V. I. Lenin

Source: ru:LS/v10;es:MT
Translated: machine translation (DeepSeek) from the Russian; AI-translated.

N. K. Krupskaya, in a letter to L. M. Knipovich of February 17 (above, document 181, p. 324), notes Plekhanov’s appearance in Martov’s pamphlet *The Fight Against the State of Siege* with an open letter to Martov against Lenin. This letter was not only a new act of open (the second after the League congress) betrayal by Plekhanov of the positions of the majority of the Second Congress of the Party and his frank transition to the positions of the minority, but also a malicious attempt to blacken and discredit Lenin’s personality as a political figure in the eyes of the Party.

Plekhanov dated this letter of his January 29, 1904, i.e., he wrote it during the January session of the Council, where he could well have expressed in debate, face to face with his opponent, all his objections and accusations concerning the substance of Lenin’s activity in his struggle against the minority. Lenin, of course, could not leave this attack by Plekhanov without a proper reply. In the pamphlet *Commentary on the Minutes of the Second Congress of the League Abroad*, in a letter addressed to the editors of the pamphlet, he gave Plekhanov a comprehensive rebuff.

Here we present this letter of Lenin’s in its original version, preserved in the Geneva archive in the form of a handwritten manuscript and somewhat different from the text of the letter published in the *Commentary*. All textual variations of the document from the text published in the *Commentary* are noted in the footnotes.

Plekhanov’s letter is given in the appendix to the present document.

184.
19235
V. I. Lenin.

*LETTER TO THE EDITORS OF THE PAMPHLET “COMMENTARY ON THE MINUTES OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE LEAGUE ABROAD OF THE R.S.D.L.P.”*

ORIGINAL DRAFT.

Geneva, February 20, 1904.

Dear Comrades,

Since in your pamphlet you touch upon the circumstances which caused my resignation from the editorial board of *Iskra*, I shall ask you to give a place in the appendix to your pamphlet for [a brief] my reply to Comrade Plekhanov’s letter to Comrade Martov of January 29, 1904, printed in Martov’s pamphlet on the fight against the “state of siege”.²

Comrade Plekhanov finds my account of the matter in my letter to the editors inaccurate. However, he has not given and could not give a single factual correction. He has merely supplemented my account with an inaccurate rendering of private conversations between him and me.

Generally speaking, I consider references to private conversations a sure sign of the absence of serious arguments. I still hold the opinion which Comrade Plekhanov himself recently held regarding references to private conversations by Comrade Martov (Minutes of the League, p. 134), namely, that it is hardly possible to “reproduce exactly” such conversations and that “polemics” about them “will lead to nothing”.³

In particular, I shall gladly explain and supplement from my side the private conversations touched upon by Plekhanov, all the more so since all these conversations took place in the presence of third persons, whom the reading public will probably be able to hear if the need arises.*

The first conversation, when Comrade Plekhanov spoke of his decision** to resign in the event of my absolute disagreement with co-optation, took place on the evening of the day the League congress ended, and the following morning, in the presence of two members of the Party Council. The conversation revolved around the question of concessions to the opposition. Plekhanov insisted on the necessity of making concessions, considering it certain that the opposition would not submit to any decision of the Party Council and that a complete split in the Party might occur immediately. I insisted that after what had happened in the League, after the measures taken at its congress by the representative of the C.C. (and Comrade Plekhanov participated in the discussion of each of these measures and fully approved them), it was impossible to yield to anarchistic individualism, and that the emergence of a special literary group (which I repeatedly acknowledged in conversations with Plekhanov as quite permissible, contrary to his opinion) did not necessarily, perhaps, mean a split. When the conversation came down to one of us resigning, I immediately said that I would resign, not wishing to prevent Plekhanov from trying to settle the conflict, to try to avoid what he considered a split.

Comrade Plekhanov is now so kind to me that he can find no other motives for my step except the most cowardly evasiveness. To depict this quality of mine in the most vivid colours, Comrade Plekhanov attributes to me the words: “Everyone will say that obviously Lenin is wrong if even Plekhanov has broken with him.”

