Date: 1905-01-11
Source: ru:LS/v16

Lenin’s Collected Works: It is clear that she will not have to resume the struggle anew. Why should she? Is it not far better to continue the war under the favorable conditions of today than to postpone military operations until such a time when Russia has healed its wounds, laid down a second track on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and built up its naval fleet?
Throughout the course of the war, the Russians never displayed sound judgment; nor did they ever demonstrate any real capacity to put themselves in the shoes of their adversaries. When a Russian cardsharp loses his stake, he jumps up from the table, ready to bolt out of the room without paying his debts—and cares not a whit about settling his losses. Yet even such a player sometimes finds himself confronted with a locked door and an opponent who insists on being paid before he’ll let him leave….
Dubasov’s condescending attitude—leaving Port Arthur and other territories to the Japanese—might even lead one to wonder whether Japan itself could be allowed to dictate terms…
1 The quotations are taken from the articles “Hints of a Temporary Peace (from Our Own Correspondent)” in Paris Yan. I (“Hints of a Temporary Peace. From Our Own Correspondent. Paris. January 11”) and “The Indiscretion of an Admiral” in No. 37602 of The Times, dated January 12, 1905.
:w.t
U ARTICLE “FROM POPULISM TO MARXISM”
»Pariy 1 oo:; g. zhg.nena.
The documents printed below contain the outline, the main points, and the materials for the article “From Populism to Marxism,” which was published in L?’s Vpered on January 24 (11), 1905 (Works, Vol. VII, pp. 70–75).
a.
FROM POPULISM TO MARXISM:
“Reflections on Marxism in the Minds of Petty Bourgeois and Intellectuals.”
[Corrupted Marxism.
1. Theory—f—i—its “favorable relationship.”]
2) The proletariat, the exploited classes, the working people?
3. Autocracy, the kulaks, the bourgeoisie, liberal democracy.

V4. A new peasant revolution (“the Russian peasant revolution does not exist”__ *
-— the proletariat + the intelligentsia.
5. Agrarian program. Socialization. “The beginning of a truly revolutionary and genuinely beneficial transformation.”
6. The Russian Revolution—“property-based changes”... not bourgeois?
7. Cooperatives, No. 5—in the name of the people.
8. Nationalization.
5.
NOTES ON THE PROJECT FOR EIP[OrPAMMjM S. R.
Ad 1)) — Russia’s connections extend not only to the advanced nations and Persia, China, etc., but also to cultural, social, and economic spheres. The source of these connections lies in exchange—Verballhornung—within our own program.
“The peculiarities of Russia.” What is the point of this obscure, convoluted terminology? Do peculiarities really have no place in a program—m i p fim um jl?
There are two possibilities: either the peculiarities do not alter the fundamental principles—then they have their place in the m in|imuml program—or the peculiarities modify the basic, principled positions. In that case, they become nothing more than a parody of the bourgeois critique of dialectics.
The theory of “positive” and “negative” aspects—f—i—its
(neN “favorable” relations (ocoiïfennoj z emle; dGel/ie]
The nail = labor; the peasantry ih ct"*bo j
) the agrarian program j
I the non-bourgeois revolution in Russia
;
E = petty-bourgeois radical-intellectual illusions
TO THE ARTICLE
“FROM POPULISM TO MARXISM”
4 3
*
The words “Russian peasantry” are written beneath the words “laboring peasantry.” Ed.
** — at the end. Ed.
*** — deterioration (see Lenin’s explanation of this term in Works, Vol. IV, p. 413). Ed.

and

The document printed below presents a brief outline of Lenin’s article “The First Lessons,” written in early February 1905 (Works, Vol. VII, pp. /04–iOl).
* TO THE ARTICLE “THE FIRST LESSONS.”
January, after the 22nd, 1905. Geneva.
.4)) Not a historical sketch.
— Zubatovism. Its causes. Its consequences.
— The economic dimension. The role of legal organizations and the broad spread of the movement.
The general strike and the important economic demands.
— Discipline and organization among the proletariat.
— Political struggles (initially moderate. Faith in the Tsar and
— the plan for a peaceful demonstration.
— The lessons taught by the police.
— The beating and the outbreak of rebellion.
The expansion of the movement to other cities. Moscow.
The South, the Caucasus, Poland.
— The likely course of events
— Barricades and the like.
U)j Tasks:
temporary!
— Arm the workers’ intelligentsia
— Disrupt the enemy’s ranks by winning over their troops
— Win over the peasantry
— Weaken the police and the institutions of autocracy in order to guarantee freedom
— Convene a constituent assembly
It would be desirable to harness the workers’ victory for broad agitation
[a) Arm the workers for reinforcement b) The peasantry.
In the manuscript, “ranks” was mistakenly written as “troops.” Peà*

