One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (THE CRISIS IN OUR PARTY)

M. The Elections. End of the Congress

After adopting the Rules, the Congress passed a resolution on
district organisations and a number of resolutions on particular
Party organisations, and, following the extremely instructive
debate on the Yuzhny Rabochy group which I have analysed above, proceeded to discuss the election of the Party’s
central institutions.

We already know that the Iskra organisation, from which
the entire Congress had expected an authoritative recommendation, had split over this question, for the minority
of the organisation wanted to test in free and open combat
whether it could not win a majority at the Congress. We also
know that a plan was known long before the Congress—and to
all the delegates at the Congress itself—for reconstituting
the editorial board by the election of two trios, one to the
Central Organ and one to the Central Committee. Let us dwell on
this plan in greater detail in order to throw light on the
Congress debate.

Here is the exact text of my commentary to the draft Tagesordnung of the Congress where this plan was set forth: [1] “The Congress shall elect three persons to the editorial board
of the Central Organ and three to the Central Committee. These
six persons in conjunction shall, if necessary, co-opt by a two-thirds majority vote additional members to the
editorial board of the Central Organ and to the Central
Committee and report to this effect to the Congress. After the
report has been endorsed by the Congress, subsequent co-optation
shall be effected by the editorial board of the Central Organ
and by the Central Committee separately.”

The plan stands out in this text quite definitely and unambiguously: it implies a reconstitution of the
editorial board, effected with the participation of the
most influential leaders of the practical work. Both the
features of this plan which I have emphasised are apparent at
once to anyone who takes the trouble to read the text at all
attentively. But nowadays one has to stop and explain the most
elementary things. It was precisely a reconstitution of
the editorial board that the plan implied—not necessarily
an enlargement and not necessarily a reduction of its membership, but its reconstitution; for the question of a
possible enlargement or reduction was left open :
co-optation was provided for only if necessary . Among the suggestions for such reconstitution made by various people,
some provided for a possible reduction of the number of editors,
and some for increasing it to seven (I personally had always
regarded seven as far preferable to six), and even to eleven (I
considered this possible in the event of peaceful union with all
Social-Democratic organisations in general and with the Bund and
the Polish Social-Democrats in particular). But what is most
important, and this is usually overlooked by people talking
about the “trio”, is that the matter of further co-optation to the Central Organ was to be decided with the participation of the members of the Central Committee . Not one comrade of
all the “minority” members of the organisation or Congress
delegates, who knew of this plan and approved it (either
explicitly or tacitly), has taken the trouble to explain the
meaning of this point. Firstly, why was a trio, and only a trio,
taken as the starting-point for reconstituting the editorial
board? Obviously, this would have been absolutely senseless if the sole , or at least the main,
purpose had been to enlarge the board, and if that board had really been considered a “harmonious” one. If the
purpose is to enlarge a “harmonious” body, it would be strange
to start , not with the whole body, but with only a part . Obviously, not all members of the board were
considered quite suitable for discussing and deciding the matter of reconstituting it, of converting the old editorial
circle into a Party institution . Obviously, even those
who personally desired the reconstitution to be an enlargement
recognised that the old composition of the board was not
harmonious and did not answer to the ideal of a Party institution, for otherwise there would be no reason
first to reduce the six to three in order to enlarge it. I repeat, this is self-evident, and only the
temporary confusion of the issue by “personalities” could have
caused it to be forgotten.

Secondly, it will be seen from the above-quoted text that even
the agreement of all three members of the Central Organ
would not by itself be enough for the enlargement of the
trio. This, too, is always lost sight of. Two-thirds of six,
that is, four votes, were to be required for co-optation; hence
it would only be necessary for the three members elected to the
Central Committee to exercise their veto, and no enlargement of the trio would be possible . Conversely, even if two of
the three members of the editorial board of the Central Organ
were opposed to further co-optation, it would nevertheless be
possible if all three members of the Central Committee were in
favour of it. It is thus obvious that the intention was, in
converting the old circle into a Party institution, to grant the
deciding voice to the Congress-elected leaders of the practical work. Which comrades we roughly had in mind may be
seen from the fact that prior to the Congress the editorial
board unanimously elected Comrade Pavlovich a seventh member of
their body, in case it should be necessary to make a statement
at the Congress on behalf of the board; in addition to Comrade
Pavlovich, a certain old member of the Iskra organisation and member of the Organising Committee, who was subsequently elected to the Central Committee , was proposed
for the seventh place.

Thus the plan for the election of two trios was obviously
designed: 1) to reconstitute the editorial board; 2) to rid it
of certain elements of the old circle spirit, which is out of
place in a Party institution (if there had been nothing to get rid of there would have been no point in the idea of an initial
trio!); and, lastly, 3) to get rid of the “theocratic” features
of a body of writers (getting rid of them by enlisting the
services of prominent practical workers in deciding the
question of enlarging the trio). This plan, with which all the
editors were acquainted, was, clearly, based on three years’ experience of work and fully accorded with the
principles of revolutionary organisation that we were consistently introducing. In the period of disunity in
which Iskra entered the arena, groups were often formed
haphazardly and spontaneously, and inevitably suffered from
certain pernicious manifestations of the circle spirit. The
creation of a Party presupposed and demanded the elimination of
these features; the participation of prominent practical workers
in this elimination was essential , for certain members
of the editorial board had always dealt with organisational affairs, and the body to enter the system of
Party institutions was to be a body not merely of writers, but
of political leaders. It was likewise natural, from the
standpoint of the policy Iskra had always pursued, to leave the selection of the initial trio to the Congress: we had
observed the greatest caution in preparing for the
Congress, waiting until all controversial questions of principle
relating to programme, tactics, and organisation had been
fully clarified; we had no doubt that the
Congress would be an “Iskra” -ist one in the sense that its overwhelming majority would be solid on these
fundamental questions (this was also indicated in part by the
resolutions recognising Iskra as the leading organ); we
were bound therefore to leave it to the comrades who had borne the whole brunt of the work of disseminating
Iskra ’s ideas and preparing for its conversion into a party to decide for themselves who were the most
suitable candidates for the new Party institution. It is
only by the fact that this plan for “two trios” was a natural one, only by the fact that it fully accorded with Iskra ’s whole policy and with every
thing known about Iskra to people at all closely acquainted with the work, that the general approval of this plan
and the absence of any rival plan is to be explained .

