One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (THE CRISIS IN OUR PARTY)

O. After the Congress. Two Methods of Struggle

The analysis of the debates and voting at the Congress, which we
have now concluded, actually explains in nuce (in embryo) everything that has happened since the Congress , and we can be brief in outlining the subsequent
stages of our Party crisis.

The refusal of Martov and Popov to stand for election immediately introduced an atmosphere of squabbling into
a Party struggle between Party shades. On the very next day
after the Congress, Comrade Glebov, thinking it incredible that
the unelected editors could seriously have decided to swing towards Akimov and Martynov, and attributing the whole
thing primarily to irritation, suggested to Plekhanov and me
that the matter should be ended peaceably and that all four
should be “co-opted” on condition that proper representation of
the editorial board on the Council was guaranteed (i.e., that of
the two representatives, one was definitely drawn from the
Party majority). This condition seemed sound to
Plekhanov and me, for its acceptance would imply a tacit admission of the mistake at the Congress , a desire for
peace instead of war, a desire to be closer to Plekhanov and me
than to Akimov and Martynov, Egorov and Makhov. The concession
as regards “co-optation” thus became a personal one, and it was not worth while refusing to make a personal
concession which should clear away the irritation and restore
peace. Plekhanov and I therefore consented. But the editorial
majority rejected the condition. Glebov left . We began
to wait and see what would happen next: whether Martov would
adhere to the loyal stand he had taken up at the Congress
(against Comrade Popov, the representative of the
Centre), or whether the unstable elements who inclined towards a
split, and in whose wake he had followed, would gain the upper
hand.

We were faced with the question: would Comrade Martov choose to
regard his Congress “coalition” as an isolated political fact
(just as, si licet parva componere magnis , [1]

Bebel’s coalition with Vollmar in
1895 was an isolated case), or would he want to consolidate this coalition, exert himself to prove that
it was Plekhanov and I who were mistaken at the
Congress, and become the actual leader of the opportunist wing
of our Party? This question might be formulated otherwise as
follows: a squabble or a political Party struggle? Of the three
of us who on the day after the Congress were the sole available
members of the central institutions, Glebov inclined most to the
former answer and made the most efforts to reconcile the
children who had fallen out. Comrade Plekhanov inclined most to
the latter answer and was, as the saying goes, neither to hold
nor to bind. I on this occasion acted the part of “Centre”, or
“Marsh”, and endeavoured to employ persuasion. To try at this
date to recall the spoken attempts at persuasion would be a
hopelessly muddled business, and I shall not follow the bad
example of Comrade Martov and Comrade Plekhanov. But I do
consider it necessary to reproduce certain passages from one
written attempt at persuasion which I addressed to one of the
“minority” Iskra -ists:

“. . . The refusal of Martov to serve on the editorial board,
his refusal and that of other Party writers to collaborate, the
refusal of a number of persons to work on the Central Committee,
and the propaganda of a boycott or passive resistance are bound
to lead, even if against the wishes of Martov and his friends,
to a split in the Party. Even if Martov adheres to a loyal stand
(which he took up so resolutely at the Congress), others will
not, and the outcome I have mentioned will be inevitable....

“And so I ask myself: over what, in point of fact, would we be
parting company? . . . I go over all the events and impressions
of the Congress; I realise that I often behaved and acted in a
state of frightful irritation, ’frenziedly’; I am quite willing
to admit this fault of mine to anyone, if that can be called a
fault which was a natural product of the atmosphere, the
reactions, the interjections, the struggle, etc. But examining
now, quite unfrenziedly, the results attained, the outcome
achieved by frenzied struggle, I can detect nothing, absolutely
nothing in these results that is injurious to the Party, and
absolutely nothing that is an affront or insult to the minority.

“Of course, the very fact of finding oneself in the minority
could not but be vexatious, but I categorically protest against
the idea that we ’cast slurs’ on anybody, that we wanted to insult or humiliate anybody. Nothing of the
kind. And one should not allow political differences to lead to
an interpretation of events based on accusing the other side of
unscrupulousness, chicanery, intrigue, and the other nice things
we are hearing mentioned more and more often in this atmosphere
of an impending split. This should not be allowed, for it is, to
say the least, the nec plus ultra of irrationality.

“Martov and I have had a political (and organisational)
difference, as we had dozens of times before. Defeated over
Paragraph 1 of the Rules, I could not but strive with all my
might for revanche in what remained to me (and to the
Congress). I could not but strive, on the one hand, for a
strictly Iskra -ist Central Committee, and, on the other, for a trio on the editorial board.... I consider this
trio

the only one capable of being an official institution, instead of a body based on indulgence and
slackness, the only one to be a real centre, each member of
which would always state and defend his Party viewpoint, not one
grain more, and irrespective of all personal considerations and
all fear of giving offence, of resignations, and so on.

