V. I.

Lenin

Differenceswithin or between political parties are usually resolved not only by
polemics over principles, but also by the course of political developments. In
particular, differences on a party’s tactics, i.e., its political conduct, are
often resolved by those with incorrect opinions going over in fact to the
correct path of struggle, under the pressure of the course of developments that
simply brush aside erroneous opinions, making them pointless and devoid of any
interest. This, of course, does not mean that fundamental differences on
questions of tactics do not call for explanations of principles, explanations
which alone can keep the Party equal to its theoretical convictions. No. This
means only that decisions made with regard to tactics must be verified
as often as possible in the light of new political events. Such verification is
necessary from the standpoint of both theory and practice: from the standpoint
of theory in order to ascertain in fact whether the decisions taken have been
correct, and what amendments to these decisions subsequent political events make
necessary; from the standpoint of practice, in order to learn how to use the
decisions as a proper guide, to learn to consider them as directives for
practical application.

Arevolutionary period, more than any other, provides material for such
verification, thanks to the tremendous speed of political development and the
sharpness of political clashes. In a revolutionary period the old
“superstructure” falls apart, and, in full view of everyone, a new
one is created by the independent action of the most diverse social forces,
which reveal their true nature in practice.

Thus,the Russian revolution, too, provides us almost weekly with an amazing
wealth of political material for verifying previously-made tactical decisions,
and for drawing most instructive lessons with regard to our entire practical
activities. Take the Odessa events. An attempt at insurrection has failed. A
bitter reverse, a severe defeat. But what a world of difference there is between
this set-back in the struggle and the set-backs in the efforts made by the
Shipovs, Trubetskois, Petrunkeviches, Struves, and all such bourgeois flunkeys
of the tsar, to strike a deal! Engels once said that defeated armies learn their
lessons well. These splendid words apply in far greater measure to
revolutionary armies, whose replacements come from the progressive
classes. Until the old, corrupt superstructure, whose putrefaction infects the
whole people, is swept away, each new defeat will produce ever new armies of
fighters. Of course, there also exists mankind’s far wider collective
experience, which has left its impress upon the history of international
democracy and of international Social-Democracy, and has been systematised by
the foremost representatives of revolutionary thought. Our Party draws on that
experience for material to be used in its everyday propaganda and agitation. But
while society is based on the oppression and exploitation of millions of working
people, only the few can learn directly from that experience. The masses have to
learn mostly from their own experience, paying dearly for every lesson. The
lesson of January 9 was a hard one, but it revolutionised the temper of the
entire proletariat of the whole of Russia. The lesson of the Odessa uprising is
a hard one, but, with sentiments already revolutionised, it will now teach the
revolutionary proletariat not only how to fight but also how to win. Regarding
the Odessa events we say: the revolutionary army has been defeated— long
live the revolutionary army!

Wehave already stated in No. 7 of our paper that the Odessa uprising has shed
new light on our slogans calling for a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government. [1]

In the preceding number we spoke about the military lessons of the uprising (Comrade

V.S. ’s

article). In this issue we dwell once more on some of its political lessons (the article “Urban Revolution”). We
must now deal with the verification of our recent tactical decisions in
the double aspect of theoretical correctness and practical expediency we
have spoken of above.

Insurrectionand a revolutionary government are the most vital political
questions of the present time. These are questions that Social-Democrats have
most of all discussed and argued about among themselves. It was to
these questions that the main resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and of
the Conference of the break-away section of the Party were devoted. It may now
be asked: in what light do these differences appear alter the Odessa
uprising? Anyone who will now go to the trouble of re-reading, on the one hand,
the statements and articles on this uprising, and, on the other, the four
resolutions on issues of insurrection and of a provisional government adopted
by the Party Congress and by the new-Iskrists’ Conference will at once notice
how, under the influence of events, the latter have in actual fact begun
to side with their opponents, i.e., to act not according to their own
resolutions, but according to those of the Third Congress. There is no better
critic of an erroneous doctrine than the course of revolutionary events.

Underthe influence of these events Iskra’s Editorial Board has issued
a leaflet entitled “The First Victory of the Revolution”, addressed
to “Russian citizens, workers, and peasants”. Here is the most
important passage in the leaflet:

"Thetime has come to act boldly and to support the soldiers’ bold
rebellion with all our might. It is boldness that will now win the day!