And so, at the Congress, Comrade Rusov first of all moved the
election of two trios . It never even occurred to the followers of Martov, who had informed us in writing that this plan was connected with the false accusation of opportunism , to reduce the dispute over a board of six or
three to the question whether this accusation was right or
wrong. Not one of them even hinted at it! None of them ventured to say a single word about the differing shades of
principle involved in the dispute over six or three. They
preferred a commoner and cheaper method, namely, to evoke
pity , to speak of possible injured feelings, to pretend that the question of the editorial board had already been settled by appointing Iskra the
Central Organ. This last argument, adduced by Comrade Koltsov
against Comrade Rusov, was a piece of downright falsity . Two separate items were included—not
fortuitously, of course—in the Congress agenda (see
Minutes, p. 10): Item 4—“Central Organ of the Party”, and
Item 18—“Election of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ”. That in the first
place. In the second place, when the Central Organ was being
appointed, all the delegates categorically declared that this did not mean the endorsement of the editorial
board, but only of the trend, [2]
[2] See Minutes, p. 140, Akimov ’s speech: “. . . I am told that we shall discuss the election of the Central Organ at the end”; Muravyov ’s speech against Akimov, “who takes the question of the future editorial board of the Central Organ very much to heart” (p. 141); Pavlovich ’s speech to the effect that, having appointed the organ, we had obtained “the concrete material on which to perform the operations Comrade Akimov is so much concerned about”, and that there could not be a shadow of doubt about Iskra ’s “submitting” to “the decisions of the Party” (p. 142), Trotsky ’s speech: “Since we are not endorsing the editorial board, what is it that we are endorsing in Iskra ? . . . Not the name, but the trend . . . not the name, but the banner” (p. 142), Martynov ’s speech: “. . . Like many other comrades, I consider that while discussing the adoption of Iskra, as a newspaper of a definite trend, as our Central Organ, we should not at this juncture discuss the method of electing or endorsing its editorial board, we shall discuss that later in its proper order on the agenda . . . ” (p. 143). — Lenin and not a single protest was
raised against these declarations.

Thus the statement that by endorsing a definite organ the
Congress had in effect endorsed the editorial board—a statement many times reiterated by the adherents of the minority
(by Koltsov, p. 321, by Posadovsky, p. 321, by Popov, p. 322,
and by many others)—was simply untrue in fact . It was a perfectly obvious manoeuvre to cover a
retreat

from the position held at the time when the question of the composition of the central bodies could still be
regarded in a really dispassionate light by all . The retreat could not be justified either by motives of principle
(for to raise the question of the “false accusation of opportunism” at the Congress was too much to the
disadvantage of the minority, and they did not even hint at it), or by a reference to the factual data
showing which was actually more effectual—six or three (for
the mere mention of these facts would have produced a heap of
arguments against the minority). They had to try to burke the
issue by talk about a “symmetrical whole”, about a “harmonious team”, about a “symmetrical and crystal-integral
entity”, and so on. It is not surprising that these arguments
were immediately called by their true name: " wretched words " (p. 328). The very plan for a trio clearly
testified to a lack of “harmony”, and the impressions obtained
by the delegates during a month and more of work ing together
obviously afforded a mass of material to enable them to judge
for themselves . When Comrade Posadovsky hinted at this
material (incautiously and injudiciously from his own standpoint: see pp. 321 and 325 regarding the “qualified sense”
in which he had used the word “dissonances”), Comrade Muravyov
bluntly declared: "In my opinion it is now quite clear to the
majority of the Congress that such  [3]
[3] What “dissonances” exactly Comrade Posadovsky had in mind the Congress never did learn. Comrade Muravyov, for his part, stated at this same sitting (p. 322) that his meaning had been misrepresented, and when the minutes were being endorsed he plainly declared that he “was referring to the dissonances which had been revealed in the Congress debates on various points, dissonances over principle, whose existence is now unfortunately a fact that nobody will deny” (p. 353). — Lenin dissonances undoubtedly do
exist" (p. 321). The minority chose to construe the word
“dissonances” (which was given currency by Posadovsky, not
Muravyov) in a purely personal sense, not daring to take up the
gauntlet flung down by Comrade Muravyov, not daring to bring
forward in defence of the board of six a single argument on the actual merits of the case . The result
was a dispute which for its sterility was more than comic: the
majority (through the mouth of Comrade Muravyov) declared that
the true significance of the six or three issue was quite clear to them, but the minority persistently refused to
listen and affirmed that “we are not in a position to examine it”. The majority not only considered themselves in a
position to examine it, but had “examined it” already and
announced that the results of the examination were quite clear to them, but the minority apparently feared an examination and took cover behind mere “wretched
words”. The majority urged us to “bear in mind that our Central
Organ is something more than a literary group”; the majority
“wanted the Central Organ to be headed by quite definite persons , persons known to the Congress, persons meeting the requirements I have mentioned”
(that is, not only literary requirements; Comrade Lange’s
speech, p. 327). Again the minority did not dare to take up the
gauntlet and did not say a word as to who, in their opinion, was
suitable for what was more than a literary body, as to who was a
figure of a “quite definite” magnitude “known to the
Congress”. The minority continued to take shelter behind their
celebrated “harmony”. Nor was this all. The minority even
introduced into the debate arguments which were absolutely false
in principle and which therefore quite rightly evoked a sharp
rebuff. “The Congress,” don’t you see, “has neither the moral
nor the political right to refashion the editorial board”
(Trotsky, p. 326); “it is too delicate [ sic !] a question” (Trotsky again); “ how will the editors who are not re-elected feel about the fact that the Congress does not want to see them on the board any more ?” (Tsaryov,

p. 324.) [4]

Such arguments simply put the whole question on the plane of
pity and injured feelings , and were a direct admission
of bankruptcy as regards real arguments of principle, real
political arguments. And the majority immediately gave this
attitude its true name: philistinism (Comrade
Rusov). “We are hearing strange speeches from the lips of
revolutionaries,” Comrade Rusov justly remarked, "speeches that
are in marked disharmony with the concepts Party work, Party
ethics. The principal argument on which the opponents of
electing trios take their stand amounts to a purely philistine view of Party affairs [my italics
throughout]....

If we adopt this standpoint, which is a philistine and not a Party standpoint, we shall at
every election have to consider: will not Petrov be offended if
Ivanov is elected and not he, will not some member of the
Organising Committee be offended if another member, and not he,
is elected to the Central Committee? Where is this going to land
us, comrades? If we have gathered here for the purpose of
creating a Party, and not of indulging in mutual compliments and philistine sentimentality , then we can never agree to
such a view. We are about to elect officials , and there
can be no talk of lack of confidence in any person not elected;
our only consideration should be the interests of the work and a person’s suitability for the post to which he is being elected " (p. 325).

