Date: 1905-04-12
Source: ru:PSS/v17

In the article by Comrade Martov printed above, an extremely important question is touched upon, or rather, a series of questions relating to the goal of the struggle of the proletariat and social-democracy in our revolution. The history of these questions in our party is touched upon, their relation to the foundations of Marxism and to Narodism is touched upon, the views of all shades expressed on this matter are touched upon – all sides of the question are touched upon, and not a single one is clarified. To answer in essence, it is necessary to give a systematic outline of all sides of the question.

I

Let us begin with the history of the discussion of this question by Russian social-democracy. It was posed at the beginning of 1905 by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The former resolved it with the "formula": the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry (cf. "Vperyod" No. 14 of April 12, 1905)[62]. The latter resolutely rejected such a definition of the class content of the victorious bourgeois revolution. The Third Congress (Bolshevik) in London in May 1905 and the simultaneous conference of the Mensheviks in Geneva gave official expression to the views of both parts of the party. At the same time, in accordance with the spirit of that era, in the resolutions both parts of the party posed not the theoretical, general question of the goal of the struggle and the class content of the victorious revolution in general, but the narrower question of the provisional revolutionary government. The Bolshevik resolution states: "...The realization of a democratic republic in Russia is possible only as a result of a victorious popular uprising, the organ of which will be a provisional revolutionary government;... depending on the correlation of forces and other factors that cannot be precisely determined in advance, the participation of representatives of our party in the provisional revolutionary government is permissible for the purpose of a ruthless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and the defense of the independent interests of the working class." The Menshevik resolution: "...Social-democracy should not set itself the goal of seizing or dividing power in the provisional government, but should remain a party of extreme revolutionary opposition."

From this it is clear that in their official resolution, the Bolsheviks themselves, at a purely Bolshevik congress, do not include anything like the "formula": dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but speak only of the permissibility of participation in the provisional government and of the "vocation" of the proletariat to "play a leading role" (resolution on armed uprising). The "formula": "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," expressed in the Bolshevik press before the Third Congress, is repeated in the pamphlet "Two Tactics"[63] after this congress, and it never occurred to a single person to accuse the Bolsheviks of inconsistency between their comments and their resolutions. It never occurred to a single person to demand a literal coincidence between the resolutions of a politically struggling mass party and the formulas of the Marxist definition of the class content of the victorious revolution.

Another important conclusion from our historical reference: in the spring of 1905, both parts of the party reduced the center of gravity of the disputed question to the conquest of power by the proletariat and revolutionary classes in general, without at all entering into the question of what the relations between these classes conquering power could or should be. The Mensheviks, as we have seen, equally reject the goal of seizing and the goal of dividing power. The Bolsheviks speak of the "leading role of the proletariat in the revolution" (resolution on armed uprising), of the "permissibility" of the participation of social-democrats in the provisional government, of the "unwavering protection of the independence of social-democracy, striving for a complete socialist revolution" (resolution on the provisional revolutionary government), of "support" for the revolutionary movement of the peasants, of "purging the revolutionary-democratic content of the peasant movement from all reactionary admixtures," of "developing the revolutionary self-consciousness of the peasants and bringing their democratic demands to the end" (resolution on the attitude to the peasant movement). There are no other "formulas" about the relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry in the resolutions of the Bolshevik congress of 1905.

Let us turn to the draft resolutions developed by both factions a year later, before the Stockholm Congress. These drafts are especially often forgotten or ignored in the press in general and in our party in particular, and this is especially regrettable, because their significance in the history of the tactical ideas of social-democracy is enormous. It is precisely these draft resolutions that show what lessons both parts of the party drew from the experience of the October and December struggles of 1905.

The Bolsheviks write in the draft resolution on the class tasks of the proletariat: "...Only the proletariat is able to bring the democratic revolution to the end, provided that it, as the only thoroughly revolutionary class of modern society, leads the mass of the peasantry, giving political consciousness to its spontaneous struggle against landlord landownership and the serf state"[143] (repeated in the draft resolution for the London Congress, see "Proletary" No. 14 of March 4, 1907).

Thus, the "formula" that the Bolsheviks themselves have chosen here for themselves reads: the proletariat leading the peasantry. There is no other formula for expressing the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry in the Bolshevik resolutions. This fact cannot be emphasized strongly enough, because the entire attempt by Comrade Martov to present the significance of the resolution adopted at the December Conference of 1908 in a completely false light is based on forgetting it or on concealing it.