TABLE OF CONTENTS A? 5 “VPERED”
4 5
* TABLE OF CONTENTS D-о “VPERED” WITH A LIST OF CORRESPONDENTS AND A PAGE COUNT
II LETTER.
[End of January 1905. Geneva.
------- 6 – 7 t. letters
Revolutionary days
1. The whip and the promises
2. The fruits of victory*
3. St. Petersburg after January 9th
4. The trials of economic life
5. The rumblings of the first thunder
[5] 6. Among the liberals
((Diversionary tactics on Lu-i-to (?)
A tough course?
4~
The fruits of victory
The whip and the promises
/
St. Petersburg and the liberals]
I
The pioneers
The relationship with foreign press
From the old:
Vyborg
Two appeals…****** foreign observation]
— — — 6 t. 6[ukvG* i « oko
280 Z eilen ***

I strGaiitza1 368 ****
:Yu
3 4-1 + 1 = 1 1
Za *****

column;— 88 Zjeilen!
2 columns I
IV,
( — 75
IV,

l.

»‘A
-253
IV, t
3*/*
* Later insertion. Ed.
** Handwritten note in pencil. Ed.
**♦ — lines. Ed.
**** The last two digits were written in pencil: 88 lines in the article “The Whip and the Promises,” published alongside “A Tough Course” on page 1 of M 5 “Vpered.” Ed.
***** — number. Ed.
***.*. One word remains undeciphered. Ed.

LENIN’S COLLECTION
1) Moscow [and the provinces].
21/.
2) Riga [and the Baltic region].
11/0
■ 3) [Poland—Warsaw
Moscow]
— 400
ClIG. and Poland

To 0
Riga
50j
Moscow

Kovno
Vilnius
Riga
Reval (-> 200
Libava
Mitava
Vidawa
Saratov st: olbna

K OF1CH |eram
\ a r, ь k obI и Вл.а д импр
I" ельс инг ф  орс * 2
Za
1'OMS‘ЛЬ ?
Feodosia?
Samara?
Pol nia
Kyiv
Tiflis so
10 —

g>
o
21 - 2 2 = ^ approx. 350


G*
thousands.
St. Petersburg — 150–200
Mohilev 30–50
Riga —

Warsaw — 

Kyiv
Narva — ^
Łódź— NI)
2 Mohilev
Gomel -
3) The Baltics
Saratov
Î
Poland
Libava _
5) The Volga Region Saratov
Mitava
6, K)i
Kyiv
Kolppno —
* The entire paragraph was written in pencil. Ed.
*' The list of correspondents available for L5 6 “Vpered” was recorded in the blank space beside Lenin’s note “Revolution is War,” see below, p. 59). Ed.

