Printed (in part) in 1904 in the pamphlet: N. Shakhov. *The Struggle for the Congress*. Geneva

First printed in full in 1929 in Lenin Miscellany X

Draft resolutions are printed from the manuscripts; the speeches—from the minutes (with V. I. Lenin’s corrections)

**1. Remark on the Agenda. January 15 (28)**

Lenin asks for the floor on a point of order and, on obtaining it, proposes that the question be discussed of measures which could help to restore peace in the Party and normal relations between dissenting members of the Party.

**2. Draft Resolution on Measures to Restore Peace in the Party, Submitted on January 15 (28)**

The Party Council, having in view the nature and forms of manifestation of that divergence between members of the Party which is linked with the Second Regular Congress, considers it urgently necessary to energetically call upon all members of the Party for friendly joint work under the leadership of both central bodies of the Party: the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

The historical moment Russia is going through—a tremendous intensification of revolutionary ferment within the country and international difficulties which may lead to war—imposes particularly serious duties on the party of the class-conscious proletariat, fighting in the front ranks for the liberation of the whole people from the yoke of autocracy. The need for friendly joint work, under the leadership of the two centres of the Party, to strengthen our organisation, to develop the consciousness and unity of the widest possible masses of the working class, has never been so pressing as at the present time.

Some differences or other on the most diverse questions have always occurred and will inevitably arise in a party which relies on a gigantic popular movement, which sets itself the task of being the conscious exponent of this movement, resolutely rejecting all circle spirit and narrow sectarian views. But in order to be worthy representatives of the conscious struggling proletariat, worthy participants in the world working-class movement, the members of our Party must strive with all their might to ensure that no private differences in the understanding and ways of implementing the principles recognised by our Party programme should hinder or be able to hinder friendly joint work under the leadership of our central bodies. The more profoundly and broadly we understand our programme and the tasks of the international proletariat, the more we value the importance of positive work to develop propaganda, agitation and organisation, the further we are from sectarianism, petty circle spirit and parochial scores—the more energetically we must strive to ensure that differences between Party members are discussed calmly and on their merits, that these differences cannot hinder our work, cannot bring disorganisation into our activity, cannot impede the proper functioning of our central bodies.

The Party Council, as the highest body of the Party, resolutely condemns all disorganising attempts, from whatever quarter they may come, all abstention from work, all abstention from material support of the central Party funds, any boycott which can only reduce a purely ideological struggle of opinions, views and nuances to methods of crude mechanical pressure, to some unworthy brawl. The Party is worn out by the dissensions, which have been dragging on for almost half a year, and insistently demands peace. No differences between members of the Party, no dissatisfaction with the personnel of one or another centre can justify a boycott and similar methods of struggle, which testify precisely to a lack of principle and ideological spirit, which testify to the sacrifice of the interests of the Party to the interests of a circle, of the interests of the working-class movement to the interests of narrow parochialism. We have, of course, and in a large party there will always be, cases where one or another number of members are dissatisfied with a certain nuance in the activity of one or another centre, with certain features of its orientation, or with its personnel, etc. Such members can and must clarify the reasons for and nature of their dissatisfaction in comradely exchange of opinions and in polemics on the pages of Party publications, but it would be absolutely inadmissible and unworthy of revolutionaries to manifest their dissatisfaction in a boycott or in abstention from supporting with all their strength all the positive work that is united and directed by the two centres of the Party. Support for both centres, friendly work under their direct leadership—such is our common and direct Party duty.

Such non-ideological, crudely mechanical methods of struggle as indicated above deserve unconditional condemnation, for they are capable of completely destroying the entire Party, which is united wholly and exclusively by the good will of revolutionaries. And the Party Council reminds all its members that this good will has already been expressed with complete definiteness in our common, unchallenged decision to recognise as binding on all members of the Party all decisions of the Second Congress and all elections carried out by it. The Organising Committee, which earned universal gratitude for its activity in convening the Congress, already adopted, in §18 of the rules of the Second Congress, the following decision, approved by all committees of the Party:

“All decisions of the Congress and all elections carried out by it are a resolution of the Party binding on all organisations of the Party. They cannot be challenged by anyone or on any pretext, and can be annulled or altered only by the next Party Congress.”