The Mensheviks in their draft resolution (reprinted from "Party News"[144] in Lenin's "Report," pp. 68-70) call the task of the proletariat "to be the motive force of the bourgeois revolution" – note: not "leader," not "guide," as stated in the Bolshevik resolution, but the motive force! – and indicate among its tasks "to support with mass pressure those oppositional steps of the bourgeois democracy that do not contradict our program demands, can contribute to their achievement, and become the starting point for the further movement of the revolution forward."

The disagreement is reduced, therefore, by the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions themselves to the opposition: "leader" and "guide" of the revolution, "leading" the peasantry, or "motive force of the revolution," "supporting" certain steps of the bourgeois democracy. Let us add that this resolution was withdrawn by the Mensheviks who won at the Stockholm Congress, despite the protests and insistence of the Bolsheviks. Why the Mensheviks did this – the reader can find the answer to this question if he learns the following passage from the same draft resolution of the Mensheviks: "the expedient fulfillment of the task of being the motive force of the bourgeois revolution is possible for the proletariat only in such a way that, organizing itself, the proletariat draws new and new layers of the urban bourgeoisie and the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle with its struggle, democratizing their demands, pushing them to organization, and thereby creates the conditions for the victory of the revolution."

This is a clear half-hearted concession to the Bolsheviks, because the proletariat is depicted here not only as the motive force, but partly, at least, as the leader, because it "draws" and "pushes" the peasantry and new layers of the urban bourgeoisie.

Further. On the question of the provisional government, the draft Menshevik resolution states: "Social-democracy, under conditions of a general revolutionary upsurge in the country, must everywhere promote the formation of soviets of workers' deputies, encourage other elements of revolutionary democracy to form the same bodies, promote the unification of all these bodies into common non-party organizations of the revolutionary struggle of the people, putting forward before them those national tasks of the revolution which, from the point of view of the proletariat, can and must be resolved by the revolution at the given moment" (p. 91, ibid.).

This forgotten draft Menshevik resolution clearly shows that under the influence of the experience of October-December 1905, the Mensheviks became completely confused and surrendered their position to the Bolsheviks. Indeed, is the quoted passage compatible with the following points of the same draft: "social-democracy should not set itself the task of seizing power and dictatorship in the modern bourgeois revolution" (p. 92)? This latter provision is strictly principled and fully repeats (with the exception of the indication of the "division of power") the resolution of 1905. But it stands in irreconcilable contradiction with the experience of October-December 1905, which the Mensheviks themselves reduce to the unification of all bodies of the proletariat and "other elements of revolutionary democracy" into "common non-party organizations of the revolutionary struggle of the people"! For if the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are "united" with the same bodies of revolutionary democracy into non-party organizations of the revolutionary struggle of the people, then it is clear that the proletariat sets itself the task of "seizing power and dictatorship," participates in the matter of such seizure. The resolution itself says that the "main task" of the revolution is "to wrest state power from the hands of the reactionary government." Fearing the word, shunning "seizure of power and dictatorship," renouncing these terrible things in the most decisive way, the Mensheviks were forced to admit after 1905 that the "unification" of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies with other "same" bodies of revolutionary democracy inevitably follows from the course of things and that such unification gives "common non-party" (inaccurate; it should have been said: non-party or inter-party) "organizations of the revolutionary struggle of the people." This common organization is the provisional revolutionary government! The Mensheviks were afraid of the precise and direct word, replacing it with a description. The matter does not change from this. An "organ of the revolutionary struggle of the people," "wresting state power" from the old government, is called the provisional revolutionary government.

And if the Mensheviks were forced to take into account the experience of October-December 1905, getting confused and straying, then the Bolsheviks directly and clearly drew their conclusions. The Bolshevik draft resolution on the provisional government states: ... "in this open struggle" (of the end of 1905) "elements of the local population capable of decisively opposing the old power (almost exclusively the proletariat and the advanced strata of the petty bourgeoisie) were brought to the need to create such organizations that were actually the rudiments of the new revolutionary power – the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities, the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies in Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk, etc., railway committees in Siberia and in the south, peasant committees in the Saratov province, city revolutionary committees in Novorossiysk and other cities, and, finally, elected rural bodies in the Caucasus and in the Baltic region" (p. 92). The disunity and rudimentary nature of these bodies caused failure, – it is said further, – and the provisional revolutionary government is defined as "the organ of a victorious uprising." "Before the proletariat," – the resolution continues, – "in the interests of bringing the revolution to the end, the urgent task is now put forward to contribute, together with revolutionary democracy, to the unification of the uprising and the creation of a unifying center of this uprising in the form of a provisional revolutionary government." Further, the resolution of the Third Congress of 1905 is repeated almost verbatim.

