Date: 1904
Source: ru:PSS/v8
Source: CW vol 8

Before proceeding to further debates on the rules, it is necessary, for the clarification of our disagreement on the question of the personnel composition of the central institutions, to touch upon the private meetings of the Iskra organization that took place during the congress. The last and most important of these four meetings occurred just after the vote on §1 of the rules—thus, the split in the Iskra organization at this meeting was both chronologically and logically a preceding condition for the further struggle.

The private meetings of the Iskra organization[92] began shortly after the incident with the Organizing Committee (OK), which provided an occasion to discuss possible candidates for the Central Committee (CC). It goes without saying that, due to the abolition of imperative mandates, these meetings had an exclusively advisory, non-binding character, but their significance was nevertheless enormous. The selection for the CC presented significant difficulties for delegates who did not know either the conspiratorial names or the internal work of the Iskra organization—an organization that had created the de facto unity of the party, carried out the leadership of the practical movement, which served as one of the reasons for the official recognition of Iskra. We have already seen that, with the unity of the Iskra-ists, they were fully assured of a large, up to 3/5, majority at the congress, and all delegates perfectly understood this. All Iskra-ists were precisely waiting for the Iskra organization to come forward with a recommendation for a specific personnel composition of the CC, and not a single member of this organization raised any objection to the preliminary discussion within it of the composition of the CC; no one even mentioned the confirmation of the entire OK, i.e., its transformation into the CC, nor did anyone mention further consultations with the entire OK regarding candidates for the CC. This circumstance is also extremely characteristic and extremely important to keep in mind, for now the Martovites are zealously defending the OK in retrospect, thereby only proving for the hundredth and thousandth time their political spinelessness[93]. As long as the split over the composition of the centers had not yet united Martov with the Akimovs, it was clear to everyone at the congress—and any impartial person can easily be convinced of this from the protocols of the congress and from the entire history of Iskra—that the OK was primarily a committee for convening the congress, a committee specially composed of representatives of different shades, including the Bund; the actual work of creating organizational unity of the party was entirely borne by the Iskra organization (it should also be noted that several Iskra members of the OK were absent from the congress purely by chance, due to arrests and other "independent" circumstances). The composition of the Iskra organization present at the congress has already been given in Comrade Pavlovich's brochure (see his "Letter on the Second Congress," p. 13){104}. The final result of the heated debates in the Iskra organization was two votes, which I have already cited in the "Letter to the Editorial Board." The first vote: "one of the candidates supported by Martov is rejected by nine votes against four, with three abstentions." It would seem that nothing could be simpler and more natural than such a fact: with the general consent of all sixteen members of the Iskra organization present at the congress, the question of possible candidates is discussed, and a majority rejects one of Comrade Martov's candidates (specifically, the candidacy of Comrade Stein, as Comrade Martov himself blurted out, unable to hold back, on p. 69 of "Siege Position")? After all, we gathered at the party congress, among other things, precisely to discuss and decide the question of who should be entrusted with the "baton"—and it was our common party duty to give the utmost serious attention to this item on the agenda, to decide this question from the standpoint of the interests of the cause, and not "bourgeois sentimentality," as Comrade Rusov later quite rightly put it. Of course, in discussing the question of candidates at the congress, it was impossible not to touch on certain personal qualities, to express approval or disapproval[94], especially in an unofficial and close gathering. And I had already warned at the League congress that disapproval of a candidate is absurdly considered something "disgraceful" (p. 49 of the League protocol), it is absurd to make a "scene" and raise a hysteria over what is directly part of the conscientious and careful performance of the party duty to elect officials. However, it was from here that the whole fuss arose for our minority; after the congress, they began to shout about the "destruction of reputation" (p. 70 of the League protocol) and to assure the public in print that Comrade Stein was the "main figure" of the former OK and that he was unjustly accused of "some diabolical plans" (p. 69 of "Siege Position"). Well, isn't this hysteria, when cries of "reputation destruction" are made over the approval or disapproval of candidates? Isn't this squabbling, when, having suffered defeat both in the private meeting of the Iskra organization and in the official, highest party assembly, at the congress, people then raise complaints in the street and recommend to the respectable public the rejected candidates as "main figures"?—when people then impose their candidates on the party through a split and demands for co-optation? Our political concepts have become so muddled in the stagnant foreign atmosphere that Comrade Martov can no longer distinguish between party duty and cliquishness and nepotism! It must be bureaucracy and formalism to think that the question of candidates is appropriate to discuss and decide only at congresses, where delegates gather primarily to discuss important principled questions, where representatives of the movement capable of impartially approaching the question of persons, capable (and obliged) to demand and collect all information about candidates for a decisive vote, where allocating a certain place for disputes over the baton is natural and necessary. Instead of this bureaucratic and formalistic view, we now have other customs: after the congresses, we will talk right and left about the political funerals of Ivan Ivanovich, about the destruction of the reputation of Ivan Nikiforovich; candidates will be recommended in brochures by one or another writer, and while doing so, they will Pharisaically beat their chests: not a clique, but a party... The reading public, those who are fond of scandals, will greedily revel in this sensational news that such-and-such was the main figure of the OK, according to Martov himself[95]. This reading public is much more capable of discussing and deciding the question than formalistic institutions like congresses with their crudely mechanical decisions by majority... Yes, there are still great Augean stables{105} of foreign squabbling to be cleaned by our real party workers!