This decision, adopted by the entire Party before the Congress and confirmed several times at the Congress itself, is tantamount to a word of honour which all Social-Democrats gave themselves of their own free will. Let them not forget this word of honour! Let them quickly cast aside all petty mutual scores, let them once and for all set ideological struggle within such bounds that it does not lead to violations of the Rules, does not hamper practical activity and positive work!

**3. Speeches on Measures to Restore Peace in the Party. January 15 (28)**

**1**

I raised the question of measures to restore good peace and normal relations in the Party precisely because the sum total of misunderstandings among Party workers has reached threatening proportions. I do not think that fruitful Party work is possible unless there is common ground on which the various members of the Party, brought to mutual misunderstandings by force of these or other circumstances, can base their activity. It is no secret to anyone that the abnormality of relations between individual members or sections of the Party is such that it would now be difficult to speak of a single Social-Democratic Labour Party without playing with words. I can, of course, if necessary, present detailed proofs to confirm this proposition (let us recall, for example, many episodes from the business correspondence between the C.C. and the C.O.{65}), but perhaps, in view of the generally known nature of the fact I am asserting, it would be better not to resort now to such ticklish illustrations. So, we must try to take more decisive measures to eliminate the basic evil. Otherwise a state of affairs is created in which, on the occasion of the simplest, most ordinary Party act, a highly undesirable exchange of opinions will arise with a systematic selection of very strong expressions and the choicest... how shall I put it more mildly... compliments, perhaps... Although it may seem that I am in some way attempting to encroach upon the “freedom of language”, the crux of the matter is that not everything is well in the sphere of actions either. As members of the Council, whose main purpose is to unite within the Party that which tends towards disunity, we must try to eliminate the frictions hindering the course of Party work, and with the desire, this would not be impossible. So, I ask, cannot any measures be taken against certain methods of struggle within the Party which reduce the latter to the state of a disorganised group, which transform it into a simple fiction. Perhaps the Council might adopt, in the interests of the common cause, a resolution, the draft of which, sketched by me, I shall now read out. I consider important in principle this kind of decision by the Council, which would pursue the aim of eliminating and condemning inadmissible forms of struggle between various units or groups within the Party that disagree with each other on one or another question. I repeat that the present situation is too abnormal and needs corrective measures. (Axelrod: “We all agree on that.”) I request the secretaries to enter Comrade Axelrod’s remark into the minutes.

Now I shall read out the draft of the resolution I am proposing.[42]

This is the draft which I submit on behalf of the C.C. over the signatures of both its representatives, and which could serve as a ground not for deciding some particular questions about eliminating these or those differences between members of the Party, but for creating common ground under the feet of the Russian Social-Democrats working in the interests of one common cause.

**2**

I have been pleased to conclude from the speeches of both representatives of the C.O. that they approve in principle the need for decisive measures to establish de facto unity in the Party. This already creates a certain common ground between us. As for Comrade Plekhanov’s proposal, I consider it necessary to say the following: Comrade Plekhanov proposes that I single out from my draft resolution the most essential practical measures aimed at eliminating the evil that has been stated in the life of the Party, and points out at the same time that this resolution has the character of an appeal; yes, indeed, my proposal does have the character of an appeal, but it is precisely designed as such. The idea of this “appeal” is that the Council, on behalf of both centres, speaks out in favour of demarcating the forms of struggle permissible in the Party from the impermissible. I know that, generally speaking, struggle itself is inevitable, but there is struggle and struggle. There are such methods of struggle as are absolutely abnormal and inadmissible in any viable party. And Comrade Martov rightly said that apart from the struggle of ideas there was also what he called “organisational complications”.