The above passages from the draft resolutions of both factions before the Stockholm Congress make it possible to put the question of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry on a concrete historical basis. Anyone who wishes to give a direct and clear answer to this question must take into account the experience of the end of 1905. To evade a direct consideration of this experience means not only to ignore the most valuable material for a Russian Marxist, – that's not all: it also means inevitably condemning oneself to a "quibbling" interpretation of formulas, to "smearing over" and "pasting over" (in Comrade Martov's apt expression) the essence of principled disagreements, inevitably condemning oneself precisely to such an unprincipled vacillation in matters of the theory and practice of "dictatorship" that is best expressed by the formula: the movement is everything, the goal is nothing.

The experience of the end of 1905 indisputably established that the "general revolutionary upsurge in the country" creates special "organizations of the revolutionary struggle of the people" (according to the Menshevik formulation; "rudimentary bodies of the new revolutionary power" – according to the Bolshevik). It is also indisputable that these bodies in the history of the Russian bourgeois revolution were created, firstly, by the proletariat, secondly, by "other elements of revolutionary democracy," and a simple reference to the composition of the population of Russia in general and Great Russia in particular shows the enormous predominance of the peasantry among these other elements. Finally, no less indisputable is the historical tendency to unite these local bodies or organizations. And from these indisputable facts, the conclusion is inevitable that a victorious revolution in modern Russia cannot be anything other than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It is impossible to evade this inevitable conclusion except by "quibbling" and "pasting over" disagreements! If we do not snatch fragments of the question, if we do not artificially and arbitrarily separate the city from the countryside, one locality from another, if we do not replace the question of the dictatorship of classes with the question of the composition of this or that government, in a word, if we consider the question really as a whole, then no one will be able to show on concrete examples from the experience of 1905 how a victorious revolution could not be a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

But let us first finish the question of the party history of the "formula" under consideration before going further. We have seen what the exact statement of the views of both factions was in 1905 and 1906. In 1907, on the eve of the London Congress, the Mensheviks first put forward one draft resolution on the attitude to bourgeois parties ("Narodnaya Duma"[145], 1907, No. 12 of 24/III 1907), then at the congress itself they introduced another. The first draft speaks of "combining" the actions of the proletariat with the action of other classes, the second – of "using" the movement of other classes "for the purposes" of the proletariat and of the "support" by the proletariat of certain "oppositional and revolutionary steps" of other classes, of "agreements" of social-democracy "in individual definite cases" with liberal and democratic classes.

The Bolshevik draft, as well as the resolution adopted by the London Congress, speaks of the fact that social-democracy "compelled them (Narodnik or Labor parties, "more or less closely expressing the interests and point of view of the broad masses of the peasant and urban petty bourgeoisie") to take the side of social-democracy against the Black Hundreds and the Constitutional Democrats" and of the "resulting joint actions," which should "serve only the purposes of a general onslaught." In the resolution of the congress, in contrast to the Bolshevik draft, the words "in the struggle to bring the revolution to the end"[146] were also inserted on the initiative of one Pole. Here, too, the clearest confirmation of the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was obtained, because such a dictatorship is the "joint action" of these classes, "who have brought or are bringing the revolution to the end"!

II

It is enough to take a general look at the history of party opinions on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry to see to what extent Comrade Martov has spoken to his own detriment about quibbling and about movement without a goal. Indeed, the first conclusion of this history is that the Bolsheviks themselves have never inserted into their draft resolutions or into their resolutions the expression or "formula": dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. And yet it has never occurred to anyone to deny that all Bolshevik drafts and resolutions of 1905-1907 are entirely based on the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. To deny this is ridiculous. To deny this means precisely to quibble, to obscure the essence of the question with empty cavils about words. The proletariat, "attaching to itself" the mass of the peasantry, – said Lenin in "Two Tactics" ("For 12 Years," p. 445)[64]; the proletariat, "leading" the mass of the peasantry, – says the draft resolution of the Bolsheviks in 1906; "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry "in the struggle to bring the democratic revolution to the end," – says the resolution of the London Congress. Is it not obvious that the thought of all these formulations is the same? that this thought expresses precisely the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry? that the "formula" – the proletariat relying on the peasantry, remains entirely within the limits of the same dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry?

