactics recommended by the conference of the “Majority” are the
only correct tactics.

The position taken up by the “Cadets” provides interesting
confirmation (indirect) of this conclusion. In its “death bed” issue
(of December 20) Narodnaya Svoboda argues as follows on a question
which has arisen once more—whether to go into the Duma. [5]

The immediate task is to convene a national constituent assembly. The newspaper
takes this proposition for granted. Who is to convene this constituent
assembly, and how? In Narodnaya Svoboda’s opinion, three answers may be
given to this question:

(1) The lawful (or de facto , the autocratic) government; (2) a provisional revolutionary government; (3) the State Duma as an
“authority competing with authority”. It goes without saying that
the “Cadets” are in favour of the third “solution” and urge the necessity of participating in the Duma precisely in order to achieve
it. They reject the first solution, as they have given up all hopes of the
government. Concerning the second solution they give us the following highly
characteristic specimen of argument:

“ Can we count on the practical achievement of that provisional
government of which even today—amidst the bloody fumes of a suppressed
insurrection—the revolutionary parties still dream? We say quite plainly:
no, we cannot—and not because armed uprising is impossible: Moscow has
proved the reverse; and not because such an insurrection must, as sure as fate,
be suppressed by armed force: who can foretell the future?

“ We cannot count en a provisional government because it will not in any circumstances—not even in the event of a successful
insurrection—be strong and authoritative enough to ’restore the shattered
temple’ of the land of Russia. It will be swept away by the waves of
counter-revolution surging up from the depths of society.

“ The Russian revolution has been going on, not for months, but for years;
during this period it has managed to take a sharp and definite course; and we
must say quite candidly that this course is neither towards armed uprising nor
towards a provisional government. Let us not shut our eyes to facts. The liberal
intelligentsia, the peasantry and the proletariat are all revolutionary; but the
revolutionary co-operation of these three elements under the banner of armed
uprising is impossible . We will not go into the question of who is
right and who is to blame: the fact remains a fact. That being so, from what
elements can the vaunted provisional government of the revolutionary parties
arise? What can it be? The dictatorship of the proletariat? But it is useless
talking about the dictatorship of the proletariat in present-day Russia....”

We have deliberately reproduced this argument in full, because it splendidly,
and with a lucidity rare for the “Cadets”, conveys the substance of
the liberal-bourgeois point of view. The flaws in this argument are so obvious
that we need dwell on them only briefly. If the possibility of armed uprising
has now been proved and if the hopelessness of its victory cannot be proved in
advance, then of what value is the argument that “it will be swept away by
counter-revolution”? It is a ridiculously weak excuse. There has never been a
revolution without counter-revolution, nor can there be. Today, for instance,
October 17 itself has been swept away by the wave of counter-revolution; but
does that prove that constitutional demands have lost their vitality? The
question is not whether there will be counter-revolution, but who, in the last
analysis, after the inevitably long battles, with their many vicissitudes, will
be the victor.

Narodnaya Svoboda realises that this question can be answered only by
an analysis of the social forces. It makes this analysis, and admits that the
proletariat, the peasantry and the liberal intelligentsia are all
revolutionary. But then it “decrees”: their “co-operation
under the banner of armed uprising is impossible”. Why? This is the pivot
of the question, and it cannot be settled by bare statements.

The fact that remains a fact is that the proletariat and the peasantry
are rising, with the co-operation of at least some part of the bourgeois
intelligentsia. By admitting the fact (which now no longer needs anyone’s
admission) that armed insurrection is possible, admitting. that it is
impossible to predict that all later outbreaks will fail, the newspaper
has cut the ground from under its own arguments. It saves itself only by
a quibble: it repudiates the possibility of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, i.e., of a socialist dictatorship, whereas it should have
talked about the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the
peasantry. These classes are assured of the sympathy and co-operation of a
certain section of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and of the bourgeois
intelligentsia in particular; the only question is the degree of
organisation and fighting capacity. This is a very important and serious
question, of course; but only those who obviously want to evade an answer
would attempt to answer it offhand in the negative.

The position of the liberal landlords is clear. They want to take part in the
Duma precisely because they do not want to take part in the revolutionary
struggle. They want the Duma convened precisely because they do not want the
revolutionary convocation of a constituent assembly. They want the Duma
precisely because they want a deal. Thus the difference between the attitude of
the liberals and that of the Social-Democrats towards the Duma quite distinctly
reflects the difference between the class attitude of the bourgeoisie and that
of the proletariat. And how hopeless is this sighing for a deal and for a Duma,
in a period of acute civil war, is shown, among other things, by the suppression
of the “Cadet” newspapers and the miserable existence of the whole
liberal press in general. Every day all this press publishes heaps of facts
which show that the representation in the Duma is an utter fraud, and that
anything like free agitation and proper elections are utterly impossible. The
realities of the revolutionary and counter revolutionary situation prove, more
convincingly than any number of arguments, that dreams about participating in
the Duma for the purpose of fighting are futile, and that the tactics of active
boycott are correct.

A few words in conclusion about how our agitation for an active boycott of the
Duma should be conducted within the Party in view of the amalgamation of the
factions and the complete unification of the R.S.D.L.P. now taking place.

Amalgamation is essential. It must be supported. In the interests of
amalgamation, we must contend with the Mensheviks on tactics in a comradely
way; we must strive to convince all the members of the Party, and convert our
polemics into a practical setting forth of the pros and cons, an explanation of
the position of the proletariat and its class aims. But amalgamation does not in
the least oblige us to gloss over disagreements on tactics or to refrain from
explaining our tactics fully and sincerely. Nothing of the kind. The ideological
struggle for the tactics that we regard as correct should be carried on openly,
straightforwardly and resolutely to the end, that is to say, until the unity
congress of the Party meets. Tactics determine the immediate activities of a
party, and therefore a united party can have only one set of tactics. These
tactics must be those agreed to by the majority of the members of the Party:
when the majority has taken a definite stand, the minority must submit to it in
its political ’conduct, while retaining the right to criticise and to advocate a
settlement of the question at the next congress.

In the present situation in our Party, both factions have agreed to the
convocation of a unity congress, and both have agreed to submit to its
decisions. The unity congress will decide what are to be the united tactics of
the Party. Our duty is to do everything to hasten the convocation of this
congress, and to strive with the utmost vigour to bring home to every Party
member as clearly as possible the tactical differences on the question of
taking part in the Duma, so that, in voting for delegates to the joint congress
that will unite our Party and our tactics, all Party members may make their
choice not haphazardly, but with deliberation, with a complete knowledge of the
case, and after fully weighing up the arguments of both sides.