We would advise all who want to make an independent examination
of the reasons for the Party split and to dig down to the roots
of it at the Congress to read this speech of Comrade Rusov’s
over and over again ; his arguments were not even contested by the minority, let alone refuted. And indeed there
is no contesting such elementary, rudimentary truths, which were
forgotten only because of " nervous excitement ", as
Comrade Rusov himself rightly explained. And this is really the
explanation least discreditable to the minority of how they
could desert the Party standpoint for a philistine and circle standpoint. [5]

But the minority were so totally unable to find sensible and
business-like arguments against election that, in addition to
introducing philistinism into Party affairs, they resorted to
downright scandalous practices . Indeed, what other name
can we give to the action of Comrade Popov when he advised
Comrade Muravyov “not to undertake delicate commissions ” (p. 322)? What is this but “getting
personal”, as Comrade Sorokin rightly put it (p. 328)? What is
it but speculating on “ personalities ”, in the absence
of political arguments? Was Comrade Sorokin right or wrong when he said that “we have always protested against such
practices”? “ Was it permissible for Comrade Deutsch to
try demonstratively to pillory comrades who did not agree with him?” [6]
[6] That is the way Comrade Sorokin, at this same sitting, understood Comrade Deutsch’s words (cf. p. 324—“sharp interchange with Orlov”). Comrade Deutsch explained (p. 351) that he had “said nothing like it”, but in thc same breath admitted that he had said something very, very much “like it”. “I did not say ’who dares’,” Comrade Deutsch explained; "what I said was: ’I would be interested to see the people who would dare [ sic !—Comrade Deutsch fell out of the frying pan into the fire!] to support such a criminal [ sic !] proposal as the election of a board of three’" (p. 351). Comrade Deutsch did not refute, but confirmed Comrade Sorokin’s words. Comrade Deutsch only confirmed the truth of Comrade Sorokin’s reproach that “all concepts are here muddled” (in the minority’s arguments in favour of six). Comrade Deutsch only confirmed the pertinence of Comrade Sorokin’s reminder of the elementary truth that “we are Party membors and should be guided exclucively by political considerations”. To cry that election was criminal was to sink not only to philistinism, but to practices that were downright scandalous ! — Lenin (P. 328.)

Let us sum up the debate on the editorial board. The minority
did not refute (nor even try to refute) the majority’s numerous
statements that the plan for a trio was known to the delegates at the very beginning of the Congress and prior to the Congress , and that, consequently, this plan
was based on considerations and facts which had no relation to the events and disputes at the Congress . In defending
the board of six, the minority took up a position which was
wrong and impermissible in principle , one based on philistine considerations. The minority displayed an
utter forgetfulness of the Party attitude towards the election of officials , not even attempting to give an
estimation of each candidate for a post and of his suitability or unsuitability for the functions it involved. The
minority evaded a discussion of the question on its merits and talked instead of their celebrated harmony, “shedding
tears” and “indulging in pathos” (Lange’s speech, p. 327), as
though “somebody was being murdered”. In their state of
" nervous excitement " (p. 325) the minority even went to the length of " getting personal ", of howling that
election was “criminal”, and similar impermissible practices.

The battle over six or three at the 30th sitting of our Congress
was a battle between philistinism and the party spirit , between " personalities " of the worst kind
and political considerations , between wretched words and the most elementary conception of
revolutionary duty .

And at the 31st sitting, when the Congress, by a majority of
nineteen to seventeen with three abstentions, had rejected the motion to endorse the old editorial board
as a whole (see p. 330 and the errata) , and when the former editors had returned to the hall, Comrade Martov
in his “statement on behalf of the majority of the former
editorial board” (pp. 330-31) displayed this same shakiness and instability of
political position and political concepts to an even greater degree. Let us examine in detail each point of this
collective statement and my reply (pp. 332-33).

“From now on,” Comrade Martov said when the old editorial board
was not endorsed, “the old Iskra does not exist, and it
would be more consistent to change its name. At any rate, we see
in the new resolution of the Congress a substantial limitation
of the vote of confidence in Iskra which was passed at one of the first Congress sittings.”

Comrade Martov and his colleagues raised a truly interesting and
in many respects instructive question of political consistency . I have already replied to this by
referring to what everyone said when Iskra was being endorsed (Minutes, p. 349, cf. above,

p. 82). [7]

What we have here is unquestionably a crying instance of political inconsistency, but
whether on the part of the majority of the Congress or of the
majority of the old editorial board we shall leave the reader to
judge. And there are two other questions very pertinently raised
by Comrade Martov and his colleagues which we shall likewise
leave the reader to decide: 1) Did the desire to detect a
“limitation of the vote of confidence in Iskra ” in the
Congress decision to elect officials to the editorial board of the Central Organ betray a
philistine or a Party attitude? 2) When did the old “Iskra” really cease to
exist—starting from No. 46, when the two of us, Plekhanov and I, began to conduct it, or from No. 53, when the
majority of the old editorial board took it over? If the first
question is a most interesting question of principle, the second is a most interesting question of fact .

“Since it has now been decided,” Comrade Martov continued, "to
elect an editorial board of three, I must declare on my own
behalf and that of the three other comrades that none of us will
sit on this new editorial board. For myself, I must add that if
it be true that certain comrades wanted to include my name in
the list of candidates for this ’trio’, I must regard it as an
insult which I have done nothing to deserve [ sic !]. I
say this in view of the circumstances under which it has been
decided to change the editorial board.

This decision was taken on the grounds of some kind of

‘friction’, [8]
[8] Comrade Martov was probably referring to Comrade Posadovsky’s expression “dissonances”. I repeat that Comrade Posadovsky never did explain to the Congress what he meant, while Comrade Muravyov, who had likewise used the expression, explained that he meant dissonances over principle , as revealed in the Congress debates . The reader will recall that the sole real debate over principles in which four of the editors (Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod, and I) took part was in connection with Paragraph 1 of the rules, and that Comrades Martov and Starover complained in writing of a “false accusation of opportunism” as being one of the arguments for “changing” the editorial board. In this letter , Comrade Martov had detected a clear connection between “opportunism” and the plan to change the editorial board, but at the Congress he confined himself to hinting hazily at “ some kind of friction” . The “false accusation of opportunism” had already been forgotten! — Lenin of the former editorial board having
been ineffectual; moreover, the Congress decided the matter
along definite lines without questioning the editorial board
about this friction or even appointing a commission to report
whether it had been ineffectual. [Strange that it never occurred
to any member of the minority to propose to the Congress to
“question the editorial board” or appoint a commission! Was it
not because it would have been useless after the split in the
Iskra organisation and the failure of the negotiations
Comrades Martov and Starover wrote about?] Under the circumstances, I must regard the assumption of certain comrades
that I would agree to sit on an editorial board reformed in this
manner as a slur on my political reputation....” [9]
[9] Comrade Martov further added: “Ryazanov might agree to such a role, but not the Martov whom, I think, you know by his work.” Inasmuch as this was a personal attack on Ryazanov, Comrade Martov withdrew the remark. But it was not because of Ryazanov’s personal qualities (to refer to them would have been out of place) that his name figured at the Congress as a byword; it was because of the political complexion of the Borba group—its political mistakes . Comrade Martov does well to withdraw real or assumed personal insults, but this should not lead us to forget political mistakes , which should serve as a lesson to the Party . The Borba group was accused at our Congress of causing “organisational chaos” and “disunity not justifled by any considerations of principle” (Comrade Martov’s speech, p. 38). Such political conduct does indeed deserve censure, and not only when seen in a small group prior to the Party Congress, during the period of general chaos, but also when we see it after the Party Congress, in the period when the chaos has been abolished, even if indulged in by “the majority of the Iskra editorial board and the majority of the Emancipation of Labour group”. — Lenin