Comrade Martov goes to great lengths to refute the latter. The discussion begins about "and." There is no "and," the formula with "and" was rejected – Comrade Martov exclaims – do not dare now to insert this "and" in unsigned articles of the Central Organ! It's too late, it's too late, dear Comrade Martov: you should have addressed such a claim to all the Bolshevik organs of the entire revolutionary era, because all these organs always spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry and spoke on the basis of resolutions that did not contain that "and." Comrade Martov lost the principled campaign he raised about "and," lost it not only because the statute of limitations has expired, but also because her majesty logic invariably leads to the ill-fated "and": both "attachment," and "leading," and "joint actions," and "relying on," and "with the help of" (this last expression is in the resolution of the VI Polish Social-Democratic Congress[147]).

But the Bolsheviks argued against "relying on" – Comrade Martov continues his principled discussion. Yes, they argued, but not because the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry was rejected here, but because in Russian this "formula" is not very successful. Usually the weaker relies on the stronger. A literal repetition of the Polish formula "the proletariat with the help of the peasantry" is quite acceptable for the Bolsheviks, although it would be even better, perhaps, to say: "the proletariat leading." One can argue about all these formulas, but to make a "principled discussion" out of such a dispute is simply a curiosity. To deny, as Comrade Martov tries to do, that "relying on" is included in the concept of joint action is to give an example of quibbling. To say that the conquest of power by "the proletariat relying on the peasantry" is the conquest of power by "the proletariat alone," as Comrades Dan, Axelrod, and Semenov, quoted by Comrade Martov, say, is to make the reader laugh. If we say: Martov and Potresov, relying on Cherevanin, Prokopovich and Co., liquidated the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, will anyone believe us that Martov and Potresov alone liquidated this idea, without Cherevanin, Prokopovich and Co.?

No, comrades, the discussion in the Central Organ should not be reduced to quibbling. It is impossible to evade by such means the recognition of the basic and undoubted fact, which consists in the fact that the majority of the RSDLP, including the Poles and Bolsheviks, resolutely stand:

1) for the recognition of the leading role of the proletariat, the role of the leader in the revolution, 2) for the recognition of the goal of the struggle as the conquest of power by the proletariat with the help of other revolutionary classes, 3) for the fact that the peasantry comes first, and perhaps even the only place, among these "helpers." Anyone who wants a discussion on the essence of the question must try to challenge at least one of these three provisions. Comrade Martov did not analyze a single one of them in essence. Comrade Martov forgot to tell the reader that on each of these three provisions the Mensheviks stand on a point of view rejected by the party, that Menshevism and only Menshevism is among the errors rejected by the party! The policy of the Mensheviks in the revolution was precisely a movement without a goal and therefore a movement dependent on the vacillations of the Constitutional Democratic Party, – it was such precisely because the Mensheviks did not know whether the proletariat should strive for the role of leader? should it strive to conquer power? should it have in mind the help of any particular class? Ignorance of this inevitably and inevitably condemns the policy of social-democrats to wanderings, to mistakes, to unprincipledness, to dependence on liberals.

The conference did not bury the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" and did not issue a bill for its removal from party use, but, on the contrary, confirmed it, took another step towards a fuller recognition of it. The London Congress recognized: 1) the role of the proletariat as the "leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution" and 2) the "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry, "serving only the purposes of a general onslaught," actions, among other things, to "bring the revolution to the end." It only remained to recognize the goal of the struggle in this revolution as the conquest of power by the proletariat and the peasantry. This was done by the conference in the formula: "the conquest of power by the proletariat, relying on the peasantry."

In saying this, we do not at all deny or obscure the disagreements between the Bolsheviks and the Poles. The Polish social-democrats have every opportunity to state these disagreements both in their separate publications in Russian, and on the pages of Bolshevik newspapers, and in the Central Organ. And the Polish social-democrats have already begun to use this opportunity. If Comrade Martov achieves the goal he is pursuing, namely, that the Polish social-democrats intervene in our dispute, then everyone will see our solidarity with the PSD against the Mensheviks in everything essential, will see that we differ only in details.