“This trio, after what had occurred at the Congress, undoubtedly
meant legitimising a political and organisational line in one
respect directed against Martov. Undoubtedly. Cause a rupture on
that account? Break up the Party because of it?? Did not Martov
and Plekhanov oppose me over the question of demonstrations? And
did not Martov and I oppose Plekhanov over the question of the
programme? Is not one side of every trio always up against the
other two? If the majority of the Iskra-ists, both in the Iskra
organisation and at the Congress, found this particular shade of
Martov’s line organisationally and politically mistaken, is it
not really senseless to attempt to attribute this to ’intrigue’,
’incitement’, and so forth? Would it not be senseless to try to
talk away this fact by abusing the majority and calling
them ’riffraff’?

“I repeat that, like the majority of the Iskra-ists at the
Congress, I am profoundly convinced that the line Martov adopted
was wrong, and that he had to be corrected. To take offence at
this correction, to regard it as an insult, etc., is unreasonable. We have not cast, and are not casting, any ’slurs’
on anyone, nor are we excluding anyone from work . And to cause a split because someone has been excluded from a central body seems to me a piece of inconceivable folly.” [2]
[2] This letter (to A. N. Potresov, of August 31 [September 13], 1903– Ed .) was written in September (New Style). I have only omitted what seemed to me irrelevant to the matter in hand. If the addressee considers what I have omitted important, he can easily repair the omission. Incidentally, let me take this opportunity to say that any of my opponents may publish any of my private letters should they think a useful purpose will be served by it. — Lenin

I have thought it necessary to recall these written statements
of mine now, because they conclusively prove that the majority wanted to draw a definite line at once between
possible (and in a heated struggle inevitable) personal grievances and personal irritations caused by biting and
“frenzied” attacks, etc., on the one hand, and a definite
political mistake, a definite political line (coalition with the
Right wing), on the other.

These statements prove that the passive resistance of the minority began immediately after the Congress and
at once evoked from us the warning that it was a step towards splitting the Party ; the warning that it ran
directly counter to their declarations of loyalty at the Congress ; that the split would be solely over the fact of exclusion from the central institutions (that is,
non-election to them), for nobody ever thought of excluding any
Party member from work ; and that our political difference (an inevitable difference, inasmuch as it had not yet
been elucidated and settled which line at the Congress was
mistaken, Martov’s or ours) was being perverted more and more into a squabble , accompanied by abuse, suspicions, and
so on and so forth.

But the warnings were in vain. The behaviour of the minority
showed that the least stable elements among them, those who
least valued the Party , were gaining the upper hand. This compelled Plekhanov and me to withdraw the consent we
had given to Glebov’s proposal. For if the minority were
demonstrating by their deeds their political instability not only as regards principles, but even as regards
elementary Party loyalty , what value could be attached
to their talk about this celebrated “continuity”?
Nobody scoffed more wittily than Plekhanov at the utter
absurdity of demanding the “co-optation” to the Party editorial
board of a majority consisting of people who frankly proclaimed
their new and growing differences of opinion! Has there ever
been a case in the world of a party majority on the central
institutions converting itself into a minority of its own
accord, prior to the airing of new differences in the press, in full view of the Party? Let the differences
first be stated, let the Party judge how profound and important
they were, let the Party itself correct the mistake it had made
at the Second Congress, should it be shown that it had made a
mistake! The very fact that such a demand was made on the plea of differences still unknown demonstrated the utter
instability of those who made it, the complete submersion of
political differences by squabbling, and their entire disrespect both for the Party as a whole and for their own
convictions. Never have there been, nor will there be, persons
of convinced principle who refuse to try to convince before they secure (privately ) a
majority in the institution they want to bring round to their
standpoint.

Finally, on October 4, Comrade Plekhanov announced that he would
make a last attempt to put an end to this absurd state of affairs. A meeting was called of all the six members of the
old editorial board, attended by a new member of the Central

Committee. [3]
[3] This Central Committee member [13] arranged, in addition, a number of private and collective talks with the minority, in which he refuted the preposterous tales that were being spread and appealed to their sense of Party duty. — Lenin

Comrade Plekhanov spent three whole hours proving how unreasonable it was to demand “co-optation” of four of the
“minority” to two of the “majority”. He proposed co-opting two of them , so as, on the one hand, to remove all fears
that we wanted to "bully, suppress, besiege, behead or bury
anyone, and, on the other, to safeguard the rights and position
of the Party “majority”. The co-optation of two was likewise rejected .