I have purposely quoted this argument in full to acquaint the
reader with a specimen and with the beginning of what has
blossomed out so profusely since the Congress and which cannot be called by any other name than squabbling . I
have already employed this expression in my Letter to the Editors of “Iskra ”, and in spite of the editors’ annoyance
I am obliged to repeat it, for its correctness is beyond
dispute. It is a mistake to think that squabbling presupposes
“sordid motives” (as the editors of the new Iskra conclude): any revolutionary at all acquainted with our colonies
of exiles and political émigrés will have witnessed dozens of cases of squabbling in which the most absurd
accusations, suspicions, self-accusations, “personalities”,
etc., were levelled and harped upon owing to “nervous excitement” and abnormal, stagnant conditions of life. No
sensible person will necessarily seek for sordid motives in these squabbles, however sordid their manifestations may be . And it is only to “nervous
excitement” that we can attribute that tangled skein of
absurdities, personalities, fantastic horrors, and imaginary
insults and slurs which is contained in the above-quoted passage
from Comrade Martov’s speech. Stagnant conditions of life breed
such squabbles among us by the hundred, and a political party
would be unworthy of respect if it did not have the courage to
designate its malady by its true name, to make a ruthless
diagnosis and search for a cure.

Insofar as anything relating to principles can be extracted at
all from this tangled skein, one is led inevitably to the conclusion that “elections have nothing to do with any slurs
on political reputations”, that “to deny the right of the
Congress to hold new elections, make new appointments of any
kind, and change the composition of its authorised boards” is to
confuse the issue, and that “Comrade Martov’s views on the permissibility of electing part of the old board reflect an
extreme confusion of political ideas ” (as I expressed it at the Congress,

p. 332). [10]

I shall omit Comrade Martov’s “personal” remark as to who
initiated the plan for the trio, and shall pass to his “political” characterisation of the significance attaching to
the non-endorsement of the old editorial board: ". . What has
now taken place is the last act of the struggle which has raged
during the second half of the Congress. [Quite right! And this
second half of the Congress began when Martov fell into the
tight clutches of Comrade Akimov over Paragraph 1 of the Rules.]
It is an open secret that in this reform it is not a question of
being ’effectual’, but of a struggle for influence on the
Central Committee. [Firstly, it is an open secret that it
was a question of being effectual, as well as of a divergence over the composition of the Central
Committee, for the plan of the “reform” was proposed at a time
when that divergence was nowhere in sight and when
Comrade Martov joined us in electing Comrade Pavlovich a seventh
member of the editorial board] Secondly, we have already shown
by documentary proofs that it was a question of the personal composition of the Central Committee, that
à la fin des fins the matter came down to a difference of lists: Glebov-Travinsky-Popov or
Glebov-Trotsky-Popov.] The majority of the editorial board
showed that they did not want the Central Committee to be
converted into a tool of the editorial board. [That is Akimov’s refrain:

the question of the influence for which every majority fights at any and every party congress so
as then to consolidate it with the help of a majority on the central institutions is transferred to
the plane of opportunist slanders about a “tool” of the
editorial board , about a “mere appendage ” of the editorial board, as Comrade Martov himself put it somewhat
later, p. 334.] That is why it was found necessary to reduce the
number of members of the editorial board [!!]. And that is why I
cannot join such an editorial board. [Just examine this “that is
why” a little more carefully. How might the editorial board have converted the Central Committee into an appendage or
tool? Only if it had had three votes on the Council and
had abused its superiority. Is that not clear? And is it not likewise clear that, having been elected the third
member, Comrade Martov could always have prevented such an abuse
and by his vote alone have destroyed all superiority of
the editorial board on the Council? Consequently, the whole
matter boils down to the personal composition of the Central
Committee, and it is at once clear that the talk about a tool
and an

appendage is slander .] Together with the majority of the old editorial board, I thought that the Congress
would put an end to the ’state of siege’ in the Party and would
establish a normal state of affairs. But as a matter of fact the
state of siege, with its emergency laws against particular
groups, still continues, and has even become more acute. Only if
the old editorial board remains in its entirety can we guarantee
that the rights conferred on the editorial board by the Rules
will not be used to the detriment of the Party....”

There you have the whole passage from Comrade Martov’s speech in
which he first advanced the notorious war-cry of a “state of siege” . And now look at my reply to him:

“. . . However, in correcting Martov’s statement about the
private character of the plan for two trios, I have no intention
of denying Martov’s assertion of the ’political significance’ of
the step we took in not endorsing the old editorial board. On
the contrary, I fully and unreservedly agree with Comrade Martov
that this step is of great political significance—only not
the significance which Martov ascribes to it. He said that it
was an act in a struggle for influence on the Central Committee
in Russia. I go farther than Martov. The whole activity of
Iskra as a separate group has hitherto been a struggle for influence; but now it is a matter of something more, namely,
the organisational consolidation of this influence, and not only
a struggle for it. How profoundly Comrade Martov and I differ
politically on this point is shown by the fact that he blames me
for this wish to influence the Central Committee, whereas I
count it to my credit that I strove and still strive to
consolidate this influence by organisational means. It appears
that we are even talking in different languages! What would be
the point of all our work, of all our efforts, if they ended in
the same old struggle for influence, and not in its complete
acquisition and consolidation? Yes, Comrade Martov is absolutely
right: the step we have taken is undoubtedly a major political
step showing that one of the trends now to be observed has been
chosen for the future work of our Party. And I am not at all frightened by the dreadful words ’a state of siege in the Party’ , ’emergency laws against particular individuals and groups’ , etc. We not only can but we must create a
’state of siege’ in relation to unstable and vacillating
elements, and all our Party Rules, the whole system of centralism now endorsed by the Congress are nothing but a ’state
of siege’ in respect to the numerous sources of political
vagueness. It is special laws, even if they are emergency laws,
that are needed as measures against vagueness, and the step
taken by the Congress has correctly indicated the political
direction to be followed, by having created a firm basis for
such laws and such measures.” [11]

I have italicised in this summary of my speech at the Congress
the sentence which Comrade Martov preferred to omit in his “State of Siege ” (p. 16). It is not surprising that he did
not like this sentence and did not choose to understand its
obvious meaning.

What does the expression “dreadful words” imply, Comrade Martov?

It implies mockery , mockery of those who give big names
to little things, who confuse a simple question by pretentious
phrase-mongering.