III

As for Trotsky, whom Comrade Martov forced to participate in the discussion of third parties he arranged, a discussion of everyone except the discussant, we definitely cannot enter into a full consideration of his views here. This would require a special large article. Touching on Trotsky's erroneous views, citing fragments of these views, Comrade Martov instills in readers a whole series of misunderstandings, because fragments of quotations do not clarify, but confuse the matter. Trotsky's main mistake is ignoring the bourgeois character of the revolution, the absence of a clear idea on the question of the transition from this revolution to the socialist revolution. From this main mistake follow those particular mistakes that Comrade Martov repeats, citing a couple of quotations with sympathy and approval. In order not to leave the matter in this confused form, in which Comrade Martov presents it, let us show, at least, the incorrectness of these arguments of Trotsky, which have earned the approval of Comrade Martov. The coalition of the proletariat and the peasantry "presupposes that either one of the existing bourgeois parties seizes the peasantry, or that the peasantry creates an independent powerful party." This is obviously incorrect both from a general theoretical point of view and from the point of view of the experience of the Russian revolution. The "coalition" of classes does not at all presuppose either the existence of one or another powerful party, or party affiliation in general. This is a confusion of the question of classes with the question of parties. The "coalition" of the indicated classes does not at all presuppose either that one of the existing bourgeois parties seizes the peasantry, or that the peasantry creates a powerful independent party! Theoretically, this is clear from the fact that, firstly, the peasantry is especially difficult to organize into a party, secondly, the creation of peasant parties is an especially difficult and lengthy process in a bourgeois revolution, so that a "powerful independent" party can appear, for example, only by the time the revolution ends. From the experience of the Russian revolution, it is also clear that the "coalition" of the proletariat and the peasantry was carried out dozens and hundreds of times in the most diverse forms without "any powerful independent party" of the peasantry. This coalition was carried out when there was "joint action," say, of the soviet of workers' deputies and the soviet of soldiers' deputies, or the railway strike committee, or peasant deputies, etc. All such organizations were predominantly non-party, and, nevertheless, the "coalition" of classes undoubtedly took place in every joint action of such organizations. The peasant party was outlined, originated, arose in this case – in the form of the "Peasant Union"[148] of 1905 or the "Labor Group" of 1906 – and, as such a party grew, developed, and became self-determined, the coalition of classes took various forms, starting from indefinite and unformed and ending with fully defined and formed political agreements. For example, after the dissolution of the first Duma, the following three appeals to the uprising were issued: 1) "To the Army and Navy"; 2) "To the Entire Russian Peasantry"; 3) "To the Entire People." The Social-Democratic Duma faction and the committee of the "Labor Group" signed the first appeal. Was a coalition of two classes revealed in this "joint action"? Of course, yes. To deny this means precisely to quibble or to turn the broad scientific concept of "coalition of classes" into a narrow legal, almost notarial, I would say, concept. Further, can it be denied that this joint appeal to the uprising, signed by Duma deputies from the working class and the peasantry, was accompanied by joint actions in partial local uprisings of representatives of both classes? Can it be denied that a joint appeal to a general uprising and joint participation in local and partial uprisings obliges one to draw the conclusion about the joint formation of a provisional revolutionary government? To deny this would mean to quibble, to reduce the concept of "government" exclusively to a finished, formed phenomenon, to forget that completeness and formality stem from incompleteness and informality.

Further, the second appeal to the uprising was signed by the Central Committee (Menshevik!) of the RSDLP, also the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the All-Russian Peasant Union, the All-Russian Railway[149] and the All-Russian Teachers' Union[150], in addition to the committee of the Labor Group and the Social-Democratic faction, and under the third appeal to the uprising is the signature of the PPS and the Bund[151] plus all the previous signatures, except for the three unions.