The other vote of the Iskra organization: "accepted by ten votes against two, with four abstentions, a list of five (for the CC) in which, at my suggestion, one leader of the non-Iskra elements and one leader of the Iskra minority were included"[96]. This vote is extremely important, for it clearly and irrefutably proves the complete falsehood of the stories that later grew, in the atmosphere of squabbling, that we wanted to expel or exclude non-Iskra-ists from the party, that the majority was choosing only from one half of the congress and so on. All of this is sheer falsehood. The vote I have cited shows that we did not exclude non-Iskra-ists not only from the party but even from the CC, and we gave our opponents a very significant minority. The whole point was that they wanted to have a majority, and when this modest desire was not realized, they raised a scandal, completely refusing to participate in the centers. That this was indeed the case, contrary to Comrade Martov's assertions in the League, is evident from the following letter sent to us, the majority of the Iskra-ists (and the majority of the congress, after the departure of seven), by the minority of the Iskra organization shortly after the adoption of §1 of the rules at the congress (it should be noted that the meeting of the Iskra organization, which I spoke about, was the last: after it, the organization de facto broke up, and both sides tried to convince the remaining delegates of the congress of their righteousness).

Here is the text of the letter:

The meeting of the "Iskra" organization, which I spoke about, was the last: after it, the organization de facto disintegrated, and both sides tried to convince the other delegates of the congress of their rightness).

Here is the text of the letter:

"Having heard the explanations of delegates Sorokin and Sablina on the question of the desire of the majority of the editorial board and the 'Emancipation of Labor' group to participate in the meeting (on such-and-such a date[97]) and having established with the help of these delegates that at the previous meeting a list of candidates for the Central Committee was read out, supposedly originating from us, which was used for an incorrect characterization of our entire political position, and bearing in mind that, firstly, this list was ascribed to us without any attempt to verify its origin; that, secondly, this circumstance is undoubtedly connected with the openly spread accusation of opportunism against the majority of the editorial board of 'Iskra' and the 'Emancipation of Labor' group; and that, thirdly, for us, the connection of this accusation with the existing, quite definite plan to change the composition of the editorial board of 'Iskra' is perfectly clear – we find the explanations given to us regarding the reasons for not allowing us to the meeting unsatisfactory, and the unwillingness to allow us to the meeting – evidence of the unwillingness to give us the opportunity to dispel the above-mentioned false accusations.

On the question of a possible agreement between us on a common list of candidates for the Central Committee, we declare that the only list we can accept as the basis for an agreement is the following: Popov, Trotsky, Glebov, while emphasizing the character of this list as a compromise list, since the inclusion of Comrade Glebov in this list has significance only as a concession to the wishes of the majority, because, after the role of Comrade Glebov at the congress became clear to us, we do not consider Comrade Glebov to meet the requirements that should be presented to a candidate for the Central Committee.

At the same time, we emphasize the fact that, entering into negotiations on candidates for the Central Committee, we do so without any relation to the question of the composition of the editorial board of the Central Organ, since we are not willing to enter into any negotiations on this issue (of the composition of the editorial board).