On October 6, Plekhanov and I wrote the following official
letter to all the old editors of Iskra and to Comrade
Trotsky, one of its contributors:

“Dear Comrades, “The editorial board of the Central Organ considers it its duty
officially to express its regret at your withdrawal from
participation in Iskra and Zarya . In spite of the repeated invitations to collaborate which we made to you
immediately following the Second Party Congress and several
times after, we have not received a single contribution from
you. The editors of the Central Organ declare that your
withdrawal from participation is not justified by anything they
have done. No personal irritation should serve, of course, as an
obstacle to your working on the Central Organ of the Party. If,
on the other hand, your withdrawal is due to any differences of
opinion with us, we would consider it of the greatest benefit to
the Party if you were to set forth these differences at
length. More, we would consider it highly desirable for the
nature and depth of these differences to be explained to the
whole Party as early as possible in the columns of the publications of which we are the editors.” [4]
[4] The letter to Comrade Martov contained in addition a reference to a certain pamphlet and the following sentence: “Lastly, we once more inform you, in the interests of the work, that we are still prepared to co-opt you to the editorial board of the Central Organ, in order to give you every opportunity officially to state and defend your views in the supreme institution of the Party.” — Lenin

As the reader sees, it was still quite unclear to us whether the
actions of the “minority” were principally governed by personal
irritation or by a desire to steer the organ (and the Party)
along a new course , and if so, what course exactly. I think that if we were even now to set seventy wise men to
elucidate this question with the help of any literature or any
testimony you like, they too could make nothing of this
tangle. I doubt whether a squabble can ever be disentangled: you
have either to cut it, or set it aside. [5]
[5] Comrade Plekhanov would probably add: “or satisfy each and every claim of the initiators of the squabble”. We shall see why this was impossible. — Lenin

Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, Trotsky, and Koltsov sent a couple
of lines in reply to this letter of October 6, to the effect
that the undersigned were taking no part in Iskra since
its passage into the hands of the new editorial board. Comrade
Martov was more communicative and honoured us with the following
reply:

“To the Editorial Board of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

“Dear Comrades, “In reply to your letter of October 6 I wish to state the
following: I consider all our discussions on the subject of
working together on one organ at an end after the conference
which took place in the presence of a Central Committee member
on October 4, and at which you refused to state the reasons that
induced you to withdraw your proposal to us that Axelrod,
Zasulich, Starover, and I should join the editorial board on
condition that we undertook to elect Comrade Lenin our
’representative’ on the Council. After you repeatedly evaded at
this conference formulating the statements you had yourselves
made in the presence of witnesses, I do not think it necessary
to explain in a letter to you my motives for refusing to work on
Iskra under present conditions. Should the need arise, I shall explain them in detail to the whole Party, which will
already be able to learn from the minutes of the Second Congress
why I rejected the proposal, which you now repeat that I accept
a seat on the editorial board and on the

Council.... [6] “ L. Martov ”

This letter, in conjunction with the previous documents,
clarifies beyond any possible dispute that question of boycott,
disorganisation, anarchy, and preparations for a split which
Comrade Martov (with the help of exclamation marks and rows of
dots) so assiduously evades in his State of Siege —the question of loyal and disloyal methods of
struggle.

Comrade Martov and the others are invited to set forth their differences, they are asked to tell us plainly
what the trouble is all about and what their intentions are,
they are exhorted to stop sulking and to analyse calmly
the mistake made over Paragraph 1 (which is intimately connected
with their mistake in swinging to the Right)—but Comrade
Martov and Co. refuse to talk , and cry: "We are being besieged! We are being bullied!" The jibe about “dreadful words”
has not cooled the ardour of these comical outcries.

How is it possible to besiege someone who refuses to work together with you ?—we asked Comrade
Martov. How is it possible to ill-treat, “bully”, and oppress a
minority which refuses to be a minority ? Being in the minority necessarily and inevitably involves certain
disadvantages. These disadvantages are that you either have to
join a body which will outvote you on certain questions, or you
stay outside that body and attack it, and consequently come
under the fire of well-mounted batteries.

Did Comrade Martov’s cries about a “state of siege” mean that
those in the minority were being fought or governed unfairly and
unloyally? Only such an assertion could have contained even a grain of sense (in Martov’s eyes), for, I repeat, being
in the minority necessarily and inevitably involves certain
disadvantages. But the whole comedy of the matter is that
Comrade Martov could not be fought at all as long as he
refused to talk! The minority could not be governed at all as
long as they refused to be a minority!