Here is a formed political coalition of parties and non-party organizations! Here is the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," proclaimed in the form of a threat to tsarism, in the form of an appeal to the entire people, but not yet realized! And at present there are hardly many social-democrats who would agree with the Menshevik "Social-Democrat"[152] of 1906, No. 6, where it was said about these appeals: "In this case, our party concluded with other revolutionary parties and groups not a political bloc, but a military agreement, which we have always considered expedient and necessary" (cf. "Proletary" No. 1, August 21, 1906 and No. 8, November 23, 1906[65]). A military agreement cannot be opposed to a political bloc, because it is included in this latter concept. A political bloc is carried out at various historical moments either by a "military agreement" in the matter of the uprising, or by a parliamentary agreement regarding "joint actions against the Black Hundreds and against the Constitutional Democrats," etc. The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry found its practical expression throughout the course of the revolution in a thousand forms, starting from the signing of the manifesto on non-payment of taxes and on taking back deposits (December 1905) or from the signing of appeals to the uprising (July 1906) and ending with the votes in the II and III Dumas in 1907 and 1908.

Similarly, the second statement of Trotsky, cited by Comrade Martov, is incorrect. It is incorrect that "the whole question is who will give content to government policy, who will unite a homogeneous majority in it," etc. This is especially incorrect when Comrade Martov cites this as an argument against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Trotsky himself in this argument allows "the participation of representatives of the democratic population" in the "workers' government," i.e., allows a government of representatives of the proletariat and the peasantry. On what conditions to allow the participation of the proletariat in the government of the revolution is a special question, and on this question, it may well be that the Bolsheviks will not agree not only with Trotsky, but also with the Polish social-democrats. But the question of the dictatorship of revolutionary classes is by no means reduced to the question of the "majority" in this or that revolutionary government, about the conditions of admissibility of the participation of social-democrats in this or that government.

Finally, the third of Trotsky's opinions cited by Comrade Martov, which seems "fair" to Comrade Martov, is the most incorrect: "even if it (the peasantry) does this ("joins the regime of working democracy") not with greater consciousness than it usually joins the bourgeois regime." The proletariat cannot either count on the unconsciousness and prejudices of the peasantry, as the masters of the bourgeois regime count on them and rely on them, nor assume the preservation in the revolutionary period of at least the usual unconsciousness and passivity of the peasantry. Facts from the history of the Russian revolution show that the very first wave of the upsurge, at the end of 1905, immediately pushes the peasantry to such a political organization (the All-Russian Peasant Union), which undoubtedly was the embryo of a special peasant party. In the I and II Dumas, despite the extermination by the counter-revolution of the first shift of advanced peasants, the peasantry – this time for the first time on a national scale, in all-Russian elections – immediately lays the foundation for the "Labor Group," an undoubted embryo of a special peasant party. There is much unstable, indefinite, shaky in these embryos and rudiments, this is undoubted, but if the beginning of the revolution created such political groupings, then there is not the slightest doubt that a revolution brought to such an "end" or, rather, to such a high degree of development as a revolutionary dictatorship, will create a more formed and stronger revolutionary-peasant party. To argue otherwise would mean to assume that in an adult person some essential organs can remain infantile in size, shape, and degree of development.

In any case, Comrade Martov's conclusion that the conference agreed precisely with Trotsky on the question of the relationship between the proletariat and the peasantry in the struggle for power is a striking inconsistency with the facts, is an attempt, truly, to "suck" out of the word what was not discussed, not cited, not meant at all at the conference.

IV

Touching on Kautsky, Comrade Martov again concentrates in a few words such an abundance of untruths that in order to answer him in essence, one inevitably has to tell the reader almost everything from the beginning.

It is completely untrue that "many, including Lenin in the preface to Kautsky's article on "Prospects"[66], resolutely denied the bourgeois character of our revolution," and it is equally untrue that Kautsky "declared the Russian revolution not bourgeois." It was quite different.

Plekhanov addressed questions to many representatives of international social-democracy, and in the 1st question he asked about the "general character" of the Russian revolution, and in the 2nd – about the "behavior of the social-democratic party in relation to the bourgeois democracy, which in its own way is fighting for political freedom." In such a formulation of questions, there were already two mistakes of Comrade Plekhanov against Marxism: the first mistake is the confusion of the "general character" of the revolution in the sense of its socio-economic content with the question of the driving forces of the revolution. Marxists cannot confuse these questions, cannot even directly derive the answer to the second question from the answer to the first without a special concrete analysis. The second mistake is the confusion of the question of the role of the peasantry in our revolution with the role of bourgeois democracy in general. In fact, both the peasantry and the liberals fall under the scientific concept of "bourgeois democracy," but the attitude of the proletariat to these two varieties of "bourgeois democracy" must inevitably be significantly different.