IRASCPIMNR
1 The article “An Unsuccessful Maneuver” (see below, p. 50), concerning the Tsarist army’s offensive following the bloody suppression of the January 9th demonstration—which Lenin had originally intended to title “Diversionary Tactics on H.U.”—was never published.
2 In L? 5 “Vpered,” on February 7 (January 25), 1905, the following articles were included: A. Lunacharsky’s “A Tough Course”; his “Revolutionary Days. The Whip and the Promises”; N. Lenin’s “The Fruits of Victory”; his “St. Petersburg After January 9th”; his “The Household Manager Takes Charge.” Under the collective heading “The Rumblings of the First Thunder,” the following correspondences were published: M. Olminsky and P. Lenin’s “Moscow”; their “Riga”; N. Lenin’s “Warsaw”; his “Łódź”; his “Helsingfors”; his “Among the Liberals.” In addition, “An Appeal to the Ophipera” and “A Letter from Riga” were included (the latter by Vl. Bonch-Bruyevich). Reference to the liberal movement in Kharkiv and Vladimir appears in the correspondence “Among the Liberals.”
8 Here, a list of available correspondents was compiled, along with a count of columns, lines, and letters for typesetting them.
4 Of the planned correspondences for No. 6 “Vpered” dated February 14 (1), 1905, the following were included: St. Petersburg, Riga (by Vl. Bonch-Bruyevich), Reval, Libava (by Vl. Bonch-Bruyevich), Mohilev, Warsaw.
The draft article printed below was never finalized. Later, Lenin returned to the topic in part in his article “European Capital and Autocracy” (Works, Vol. VII, pp. 176–111).
TSARIST HI IIP.
February 1, 1905. Geneva.
•Foreign newspapers reported that, at the latest meetings held in Tsarskoye Selo (after the victory of January 9th), discussions—whether with or without the Tsar—had been lively regarding the desirability of peace with Japan. In principle, all those around the beloved monarch now stood firmly in favor of peace. The number of government officials who, just ten days earlier, had been unequivocally opposed to ending the war had dwindled significantly, and many of them had come to embrace peace as a firm conviction.
For the benefit of those foolish social-democrats within the so‑called Central Committee of our party—who failed to grasp that empty slogans like “Peace at All Costs,” though often repeated (for no one ever asked the social democrats for their opinions, and their views carried no weight), in fact, given the prevailing circumstances, served only to play into the hands of frightened supporters of autocracy. Our Novaya Zhizn’ members missed the shift in sentiment across the entire European bourgeoisie (which had begun by sympathizing with Japan and had long since started to turn toward Russia out of fear of revolution—cf. Frankfurter Zeitung and others). Now they are missing yet another opportunity: as empty, commonplace slogans about “peace at all costs” begin to be co-opted for their own purposes, even the stern Ugrum Burcheevs of St. Petersburg are taking notice.*
1 The slogan “Peace at All Costs” was first raised in the leaflet “Who Shall Prevail,” signed by the editorial staff of Iskra. Trotsky also promoted this slogan on p. 87 of his pamphlet “Our Political Tasks.” In 1905, Lenin repeatedly returned to criticize this very slogan (see, for example, Works, Vol. VII, pp. 49 and 176).
2 Ugrum-Burcheev—a caricature of the Tsarist official Arakcheev in M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin’s “The History of One Town.”
Below is Lenin’s manuscript, containing the text of an appeal to officers, adopted by the Free Economic Society at a protest meeting against the atrocities committed by the police and the military (January 22, 1905). The text is based on the German newspaper Vossische Zeitung. In No. 7 of Vpered, dated February 7 (January 25), 1903, Lenin’s note “An Appeal to the Officers” was published in a slightly revised version, with the full text of the appeal reproduced verbatim.
APPEAL TO THE OFFICERS. *
February, before the 7th, 1905. Geneva.
Vossische Zeitung, March 1, 1905.
The Berlin newspaper Vossische Zeitung published a translation of the appeal to officers, signed by 59 individuals who had gathered in the evening of January 9th at the Free Economic Society.
The signatures are not listed in the newspaper. [The appeal is presented.] The appeal states:*’ The situation in Russia, it says, is such that the Russian people need bread, education, and freedom. The demand for a constitution has been voiced by representatives of the most diverse classes, starting from
* The heading was written in pencil. Ed.
** Written in pencil, replacing a crossed-out phrase; the rest of the text was subsequently crossed out in pencil. Ed.

APPEAL TO THE OFFICERS

from landowners and capitalists down to the working masses.
If the shortsighted government had refused to heed the people’s demands, it would have been swept away long ago—if the Russian people, shackled by poverty, slavery, and ignorance, had not been able to rely on their own armed forces. Yes! Their own armed forces!
You officers were trained with the people’s money; it is from that same money that you receive your salaries. With those funds, you acquired your bayonets and rifles. You yourselves are children of this people—and yet you are sent now to kill your own brothers and sisters.
The appeal states that the workers had peacefully marched to the Tsar with a petition. Those who signed the appeal sent a delegation to the government—but ten of them were arrested; among them was Maxim Gorky.
Ed.), who achieved nothing either with Witte or with Rydzewski.
Witte did not receive her. It was impossible to prevent the bloodshed. The government—said Comrade Minister Rydzewski—had already taken measures.
Yes! Measures had already been taken! The bloodshed occurred in accordance with those official directives. Perhaps it even took place precisely in those parts of the capital that had been designated in advance during the officials’ meetings. Indeed, what good is it to listen to the opinions and reports of private individuals when dealing with the Russian government? What does it care about honor, reason, or common sense? After all, it possesses the full wisdom [(Scharfsinn)J of thousands of police agents! It commands the entire armed force!
Officers of the Russian army!
You too are human beings—you have taken upon yourselves the great obligation to give your lives for the fatherland if necessary. Then ask your conscience: whose side are you on now—on the side of those headless [(Unsinnigen)] people who are always ready to shed blood, or on the side of the suffering people? If you have a sense of honor, listen to their voice! Are you on the side of those who are afraid even to accept a petition, or on the side of the great, honest, self-sacrificing Russia? If you are honest people, then do not raise your hands against the defenseless! Do not agree to take the people’s money in return for the blood you shed for the people—turn your weapons against the enemies of the people!
It is believed that the arrested individuals are being charged in connection with this appeal. Whether it was widely circulated—we have no information on that matter at this moment.
Lenin’s Collection XVI.

