After the January session of the Party Council, the internal party situation changed sharply.

Before this, the editorial board of the Central Organ intensified its aggressiveness and its usurpatory tactics with respect to the Central Committee, without actually having sanction from the highest institution of the party, and evoking in the ranks of the party not only doubts as to the legality of its conduct, but also protests against it; before this, the editorial board of the Central Organ assured us that it would under no circumstances use the authority of the Council to suppress the Central Committee; before this, Plekhanov still attempted to preserve some appearance of independence with respect to the majority of the editorial board and tried to observe some neutrality in the struggle between the Central Organ and the Central Committee. After, however, the editorial board of the Central Organ received sanction from the Council for the seizure into its jurisdiction of a whole series of functions of the Central Committee, it could already on a "legal" basis continue and on a broader base develop its struggle against the Central Committee and its schismatic work in the party; after this, Plekhanov, openly taking the side of the minority in the Party Council, transformed himself into the most dangerous opponent of the majority.

The entire situation created for the Central Committee after the Council session most urgently demanded from Lenin a statement in the party press on the question of the crisis in the party. The article by Plekhanov in No. 57 of *Iskra* under the heading: "A Sad Misunderstanding" presented a sufficiently important occasion for this. It prompted Lenin to write a new draft appeal "To the Party."

This appeal, however, just like the earlier one ("To Party Members," see above, document 164, p. 465), was not published by Lenin.

The appeal "To the Party," as well as the appeal "To Party Members" cited above, is published here for the first time.

[Early February 1904. Geneva.]

Comrades! That our Party is experiencing a grave crisis—this is now known to everyone; this has been stated directly and openly even on the pages of our Central Organ.¹

# TO THE PARTY

We consider it our duty to call upon all members of the Party for active and conscious participation in everything that is necessary for the speediest and least painful exit from the crisis.

Comrade Plekhanov, who belonged at the Party Congress and—much time after it—at the Congress of the Foreign League to the majority of the party congress, now comes forward in No. 57 of *Iskra* with a defense of the demands of the minority, accusing the Central Committee of "eccentricity," of an intransigence that serves only the enemy, of an unwillingness to co-opt supporters of the minority.² It is precisely in such co-optation that Comrade Plekhanov sees nothing less than the "only means to bring our Party out of a state of grave crisis, which extraordinarily weakens our positions and strengthens the positions of our numerous enemies and opponents."³ One must not check only against the statute—says Comrade Plekhanov—bearing in mind, apparently, this state of grave crisis—but also against the actual state of affairs, against the given relationship of forces in the Party.⁴ One must rise above the standpoint of cliquishness and doctrinairism, which places in the foreground that which divides workers rather than that which unites them.⁵

These general propositions are absolutely correct, and all social-democrats need only precisely familiarize themselves with the facts, seriously ponder the state of affairs, to correctly apply these general propositions.

Yes, we must at all costs, at the price of any effort, not fearing long and persistent work, heal our Party of cliquishness, of divergence and disunity over unimportant pretexts, of improper and unworthy squabbles over the conductor's baton! Look at the events that have unfolded in our Party since its Second Congress. Have the courage to expose our sores, so that without hypocrisy, without official falsification, we might diagnose them and cure them properly.

The protocols of the Second Congress have now been published in full; for Party members, the protocols of the Congress of the Foreign League have also been issued. Party literature has already exposed many manifestations and symptoms of our crisis, and, although much remains to be done in this regard, even now it is possible and necessary to draw some conclusions.