We, however, gathered here not for struggle, but for eliminating abnormal conditions in the life of the Party, can and must influence our other comrades by an authoritative indication of the boundaries of permissible struggle within the Party. But I know of no other means of influence than an appeal. Singling out practical proposals would be pointless here. As for the statement by the representatives of the C.O. that I, while stating the abnormality of Party life, do not touch upon the causes of this kind of abnormality, I must say that I chose this position not accidentally, but quite consciously, fearing that if we only barely touch upon this already very tangled skein now, we will not only not untangle it, but will tangle it still more. For it must not be forgotten, after all, that in relation to this skein we are two equally interested and highly subjectively inclined sides, so that if there is to be any attempt to untangle it, then it should not be made by us at all, but by those who were completely uninvolved in the business of tangling it. For our part, such an attempt would lead us to rummaging through all sorts of documents, which, given the present composition of the Council, would once again lead to... a brawl.

Let us take what exists as the starting point of our deliberations, since reality cannot be erased, and I am quite willing to agree with Comrade Martov that all differences and clashes cannot be abolished by some soul-saving word. That is true, but who can be a judge of such sorrowful aspects of our Party life? I think that such a role cannot in any case belong to ourselves, but to a large number of people—practical revolutionary workers devoted to the cause, who did not take part in the brawl. Cautiously avoiding the question of the causes of our dissensions, I shall permit myself, however, to clarify my thought with one example from the area of our recent past. The struggle has been going on for five months already. During this period there have already been, I think, up to 50 individuals acting as mediators trying to put an end to the Party dissensions, but I know only one whose activity in this direction had, albeit very modest, but still relatively happy results. I am speaking of Comrade Travinsky, regarding whom it should be noted that he is a man up to his ears, so to speak, immersed in positive practical revolutionary work, so that his attention was almost entirely concentrated on this work, and that he did not take part in the conflict. It is only by these fortunate circumstances that one can perhaps explain the somewhat non-fruitless nature of his conciliatory attempts. I think that with the participation of such people in analysing the causes of Party trouble it would be possible to untangle the skein before which we now stand in perplexity. We ourselves must be careful not to enter into an examination of these or other causes of the conflict, for this, against our will, might lead us to inflicting (to use Comrade Martov’s expression) fresh wounds on each other in addition to the numerous old ones, still very far from healing. That is why I am against an analysis of causes and in favour of seeking means which could at least confine the methods of struggle within more or less admissible bounds. One of two things: if something can be done in this direction, then we must try to do it, and if not, if it is impossible to influence the contending sides by authoritative conviction, then only one thing remains—to turn to those third persons standing outside the field of battle and carrying out their positive practical tasks, of whom I have already spoken. I doubt whether we ourselves can convince each other of the rightness of one or the other side. It seems to me that this is impossible.

**3**

I do not quite understand Comrade Plekhanov’s proposal. When he says that some practical measures must be adopted, my draft already contains an indication of the possibility of such a practical measure. One need only say, say authoritatively, that normal struggle, ideological struggle, struggle conducted within certain boundaries, is permissible, but impermissible are: boycott, refusal to work under the leadership of the C.C., refusal to support the central Party funds with monetary means, etc. It is said that we will not convince anyone with words. I too would not venture to assert that this would be sufficient to establish good relations between the two parts of the Party, because the illness that has to be treated is indeed chronic, because, as Comrade Martov expresses it, a very solid wall has indeed grown up between the two parts of the Party. Perhaps this wall cannot be broken by us who created it, but there is nothing impossible in that we, who have dealt each other the strongest wounds—we, as members of the Council, by our authoritative appeal will restrain comrades from unworthy forms of struggle. As for breaking down the wall, in my view time will play such a role that everything further will be waning. And as to the fact that certain passages of the appeal may be interpreted by both sides in their own way, in my view, whatever we say here, everything may perhaps be interpreted in its own way. (Axelrod: “Therefore we must not only speak, but also act.”) Next, why Comrade Axelrod thinks that my proposal could prove to be only a new source of struggle—this I do not understand. I repeat, we will not break the wall that has grown up between the two parts of the Party, for we ourselves have put a lot of effort into creating it, but this wall could be knocked down by those of our comrades who, being occupied with practical work, stand aside from our dissensions. Comrade Martov, as I have been pleased to ascertain today, agrees in principle with this proposition—about the possible useful role in the matter of our conflict of those of our other comrades who are outsiders with respect to this conflict. But apart from this, it seems to me that the very fact of agreement between the representatives of the central bodies that such-and-such a form of struggle is permissible and such-and-such is not—this alone could breach the first gap in the wall dividing the two sides, after which the existing abnormality in Party life could begin to wane.