The article “An Unsuccessful Maneuver” presents a summary of reports from military correspondents in the foreign press, focusing on Kurapatkin’s attempt to launch an offensive against the Japanese at Hun-Ho. As can be seen from the document printed above *L? 7/7 (p. 45), Lenin had initially planned to title this summary “Diversionary Tactics on Hun-Ho.” The article was intended for L? 5 “Vpered” on February 7 (January 25), 1905, but it was never published.
AN UNSUCCESSFUL MANEUVER.
[February, before the 7th, 1905. Geneva.] “The decision to launch an offensive—the army’s move toward Hun-Ho—just a few days after the bloody suppression of the workers’ demonstration in St. Petersburg gives rise to many reflections. Military considerations alone hardly explain this shift toward offensive action—unless we assume a massive [underestimation] of the strength of the Russian generals. From a purely military standpoint, the drawbacks of such a move are enormous and glaring: our military correspondent details this in today’s article. General Kurapatkin is not the kind of man who would throw fresh troops—those who have just arrived under his command—into a battle that is clearly hopeless against an adversary of equal strength, or even stronger, one that boasts especially seasoned fighters and possesses highly fortified defenses. These fresh troops were his most crucial resource for the upcoming campaign. Why demoralize them before the campaign begins, subjecting them to all the hardships of an offensive in the midst of a bitterly cold winter, while knowing in advance that the attack would be repelled with heavy losses? The answer to this question lies in comparing dates and pondering, for a moment, the pressing needs of the autocratic regime in its domestic policy. On Sunday, January 9 (22), workers in the capital were being shot down in the streets. By midday on January 12 (25), newly arrived reinforcements were thrown into the attack against the Japanese at Hun-Ho. Clearly, they sought to distract the Russian people as quickly as possible from the events that had shaken the entire world with horror. Even before the blood stopped flowing in St. Petersburg, reports began to arrive of tumultuous popular unrest in many major provincial cities. How, under such conditions, could it be that{

AN UNSUCCESSFUL MANEUVER

the court clique—with its allies in the bureaucracy—did not eagerly seek to offer the popular masses some other absorbing topic of interest? The court clique could hardly harbor any special hope of victory; but a military incident—whatever its outcome, even if it ended in defeat—could at least provide the public with fresh material for discussion. Better to talk about the repulsed attack on Hun-Ho than about the fighting on Nevsky Prospekt. Of course, we cannot say with certainty that this is exactly how the higher echelons reasoned when preparing the military campaign that, according to calculations from Tokyo, added another 10,000 men* to the vast roster of Russian soldiers lost in ventures that any military commander would have deemed hopeless. But this fateful dominance of politics over strategy—already evident on numerous previous occasions, when the need to divert attention from domestic affairs was far less urgent—fully justifies the suspicion that the unfortunate Kurapatkin was once again condemned to sacrifice his troops in operations that were doomed from the start, at the behest of Peter.”
Thus wrote the reputable Times on Tuesday, January 31 (18), a newspaper that usually approaches Russian events with a very, very sober perspective—viewed from the “reasonably conservative” standpoint of the bourgeoisie. This newspaper was so cautious,** that it recently spoke of the “historical” exaggerations surrounding the St. Petersburg massacre (I), even warning the British public about the “impropriety” of collecting funds in England to aid the Russian freedom fighters.
All the more valuable, then, are the cool-headed assessments offered by this faithful advocate of large-capital interests regarding the significance of the latest military developments.
In Russia, there are so few opportunities to obtain reliable information about these events; it is incredibly difficult to hear even a minimally conscientious military assessment of them; and it is exceedingly hard to gauge the political and strategic significance of the various “maneuvers” undertaken by the Tsarist clique. For this reason, we will present further commentary from the very military correspondent whom The Times cites. The authority
*
We have just read in Temps that the correspondent of Novaya Zhizn’ estimates Russian losses in the recent battle at Hun-Ho at 43,000 men. Ed. [Lenin’s note. Ed.]
** In the manuscript, there was a typo: it reads “soberly.” Ed.
*