V. I. Lenin

Source: ru:PSS/v47; en:CW/CW36;es:MT
Translated: machine translation (DeepSeek) from the Russian; AI-translated.

September 15, 1905

Dear Comrades,

I have received the money, 1,000 rubles = 2,640 francs, and the first issue of *Rabochy*.

It makes an excellent impression. It may be hoped that the difficult task of presenting things in a popular and interesting way will be largely solved by it. There is something fresh in the tone and character of the exposition. A splendid fighting spirit. In a word, I can sincerely congratulate you on your success and wish you further successes. For the time being I have the following particular remarks to make: (1) it would be desirable to say a little more about socialism, in view of the “explanatory” character of the organ; (2) it would be desirable to link the fighting political slogans more closely and directly with the resolutions of the Third Congress and with the general spirit of our revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics.

Now to your letter of August 24, 1905, the tone of which fairly staggered all of us.\[77\]

I. ON INFORMATION

You say you “can do nothing more”. That is not true, for we see and know that the Bund, the Mensheviks, and a number of Bolsheviks can do more and are doing more. It is a fact that the foreign member of the Central Committee is worse informed than the Bundists and *Iskra*. This must be corrected, and corrected steadily and unremittingly. Here is the latest example. We received your resolution on the active boycott only the other day.\[78\] People arriving from Russia have known about it since June!! And you say you “can do nothing more”???? Apart from my own fault, the delay in receiving it caused a certain discord among us, for in *Proletary* I interpreted the “active boycott” differently, not knowing how you interpreted it.*

Here is another fact: you have restored dual centralism. In essence the discord was not great, but it is nevertheless undesirable on a question concerning the method of action of the whole Party. It seems to me (1) that it is extremely important and the only correct thing from the standpoint of the decisions of the Third Congress to make the slogan of insurrection and a provisional revolutionary government the central point of the agitation campaign. (2) It seems to me that the advice to “forcibly disperse” the meetings of the electors is absolutely wrong. That would be a disastrous tactic. One of two things: either there are no conditions for applying force on a serious scale—in which case we must confine ourselves to agitation, speeches, strikes, demonstrations, and persuasion of the electors, and by no means “disperse” them. Or there are conditions for applying force on a serious scale—in which case we must direct that force not against the electors but against the police and the government. In that case you must proceed to insurrection. Otherwise you will find yourselves in a most ridiculous position: the workers “forcibly disperse” the electors, and the government forcibly protects them!!

Here we have the practical harm resulting from the failure to advance the direct and decisive slogan of insurrection as the central point of agitation against the Duma: prepare for insurrection, convince everybody (including the electors) to prepare for insurrection, make clear its aims, forms, methods, conditions, organs, and prerequisites. But do not apply force in vain until it has been accumulated, and if you have not convinced the electors, to disperse them by force is sheer madness, suicide for Social-Democracy.

Further. II. You write that you did not try to outwit the Organising Commission but carried out the will of the Third Congress. I think you are clearly wrong there. I wrote to you earlier* about the necessity of preparing the conditions for unity and of two congresses for unity (in one place and at one time, with the obligation of each organisation to submit to the decisions of its own congress). So there is no disagreement on that score. But the fact remains that you forgot the secret resolution (I enclose it below) on the obligatory confirmation of the terms of fusion by the Fourth Congress. And it was on this that the Organising Commission harped. In two points of its statement (*Letuchy Listok* of the C.C., No. 3, p. 5), in points 2 and 3, the Organising Commission speaks directly against fusion by means of a congress. That cannot be denied. And in your reply you do not say a word about your disagreement!! The result was that you did in fact repeal the resolution. That this is a mistake and must be corrected is indisputable.

Finally, another indisputable mistake: the absence of a direct reply to the Organising Commission. You write that “the question was one of fusion on the basis of the Third Congress”. Good gracious, gentlemen! Why deceive yourselves? Why weaken your correct position by obvious hypocrisy??

Fusion on the basis of the Third Congress has been rejected. It was proposed here directly to Plekhanov, to the Organising Commission, to Vinter, and to Vadim. With such fusion there would have been one Central Organ (Plekhanov even proposed a “troika” for it through his agents). With such fusion there would have been one Central Committee, necessarily from both halves, i.e., “co-optation” would not have been co-optation but real fusion.

But this has been rejected. Consequently, what remains is agreement until the Fourth Congress and fusion “on the basis of the Fourth Congress”. Instead of this direct and clear reply and an open statement to all, you pass over the essence of the question in silence before the public (for the O.C. clearly proposes fusion not on the basis of the Third Congress, and you reply: on the whole it is acceptable, good, we shall talk it over further!). And to me you write: “our ultimatum was the Rules of the Third Congress”. Is that not self-deception? For if you say this publicly, then, in the first place, all the Bolsheviks will laugh at you, and, in the second place, the Mensheviks will answer you in such a way that all your good intentions regarding fusion will go to the devil!

In my opinion, it would be better to declare openly to the Party: unfortunately, they have rejected fusion on the basis of the Third Congress. Let us prepare the Fourth Congress in such a way that two congresses meet at one time and in one place. Let us prepare a plan for fusion. For instance, in all parallel organisations let there be an equal number of both sides everywhere (à la Nikolayev).\[79\] If so, draw up a complete list of parallel organisations, and make inquiries of all of them. Then the Central Committee, let us say, should also be half and half, i.e., equal numbers. In the event of complete fusion, it is impossible to argue in principle against such “co-optation” (although in practice the question is more complicated, and we must know how many parallel organisations there are, etc.). (Parenthetically: I very much regret that in No. 1 of your *Letuchy Listok* you boasted that two-thirds of the Party were on our side. By this you have undermined your future agreement to “half and half”. And did you tell the truth when you said two-thirds??) Further, the Central Organ. In the event of fusion, two Central Organs would, in my opinion, be an absurdity, and I think it possible that the Bolsheviks would prefer to this absurdity their own organ of several committees on the basis of the Party Rules. With two competing Central Organs, fusion would be a dead letter. In that case it would be better to have an “agreement”—on a basis similar to the “Nikolayev” one, i.e., everywhere joint or conciliation commissions with equal numbers from both sides.

III. On the money question. Your statement that the Central Organ must be published “with funds from abroad”, that the bankruptcy of the Central Committee must begin with the Central Organ, staggered all of us like a thunderbolt.

You write that this is not irritation and not a reproach. Allow me not to believe you. To say such a thing seriously, calmly, and coolly means to announce a rupture between the Central Organ and the Party, and you could not have wanted that. To publish the Party’s Central Organ not with Party funds but with funds from abroad—to decide that the Party’s bankruptcy must begin (and not end) with the Central Organ—that is something phenomenal. If we were to take this seriously, and not regard it precisely as a manifestation of nervousness due to temporary difficulties (for on the whole your turnover is “fat”, and the prospects for the 60,000 and for the “enterprise” are three times “fatter”), we should have to take immediate steps to arrange for the publication “with funds from abroad” of the organ of the Committee of the Foreign Organisation. But I repeat, I see in this monstrous sally on your part only nervousness, and I shall wait for a personal meeting, for here, in my opinion, we have not the beginning of a rupture but a misunderstanding.

I firmly clasp your hand.

N. Lenin