"Therefore,call open meetings of the people and bring them tidings of the
collapse of tsarism’s military prop! Wherever possible seize municipal
institutions and make them the bulwark o? the people s revolutionary government!
Oust the tsarist officials and appoint general elections to bodies of
revolutionary government, to which you will entrust the provisional
administration of public affairs pending the final victory over the tsar’s
government and the establishment of a new political regime. Seize the branches
of the State Bank and the arsenals and arm the people! Establish contacts
between the cities, between town and countryside, and let armed citizens hasten
to each other’s assistance wherever aid is needed! Take the prisons and free the
champions of our cause imprisoned there—they will swell your ranks!
Proclaim everywhere the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy and its replacement by a free democratic republic! Arise citizens! The
hour of liberation has struck! Long live the revolution! Long live the
democratic republic! Long live the revolutionary army! Down with the autocracy!”

Thus,we have before us a determined, open, and clear call for an armed uprising
of the whole people. We also have here an equally determined call—though,
regrettably, inexplicit and incompletely worded—to form a provisional
revolutionary government. Let us first consider the question of an uprising.

Isthere any difference in principle between the way this question was handled
by the Third Congress and by the Conference? Undoubtedly there is. We have
already dealt with this in Proletary , No. 6 (“A Third
Step

Back” [2]

)

and we shall now refer, furthermore, to the instructive testimony of
Osvobozhdeniye. In ·No. 72 of the magazine we read that the
“Majority” is lapsing into “abstract revolutionism, rebelliousness, an eagerness to stir up insurrection among the popular masses by
any and every means, and to immediately seize power on their
behalf”. “On the contrary, the Minority, while steadfastly adhering
to the dogma of Marxism, at the same time preserves the realistic elements of
the Marxist world outlook.” This opinion of liberals who have gone through the
preparatory school of Marxism and through Bernsteinism is extremely
valuable. The liberal bourgeois have always reproached the revolutionary wing of
Social- Democracy with “abstract revolutionism and rebelliousness and
have always praised the opportunist wing for its “realism” in
stating the question. Iskra itself has had to admit (see No. 73, note
referring to Mr. Struve’s approval of the “realism” of Comrade
Akimov’s pamphlet) that, when spoken by the Osvobozhdeniye League
members, “realist” means “opportunist”. The
Osvobozhdeniye League members know only pedestrian realism; the
revolutionary dialectics of Marxist realism, which emphasises the urgent tasks
of the advanced class, and discovers in the existing state of things those
elements that will lead to its overthrow, are absolutely alien to
them. Therefore, Osvobozhdeniye’s characterisation of the two trends in
Social-Democracy once more confirms a fact proved by our literature, namely, that the
“Majority” is the revolutionary wing of Russian
Social-Democracy, and the “Minority” its opportunist wing.

Osvobozhdeniye definitely admits that, compared with the
Congress, “the Conference of the Minority regards insurrection
in a quite different way”. Indeed, the Conference resolution in
the first place defeats its own purpose by now denying the
possibility of a planned uprising (Clause 1), now admitting it
(par. d), and, in the second place, confines itself to a mere
enumeration of the general conditions for “preparing an uprising” such as: a) extending agitation; b) strengthening
the ties with the mass movement; c) promoting a revolutionary
consciousness; d) establishing connections between the various
localities; e) winning over non-proletarian groups to support the
proletariat. The Congress resolution, on the contrary, outspokenly
proclaims positive slogans, recognises that the movement has already made insurrection imperative, and calls for the
organisation of the proletariat for the immediate struggle, for the
adoption of the most energetic measures to arm it, for the
explanation through propaganda and agitation “not only of the
political significance” of the uprising (in essence, the
resolution of the Conference confines itself to this), but also its
practical and organisational aspect.

Fora clearer understanding of the difference between the two
solutions of the problem let us recall the evolution of
Social-Democratic views on insurrection since the very inception
of the mass working-class movement. The first stage: 1897. In
his Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats Lenin states that “to decide at the present time the question of what
methods the Social-Democracy will resort to for the direct
overthrow of the autocracy, whether it will choose an uprising,
or a widespread political strike, or some other form of attack,
would be akin to generals calling a council of war before they
have mustered an army” (p.

18). [3]

Here, as we see, there is not the slightest reference to preparations
for an uprising; what is spoken of is merely the mustering of an army,
i.e., propaganda, agitation, and organisation in general.