Comrade Martov could not cite a single fact to show that the editorial board of the Central Organ had exceeded or
abused its powers while Plekhanov and I were on it. Nor could
the practical workers of the minority cite a single fact of a like kind with regard to the Central
Committee. However Comrade Martov may now twist and turn in his
State of Siege , it remains absolutely incontrovertible
that the outcries about a state of siege were nothing but “feeble whining” .

How utterly Comrade Martov and Co. lacked sensible arguments against the editorial board appointed by the Congress
is best of all shown by their own catchword: “We are not serfs!”
(State of Siege , p. 34.) The mentality of the bourgeois
intellectual, who counts himself among the “elect minds”
standing above mass organisation and mass discipline, is
expressed here with remarkable clarity. To explain their refusal to work in the Party by saying that they “are not
serfs” is to give themselves away completely , to confess to a total lack of arguments, an utter inability to
furnish any motives, any sensible reasons for dissatisfaction. Plekhanov and I declare that their refusal is
not justified by anything we have done; we request them to set
forth their differences; and all they reply is: “We are not
serfs” (adding that no bargain has yet been reached on the
subject of co-optation).

To the individualism of the intellectual, which already
manifested itself in the controversy over Paragraph 1, revealing
its tendency to opportunist argument and anarchistic phrase-mongering, all proletarian organisation and
discipline seems to be serfdom . The reading public will
soon learn that in the eyes of these “Party members” and Party
“officials” even a new Party Congress is a serf institution that is terrible and abhorrent to the “elect
minds”.... This “institution” is indeed terrible to people
who are not averse to making use of the Party title but are
conscious that this title of theirs does not accord with the interests and will of the Party.

The committee resolutions enumerated in my letter to the editors
of the new Iskra , and published by Comrade Martov in his State of Siege , show with facts that the behaviour
of the minority amounted all along to sheer disobedience of the decisions of the Congress and
disorganisation of positive practical work. Consisting of opportunists and people who detested Iskra , the
minority strove to rend the Party and damaged and disorganised its work, thirsting to avenge their defeat at the
Congress and sensing that by honest and loyal means (by
explaining their case in the press or at a congress) they would
never succeed in refuting the accusation of opportunism
and intellectualist instability which at the Second Congress had
been levelled against them.

Realising that they could not convince the Party, they tried to gain their ends by disorganising the Party and
hampering all its work . They were reproached with having (by their mistakes at the Congress) caused a crack in our
pot; they replied to the reproach by trying with all their might to smash the pot altogether .

So distorted had their ideas become that boycott and refusal to
work were proclaimed to be “ honest [7] methods” of struggle. Comrade Martov is now
wriggling all around this delicate point. Comrade Martov is such
a “man of principle” that he defends boycott . . . when
practised by the minority, but condemns boycott when, his side
happening to have become the majority, it threatens Martov
himself!

We need not, I think, go into the question whether this is a
squabble or a “difference of principle” as to what are honest
methods of struggle in a Social-Democratic workers’ party.

After the unsuccessful attempts (of October 4 and 6) to obtain
an explanation from the comrades who had started the “co-optation” row, nothing remained for the central institutions
but to wait and see what would come of their verbal assurances
that they would adhere to loyal methods of struggle. On October
10, the Central Committee addressed a circular letter to the
League (see League Minutes, pp. 3-5), announcing that it was
engaged in drafting Rules for the League and inviting the League
members to assist. The Administration of the League had at that
time decided against a congress of that body (by two votes to
one; ibid ., p. 20). The replies received from minority
supporters to this circular showed at once that the celebrated
promise to be loyal and abide by the decisions of the Congress
was just talk, and that, as a matter of fact, the minority had
positively decided not to obey the central institutions
of the Party, replying to their appeals to collaborate with
evasive excuses full of sophistry and anarchistic phrase-mongering. In reply to the famous
open letter of Deutsch, a member of the Administration (p. 10),
Plekhanov, myself, and other supporters of the majority
expressed our vigorous "protest against the gross violations of
Party discipline by which an official of the League permits
himself to hamper the organisational activities of a Party
institution and calls upon other comrades likewise to violate
discipline and the Rules. Remarks such as, ’I do not consider
myself at liberty to take part in such work on the invitation of
the Central Committee’, or, ’Comrades, we must on no account
allow it [The Central Committee] to draw up new Rules for the
League’, etc., are agitational methods of a kind that can only
arouse disgust in anyone who has the slightest conception of the
meaning of the words party, organisation, and party discipline. Such methods are all the more disgraceful for the
fact that they are being used against a newly created Party
institution and are therefore an undoubted attempt to undermine
confidence in it among Party comrades, and that, moreover, they
are being employed under the cachet of a member of the League
Administration and behind the back of the Central Committee.”
(p. 17.)