The Second Congress ended with fierce struggle over the composition of our centers. By a majority of 24 votes against 20, an editorial board of the Central Organ consisting of three persons (Plekhanov, Martov, and Lenin) was elected, and the Central Committee also of three comrades. Martov declined his election, declined together with the entire minority to participate in the elections to the Central Committee. From the very congress began the fierce struggle of the minority against the centers—a genuine struggle over the conductor's baton, a genuine struggle of cliquishness against partisanship, a struggle in the name of restoring the old editorial board, in the name of co-opting into the Central Committee a corresponding (in the minority's view) number of members. This struggle lasted months, accompanied by the complete exclusion of the minority from work under the direction of the centers, by boycott and purely anarchistic preaching, examples of which Party members will find in abundance in the protocols of the League Congress. This struggle concentrated itself mainly abroad, on terrain most removed from positive work and from participation by conscious representatives of the proletariat. This struggle deprived the centers created by the Second Congress of an enormous mass of forces on trips, meetings, negotiations aimed at eliminating countless petty grievances, conflicts and squabbles. That the opposition's demands had no regard for any relationship of forces either at the Second Congress or in the Party generally is evident from the fact that, for example, the editorial board of the Central Organ (Plekhanov and Lenin) even agreed to the co-optation of two—that is, to equal representation of the majority and minority of the party congress. The opposition demanded an enormous majority in the editorial board (four against two).⁶ Under the threat of inevitable and immediate schism, both centers finally made a series of concessions relating to demands concerning the conductor's baton: the editorial board was co-opted; Lenin withdrew from the editorial board and the Council; one member of the majority left the Council; the Foreign League was left without reorganization, having broken at its congress everything established by the party congress; the opposition was offered two places in the Central Committee.

The opposition rejected this last condition. It apparently demands a greater number of places, and moreover not for those persons whom the Central Committee would elect, but for those whom the opposition would designate. No relationship of forces, no interests of the matter could justify such demands: only the threat of schism, only crude mechanical means of pressure like boycott and the withholding of monetary resources back up these ultimatums.

The Party is demoralized and disorganized to the last degree by this struggle for posts, which distracts forces from positive work. The Party is demoralized no less, if not more, by the fact that the so-called principled disagreements of the minority cloak this struggle in false garb.

All unanimously agreed—and repeatedly stated this categorically—to recognize all decisions and all elections of the Second Congress as absolutely binding upon themselves.⁷ Now the minority has in deed torn apart the entire statute and all the elections; now those who defend the jointly adopted decisions turn out to be "formalists"—every person who has received his mandate from the congress is called a "bureaucrat"—the person who relies on the majority vote, which expressed (by our general agreement) the relationship of forces in the Party, is accused of a crude mechanical and bureaucratic point of view. The person who at the congress, being called upon by all comrades to elect officials, transferred some editors to the position of contributors and some Central Committee members to the position of ordinary workers—that person turns out to be guilty of transforming Party members into cogs and wheels and so forth. The incorrect and unstable position that the minority adopted at the party congress itself inevitably led to this falsification, which in no way relates to anyone's subjective will.

Is it not time to put an end to this chaos? Let each person who cares about the fate of our Party think about this.

Is it not time to put a decisive end to this struggle for centers, these parochial accounts, which exert such a decomposing influence on all our work? Is it fitting again and again, after months and months of negotiations, to raise new negotiations with the opposition, to raise the question of the one-sidedness or eccentricity of the Central Committee? After all, the raising of this question after peace seemed already assured by the co-optation of the editorial board, inevitably brings back onto the scene again and again the question of the one-sidedness and eccentricity, even the anti-party nature of our Central Organ. How long shall we conduct this unworthy bickering over the composition of the centers? And how can we decide the question of the justice of the demands of one side and the other? Where is the measure of this justice? Why should the "firm" ones, who have conceded very, very much of what was decided at the congress, be considered intransigent, and not the "soft" ones, who turned out in reality to be extraordinarily firm in their striving for schism and in direct preparation for schism?

Let comrades think about how to get out of this abnormal situation. The Central Committee hoped that a change of leadership in the Central Organ would lead to peace. When the disputing sides had already gone very far, when the struggle for the conductor's baton had brought things to the brink of schism—there remained one last hope: the possibility of somehow drawing a line, so as not to interfere with one another, so that, working in one Party, we might gradually weaken any friction, so as not to touch or to touch less frequently the "sore" questions. It would seem that the division of centers would at least partially ensure an end to the crisis: the minority would have its own Central Organ and could freely group around it, freely advance its views, freely conduct its party work, not feeling itself "alien" in the Party. The presence of a center for the majority (or the predominance of the majority in the Central Committee) would give at least some satisfaction even to the majority. The struggle for centers could be transformed and redirected toward purely principled elucidation of disagreements and nuances.

