V. I.

Lenin

Alleyewitnesses agree that the demonstration of November 28 was a failure
because of the almost complete absence of workers. But why did the workers keep
away from the demonstration? Why did the St. Petersburg Committee, in response
to whose call the student youth had come to the demonstration, fail to take
steps to secure the attendance of the workers, thus defeating its own
enterprise? The answer to these questions is given in the following letter from
a worker, a member of the Committee, from which we print the most important
passages:

“Feeling(at the beginning of November) was running high and seeking an
outlet. This outlet was to be provided by a demonstration, and in fact a leaflet
did appear at that time, issued in the name of the Students’ Social-Democratic
Organisation and calling for a demonstration on November 14. On learning of
this, the Committee proposed to the organisation that the demonstration be
postponed until the end of November, to permit joint participation with the
St. Petersburg proletariat. The students agreed.... The class-conscious workers
were very edger to have a demonstration. Many workers came to Nevsky Prospekt on
November 14 under the impression that the students’ demonstration would take
place. When they were told that they should not have come without a call by the
Committee, they conceded the point, but said that they ’thought there would be
something doing there anyway’. At any rate, this fact illustrates the mood of
the class-conscious workers.

“Ata meeting of the Committee on November 18 it was decided to hold the
demonstration on the 28th. A subcommittee was immediately set up to organise the
demonstration and work out a plan of action; it was decided to issue two
preparatory agitational leaflets and a call. We threw ourselves into the job
with all energy. The writer of these lines personally arranged several meetings
of workers, study circle members, at which we discussed the role of the working
class and the aim and significance of a demonstration at the present moment. We
discussed the question of an armed or an unarmed demonstration, and all these
meetings adopted resolutions supporting the decision of the Committee. The
workers demanded as many leaflets as possible for distribution, ’Give us
wagon-loads,’ they said.

“Andso, a demonstration, which promised to be really impressive,
was being prepared for the 28th. But here our St. Petersburg ’Minority’,
like the ’All-Russian’ ’Minority’ and the ’Minority’ abroad, could not help
playing a purely negative role, the role of a disorganiser. To make that
role perfectly clear, I shall have to say a few words about the local
’Minority’ and its activities. Before the demonstration, and after the
Committee consisted largely of adherents of the Majority of the Second
Party

Congress. [1]

Arrests and the differences that are tearing the Party asunder have in many
ways weakened the activity of the local Social-Democratic
organisations. In its fight against the ’Majority’ the local
’Minority’ tries, for its own factional purposes, to discredit our
local Committee. District representatives who adhere to the
’Minority’ do not admit comrades of the ’Majority’ into their
districts and do not supply the Committee with ally contacts. The
result is terrible disorganisation and lowered efficiency in the
districts concerned. The following is a case in point. For the last
five or six months the representative of one district has been a
’Menshevik’. Due to the fact that it has been out of touch with the
general activity, this district has lost ground terribly. Where there
were formerly from fifteen to twenty study circles, there are now
barely from four to five. The workers are dissatisfied with this
state of affairs, and their representative is seeking to exploit this
dissatisfaction against the ’Majority’ by setting the workers against
the Committee. The ’Minority seeks to turn every weakness in the
local Social-Democratic organisation to account against the
’Majority’. Whether its attempts are successful or not is another
matter, but the fact remains that this is so.

“Threedays before the demonstration, the Committee was called
together on the initiative of the ’Minority’. For certain reasons three
members of the ’Majority’ on the Committee could not be notified in advance
and were absent. The ’Minority’ made a motion to call off the
demonstration, threatening, otherwise, to work against it and not
distribute a single leaflet. Owing to the absence of the three comrades
that would have supported the demonstration, the motion was carried. It was
decided not to distribute any leaflets and to destroy those containing the
call.

“Thebroad mass of the general public, as well as the workers,
prepared to attend the demonstration and waited only for the Committee’s
call. Rumours began to circulate that the demonstration had been called off
and indefinitely postponed. Many strongly objected to the cancellation; the
technical workers [3] protested and refused to work for the Committee in the future.

“Ameeting of the Committee was called on Friday, and the three
members who had been absent at the previous meeting protested against the
improper revision of the decision to hold the demonstration.

Since a mass of people would gather in Nevsky Prospekt anyway, even if no
leaflets were distributed, they urged that all steps be taken to get the
workers as well to participate in the demonstration. A representative of
the ’Minority’ objected on the grounds that ’ not all workers are sufficiently developed to participate consciously in the demonstration and to be able to defend the demands put forward by the Committee ’. The
question was put to the vote; the meeting decided, with only one opposing
vote, to hold the demonstration. But it transpired that many of the printed
leaflets—over 12,000—containing the call had been burnt. Besides, their
mass distribution at the factories was impossible, since they could not be
delivered anywhere by Saturday morning, and on Saturdays the factories stop
work at two or three o’clock. Thus, the leaflets could be distributed only
among a small circle of workers, among acquaintances, but not among the
broad masses. Under the circumstances the demonstration was foredoomed to
failure. And fail it did....