Kautsky immediately noticed the mistakes of Comrade Plekhanov and corrected them with his answer. In the sense of the socio-economic content of the revolution, Kautsky not only did not think of denying its bourgeois character, but, on the contrary, resolutely recognized it as such. Here are Kautsky's statements relating to this in those very "Prospects" that Comrade Martov so deeply misrepresents:

"The present revolution (in Russia) can only lead in the countryside to the creation of a strong peasantry on the basis of private ownership of land and thereby dig between the proletariat and the propertied part of the rural population the same abyss that already exists in Western Europe. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine that the present Russian revolution would already lead to the introduction of the socialist mode of production, even if it temporarily gave the social-democrats the helm of government" (p. 31 of the translation edited by N. Lenin).

In Lenin's preface, it is precisely this place that is meant when it is said (p. 6, ibid.): "Needless to say, the basic provisions of all Russian social-democrats about the non-socialist character of the peasant movement, about the impossibility of the emergence of socialism from small peasant production, etc., are entirely (Lenin's italics in the preface) shared by Kautsky."

Comrade Martov's assertion that Lenin resolutely denied the bourgeois character of our revolution resolutely contradicts the truth. Lenin says just the opposite. Kautsky resolutely recognized our revolution as bourgeois in general character in the sense of the socio-economic content of the revolution.

"To Plekhanov's first question," – Kautsky wrote there, – "it seems to me, one cannot answer simply in one sense or another. The time of bourgeois revolutions, i.e., revolutions whose driving force was the bourgeoisie, has passed, has passed even for Russia... The bourgeoisie does not belong to the driving forces of the modern revolutionary movement in Russia, and insofar as this movement cannot be called bourgeois" (p. 29). The reader sees that Kautsky defines here with complete clarity what is being discussed, – with complete clarity he speaks of the bourgeois revolution not in the sense of socio-economic content, but in the sense of a revolution "whose driving force is the bourgeoisie."

Further. Kautsky corrected Plekhanov's second mistake by clearly and definitely distinguishing between "liberal" and peasant bourgeois democracy. Kautsky recognized that "the revolutionary force of Russian social-democracy lies in the community of interests of the industrial proletariat and the peasantry," that "without the peasants we cannot now win in Russia" (p. 31). It is interesting to note, – on that uninteresting question about "and," which fills Comrade Martov's principled discussion, – that Kautsky in this same article, i.e., in 1906, uses on one page both the expression "rely" ("on what class can the Russian proletariat rely?") and the expression: "the alliance of the proletariat with other classes in the revolutionary struggle must, first of all, be based on the community of economic interests" (p. 30).

Will Comrade Martov accuse K. Kautsky of the fact that in 1906, anticipating the December conference of the RSDLP in 1908, he set out to "mislead readers," "smear over and paste over" the disagreements between the Bolsheviks and the Polish social-democrats, "quibble," etc.?

Let us note that, defending the idea of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry in the bourgeois Russian revolution, Kautsky essentially does not put forward any "new" idea, but entirely follows in the footsteps of Marx and Engels. Marx wrote in 1848 in the "New Rhenish Gazette"[153]: "The big bourgeoisie – we are talking about the German bourgeoisie after March 18, 1848 – is anti-revolutionary from the very beginning, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with the reaction out of fear of the people, i.e., of the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie" (see the third volume of Marx's collected works published by Mehring: only two volumes have been published in Russian so far). "The German revolution of 1848," – Marx wrote on July 29, 1848, – "is only a parody of the French revolution of 1789... The French bourgeoisie of 1789 did not leave its allies, the peasants, for a minute... The German bourgeoisie of 1848 betrays the peasants without any pangs of conscience..."

Marx clearly opposes here in relation to the bourgeois revolution the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in alliance with the reaction to the working class plus the democratic bourgeoisie, i.e., mainly the peasantry. And one should not think that this view is explained by the incompleteness of Marx's socialist worldview at that time. 44 years later, in 1892, Engels wrote in his article "On Historical Materialism" ("Neue Zeit", XI, vol. I; in Russian – in the collection "Historical Materialism"): "... in all three great bourgeois revolutions" (the Reformation and the Peasant War of the XVI century in Germany, the English revolution of the XVII century and the French – XVIII) "the peasants are the fighting army... Exclusively thanks to the intervention of the peasantry" (