The little and simple fact which alone could have given, and actually did give, Comrade Martov cause for “nervous
excitement” was nothing but his defeat at the Congress over the personal composition of the central bodies . The political significance of this simple fact was
that, having won, the majority of the Party Congress consolidated their influence by establishing their majority in
the Party leadership as well, by creating an organisational
basis for a struggle, with the help of the Rules, against what
this majority considered to be vacillation, instability, and vagueness. [12]
[12] How was the instability, vacillation, and vagueness of the Iskra -ist minority manifested at the Congress? Firstly, by their opportunist phrase-mongering over Paragraph 1 of the Rules; secondly, by their coalition with Comrades Akimov and Lieber, which during the second half of the Congress rapidly grew more pronounced; thirdly, by their readiness to degrade the question of electing officials to the Central Organ to the level of philistinism, of wretched words and even of getting personal. After the Congress all these lovely attributes developed from mere buds into blossoms and fruit. — Lenin

To make this an occasion for talking of a “struggle for influence” with horror in one’s eyes and
complaining of a “state of siege” was nothing but pretentious phrase-mongering , dreadful words.

Comrade Martov does not agree with this? Then perhaps he will
try to prove to us that a party congress has ever existed, or is
in general conceivable, where the majority would not proceed to
consolidate the influence they had gained:
1) by securing a
majority on the central bodies, and
2) by endowing it with
powers to counteract vacillation, instability, and vagueness.

Before the elections, our Congress had to decide whether to give
one-third of the votes on the Central Organ and on the
Central Committee to the Party majority or the Party minority. The board of six and Comrade Martov’s list meant
giving one-third to us and two-thirds to his followers. A trio
on the Central Organ and our list meant two-thirds for us and
one-third for Comrade Martov’s followers. Comrade Martov refused
to make terms with us or yield, and challenged us in writing to a battle at the Congress. Having suffered defeat
at the Congress, he began to weep and to complain of a “state of
siege”! Well, isn’t that squabbling? Isn’t it a new manifestation of the wishy-washiness of the intellectual?

One cannot help recalling in this connection the brilliant
social and psychological characterisation of this latter quality
recently given by Karl Kautsky. The Social Democratic parties of
different countries suffer not infrequently nowadays from
similar maladies, and it would be very, very useful for us to
learn from more experienced comrades the correct diagnosis and
the correct cure. Karl Kautsky’s characterisation of certain
intellectuals will therefore be only a seeming digression from
our theme.

The problem “that again interests us so keenly today is
the antagonism between the intelligentsia [13] and the proletariat . My colleagues [Kautsky is himself an
intellectual, a writer and editor] will mostly be indignant that
I admit this antagonism. But it actually exists, and, as in
other cases, it would be the most inexpedient tactics to try to
overcome the fact by denying it. This antagonism is a social
one, it relates to classes, not to individuals. The individual
intellectual, like the individual capitalist, may identify
himself with the proletariat in its class struggle. When he
does, he changes his character too. It is not this type
of intellectual, who is still an exception among his class, that
we shall mainly speak of in what follows. Unless otherwise
stated, I shall use the word intellectual to mean only the common run of intellectual who takes the stand of bourgeois society , and who is characteristic of the intelligentsia as
a class . This class stands in a certain antagonism to the proletariat.

“This antagonism differs, however, from the antagonism between
labour and capital. The intellectual is not a capitalist. True,
his standard of life is bourgeois, and he must maintain it if he
is not to become a pauper; but at the same time he is compelled
to sell the product of his labour, and often his labour-power,
and is himself often enough exploited and humiliated by the
capitalist. Hence the intellectual does not stand in any
economic antagonism to the proletariat. But his status of life
and his conditions of labour are not proletarian, and this gives
rise to a certain antagonism in sentiments and ideas.

“As an isolated individual, the proletarian is nothing. His
whole strength, his whole progress, all his hopes and expectations are derived from organisation , from
systematic action in conjunction with his fellows. He feels big
and strong when he forms part of a big and strong organism. This
organism is the main thing for him; the individual in comparison
means very little. The proletarian fights with the utmost
devotion as part of the anonymous mass, without prospect of
personal advantage or personal glory, doing his duty in any post
he is assigned to with a voluntary discipline which pervades all
his feelings and thoughts.

“Quite different is the case of the intellectual. He does not
fight by means of power, but by argument. His weapons are his
personal knowledge, his personal ability, his personal convictions. He can attain to any position at all only through
his personal qualities. Hence the freest play for his individuality seems to him the prime condition for successful
activity. It is only with difficulty that he submits to being a
part subordinate to a whole, and then only from necessity, not
from inclination. He recognises the need of discipline only for
the mass, not for the elect minds. And of course he counts
himself among the latter....

“Nietzsche’s philosophy, with its cult of the superman, for whom
the fulfilment of his own individuality is everything and any
subordination of that individuality to a great social aim is
vulgar and despicable, is the real philosophy of the intellectual, and it renders him totally unfit to take part in
the class struggle of the proletariat.

“Next to Nietzsche, the most outstanding exponent of a philosophy answering to the sentiments of the intelligentsia is
probably Ibsen. His Doctor Stockmann (in An Enemy of the People) is not a socialist as many have thought, but the
type of the intellectual, who is bound to come into conflict
with the proletarian movement, and with any movement of the
people generally, as soon as he attempts to work within it. For
the basis of the proletarian movement, as of every democratic [14] movement, is respect for the majority of one’s fellows.

The typical intellectual à la Stockmann regards a
’compact majority’ as a monster that must be overthrown....

“An ideal example of an intellectual who had become thoroughly
imbued with the sentiments of the proletariat, and who, although
he was a brilliant writer, had quite lost the specific mentality
of the intellectual, marched cheerfully with the rank and file,
worked in any post he was assigned to subordinated himself
whole-heartedly to our great cause, and despised the feeble
whining [ weichliches Gewinsel ] about the suppression of
his individuality which the intellectual trained on Ibsen and
Nietzsche is prone to indulge in when he happens to be in the
minority—an ideal example of the kind of intellectual the
socialist movement needs was Liebknecht. We may also mention
Marx, who never forced himself to the forefront and whose party
discipline in the International, where he often found himself in
the minority, was exemplary.” [15]

Just such feeble whining of intellectuals who happened to find
themselves in the minority, and nothing more, was the refusal of
Martov and his friends to be named for office merely because the
old circle had not been endorsed, as were their complaints of a
state of siege and emergency laws “against particular groups”,
which Martov cared nothing about when Yuzhny Rabochy and Rabocheye Dyelo were dissolved, but only came to
care about when his group was dissolved.

Just such feeble whining of intellectuals who happened to find
themselves in the minority was that endless torrent of complaints, reproaches, hints, accusations, slanders, and
insinuations regarding the “compact majority” which was started
by Martov and which poured out in such a flood at our Party

Congress [16] (and even more so after).

The minority bitterly complained that the compact majority held
private meetings. Well, the minority had to do something to
conceal the unpleasant fact that the delegates it invited to its
own private meetings refused to attend, while those who would
willingly have attended (the Egorovs, Makhovs, and
Brouckères) the minority could not invite after all the
fighting it had done with them at the Congress.