Thesecond stage: 1902. In Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? we read:

"...Pictureto yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone
will now (February
1902) agree that we must think of this and prepare for it. But how?
Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to all localities for the
purpose of preparing the uprising! Even if we had a Central Committee it could
achieve absolutely nothing by such appointments under present-day Russian
conditions. But a network of agents that would form in the course of
establishing and distributing the common newspaper would not have to “sit
about and wait” for the call for an uprising, but could carry on the
regular activity that would guarantee the highest probability of success in the
event of an uprising. Such activity would strengthen our contacts with the
broadest strata of the working masses and with all social strata that are
discontented with the autocracy, which is of such importance for an
uprising. Precisely such activity would serve to cultivate the ability to
estimate correctly the general political situation and, consequently, the
ability to select the proper moment for an uprising. Precisely such activity
would train all local organisations to respond simultaneously to the
same political questions, incidents, and events that agitate the whole of Russia
and to react to such ’incidents’ in the most vigorous, uniform, and expedient
manner possible; for an uprising is in essence the most vigorous, most uniform,
and most expedient ’answer’ of the entire people to the government. Lastly, it
is precisely such activity that would train all revolutionary organisations
throughout Russia to maintain the most continuous, and at the same time the most
secret, contacts with one another, thus creating real Party unity; for
without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss the plan for
the uprising and to take the necessary preparatory measures on its eve, measures
that must be kept in the strictest secrecy” (pp.

136-37 [4]

).

Whatpoints does this reasoning bring out with regard to the question of an
uprising? 1) The absurdity of the idea of “preparing” an uprising by
appointing special agents who would “sit around and wait” for the call. 2) The necessity of
contacts established in the course ol work done in common between
people and organisations engaged in the regular work. 3) The necessity of
strengthening the ties between the proletarian (workers) and the
non-proletarian (all the discontented) sections of the population in the
course of such work. 4) The necessity of jointly cultivating the ability to
appraise correctly the political situation and to “react” to
political events in the most expedient manner. 5) The need for actual
unification of all local revolutionary organisations.

Consequently,the slogan of preparations for an uprising is already
plainly advanced, but as yet there is no direct call to rise, no recognition
that the movement “has already led up to” the necessity for an
uprising, that it is necessary to arm immediately, to organise ourselves in
combat squads, etc. Before us is an analysis of those very conditions for
preparing an uprising which are repeated almost literally in the
Conference resolution (in 1905!!).

Thethird stage: 1905. A further step forward is made in the newspaper
Vperyod and later on in the resolution of the Third
Congress. Besides general political preparations for an uprising, a
direct slogan is issued, namely, that we should immediately organise
and arm for an uprising, and that special (combat) squads should be formed, as
the movement “has already led to the necessity of an armed uprising”
(Clause 2 of the Congress resolution).

Thispiece of historical information leads us to three indubitable conclusions:
1) The assertion of the liberal bourgeoisie, the Osvobozhdeniye
League, that we are lapsing into “abstract revolutionism and
rebelliousness” is a downright lie. We have always raised, and are now
raising, this question not in an “abstract” way, but on a
concrete basis , answering it differently in 1897, in 1902, and in
1905. The accusation of rebelliousness is an opportunist phrase of the liberal
bourgeois gentry, who are preparing to betray the interests of the revolution
and to play it false at a time of decisive conflict with the autocracy. 2) The
Conference of the new-Iskrists stopped short at the second stage in the
evolution of the question of insurrection.. In 1905 it merely reiterated what
had been enough in 1902.

It lagged some three years behind revolutionary developments. 3) Under the influence of the lessons of life, namely, the Odessa
uprising, the new-Iskrists have in fact acknowledged the necessity of acting
according to the Congress resolution and not according to their own, i.e., they
have recognised that the task of an insurrection is an urgent one, that a direct
call must be made forthwith for the immediate organisation of an uprising and
for the arming of the people.

Therevolution has dislodged a backward Social-Democratic doctrine at one
stroke. Another obstacle to practical unity in work in common with the
new-Iskrists has been removed, which, of course, does not yet mean that
differences on principles have been entirely eliminated. We cannot be content to
have our tactical slogans limp behind events and to their being adapted to
events after their occurrence. We must have slogans that lead us forward, light
up the path before us, and raise us above the immediate tasks of the moment. To
wage a consistent and sustained struggle the party of the proletariat cannot
determine its tactics from occasion to occasion. In its tactical decisions it
must combine fidelity to the principles of Marxism with due regard for the
progressive tasks of the revolutionary class.