**4**

Comrade Plekhanov’s proposal{66} evoked a very mixed feeling in me. Having begun to speak of the causes of the struggle, he precisely thereby arrived at those very wounds, the mutual infliction of which Comrade Martov also stated. I in my draft am attempting to demarcate what is permissible in our struggle from what is impermissible, irrespective of which side the attacks may have come from. If we were to speak of when, from whom, what originated, we would thereby be laying the beginning of the end, i.e., the end of our conversation. To judge ourselves—it is simply psychologically, morally quite impossible. If we again begin discussing here the causes of the aggravated relations between members of the Party, will we ourselves then be able to rise above the level of petty squabbles? (Axelrod: “We will!”) I do not share Comrade Axelrod’s optimism. Comrade Plekhanov, in analysing the causes that gave rise to the Party split, gave his own interpretation of the facts, with which I do not agree. If we start debates, we shall have to pull out the minutes and turn to them for reference. Thus, for example, Comrade Plekhanov says that on the question of elections to the central bodies the Congress split into almost equal parts, that one delegate who moved from the majority to the minority thereby established the fact of equality of both halves of the Congress, that thus the C.C. represents only one part of the Party, and so on. But one cannot reason like that; it is impossible indeed to speak of the existence of only one part of the Party which elected the Central Committee. Many would perhaps now vote on some questions differently from how they voted at the Congress. And perhaps I myself would vote differently on many questions. But that does not mean that possible changes and new combinations in this field somehow negate the results of previous voting. As for the struggle, there is always a division of the whole into parts. Yes, the C.C. now, and not at the Congress, is the representative of a part, but I well know that, in the opinion of comrades, the C.O. also is, in the same sense, the representative of only one part. Only from one point of view could I recognise Comrade Plekhanov’s expression as correct, namely from the point of view of the actually existing split. It is not because the Congress is to blame for something that one can speak of the “abnormality” of the composition of one or another central body, but only because, given such-and-such circumstances, people do not wish to work jointly with each other... Thus, scarcely had we touched upon the causes of the abnormality when we again come to the need to unwind a skein which not only cannot we untangle, but will tangle even further. That many are dissatisfied with the composition of the C.C.—this is true; but it is just as true that there is a whole series of persons dissatisfied with the present composition of the Central Organ. To Comrade Martov’s question whether the “destruction” of existing organisations is permissible, I would say: “Yes! the reconstruction of organisations is entirely permissible!” Is it permissible for a competent Party body to remove one or another person from one or another kind of revolutionary work?—I answer: “Yes, it is permissible!” But if I ask, why and how did one or another “encroachment” upon the integrity and inviolability of some organisation arise, why did so-and-so not gain access to such-and-such an area of Party affairs, etc.—by this I again stretch out my hand to that very skein which is beyond our strength to untangle. Thus, on the question of the permissibility or impermissibility of “destroying” organisations we again come to differences. All this proves that to argue now about the causes of our conflicts would be a completely useless and even harmful waste of time.—I return to the question of proportional representation. One could speak of it only on the basis of recognition of an already existing split. We are here as representatives of two contending sides... (Plekhanov: “We have gathered here as members of the Council, and not as contending sides.”) Comrade Plekhanov’s remark contradicts his own resolution, which speaks of the existing conflict within the Party that has split the Party into two halves, one half, according to the resolution, being not at all represented in a central body such as the Central Committee. Of course, officially we are not representatives of two contending sides, but, insofar as this representation follows from the course of our debates, I had the logical right to speak of it. (Plekhanov: “You expressed that we have gathered here as representatives of two contending sides, and it was in connection with this that I made my remark.”) I do not deny that perhaps I did not express myself quite accurately... (Plekhanov: “You expressed yourself incorrectly.”) Perhaps I expressed myself incorrectly; I will not dispute that. I only affirm that Comrade Plekhanov’s resolution shifts the debate onto the ground of de facto recognition of the split. We have split; I state this. If that were not so, the resolution would be unlawful. The majority of the Party is also dissatisfied with the composition of the C.O., a composition in which 4 out of 5 belong to the minority. From the side of the C.C. a similar claim could arise about changing the composition of the C.O. as is now being put forward against the Central Committee. In its essence, Comrade Plekhanov’s resolution is tantamount to stating the conditions of only one side... (Plekhanov: “I belong neither to the majority nor to the minority.”) Comrade Plekhanov told us that he belongs neither to the majority nor to the minority, but apart from him, no one in the Council will say that. Reasoning formalistically, from the point of view of the Rules, the resolution proposed by Comrade Plekhanov is unlawful. But, I repeat, in essence it can be understood insofar as it proceeds from the fact of the split. But once one side expresses its “conditions”, the other side would also have the right to put forward its own “conditions” in exactly the same way. We are not above “both sides”, but precisely these “both sides”. Therefore, once we take the ground of recognising the de facto split already existing in the Party, then to resolve our disputes and “misunderstandings” we must recognise only one radical means—to turn to third persons. In the Party there are people, as I have already said before, people who are engaged in positive work and who did not participate in the struggle of the “majority” and “minority”. It is to these people alone that we can appeal.