The raising by *Iskra* of the question of co-optation into the Central Committee destroys this hope. We no longer consider it possible to begin again this trading over posts, which fills us with disgust. We would even prefer, in the absence of any other outcome, the transfer of all the conductor's batons to the minority, if it is indeed decisively incapable of working in the Party in any other way than from the highest posts. Our readiness for such a step is strengthened as this new, repulsive disease of our movement takes on protracted forms—as these petty squabbles, intolerable especially because they are so petty, become chronic.

But we would first like to ascertain as precisely as possible the opinion of the Party; we would like* to take account of public opinion in the revolutionary circles, especially in Russia. We invite comrades to carefully examine and study the data on our "crisis," to evaluate from all sides the present state of affairs in the Party, and to express themselves on all the questions that have been raised.**

¹ The acknowledgment of the existence of a crisis in the party was made by G. V. Plekhanov in his article "A Sad Misunderstanding" in No. 57 of *Iskra*, which Lenin uses as the basis for this appeal "To the Party."

² The entire third paragraph of Lenin's appeal consists of quotations or paraphrases of the main propositions of Plekhanov's article concerning the crisis in the party and measures for overcoming it. The beginning of the paragraph, ending with the words "supporters of the minority," corresponds to the following passage from Plekhanov's article: "And to me it is obvious that our Central Committee is obligated to act in the same way [as Plekhanov himself, who co-opted representatives of the minority into the editorial board]. It must take measures to be the expression of our entire party, and not of only one part of it. This, of course, is not obligatory from the standpoint of the statute, but it is undoubtedly required by the interests of the cause. And until this requirement is fulfilled by those 'to whom it falls to act,' our Central Committee will remain, so to speak, eccentric. But it needs to become truly central." (Emphases—author.)

³ Here Lenin partially cites the following passage (immediately following the passage cited in note 2): "Will this requirement be fulfilled [see note 2 above]? I do not know. But I know well that its fulfillment is the only means to bring our party out of a state of grave crisis, which extraordinarily weakens our positions and strengthens the positions of our numerous enemies and opponents. Who needs this crisis? In any case, not our party; in any case, not the class which it represents."

⁴ This reference corresponds to the following passage from Plekhanov's article (located in it before the previously indicated passages): "A person who has managed to rise above formalism reasons on the merits; a person who has managed to attain a political point of view does not consult the statute, or rather, not only the statute, but also the actual state of affairs, the given relationship of forces." (Emphasis—author.)

⁵ The end of the paragraph, beginning with the words "One must rise above," represents a reference to the following passage from Plekhanov's article (located in it before all previously indicated passages): "The reaction against utopian vagueness, striving to unite everyone and everything, led some of our comrades to the opposite extreme. They began to judge everything occurring in our movement by means of two or three short formulas, which in their opinion contain the entire quintessence of 'orthodoxy'... They show themselves incapable of 'building the party.' Their horizon does not extend beyond the limits of the circle. Hence—excessive suspiciousness in mutual relations among people belonging to different circles; the discovery of heresies where there is not a trace of them, divergence and disunity where people should have come together and united. The formulas producing these sad fruits are so narrow that in the name of them one could accuse Marx himself of betraying Marxism. Indeed, Marx says somewhere that the doctrinaire places in the foreground that which divides workers, whereas a person not infected by doctrinairism strives to unite them."

⁶ Here Lenin refers to the negotiations that took place at the meeting of the entire former pre-congress editorial board (the "six") together with the Foreign League representative to the Central Committee F. V. Lengnik on October 4, which is described in detail in Lenin Miscellany VI, document 29, pp. 265-272.

⁷ Here and further, in the greater part of this paragraph, Lenin repeats, in somewhat altered and abbreviated form, the content of three paragraphs from his previously cited appeal "To Party Members"—paragraphs about "formalists," about "bureaucrats," and about "crude mechanical decision by majority vote" (document 164, p. 166, and note 7 to it, p. 169).

* In the manuscript, the passage beginning with the words "first ascertain" and ending with the words "would like" was inserted by Lenin's hand in ink of a different color.

** The last two paragraphs, beginning with the words "The raising by *Iskra* of the question" to the end of the manuscript, are crossed out in red and blue pencil.