“Nowour ’Minority’ can rejoice. It has won! Here is a new fact
that discredits the Committee (read: the ’Majority’). But we hope that the
reader will consider more seriously the reasons why the demonstration
turned out as it did, and will say with us: ’Yes, as things now are in the
Party it is impossible to work with any success. We must put an end to the
crisis within the Party as soon as possible, we must close our ranks,
otherwise we are in danger of complete enfeeblement and, unless we take
advantage of the present favourable moment, we shall find ourselves
trailing at the tail—end of great events.”

Thisdisruptive act of the St. Petersburg “Minority”, which, in their
own petty factional interests, prevented a proletarian demonstration, is
the last drop that should make the cup of the Party’s patience run
over. That our Party is seriously ill and has lost a good half of its
influence during the past year is known to the whole world. We appeal now
to those who are incapable of regarding this serious ailment with sneers or
malicious joy, who cannot dismiss the accursed questions of the Party
crisis with mere sighs and shakes of the head, with snivelling and whining,
who consider it their duty, even at the cost of a supreme effort, to
achieve full clarity on the causes of the crisis—to fulfil that duty and
pluck up the evil by its roots. For these people, and these people only , we shall recapitulate the history of the crisis; for with out
studying this history it is impossible to understand the present split,
which the “Mensheviks” have finally contrived to bring about.

Firststage of the crisis: At the Second Congress of our Party the principles of
the Iskra position win, despite the opposition of the Rabocheye Dyelo and semi-Rabocheye Dyelo people. After the Congress, the Minority begins to tear the Party asunder over
the question of bringing into the Editorial Board persons whom the
Congress rejected. Disorganisation, boycott, and preparation for a split
go on for three months , from the end of August to the end of
November.

Secondstage: Plekhanov yields to the gentlemen who yearn for co-optation and
makes manifest to all in public print, in the article “What Should Not Be
Done” (No. 52), that he is offering a personal concession to the
revisionists and anarchists-individualists in order to avert a greater
evil. The gentlemen take advantage of this concession to go on rending the
Party. Having taken their seats on the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and
on the Council of the Party, they form a secret organisation for the
purpose of getting their people into the Central Committee and obstructing the
Third Congress. Unheard-of and incredible though it may be, this fact is proved
by documentary evidence in the form of a letter of the new Central Committee
concerning deals made with this worthy crew.

Thirdstage: Three members of the Central Committee side with the conspirators
against the Party. They co-opt three pretenders from the Minority
(assuring the committees, in writing, of the contrary), and, with the aid of the
Council, decidedly obstruct the Third Congress , which was favoured by
the overwhelming majority of the committees that voiced their opinions on the
crisis. In Orlovsky’s [4] pamphlet ( The Council Against the Party ) and
in Lenin’s ( Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party [2]

),

these facts are likewise proved by documentary evidence. The mass of the Party workers in Russia are unaware of these facts, but
they should be known to everyone who wishes to be a Party member in more than
name.

Fourthstage: The Party workers in Russia unite for action against the group
abroad which has disgraced our Party. The adherents and the Committees of the Majority arrange several private conferences and elect
representatives. The new Central Committee, which is controlled completely by
the co-opted pretenders, makes it its business to disorganise and split all local committees of the Majority. The comrades should not
entertain any illusions on this score; the Central Committee has no other
purpose. The creatures of the clique abroad are preparing and forming new
committees everywhere (in Odessa, Baku, Ekaterinoslav, Moscow, Voronezh,
etc.). The group abroad is preparing its own, hand-picked congress. The secret
organisation, having finished with the central bodies, has turned against the
local committees.

Thedisruptive trick of the St. Petersburg Mensheviks is no accident; it is a
calculated step towards splitting the Committee, a move made with the help of
the “Mensheviks” co-opted into the Central Committee. We repeat: The
Party workers in Russia in their majority are unaware of these facts. We warn
them and say to them most emphatically that everyone who wishes to struggle for
the Party and against disorganisation, everyone who does not want to be utterly
duped, must know all these facts.

Wehave made all possible concessions and several quite impossible ones in order
to continue working in one party with the “Minority”. Now that the
Third Congress has been obstructed and the disruptive tactics have been directed
against the local committees, all hope of achieving this is lost. Unlike the
“Mensheviks”, who work by underhand means, behind the Party’s back,
we must declare openly and prove by deeds that the Party has broken off any and
all relations with these gentry.

---
Notes:
[1]
The Russian terms for “majority” and “minority” are, respectively,
bolshinstvo and menshinstvo . Hence, Lenin’s adherents,
who obtained a majority of votes in the elections to the leading organs
of the Party at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in London in
1903, were called Bolsheviks, and their opponents, the minority, were
called Mensheviks.— Ed .

[2]
First published in pamphlet form, January 1905, Geneva. See present
edition, Vol. 7, pp. 529-39.— Ed .

[3]
Technical workers—a group of Bolsheviks authorised by the
Party to handle the business of organising underground printing-press, the printing and distribution of underground Party literature, and
obtaining and transporting weapons.

[4]
Orlovsky—pseudonym of the Bolshevik V. V
Vorovsky.