The minority bitterly complained of the “false accusation of
opportunism”. Well, it had to do something to conceal the
unpleasant fact that it was opportunists , who in most cases had followed the anti- Iskra -ists—and partly
these anti- Iskra -ists themselves—that made up the compact minority, seizing with both hands on the championship of
the circle spirit in Party institutions, opportunism in
arguments, philistinism in Party affairs, and the instability
and wishy-washiness of the intellectual.

We shall show in the next section what is the explanation of the
highly interesting political fact that a “compact majority” was formed towards the end of the Congress, and why,
in spite of every challenge, the minority so very, very warily
evades the reasons for its formation and its history . But let us first finish our analysis of the
Congress debates.

During the elections to the Central Committee, Comrade Martov
moved a highly characteristic resolution (p. 336), the three
main features of which I have on occasion referred to as “mate
in three moves”. Here they are: 1) to ballot lists of candidates for the Central Committee, and not the candidates
individually; 2) after the lists had been announced, to allow
two sittings to elapse (for discussion, evidently); 3) in the
absence of an absolute majority, a second ballot to be regarded
as final. This resolution was a most carefully conceived
stratagem (we must give the adversary his due!), with which
Comrade Egorov did not agree (p. 337), but which would most certainly have assured a complete victory for Martov if the seven Bundists and “Rabocheye Dyelo”-ists had not quit the Congress . The reason for this stratagem was that the
Iskra -ist minority did not have , and could not have had , a “direct agreement” (such as there was among
the Iskra -ist majority) even with the Egorovs and Makhovs , let alone the Bund and Brouckère.

Remember that at the League Congress Comrade Martov complained
that the “false accusation of opportunism” presumed a direct
agreement between him and the Bund. I repeat, this only seemed
so to Comrade Martov in his fright, and this very refusal of Comrade Egorov to agree to the balloting of lists (Comrade
Egorov “had not yet lost his principles”—presumably the
principles that made him join forces with Goldblatt in appraising the absolute importance of democratic guarantees)
graphically demonstrates the highly important fact that
there could be no question of a “direct agreement” even with Egorov . But a coalition there could be, and was,
both with Egorov and with Brouckere, a coalition in the sense
that the Martovites were sure of their support every time they, the Martovites, came into serious conflict with us
and Akimov and his friends had to choose the lesser evil . There was not and is not the slightest doubt that
Comrades Akimov and Lieber would certainly have voted both for the board of six on the Central Organ and for Martov’s list for the Central Committee , as being the lesser evil , as being what would least achieve the
“Iskra” aims (see Akimov’s speech on Paragraph 1 and the “hopes” he placed in Martov). Balloting of lists,
allowing two sittings to elapse, and a re-ballot were designed
to achieve this very result with almost mechanical certainty
without a direct agreement.

But since our compact majority remained a compact majority,
Comrade Martov’s flank movement would only have meant delay, and
we were bound to reject it. The minority poured forth their
complaints on this score in a written statement (p. 341) and,
following the example of Martynov and Akimov, refused to vote in the elections to the Central
Committee, “in view of the conditions in which they were
held”. Since the Congress, such complaints of abnormal conditions at the elections (see State of Siege , p. 31)
have been poured right and left into the ears of hundreds of
Party gossips. But in what did this abnormality consist? In the secret ballot—which had been stipulated
beforehand in the Standing Orders of the Congress (Point 6,
Minutes, p. 11), and in which it was absurd- to detect any
“hypocrisy” or “injustice”? In the formation of a compact
majority—that “monster” in the eyes of wishy-washy intellectuals? Or in the abnormal desire of these
worthy intellectuals to violate the pledge they had given before the Congress that they would recognise all its
elections (p. 380, Point 18 of the Congress Regulations)?

Comrade Popov subtly hinted at this desire when he asked outright at the Congress on the day of the elections: “Is
the Bureau certain that the decision of the Congress is valid
and in order when half the delegates refused to vote?” [17]

The Bureau of course replied that it was certain, and recalled
the incident of Comrades Akimov and Martynov Comrade Martov
agreed with the Bureau and explicitly declared that Comrade
Popov was mistaken and that " the decisions of the Congress are valid " (p. 343). Now let the reader form his own
opinion of the political consistency—highly normal, we must
suppose—revealed by a comparison of this declaration made by him in the hearing of the Party with his behaviour
after the Congress and with the phrase in his State of Siege about " the revolt of half the Party which already began at the Congress " (p. 20). The hopes which Comrade
Akimov had placed in Comrade Martov outweighed the ephemeral
good intentions of Martov himself.

" You have conquered ", Comrade Akimov!

*     * *
Certain features, seemingly petty but actually very important,
of the end of the Congress, the part of it after the elections, may serve to show how pure and
simple a “dreadful word” was the famous phrase about a “state of
siege”, which has now for ever acquired a tragicomical meaning. Comrade Martov is now making great play with this
tragicomical “state of siege”, seriously assuring both himself
and his readers that this bogey of his own invention implied
some sort of abnormal persecution, hounding, bullying of the
“minority” by the “majority”. We shall presently show how
matters stood after the Congress. But take even the end
of the Congress, and you will find that after the elections , far from persecuting the unhappy Martovites, who
are supposed to have been bullied, ill-treated, and led to the
slaughter, the “compact majority” itself offered them (through Lyadov) two seats out of three on the Minutes
Committee (p. 354). Take the resolutions on tactical and other
questions (p. 355 et seq.), and you will find that they were
discussed on their merits in a purely business-like way, and
that the signatories to many of the resolutions included both
representatives of the monstrous compact “majority” and
followers of the “humiliated and insulted” “minority” (Minutes,
pp. 355, 357, 363, 365 and 367). This looks like “shutting out
from work” and “bullying” in general, does it not?

The only interesting—but, unfortunately, all too brief—controversy on the substance of a question arose in
connection with Starover’s resolution on the liberals. As one
can see from the signatures to it (pp. 357 and 358), it was
adopted by the Congress because three of the supporters of the
“majority” (Braun, Orlov, and