The colours are laid on thick, I must say! So thick that they even produce an obvious incongruity unnoticed by Comrade Plekhanov. If I were convinced that “everyone” would find Plekhanov right (as Plekhanov modestly thinks of himself) and if I considered it necessary to take the opinion of this “everyone” into account, then obviously I would never have decided to break with Plekhanov, I would have followed him even in this case. Comrade Plekhanov, wishing to present my behaviour in the worst possible light and as stemming from the basest motives, attributed to me a motive devoid of all sense. I was supposedly so afraid of breaking with Plekhanov in anything that I broke with him. This doesn’t come out smoothly for Comrade Plekhanov.

In reality, my thought was: it is better for me to resign, because otherwise [I will be accused] my dissenting opinion will serve as an obstacle to Plekhanov’s attempts to make peace. I do not wish to hinder the attempts; perhaps we will even* come to terms on conditions of peace, but I do not consider it possible to be responsible for an editorial board to which candidates are thus foisted by the foreign clique.

A few days later I actually called on Plekhanov together with one member of the Council, and** our conversation*** with Plekhanov took the following turn. “You know,” said Plekhanov, “there are sometimes such scandalous wives that it is necessary to give in to them to avoid hysterics and a loud scandal before the public.” “Perhaps,” I replied, “but one must give in in such a way as to retain the strength to prevent an even greater* ‘scandal’.” “Well, to resign means to give in completely,” replied Plekhanov. “Not always,” I objected, and cited the example of Chamberlain. My thought was precisely that which I expressed in print: if Plekhanov succeeds in achieving a peace acceptable also to the majority, in whose ranks Plekhanov fought so long and so energetically, then I too will not start a war. If he does not succeed, I retain freedom of action to expose the “scandalous wife”, if even Plekhanov cannot calm and pacify her.

In the same conversation I told Plekhanov (who did not yet know the conditions of the opposition) about my “decision” to join the C.C. (I could “decide” this, but the consent had to be given, of course, by all members of the C.C.). Plekhanov was quite sympathetic to this plan, as a last attempt to get along with the “scandalous wife” on any terms whatsoever.

When in my letter to Plekhanov of November 6, 1903** I expressed the opinion that he might simply hand over the editorial board to the Martovites, Plekhanov replied (November 8): “...You seem to have poorly understood my intentions. I explained them yesterday once again to Comrade V[asilyev]”⁴ (a member of the C.C. who was at the League congress). To the same Comrade V[asilyev] Plekhanov wrote on November 10 on the question of hastening or delaying the publication of No. 52 of *Iskra* with the announcement of the congress: “...To print the announcement of the congress means: either 1)*** to print that Martov and others are not participating in *Iskra*; or 2) to refuse this to Martov, — and then he will print it in a special leaflet. In both cases this brings the split to the attention of the public, and that is precisely what we must now avoid.”⁵ (My italics, N. L.) On November 17 Plekhanov writes to the same comrade: “...What do you think about the immediate co-optation of Martov and others? I am beginning to think that this would be a way to settle the matter with the least difficulty. Without you I do not wish to act.”⁶... (Plekhanov’s italics.)

From these excerpts it is clearly evident that Plekhanov was trying to act in solidarity with the majority, wishing to co-opt the editorial board only for the sake of peace and on condition of peace, by no means for war with the majority. If the opposite happened, it only showed that the cart of anarchistic individualism had gone too far in the tactics of boycott and disorganisation; the strongest brakes did not work. This is very regrettable, of course, and Plekhanov, who sincerely desired peace, found himself in an unpleasant position; but it is not right to put the blame for this on me alone.

As for Plekhanov’s words about my trading silence for a suitable equivalent and his proud declaration: “I did not find it necessary to buy his silence,” this polemical device, specially intended to cast suspicion on the purity of my motives*, produces only a comical impression when compared with the words from the letter of November 10 quoted by me above. It was precisely Plekhanov who attached the greatest importance to the question of silence, of not bringing the split to the attention of the public**! What could be more natural*** than my informing him of my agreement to this as well, on condition of peace? Talk about trading for an equivalent and about buying only makes one expect that next time Plekhanov will inform the public that Lenin is preparing counterfeit banknotes for such purchases. This has happened before in émigré squabbles — the appropriate atmosphere exists.