**5**

I agree neither with Martov nor with Plekhanov. They say that there can be no talk of the unlawfulness of such a resolution, and adduce two arguments. 1) Martov’s argument consisted in pointing out that the Council is the highest body of the Party. But the Council is limited in its competence by special provisions of the Rules, about which Comrade Martov himself in due time strongly exerted himself. 2) The second argument is that the Council by the proposed resolution is merely expressing its opinion and wish. The Council, of course, can state its opinion and express its wishes, but not encroaching upon this or that. (Plekhanov: “Of course! Of course!”) The Council can only propose co-optation to the C.C., but then the C.C. would demand changing the composition of the Central Organ. Under certain conditions I am prepared to agree with proportional representation. But I ask, does proportional representation exist in the C.O.? The composition of the C.O. is as follows: 1 to 4, and that one does not belong either to the majority or to the minority. The Central Committee at one time proposed 2 out of 9{67}; that was in the period of complete disarray, on the eve of the split. Any disagreement is in a certain sense a split, and when two parts do not wish to work jointly, then it is a de facto split. Only from the standpoint of the split could we recognise any sense in Comrade Plekhanov’s resolution. It could be looked upon as ultima ratio[43], but in that case both sides could have an equal right to change the composition of the central bodies. I am firmly convinced that the C.C. is also dissatisfied with the composition of the Central Organ. As soon as we touch upon the question of the past Congress, a clash will occur, and we shall arrive at nothing. Thus, for example, Plekhanov says that the Congress did not elect a third to the editorial board allegedly because there was no such third. I assert that the Congress did not elect a third because it was convinced that Comrade Martov would enter the editorial board. The same can be said about the composition of the Council. Many at the Congress thought that Comrade Martov would enter the composition of the Council as a member of the editorial board. The majority may say and will say that if it is a matter of proportional representation, it is necessary to supplement the C.O. with six more members from the so-called majority. But this kind of reasoning will not bring us nearer to the desired end; in view of this, I consider that Comrade Plekhanov’s resolution is worse than mine. My resolution on “the permissible and the impermissible” would have the significance that we, as representatives of the contending sides, would propose to the other comrades not to exceed the bounds of permitted forms of struggle.

We must not stand on a purely juridical point of view alone, for in the essence of the matter our common recognition of the abnormality of relations in the Party is tantamount to recognition that we are two contending sides, the Central Organ and the Central Committee. (Plekhanov: “This is not a session of the editorial board, but a session of the Council.”) Yes, I do not forget that. From the juridical point of view we cannot speak of proportional representation in the central bodies. But even from the political point of view it is inexpedient to operate with this idea, because we shall have to take into account the wish of one side without hearing the wish of the other. Among us there is not that third who could decide our dispute. And yet only the opinion of this third could have both political and moral significance. The split exists de facto, and we are on the eve of a formal split if the minority continues, without discrimination of means, to strive to transform itself into a majority.