Under such conditions, the League Congress promised to be
nothing but a brawl.

From the outset, Comrade Martov continued his Congress tactics
of “getting personal”, this time with Comrade Plekhanov, by
distorting private conversations. Comrade Plekhanov protested,
and Comrade Martov was obliged to withdraw his accusations
(League Minutes, pp. 39 and 134), which were a product of either
irresponsibility or resentment.

The time for the report arrived. I had been the League’s
delegate at the Party Congress. A mere reference to the summary
of my report (p. 43 et seq.) [8] will show the reader that I gave a rough outline of that analysis of the voting at
the Congress which, in greater detail, forms the contents of the
present pamphlet. The central feature of the report was
precisely the proof that, owing to their mistakes, Martov and
Co. had landed in the opportunist wing of our Party. Although
this report was made to an audience whose majority consisted of
violent opponents, they could discover absolutely nothing in it
which departed from loyal methods of Party struggle and
controversy.

Martov’s report, on the contrary, apart from minor “corrections”
to particular points of my account (the incorrectness of these
corrections we have shown above), was nothing but—a product
of disordered nerves.

No wonder that the majority refused to carry on the fight in
this atmosphere. Comrade Plekhanov entered a protest against the
“scene” (p. 68)—it was indeed a regular " scene "!—and withdrew from the Congress without stating the
objections he had already prepared on the substance of the
report. Nearly all the other supporters of the majority also
withdrew from the Congress, after filing a written protest
against the “unworthy behaviour” of Comrade Martov (League
Minutes, p. 75).

The methods of struggle employed by the minority became
perfectly clear to all. We had accused the minority of committing a political mistake at the Congress, of having swung
towards opportunism, of having formed a coalition with the
Bundists, the Akimovs, the Brouckères, the Egorovs, and the
Makhovs. The minority had been defeated at the Congress, and
they had now “worked out” two methods of struggle, embracing all their endless variety of sorties, assaults,
attacks, etc.

First method —disorganising all the activity of the
Party, damaging the work, hampering all and everything “without
statement of reasons”.

Second method —making “scenes”, and so on and so forth. [9]
[9] I have already pointed out that it would be unwise to attribute to sordid motives even the most sordid manifestations of the squabbling that is so habitual in the atmosphere of émigré and exile colonies. It is a sort of epidemic disease engendered by abnormal conditions of life, disordered nerves, and so on. I had to give a true picture of this system of struggle here, because Comrade Martov has again resorted to it in its full scope in his " State of Siege". — Lenin

This “second method of struggle” is also apparent in the
League’s famous resolutions of “principle”, in the discussion of
which the “majority”, of course, took no part. Let us examine
these resolutions, which Comrade Martov has reproduced in his
State of Siege .

The first resolution, signed by Comrades Trotsky, Fomin,
Deutsch, and others, contains two theses directed against the
“majority” of the Party Congress: 1) “The League expresses its
profound regret that, owing to the manifestation at the Congress
of tendencies which essentially run counter to the earlier
policy of Iskra , due care was not given in drafting the
Party Rules to providing sufficient safeguards of the independence and authority of the Central Committee.” (League
Minutes, p. 83.)

As we have already seen, this thesis of “principle” amounts to
nothing but Akimov phrase-mongering, the opportunist character of which was exposed at the Party
Congress even by Comrade Popov! In point of fact, the claim that the “majority” did not mean to safeguard the
independence and authority of the Central Committee was never
anything but gossip . It need only be mentioned that when Plekhanov and I were on the editorial board, there was on the Council no predominance of the Central Organ over
the Central Committee, but when the Martovites joined the
editorial board, the Central Organ secured predominance
over the Central Committee on the Council! When we were on the
editorial board, practical workers in Russia predominated on the Council over writers residing
abroad; since the Martovites took over, the contrary has been
the case. When we were on the editorial board, the Council
never once attempted to interfere in any practical matter; since the unanimous co-optation
such interference has begun , as the reading public will
learn in detail in the near future.

Next thesis of the resolution we are examining: “. . . when
constituting the official central bodies of the Party, the
Congress ignored the need for maintaining continuity with the
actually existing central bodies....”