Takeanother urgent political question, that of a provisional revolutionary
government. Here we see, perhaps, even more clearly that in its leaflet the
Iskra Editorial Board has in fact abandoned the slogans of the
Conference and has accepted the tactical slogans of the Third Congress. The
absurd theory of “not setting ourselves the aim of seizing” (for a
democratic revolution) “or sharing power in a provisional
government” has gone by the board, for the leaflet makes a direct appeal
for the “seizure of municipal institutions” and the organisation of
a “provisional administration of public affairs”. The absurd slogan
of “remaining a party of extreme revolutionary opposition” (absurd
in a period of revolution, although quite appropriate in a period of
parliamentary struggle alone) has in fact been shelved, for the Odessa events
have forced Iskra to realise that during an insurrection it is
ridiculous to confine one self to this slogan, that it is necessary to call
energetically for an uprising, for its vigorous prosecution and for the use of revolutionary power. The absurd slogan of “revolutionary
communes” has also been discarded, for the events in Odessa have
forced Iskra to realise that this slogan merely serves to confuse
the democratic revolution with the socialist. To confuse these two very
different things would be slicer adventurism, testifying to
complete obscurity in theoretical thinking, and capable of hampering implementation of
essential practical measures facilitating the working-class struggle for
socialism in a democratic republic.

Callto mind the polemic between the new Iskra and Vperyod ,
the former’s tactics of action “only from below”, as opposed to the
Vperyod tactics of action “both from below and from above”,
and you will see that Iskra has accepted our solution of the question
by now itself calling for action from above. Remember Iskra’s
apprehensions that we might discredit ourselves by assuming responsibility for
the treasury, finances, etc.—and you will see that, though our arguments
failed to convince Iskra , the events did convince it of the correctness
of those arguments, for in the leaflet quoted above Iskra clearly
recommends “seizure of branches of the State Bank”. The absurd
theory that a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the
peasantry, their joint participation in a provisional revolutionary
government constitutes “treason to the proletariat” or “vulgar
Jaurèsism (Millerandism)” has simply been forgotten by the new-Iskrists, who
are themselves now calling upon the workers and peasants to seize municipal
institutions, branches of the State Bank and arsenals “to arm the whole
people” (apparently, this time meaning to arm with weapons and
not merely with a “burning desire to arm themselves”), to proclaim the
overthrow of the tsarist monarchy, etc.—in a word, to act wholly in
accordance with the programme provided in the resolution of the Third Congress,
to act precisely as is indicated by the slogan calling for a
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship and a provisional revolutionary
government.

True Iskra mentions neither of these slogans in its leaflet. It
enumerates and describes actions whose sum is characteristic of a provisional
revolutionary government, but avoids mentioning the term. That is to be
regretted. In actual fact it accepts this slogan, but the absence of a clear term can only
create vacillation and uncertainty, and sow confusion in fighters’ minds. Fear
of the words revolutionary government” and “revolutionary
power” is a purely anarchist fear, and unworthy of a Marxist. To
“seize” institutions and banks, “appoint elections”, establish “provisional administration”, and “proclaim the over
throw of the monarchy”—for all this the first and absolutely necessary
step is the proclamation of a provisional revolutionary government to unite all
the military and political activities of the revolutionary people and direct
these activities towards a single aim. Unless there is such unity, unless the
provisional government is universally recognised by the revolutionary people,
unless it assumes all power, any “seizure” of institutions and any
“proclamation” of a republic will remain merely an outburst of
senseless rebelliousness. Unless it is concentrated by the revolutionary
government the people’s revolutionary energy will merely dissipate after the
first success of the uprising, squander itself on trifles, and lose its national
scope. It will be unable to cope with the task of keeping what has been seized,
or of giving effect to what has been proclaimed.

Werepeat: Social-Democrats who do not recognise the decisions of the Third
Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. have been in actual fact forced by the course of
events to act in full accordance with the slogans proclaimed by the Congress and
to throw the Conference’s slogans by the board. Revolution teaches. It is our
duty to make the most of the lessons it provides, frame our tactical slogans in
conformity with our conduct and our immediate aims, give the masses a proper
understanding of those immediate aims, and start most extensively organising the
workers everywhere to fight in an uprising, create a revolutionary army, and
form a provisional revolutionary government!

---
Notes:
[1]
“The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government”, 1905. See
present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 559-67.— Ed .

[2]
First published in 1905. See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 544-54.— Ed .

[3]
First published in pamphlet form in Geneva, 1898. See present edition,
Vol. 2, p. 342.— Ed .

[4]
First published in Iskra , 1902. See present edition, Vol. 5,
pp. 515-16.— Ed .