This letter, accurately reproducing the mood of the disputing parties and the state of the dispute, immediately introduces us to the 'core' of the beginning split and shows its real causes. The minority of the 'Iskra' organization, not wishing to agree with the majority, preferring free agitation at the congress (having, of course, every right to do so), nevertheless, seeks from the 'delegates' of the majority admission to their private meeting! It is understandable that this amusing demand met in our meeting (the letter, of course, was read out at the meeting) only with a smile and a shrug, and the outcries, already bordering on hysteria, regarding 'false accusations of opportunism' caused outright laughter. But let us first examine, point by point, the bitter complaints of Martov and Starover.

They were incorrectly ascribed a list; their political position was incorrectly characterized. – But as Martov himself admits (p. 64 of the League's protocols), I did not think to doubt the truthfulness of his words that he was not the author of the list. The question of authorship is generally irrelevant here, and whether the list was drafted by any of the Iskraists or by any representatives of the 'center,' etc., – this has absolutely no significance. What is important is that this list, consisting entirely of members of the current minority, circulated at the congress, even if only as a simple guess or assumption. Most importantly, finally, is that Comrade Martov had to defend himself with hands and feet at the congress from such a list, which he now should have welcomed with enthusiasm. There could be no more vivid illustration of the instability in the evaluation of people and nuances than this leap over a couple of months from cries about a 'disgraceful rumor' to imposing on the party, at the center, precisely those candidates from the supposedly disgracing list![98]

This list, – said Comrade Martov at the League congress, – 'meant a political coalition of ours and 'Yuzhny Rabochii' with the Bund, a coalition in the sense of a direct agreement' (p. 64). This is incorrect, for, firstly, the Bund would never have gone for an 'agreement' on a list in which there was not a single Bundist; and, secondly, there was no talk and could be no talk of a direct agreement (which seemed shameful to Martov) not only with the Bund but also with the 'Yuzhny Rabochii' group. The matter was not about an agreement, but about a coalition, not about Comrade Martov making a deal, but about the fact that he inevitably had to be supported by the very anti-Iskra and unstable elements with whom he fought during the first half of the congress and who latched onto his mistake in §1 of the charter. The letter I have quoted proves most indisputably that the root of the 'offense' lay precisely in the open, and moreover, false, accusation of opportunism. These 'accusations,' over which the whole fuss began and which Comrade Martov now carefully avoids, despite my reminder in the 'Letter to the Editor,' were of two kinds: first, during the debate on §1 of the charter, Plekhanov directly stated that the question of §1 was a question of 'separating' from us 'all sorts of representatives of opportunism' and that for my draft, as a bulwark against their intrusion into the party, 'for this reason alone, all opponents of opportunism must vote' (p. 246 of the congress protocols). These energetic words, despite the small softening I introduced (p. 250)[99], caused a sensation, clearly expressed in the speeches of Comrades Rusov (p. 247), Trotsky (p. 248), and Akimov (p. 253). In the 'corridors' of our 'parliament,' Plekhanov's thesis was lively commented on and varied in a thousand ways in endless debates about §1. And instead of defending themselves on the merits, our dear comrades resorted to a ridiculous offense, up to written complaints about 'false accusations of opportunism'!

The psychology of circle mentality and striking party immaturity, unable to withstand the fresh breeze of open debates before everyone, manifested itself here in full view. This is the familiar Russian psychology, expressed in the old saying: either in the teeth or shake hands! People are so accustomed to the glass bell jar of a close and warm company that they fainted at the first appearance, behind their responsibility, on a free and open arena. To accuse, and of what? The 'Emancipation of Labor' group, and moreover, the majority of it, of opportunism – can you imagine such horror! Either a party split due to such an indelible insult, or to hush up this 'domestic unpleasantness' by restoring the 'continuity' of the glass bell jar – this dilemma is already quite clearly outlined in the letter under consideration. The psychology of intellectual individualism and circle mentality collided with the requirement of an open appearance before the party. Just imagine that in the German party such nonsense, such pettiness, as a complaint about 'false accusations of opportunism' would be possible! Proletarian organization and discipline long ago weaned them from this intellectual flabbiness. No one treats, say, Liebknecht with anything but the greatest respect, but how they would have ridiculed there complaints that he was 'openly accused of opportunism' (along with Bebel) at the 1895 congress{106}, when he found himself in bad company with the known opportunist Vollmar and his friends. Liebknecht's name is inseparably linked with the history of the German workers' movement not because, of course, Liebknecht happened to fall into opportunism on such a relatively minor and specific issue, but in spite of it. And just as, in spite of any irritation from the struggle, the name, say, of Comrade Axelrod inspires and will always inspire respect in every Russian Social-Democrat, but not because Comrade Axelrod happened to defend an opportunist idea at the second congress of our party, happened to dig up old anarchist nonsense at the second congress of the League, but in spite of it. Only the most hardened circle mentality with its logic: either in the teeth or shake hands, could raise a hysterical fuss and a party split over 'false accusations of opportunism against the majority of the 'Emancipation of Labor' group.'