This thesis boils down to nothing but the question of the
personal composition of the central bodies. The “minority” preferred to evade the fact that at the Congress the
old central bodies had proved their unfitness and committed a
number of mistakes. But most comical of all is the reference to
“continuity” with respect to the Organising Committee. At the
Congress, as we have seen, nobody even hinted that the entire
membership of the Organising Committee should be endorsed. At
the Congress, Martov actually cried in a frenzy that a list
containing three members of the Organising Committee was
defamatory to him. At the Congress, the final list proposed by the “minority” contained one member of the
Organising Committee (Popov , Glebov or Fomin, and
Trotsky), whereas the list the “majority” put through contained
two

members of the Organising Committee out of three (Travinsky , Vasilyev , and Glebov). We ask, can
this reference to “continuity” really be considered a “difference of principle”?

Let us pass to the other resolution, which was signed by four
members of the old editorial board, headed by Comrade
Axelrod. Here we find all those major accusations against the
“majority” which have subsequently been repeated many times in
the press. They can most conveniently be examined as formulated
by the members of the editorial circle. The accusations are
levelled against “the system of autocratic and bureaucratic
government of the Party”, against “bureaucratic centralism”,
which, as distinct from “genuinely Social-Democratic centralism”, is defined as follows: it “places in the forefront,
not internal union, but external, formal unity, achieved and
maintained by purely mechanical means, by the systematic
suppression of individual initiative and independent social
activity”; it is therefore “by its very nature incapable of
organically uniting the component elements of society”.

What “society” Comrade Axelrod and Co. are here referring to,
heaven alone knows. Apparently, Comrade Axelrod was not quite
clear himself whether he was penning a Zemstvo address on the
subject of desirable government reforms, or pouring forth the
complaints of the “minority”. What is the implication of “autocracy” in the Party, about which the dissatisfied
“editors” clamour? Autocracy means the supreme, uncontrolled,
non-accountable, non-elective rule of one individual. We know
very well from the literature of the “minority” that by autocrat
they mean me , and no one else. When the resolution in question was being drafted and adopted, I was on the Central
Organ together with Plekhanov. Consequently, Comrade Axelrod and
Co. were expressing the conviction that Plekhanov and all the
members of the Central Committee “governed the Party”, not in
accordance with their own views of what the interests of the
work required, but in accordance with the will of the autocrat Lenin. This accusation of autocratic government
necessarily and inevitably implies pronouncing all members of
the governing body except the autocrat to be mere tools in the
hands of another, mere pawns and agents of another’s will. And
once again we ask, is this really a “difference of principle” on
the part of the highly respected Comrade Axelrod?

Further, what external, formal unity are they here talking
about, our “Party members” just returned from a Party Congress
whose decisions they have solemnly acknowledged valid? Do they
know of any other method of achieving unity in a party organised
on any at all durable basis, except a party congress? If they
do, why have they not the courage to declare frankly that they
no longer regard the Second Congress as valid? Why do they not
try to tell us their new ideas and new methods of achieving
unity in a supposedly organised party?

Further, what “suppression of individual initiative” are they
talking about, our individualist intellectuals whom the Central
Organ of the Party has just been exhorting to set forth
their differences, but who instead have engaged in bargaining about “co-optation”? And, in general, how could
Plekhanov and I, or the Central Committee, have suppressed the
initiative and independent activity of people who refused to
engage in any “activity” in conjunction with us? How can anyone be “suppressed” in an institution or body in which he
refuses to have any part ? How could the unelected editors complain of a “system of government” when they refused
to " be governed "? We could not have committed any errors in directing our comrades for the simple
reason that they never worked under our direction at all.

It is clear, I think, that the cries about this celebrated
bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the
personal composition of the central bodies, a fig-leaf to cover
up the violation of a pledge solemnly given at the Congress. You
are a bureaucrat because you were appointed by the Congress not
in accordance with my wishes, but against them; you are a
formalist because you take your stand on the formal decisions of
the Congress, and not on my consent; you are acting in a grossly
mechanical way because you cite the “mechanical” majority at the
Party Congress and pay no heed to my wish to be co-opted; you
are an autocrat because you refuse to hand over the power to the
old snug little band who insist on their circle “continuity” all
the more because they do not like the explicit disapproval of
this circle spirit by the Congress.