Osipov [19] )
voted both for it and for Plekhanov’s resolution, not perceiving the
irreconcilable contradiction between the two. No irreconcilable
contradiction is apparent at first glance, because Plekhanov’s
resolution lays down a general principle, outlines a defnite
attitude, as regards principles and tactics, towards bourgeois liberalism in Russia , whereas Starover’s
attempts to define the concrete conditions in which “temporary agreements” would be permissible with “liberal
or liberal-democratic trends”. The subjects of the two resolutions are different. But Starover’s suffers from
political vagueness , and is consequently petty and shallow. It does not define the class content of Russian liberalism , does not indicate the definite political trends
in which this is expressed, does not explain to the proletariat
the principal tasks of propaganda and agitation in relation to
these definite trends; it confuses (owing to its vagueness) such
different things as the student movement and
Osvobozhdeniye , it too pettily and casuistically prescribes three concrete conditions under which
“temporary agreements” would be permissible. Here too, as in
many other cases, political vagueness leads to casuistry. The
absence of any general principle and the attempt to enumerate
“conditions” result in a petty and, strictly speaking, incorrect specification of these conditions. Just
examine Starover’s three conditions: 1) the “liberal or
liberal-democratic trends” shall “clearly and unambiguously
declare that in their struggle against the autocratic government
they will resolutely side with the Russian
Social-Democrats”. What is the difference between the liberal
and liberal-democratic trends? The resolution furnishes no
material for a reply to this question. Is it not that the
liberal trends speak for the politically least progressive
sections of the bourgeoisie, and the liberal-democratic—for
the more progressive sections of the bourgeoisie and the petty
bourgeoisie? If that is so, can Comrade Starover possibly think
that the sections of the bourgeoisie which are least progressive
(but progressive nevertheless, for otherwise there could be no
talk of liberalism) can “resolutely side with the
Social-Democrats”?? That is absurd, and even if the spokesmen of
such a trend were to " declare it clearly and unambiguously " (an absolutely impossible assumption), we,
the party of the proletariat, would be obliged not to believe their declarations. To be a liberal and resolutely
side with the Social-Democrats—the one excludes the other.

Further, let us assume a case where “liberal or liberal-democratic trends” clearly and unambiguously declare
that in their struggle against the autocracy they will resolutely side with the Socialist-Revolutionaries .
Such an assumption is far less unlikely than Comrade Starover’s
(owing to the bourgeois-democratic nature of the
Socialist-Revolutionary trend). From his resolution, because of
its vagueness and casuistry, it would appear that in a case like this temporary agreements with such liberals would be
impermissible . But this conclusion, which follows inevitably from Comrade Starover’s resolution, is an
absolutely false one. Temporary agreements are permissible with the Socialist-Revolutionaries (see the Congress
resolution on the latter), and, consequently , with liberals who side with the Socialist Revolutionaries.

Second condition: these trends “shall not include in their
programmes any demands running counter to the interests of the
working class or the democracy generally, or obscuring their
political consciousness”. Here we have the same mistake again:
there never have been, nor can there be, liberal-democratic
trends which did not include in their programmes demands running
counter to the interests of the working class and obscuring its
(the proletariat’s) political consciousness. Even one of the
most democratic sections of our liberal-democratic trend, the
Socialist-Revolutionaries, put forward in their programme—a
muddled one, like all liberal programmes—demands that run
counter to the interests of the working class and obscure its
political consciousness. The conclusion to be drawn from this
fact is that it is essential to “expose the limitations
and inadequacy of the bourgeois emancipation movement”, but not
that temporary agreements are impermissible.

Lastly, in the general form in which it is presented, Comrade
Starover’s third “condition” (that the liberal-democrats should
make universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage the slogan of
their struggle) is likewise incorrect : it would be unwise to declare impermissible in all cases temporary and
partial agreements with liberal-democratic trends whose slogan
was a constitution with a qualified suffrage, or a “curtailed”
constitution generally. As a matter of fact, the
Osvobozhdeniye “trend” would fit into just this category, but it would be political short-sightedness
incompatible with the principles of Marxism to tie one’s hands
by forbidding in advance “temporary agreements” with even the
most timorous liberals.

To sum up: Comrade Starover’s resolution, which was signed also
by Comrades Martov and Axelrod, is a mistake , and the
Third Congress would be wise to rescind it. It suffers from
political vagueness in its theoretical and tactical position,
from casuistry in the practical “conditions” it stipulates. It
confuses two questions : 1) the exposure of the “anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian” features of
all liberal-democratic trends, and the need to combat these features, and 2) the conditions
for temporary and partial agreements with any of these trends. It does not give what it should (an analysis of the
class content of liberalism), and gives what it should not
(prescription of “conditions”). It is absurd in general to draw
up detailed “conditions” for temporary agreements at a party
congress, when there is not even a definite partner to such
possible agreements in view; and even if there were such a
definite partner in view, it would be a hundred times more
rational to leave the definition of the “conditions” for a
temporary agreement to the Party’s central institutions, as the
Congress did in relation to the Socialist-Revolutionary “trend”
(see Plekhanov’s modification of the end of Comrade Axelrod’s
resolution—Minutes, pp. 362 and 15).

As to the objections of the “minority” to Plekhanov’s resolution, Comrade Martov’s only argument was: Plekhanov’s
resolution “ends with the paltry conclusion that a particular
writer should be exposed. Would this not be ’using a sledge
hammer to kill a fly’?” (p. 358.) This argument, whose emptiness
is concealed by a smart phrase—“paltry conclusion”—provides a new specimen of pompous
phrase-mongering. Firstly, Plekhanov’s resolution speaks of
“exposing in the eyes of the proletariat the limitations and
inadequacy of the bourgeois emancipation movement wherever these
limitations and inadequacy manifest themselves”. Hence Comrade
Martov’s assertion (at the League Congress; Minutes, p. 88) that
“all attention is to be directed only to Struve, only to one
liberal” is the sheerest nonsense. Secondly, to compare
Mr. Struve to a “fly” when the possibility of temporary
agreements with the Russian liberals is in question, is to
sacrifice an elementary and manifest political fact for a smart
phrase. No, Mr. Struve is not a fly, but a political magnitude,
and not because he personally is such a big figure, but because
of his position as the sole representative of Russian liberalism—of at all effectual and organised
liberalism—in the illegal world. Therefore, to talk of the
Russian liberals, and of what our Party’s attitude towards them
should be, without having precisely Mr. Struve and
Osvobozhdeniye in mind is to talk without saying anything. Or perhaps Comrade Martov will show us even one single “liberal or liberal-democratic trend” in Russia
which could compare even remotely today with the
Osvobozhdeniye trend? It would be interesting to see him try! [18] “Struve’s name means nothing to the workers,” said Comrade
Kostrov, supporting Comrade Martov. I hope Comrade Kostrov and
Comrade Martov will not be offended—but that argument is
fully in the Akimov style. It is like the argument about the
proletariat in the genitive case. [20]

Who are the workers to whom Struve’s name (and the name of
Osvobozhdeniye , mentioned in Comrade Plekhanov’s resolution alongside of Mr. Struve) “means nothing”? Those who
know very little, or nothing at all, of the “liberal and
liberal-democratic trends” in Russia. One asks, what should be
the attitude of our Party Congress to such workers: should it
instruct Party members to acquaint these workers with the only
definite liberal trend in Russia; or should it refrain from mentioning a name with which the workers are little
acquainted because of their little acquaintance with politics?
If Comrade Kostrov, having taken one step in the wake of Comrade
Akimov, does not want to take another, he will answer this
question in the former sense. And having answered it in the
former sense, he will see how groundless his argument was. At any rate , the words “Struve” and
" Osvobozhdeniye " in Plekhanov’s resolution are likely
to be of much more value to the workers than the words “liberal
and liberal-democratic trend” in Starover’s resolution.