The narrow coterie mentality with its logic: either a punch in the face or a handshake, could raise a hysteria, squabble, and party split over the "false accusation of opportunism against the majority of the 'Emancipation of Labor' group."

Another basis for this terrible accusation is most closely connected with the previous one (Comrade Martov vainly tried at the League Congress (p. 63) to evade and blur one aspect of this incident). It refers precisely to that coalition of anti-Iskra and wavering elements with Comrade Martov, which began to take shape around § 1 of the statutes. Of course, there was no direct or indirect agreement between Comrade Martov and the anti-Iskra people, nor could there be, and no one suspected him of it: it only seemed so to him out of fear. But his political mistake manifested itself precisely in the fact that people undoubtedly inclined towards opportunism began to form an increasingly dense "compact" majority around him (which has now become a minority only thanks to the "accidental" departure of seven delegates). We pointed out this "coalition," of course, also openly immediately after § 1 and at the congress (see the already mentioned remark by Comrade Pavlovich, p. 255 of the congress minutes) and in the Iskra organization (Plekhanov, in particular, emphasized this, as I recall). This is literally the same indication and the same mockery that fell on Bebel and Liebknecht in 1895 when Zetkin said to them: "Es tut mir in der Seele weh, daß ich dich in der Gesellschaft seh'" (it grieves me in my soul to see you – i.e., Bebel – in such company – i.e., with Vollmar and Co.).{107} It is strange, really, that Bebel and Liebknecht did not then send Kautsky and Zetkin a hysterical letter about a false accusation of opportunism...

Regarding the list of candidates for the Central Committee, this letter shows the mistake of Comrade Martov, who asserted in the League that the refusal to come to terms with us was not yet final – another example of how unwise it is in political struggle to try to reproduce conversations from memory instead of checking documents. In reality, the "minority" was so modest that it presented an ultimatum to the "majority": take two from the "minority" and one (as a compromise and only as a concession!) from the "majority." This is monstrous, but it is a fact. And this fact clearly shows how absurd the current stories are, that the "majority" of one half of the congress chose representatives of only one half. On the contrary: the Martovites, as a concession, offered us one out of three, thus wishing, in case of our disagreement with this original "concession," to push through all their own! We laughed at the modesty of the Martovites at our private meeting and made up our own list: Glebov – Travin (later elected to the CC) – Popov. The latter was replaced by us (also at a private meeting of the 24) with Comrade Vasiliev (later elected to the CC) only because Comrade Popov refused to go in our list, first in a private conversation, and then openly at the congress (p. 338).

That's how it was.

The modest "minority" had a modest desire to be in the majority. When this modest desire was not satisfied, the "minority" deigned to refuse altogether and start a scandal. And now there are still people who condescendingly talk about the "inflexibility" of the "majority"!

The "minority" presented amusing ultimatums to the "majority," going into battle with free agitation at the congress. After suffering defeat, our heroes burst into tears and shouted about a state of siege. Voilà tout[100].

We (the private meeting of the 24) met the terrible accusation that we intended to change the composition of the editorial board with a smile: everyone knew from the very beginning of the congress and even before the congress about the plan to renew the editorial board by electing an initial trio (I will say more about this when I speak about the election of the editorial board at the congress). That the "minority" was frightened by this plan after seeing that a beautiful confirmation of the correctness of this plan was the coalition of the "minority" with the anti-Iskra people – this did not surprise us, it was quite natural. Of course, we could not take seriously the proposal to voluntarily, before the struggle at the congress, turn into a minority, we could not take seriously the entire letter, whose authors, in their incredible degree of irritation, spoke of "false accusations of opportunism." We firmly hoped that the party duty would very quickly prevail over the natural desire to "vent one's heart."