These cries about bureaucracy have never had any real meaning except the one I have indicated. [10]
[10] It is enough to point out that Comrade Plekhanov ceased to be a supporter of “bureaucratic centralism” in the eyes of the minority once he put through the beneficent co-optation. — Lenin

And this method of struggle only proves once again the intellectualist instability of the minority. They
wanted to convince the Party that the selection of the central
bodies was unfortunate. And how did they go about it? By
criticism of Iskra as conducted by Plekhanov and me?
No, that they were unable to offer. The method they used
consisted in the refusal of a section of the Party to work under
the direction of the hated central bodies. But no central
institution of any party in the world can ever prove its ability
to direct people who refuse to accept its direction. Refusal to
accept the direction of the central bodies is tantamount to
refusing to remain in the Party, it is tantamount to disrupting
the Party; it is a method of destroying , not of convincing. And these efforts to destroy instead of convince
show their lack of consistent principles, lack of faith in their
own ideas.

They talk of bureaucracy. The word bureaucracy might be
translated into Russian as concentration on place and position. Bureaucracy means subordinating the interests of the
work to the interests of one’s own career ; it means focusing attention on places and ignoring the
work itself; it means wrangling over co-optation instead of fighting for ideas . That bureaucracy of this
kind is undesirable and detrimental to the Party is unquestionably true, and I can safely leave it to the reader to
judge which of the two sides now contending in our Party is
guilty of such bureaucracy.... They talk about grossly mechanical methods of achieving unity. Unquestionably, grossly
mechanical methods are detrimental; but I again leave it to the
reader to judge whether a grosser and more mechanical method of
struggle of a new trend against an old one can be imagined than
installing people in Party institutions before the Party has
been convinced of the correctness of their new views, and before
these views have even been set forth to the Party.

But perhaps the catchwords of the minority do mean something in
principle, perhaps they do express some special group of ideas,
irrespective of the petty and particular cause which undoubtedly
started the “swing” in the present case? Perhaps if we were to
set aside the wrangling over “co-optation”, these catchwords
might turn out to be an expression of a different system of
views?

Let us examine the matter from this angle. Before doing so, we
must place on record that the first to attempt such an examination was Comrade Plekhanov at the League, who pointed out
the minority’s swing towards anarchism and opportunism , and that Comrade Martov (who is now highly
offended because not everyone is ready to admit that his
position is one of principle [11]
[11] Nothing could be more comical than the new Iskra’s grievance that Lenin refuses to see any differences of principle, or denies them. If your attitude had been based more on principle, you would the sooner have examined my repeated statements that you have swung towards opportunism. If your position had been based more on principle, you could not well have degraded an ideological struggle to a squabble over places. You have only yourselves to blame, for you hava yourselves done everything to make it impossible to regard you as men of principle. Take Comrade Martov, for example: when speaking in his State of Siege , of the League Congress, he says nothing about the dispute with Plekhanov over anarchism, but instead informs us that Lenin is a super-centre, that Lenin has only to wink his eye to have the centre issue orders, that the Central Committee rode rough-shod over the League, etc. I have no doubt that by picking his topic in this way, Comrade Martov displayed the profundity of his ideals and principles. — Lenin

)

preferred completely to ignore this incident in his State of Siege .

At the League Congress the general question was raised as to
whether Rules that the League or a committee may draw up for
itself are valid without the Central Committee’s endorsement,
and even if the Central Committee refuses to endorse them. Nothing could be clearer, one would think: Rules are a
formal expression of organisation, and, according to Paragraph 6
of our Party Rules, the right to organise committees is
explicitly vested in the Central Committee; Rules define the
limits of a committee’s autonomy, and the decisive voice in
defining those limits belongs to the central and not to a local
institution of the Party. That is elementary , and it was sheer childishness to argue with such an air of profundity
that “organising” does not always imply “endorsing Rules” (as if
the League itself had not of its own accord expressed the wish
to be organised on the basis of formal Rules). But Comrade
Martov has forgotten (temporarily, let us hope) even the ABC of
Social-Democracy. In his opinion, the demand that Rules should
be endorsed only indicated that “the earlier, revolutionary
Iskra centralism is being replaced by bureaucratic centralism” (League Minutes, p. 95), and there, in
fact—Comrade Martov declared in the same speech—lay the “principle” at issue (p. 96)—a principle which he
preferred to ignore in his State of Siege !