**4. Speeches on Measures to Restore Peace in the Party. January 16 (29)**

**1**

I consider it necessary to reply, mainly, to the detailed objections which Comrade Martov has made to me; but so as not to leave unanswered Comrade Plekhanov’s objections either, I shall briefly touch first on the latter. It seemed to me that he stands in principle on the point of view of proportional representation... (Plekhanov: “No!”) Perhaps I did not understand him, but that is how it seemed to me. In our Party organisation, the principle of proportional representation is not adopted, and the sole criterion of the legitimacy of the composition of this or that body whose members are elected at the congress is the clearly expressed will of the congress majority. But it is being said that the lawful elections at the congress created a “lawful” state of affairs which is worse than unlawful. That is true, but why? Is it because the majority was insignificant, or because the minority created a de facto split? When it is said that the C.C. was elected by only 24 votes, i.e., with a negligible preponderance of the majority, and that allegedly it is precisely in this circumstance that the reason for all subsequent unpleasant complications in Party life lies, I assert that this is not true. As for Comrade Plekhanov’s remark about my “formalistic thinking”, allegedly preventing me from seeing to the root of things, I really am bewildered as to what, properly speaking, this means? Perhaps the “root of things” lies in the Congress? In that case we are all formalists, for, in transporting ourselves in thought to the Congress, we must proceed from its formal decisions. But if the “root of things” lies outside the Congress, then where exactly? Indeed, it has turned out that the state of affairs in the Party has become worse than unlawful (these are very serious words), but the whole question is precisely why it has turned out so? Is the Congress to blame for this, or the circumstances that ensued after the Congress? Unfortunately, Comrade Plekhanov does not put the question in that way.

Lenin, protesting against such a formulation, appeals to the Council for a decision on his (Lenin’s) right, in objecting to Martov, to give his own account of a fact that is interpreted so differently here. (Plekhanov again points out the inappropriateness in this case of debates on the question of Rusov.)

Lenin insists on his right to appeal to the Council for permission to speak on a question which has already been raised in the Council and provoked debate. (Martov: “In view of the fact that Comrade Lenin has touched upon the very important question of the right of collegiums represented in the Council to recall their delegates, I declare that I shall introduce a special proposal on deciding this question once and for all. Perhaps this statement will satisfy Lenin and induce him to eliminate the question of Rusov from the present debates.”)

Comrade Martov not only does not refute but confirms the substantiation of my intention to subject the question of Comrade Rusov’s leaving the Council to a proper elucidation now. I state that my explanations on this question were only a reply to Comrade Martov’s corresponding remarks. (Plekhanov points out to Martov and Lenin that the question of Rusov is not subject to discussion now, as it does not fall within the circle of questions on which the attention of the Council members must be concentrated at the present session of the Council.) I protest against Comrade Plekhanov’s remark that it is inopportune to discuss here the question of Comrade Rusov, who stood on the ground of the irremovability of Council members, so that Rusov’s resignation from the Council must be regarded as a concession by him to the opposition in the interests of good peace in the Party. (Plekhanov: “Since the Council has nothing against an exchange of opinions on the question of Comrade Rusov, I propose that Lenin continue speaking about this.”) I have already finished. (Plekhanov: “If you have finished, then I propose that the Council proceed to discuss the resolutions proposed yesterday by Comrade Lenin and myself.”)

I agree with Comrade Martov that the Council’s resolutions would have not a juridical but a moral significance. Comrade Plekhanov expressed that it would be desirable if I were to enter the editorial board. (Plekhanov: “I did not say that.”) At least, that is precisely how I have recorded your words: “It would be best of all for Lenin to enter the editorial board, and for the C.C. to co-opt three.” (Plekhanov: “Yes, I said that under certain conditions, for the pacification of the Party, the entry of Comrade Lenin into the editorial board and the co-optation of representatives of the minority into the Central Committee is permissible.”)