Except through Osvobozhdeniye , the Russian worker cannot at the present time acquaint himself in practice with
anything like a frank expression of the political tendencies of
our liberalism. The legal liberal literature is unsuitable for
this purpose because it is so nebulous. And we must as assiduously as possible (and among the broadest possible masses
of workers) direct the weapon of our criticism against the
Osvobozhdeniye gentry, so that when the future revolution breaks out, the Russian proletariat may, with the
real criticism of weapons, [21] paralyse the inevitable attempts of
the Osvobozhdeniye gentry to curtail the democratic character of the revolution.

Apart from Comrade Egorov’s “perplexity”, mentioned above, over
the question of our “supporting” the oppositional and revolutionary movement, the debate on the resolutions offered little of interest; in fact, there was hardly any debate at all.

The Congress ended with a brief reminder from the chairman that
its decisions were binding on all Party members.

---
Notes:
[1]
See my Letter to the Editors of “Iskra ”, p. 5, and the League Minutes, p. 53. — Lenin

[2] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[3] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[4]
Cf. Comrade Posadovsky’s speech: “. . . By electing three of the
six members of the old editorial board, you pronounce the other
three to be unnecessary and superfluous. And you have neither
any right nor any grounds to do that.”
— Lenin

[5]

In his State of Siege , Comrade Martov treats this question
just as he does all the others he touches upon. He does not
trouble to give a complete picture of the controversy. He very
modestly evades the only real issue of principle that arose in
this controversy: philistine sentimentality or the election of
officials, the Party standpoint, or the injured feelings of the
Ivan Ivanoviches? Here, too, Comrade Martov confines himself to
plucking out isolated bits and pieces of what happened and
adding all sorts of abusive remarks at my expense. That’s not
quite enough, Comrade Martov!

Comrade Martov particularly pesters me with the question why Comrades Axelrod, Zasulich, and Starover
were not elected at the Congress. The philistine attitude he has
adopted prevents him from seeing how unseemly these questions
are (why doesn’t he ask his colleague on the editorial board,
Comrade Plekhanov?). He detects a contradiction in the fact that
I regard the behaviour of the minority at the Congress on the
question of the six as tactless", yet at the same time demand
Party publicity. There is no contradiction here, as Martov
himself could easily have seen if he had taken the trouble to
give a connected account of the whole matter, and not merely
fragments of it.

It was tactless to treat the question from a philistine standpoint and appeal to pity and consideration for
injured feelings; the interests of Party publicity demanded that
an estimation be given in point of fact of the advantages of six as compared with three, an estimation of the
candidates for the posts, an estimation of the different shades;
the minority gave not a hint of any of this at the Congress .

By carefully studying the minutes, Comrade Martov would have
found in the delegates’ speeches a whole series of arguments against the board of six. Here is a selection from
these speeches: firstly, that dissonances, in the sense of
different shades of principle, were clearly apparent in the old
six; secondly, that a technical simplification of the editorial
work was desirable; thirdly, that the interests of the work came
before philistine sentimentality, and only election could ensure
that the persons chosen were suited for their posts; fourthly,
that the right of the Congress to choose must not be restricted;
fifthly, that the Party now needed something more than a
literary group on the Central Organ, that the Central Organ
needed not only writers, but administrators as well; sixthly,
that the Central Organ must consist of quite definite persons,
persons known to the Congress ; seventhly, that a board
of six was often ineffectual, and the board’s work had been
accomplished not thanks to its abnormal constitution, but in spite of it ; eighthly, that the conduct of a
newspaper was a party (not a circle) affair, etc. Let Comrade
Martov, if he is so interested in the reasons for the non-election of these persons, penetrate into the
meaning of each of these considerations and refute a single one of them.
— Lenin

[6] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[7]
See pp. 308-10 of this volume.— Ed .

[8] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[9] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[10]
See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 505-06.– Ed . — Lenin

[11]
See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 507-08.— Ed .

[12] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[13]
I use the words intellectual and intelligentsia to translate the
German Literat and Literatentum , which include not only writers but in general all educated people, the members
of the liberal professions, the brain workers, as the English
call them, as distinct from manual workers.
— Lenin

[14]
It is extremely characteristic of the confusion brought by our
Martovites into all questions of organisation that, though they
have swung towards Akimov aud a misplaced democracy, they are at the same time incensed at the democratic election of the editorial board , its election at the Congress , as planned in advance by everybody! Perhaps that
is your principle , gentlemen?
— Lenin

[15]
Karl Kautsky, “Franz Mehring”, Neue Zeit , XXII, I, S. 101-03,
1903, No. 4. — Lenin

[16]
See pp. 337, 338, 340, 352, etc., of the Congress Minutes. — Lenin

[17]
P. 342. This refers to the election of the fifth member of the
Council. Twenty-four ballots (out of a total of forty-four votes) were
cast, two of which were blank. — Lenin

[18]

At the League Congress Comrade Martov also adduced the following
argument against Comrade Plekhanov’s resolution: "The chief
objection to it, the chief defect of this resolution, is that it
totally ignores the fact that it is our duty, in the struggle
against the autocracy, not to shun alliance with liberal-democratic elements. Comrade Lenin would call this a
Martynov tendency. This tendency is already being manifested in
the new Iskra (p. 88)

For the wealth of “gems” it contains, this passage is indeed
rare.
1) The phrase about alliance with the liberals is
a sheer muddle. Nobody mentioned alliance, Comrade Martov, but
only temporary or partial agreements. That is an entirely
different thing.
2) If Plekhanov’s resolution ignores an
incredible “alliance” and speaks only of “support” in general,
that is one of its merits, not a defect.
3) Perhaps Comrade
Martov will take the trouble to explain what in general
characterises “Martynov tendencies”? Perhaps he will tell us
what is the relation between these tendencies and opportunism?
Perhaps he will trace the relation of these tendencies to
Paragraph 1 of the Rules?
4) I am just burning with impatience
to hear from Comrade Martov how “Martynov tendencies” were
manifested in the “new” Iskra . Please, Comrade Martov,
relieve me of the torments of suspense!
— Lenin

[19]
Osipov—pseudonym of the Bolshevik Rosalia Zemlyachka, co opted after
the Congress to the Central Committee.

[20]
Lenin is referring to a speech made by the Economist Akimov during the Congress
discussion of the Party programme. One of Akimov’s objections against the
Iskra draft programme was that it did not mention the word
“proletariat” in the nominative case, as subject of tile
sentence, but only in the genitive ("party of the proletariat”). This,
Akimov claimed, showed a tendency to exalt the party above the proletariat.

[21]
Lenin is alluding to the following passage in Marx’s Introduction to his
“Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right”:

"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, take the place of criticism
with weapons; it is by material force that material force must be
overthrown.”