Comrade Plekhanov’s letter involuntarily suggests the thought: isn’t he now having to buy the right to be in the minority? The tactics of the minority in our so-called Party organ have already been defined. One must try to obscure the controversial questions and facts which actually led to our divergence. One must try to prove that Martynov was much closer to *Iskra* than Lenin — how exactly, in what exactly, and to what extent exactly, the muddled editorial board of the new *Iskra* will still have to sort out for a long time. One must pharisaically condemn personalities in polemics — and in practice reduce the whole struggle to a campaign against the person, not stopping even at attributing to the “enemy” very incoherent harmful qualities, from the most reckless straightforwardness to the most cowardly evasiveness. As long as it comes out strong.

(And with our new allies, Comrades Plekhanov and Martov, it comes out so strong that soon they will yield nothing to the famous Bundists with their famous “abuse”*.)

The allies bombard me so zealously from their ironclads that I sometimes** have the thought: isn’t this a conspiracy of two-thirds of the terrible trio?⁸ shouldn’t I too pretend to be offended? shouldn’t I too howl about the “state of siege”? (for this is sometimes so convenient and so advantageous***)...

However, for Comrade Plekhanov to become a real supporter of the minority, he will still have to take two**** steps: first*****, to admit that the formulation of Paragraph 1 of the Rules defended by Comrades Martov and Axelrod at the congress (and now diligently [evaded] hushed up by them) expresses not a step towards opportunism, not a capitulation before bourgeois individualism, but the germ of new, truly Social-Democratic, Akimov-Martov and Martynov-Axelrod organisational views. Secondly, to admit that the struggle after the congress with the minority was not a struggle against gross violations of Party discipline, against methods of agitation which arouse only indignation, not a struggle against anarchism and anarchistic phrase-mongering (pp. 17, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 104 and many others of the League minutes⁹), but a struggle against the “state of siege”, bureaucratism, formalism, etc.

I shall have to deal in detail with controversial questions of this kind in a pamphlet now being prepared for the press.¹⁰ For the time being... for the time being let us observe the gallery of Gogol types opened by our leading organ, which has adopted the rule of setting riddles for its readers. Who resembles the straightforward Sobakevich, trampling on everyone’s self-esteem, that is, on their corns? Who resembles the evasive Chichikov, buying up, along with dead souls, also silence? Who resembles Nozdryov and Khlestakov? Manilov and Skvoznik-Dmukhanovsky? Interesting and instructive riddles... “Principled polemics”...

N. Lenin.

¹ In the *Commentary on the Minutes of the Second Congress of the League Abroad of the R.S.D.L.P.*, the “circumstances which caused... [Lenin’s] resignation from the editorial board of *Iskra*” are briefly set forth as follows: “Despite this open disobedience not only to the C. Committee, but also to the Party Council [the reference is to the conflict between the League and the C.C. — Ed.], the C.C. did not lose hope of settling the aggravated conflict peacefully, and negotiations began between it and part of the C.O., on the one hand, and representatives of the ‘opposition’, on the other. In order not to hinder the establishment of ‘good peace’ in the Party by means of a ‘friendly’ agreement — as explained in the ‘letter to the editors of *Iskra*’ — Comrade Lenin resigned from the editorial board.”
² See below (p. 337) Appendix 1 to this document.
³ The last words from Plekhanov’s letter to the editors of the minutes of the League congress are quoted here not quite accurately. In the text of this letter appended to the minutes of the League congress it is printed: “will lead to nothing”. The italics here are Lenin’s.
⁴ See *Lenin Miscellany* VII, document 85, p. 217.
⁵ See *Lenin Miscellany* VII, document 89, p. 228.
⁶ See *Lenin Miscellany* VII, document 95, pp. 236-237.
⁷ The reference is to the end of the 35th session of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the question of approving the minutes of the 31st session, at which the question of the composition of the editorial board of the C.O. was decided. When approving the minutes of the 31st session, Martov proposed “to note that Comrades Plekhanov and Lenin voted against reopening the question of the editorial board and for granting the two elected editors the right to co-opt a third”. Here Lenin has in mind Plekhanov’s speech on this proposal by Martov just before the close of the 35th session. In the minutes of the congress it is recorded as follows: “Plekhanov declares on behalf of the bureau that it considers the publication of the results of roll-call votes and the inquiries concerning these votes to be incorrect and contrary to the rules of procedure, but he, Plekhanov, personally, as well as Lenin,