Comrade Plekhanov answered Martov at once, requesting that
expressions like bureaucracy, Jack-in-office, etc., be refrained
from as “detracting from the dignity of the Congress” (p. 96). There followed an interchange with Comrade Martov, who
regarded these expressions as “a characterisation of a certain
trend from the standpoint of principle”. At that time, Comrade Plekhanov, like all the other supporters of the
majority, took these expressions at their real value, clearly
realising that they related exclusively to the realm, if we may
so put it, of “co-optation”, and not of principle. However, he
deferred to the insistence of the Martovs and Deutsches
(pp. 96-97) and proceeded to examine their supposed principles
from the standpoint of principle . “If that were so,” said he (that is, if the committees were autonomous in shaping
their organisation, in drawing up their Rules), "they would be
autonomous in relation to the whole, to the Party. That is not
even a Bundist view, it is a downright anarchistic view. That is
just how the anarchists argue: the rights of individuals are
unlimited; they may conflict; every individual determines the
limits of his rights for himself. The limits of autonomy should
be determined not by the group itself, but by the whole of which
it forms a part. The Bund was a striking instance of the
violation of this principle. Hence, the limits of autonomy are
determined by the Congress, or by the highest body set up by the
Congress. The authority of the central institution should rest
on moral and intellectual prestige. There I, of course,
agree. Every representative of the organisation must be
concerned for the moral prestige of its institution. But it does
not follow that, while prestige in necessary, authority is
not.... To counterpoise the power of authority to the power
of ideas is anarchistic talk, which should have no place here"
(p. 98). These propositions are as elementary as can be, they
are in fact axioms, which it was strange even to put to the vote
(p. 102), and which were called in question only because
“concepts have now been confused” (loc .
cit) . But the minority’s intellectualist individualism
had, inevitably, driven them to the point of wanting to sabotage
the Congress, to refuse to submit to the majority; and that wish
could not be justified except by anarchistic talk . It is very amusing to note that the minority had nothing to offer
in reply to Plekhanov but complaints of his use of excessively strong words, like opportunism, anarchism, and so
forth. Plekhanov quite rightly poked fun at these complaints by
asking why “the words Jauresism and anarchism are not permissible, and the words lèse-majesté and
Jack-in-office are”. No answer was given. This quaint sort of
quid pro quo is always happening to Comrades Martov, Axelrod, and Co.: their new catchwords clearly bear the stamp of
vexation; any reference to the fact offends them—they are,
you see, men of principle; but, they are told, if you deny
on principle that the part should submit to the whole, you are anarchists, and again they are offended!—the
expression is too strong! In other words, they want to give
battle to Plekhanov, but only on condition that he does not hit
back in earnest!

How many times Comrade Martov and various other “Mensheviks” [12] have convicted me, no less childishly, of the following
“contradiction”. They quote a passage from What Is To Be Done? or A Letter to a Comrade which speaks of
ideological influence, a struggle for influence, etc., and
contrast it to the “bureaucratic” method of inflyencing by means
of the Rules, to the “autocratic” tendency to rely on authority,
and the like. How naïve they are! They have already forgotten that previously our Party was not a formally organised
whole, but merely a sum of separate groups, and therefore no
other relations except those of ideological influence were
possible between these groups. Now we have become an organised Party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the transformation of the power of ideas into the
power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to
higher ones. Why, it positively makes one uncomfortable to have
to chew over such elementary things for the benefit of old
associates, especially when one feels that at the bottom of it
all is simply the minority’s refusal to submit to the majority
in the matter of the elections! But from the standpoint of principle these endless exposures of my contradictions boil
down to nothing but anarchistic phrase-mongering. The new Iskra is not averse to enjoying the title and
rights of a Party institution, but it does not want to submit to
the majority of the Party.

If the talk about bureaucracy contains any principle at all, if
it is not just an anarchistic denial of the duty of the part to
submit to the whole, then what we have here is the principle of opportunism , which seeks to lessen the responsibility of
individual intellectuals to the party of the proletariat, to
lessen the influence of the central institutions, to enlarge the
autonomy of the least steadfast elements in the Party, to reduce
organisational relations to a purely platonic and verbal
acceptance of them. We saw this at the Party Congress, where the
Akimovs and Liebers made exactly the same sort of speeches about
“monstrous” centralism as poured from the lips of Martov and
Co. at the League Congress. That opportunism leads to the Martov
and Axelrod “views” on organisation by its very nature, and not
by chance, and not in Russia alone but the world over, we shall
see later, when examining Comrade Axelrod’s article in the new
Iskra .

---
Notes:
[1]
If little things may be compared to big.— Ed .

[2] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[3] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[4] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[5] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[6]
I omit what Martov replied in reference to his pamphlet, then being republished. — Lenin

[7]
Mining Area resolution ( State of Siege ,
p. 38). — Lenin

[8]
See pp. 73-83 of this volume.— Ed .

[9] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[10] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[11] Note: This footnote has been moved into the body of the document.

[12]
From the Russian menshinstvo –“minority”, as “Bolshevik” comes from
bolshinstvo –“majority”.— Trans .

[13]
This new member of the Central Committee was F. V. Lengnik.