In reply to the question put to me here, what precisely change in the composition of the editorial board of the C.O. is considered desirable, it was easy for me to refer to the opinion of the “majority”, which spoke out in favour of the desirability of Comrades Axelrod, Zasulich and Starover leaving the editorial board. Then I must say that in the actions of the C.C. there has not been a single fact of anyone being removed from Party work. Just as I cannot leave without protest Comrade Martov’s statement that the C.C. became an instrument of war of one side against the other. The Central Committee was appointed as an instrument for carrying out Party functions, and not as an instrument of “war of one side against the other”. Such an assertion by Comrade Martov completely contradicts the facts. No one will prove by a single fact that the C.C. began and waged “war” against the minority. On the contrary, the minority, having begun a boycott, waged war, which provoked inevitable repulse. Furthermore, I protest against the assertion that the existing distrust of the C.C. hinders the C.C. more than distrust of the C.O. hinders peaceful positive work. As for the centre of disorder being allegedly not abroad but in Russia, as Comrade Martov insists, I must note that Party documents will show the opposite. Comrade Martov, referring to the document of 25 November, said that the C.C. in principle itself recognised the one-sided character of its composition by agreeing to the co-optation of two from the minority. I protest against such an interpretation of this document, for I myself participated in drafting it. The act of the C.C. had an entirely different meaning. It was not because of recognition of the one-sidedness of its composition that the C.C. resolved upon the co-optation of two, but because we saw a complete de facto split in the Party. Whether we pictured the state of affairs correctly or incorrectly—that is another question... Rumours were reaching us at that time that the publication of a new organ was being prepared... (Plekhanov: “If we start referring to rumours, we shall get nowhere.” Axelrod: “And I heard that now a new organ is being prepared for publication...”.) I appeal to the Council: since the C.C. document{68} has been interpreted by Comrade Martov in a certain sense, I am compelled to put forward my own interpretation on this matter... I do not understand why my remark evoked such agitation here. (Plekhanov: “It is not a matter of agitation, but of the fact that references to rumours are inopportune here.”) It may be said that my motives are unfounded. Possibly! But in any case I state that these motives had precisely the character which I have just indicated.

I continue on the merits: Comrade Martov impugned the motives of the C.C. in agreeing to the co-optation of two. And I state that the C.C. proceeded from the opinion that a de facto split already exists in the Party and that we are on the eve of a complete formal split in the sense of a separate publication of an organ, separate transport and a separate organisation in Russia. Now I shall speak to a point of order: Comrade Martov made a remark on the merits, not to a point of order. I appeal to the Council with the question: was the chairman’s action in this case correct?{69}

**2**

Comrade Martov declared that I had allegedly immediately begun with polemics instead of peacefully and calmly proceeding to discuss the general question of seeking measures for the pacification of the Party. I do not agree with this, because it was none other than Comrade Martov himself who began the polemics. My draft resolution contains nothing polemical. It was not for nothing that Comrade Axelrod called this resolution a “pastoral appeal”. And as is known, pastoral appeals contain no polemics. And indeed, I dealt there only with the boundaries within which inner-Party struggle must be conducted, which forms of such struggle may be considered permissible and which must be recognised as impermissible and presenting a danger not only for the normal course of Party life, but even for the very existence of the Party. In doing so I carefully tried to avoid such a posing of the question as might lead us to new fruitless polemics—I tried in my proposal not to proceed from an evaluation of those methods of struggle which have already marked almost half a year of war between the two parts of the Party. Comrade Martov, however, did not wish to keep to this ground and set polemics going. But I shall nevertheless be prepared, if desired, later to return to what I began with. Now I shall point out the following. Comrade Martov referred to the fact that Travinsky welcomed the co-optation of its old members into the editorial board. I consider it necessary to underline here the circumstance that private conversations or negotiations have no significance. All official negotiations were conducted by Travinsky in writing. As for his private statements, they have apparently been incorrectly understood by Comrade Martov, and I can prove this at another time if necessary.

Then Comrade Martov expressed himself to the effect that the activity of the C.C. has many different shortcomings; by this Comrade Martov again enters the sphere of polemics. Perhaps there are shortcomings in the activity of the C.C