## SECOND SESSION OF THE COUNCIL.
[29 January 1904] (The Council reconvened in the same composition.)

**Chairman.** Who requests the floor? If no one requests the floor, then perhaps we shall proceed to voting on the proposed resolutions?

**Lenin.** I expected that the Chairman himself would take the floor, since, as far as I recall, he yesterday still wanted to subject to detailed criticism the considerations I expressed at that time, but, owing to the late hour, postponed this intention until the next session.

**Plekhanov.*** The most important thing for me was to respond to the repeatedly stated position of Comrade Lenin that here there is a dispute between central institutions with one another. I have already reminded, and once again remind him, that I am present here not as a representative of the Editorial Board, but as a member of the Council elected by the Fifth Congress. I request the comrade secretaries once more to enter into the minutes this remark of mine, which Comrade Lenin keeps forgetting. As regards objections to other parts of the last speech delivered by Comrade Lenin at yesterday's session, I expected that today's session would begin with the reading of yesterday's minutes and that thus this speech would be refreshed in my memory. Unfortunately, the minutes are not ready, and I do not remember well what exactly Comrade Lenin said. I shall point out what has been preserved in my recollection, and if anything is forgotten by me, let Comrade Lenin himself point it out to me. Comrade Lenin did not understand the significance of my indication regarding proportional representation. It had purely theoretical significance. Comrade Lenin said that elections always and everywhere are conducted by a majority. I objected: this is not so; proof: proportional representation. But I did not propose to introduce it in our party. This would hardly be practicable in practice. My proposal has a different character. I propose to undertake cooptation, which has already been much discussed and which will not encounter difficulties in practice. And I am convinced that only this cooptation will create that foundation upon which, relying, we shall eliminate the abnormality of the present state of party affairs, acknowledged by all of us and pointed out by Comrade Lenin.

**Lenin.** I consider it necessary to respond, mainly, to the detailed objections made to me by Comrade Martov; but, in order not to leave the objections of Comrade Plekhanov without a response, I shall briefly touch upon these latter first. It seemed to me that he takes a principled stand on the point of view of proportional representation... [Plekhanov: "No!"]. Perhaps I did not understand him, but it seemed to me that way. In our party organization, the principle of proportional representation is not accepted, and the sole criterion of the legality of the composition of such or such an institution, whose members have been elected at the congress, is the clearly expressed will of the majority of the congress. But here they say that legal elections at the congress created such a "legal" state of affairs which is worse than an illegal one. This is true, but why? Is it because the majority was insignificant, or because the minority created an actual schism? When they say that the Central Committee was elected by only 24 votes, i.e., by a negligible majority, and that in this very circumstance lies the cause of all further unpleasant complications in party life, I assert that this is not true. As regards the remark of Comrade Plekhanov about my "formalistic thinking," supposedly not allowing me to look to the root of things, I, frankly, am at a loss as to what this is supposed to mean? Perhaps the "root of things" lies in the congress? In that case we are all formalists, because, transferring our thoughts to the congress, we must proceed from its formal decisions. If the "root of things" lies outside the congress, then where exactly? Indeed, it turned out that the state of affairs in the party proved worse than an illegal one (these are very serious words), but the whole question is precisely why did it turn out this way? Is the congress guilty of this, or the circumstances that followed the congress? Unfortunately, Comrade Plekhanov does not pose the question in this way.

Now I shall turn to the words of Comrade Martov. He asserts that on the part of the minority there is and was no unwillingness to work together. This is not true. During three months—September, October, and November—many representatives of the minority actually proved that they do not wish to work together. In such cases, the boycotted side has only one method remaining—to resort to an agreement, a deal with the opposing "aggrieved" opposition, which is leading the party to a schism, because the very fact itself of withdrawing from joint work is nothing other than a schism. When people directly declare that we, they say, do not wish to work together with you, and thereby actually prove that a "unified organization" is a mere fiction—that it has, in fact, already been destroyed—then they put forward, thus, if not a convincing, then a truly devastating argument... I turn to the second objection of Comrade Martov—regarding the withdrawal from the Council of Comrade Roux.

This question breaks down into two separate questions. First, was it legal to appoint Roux to the Council from the Editorial Board, although Roux was not a member of the Editorial Board? I think it was legal. [Martov: Of course it was legal!] I request that Martov's remark be entered in the minutes. Second, are members of the Council replaceable by the will of the institutions that sent them? This is a complex question, which can be interpreted both ways. In any case, I note that Plekhanov, remaining the sole member of the Editorial Board from 1 November, did not replace Roux from his position on the Council up until 26 November, when Martov and company were cooptated. Roux left himself, in order to yield without raising a dispute connected with his personality.

**Plekhanov.** It seems to me that disputes about Comrade Roux are now inopportune. This question is not on our agenda, and I do not know why we should waste precious time on debate on this, in the given case, extraneous question for us.

**Lenin.** I must note that Comrade Martov in the previous session requested that a clarification made by him on this question be entered in the minutes—a clarification with which I completely disagree, and if the other side is not allowed to express its opinion on the same question, then the latter will thus receive here, in the Council, an incorrect, one-sided elucidation.

**Plekhanov.** I call attention to the fact that this question is not on the agenda and has no direct relation to the main subject of our conference.

**Lenin,** protesting against such a formulation, appeals to the Council for a decision on his (Lenin's) right, in responding to Martov, to give his own elucidation of a fact so variously interpreted here.

**Plekhanov** again points out the inopportuneness in the given case of debate on the question of Roux.

**Lenin** insists on his right to appeal to the Council for permission to speak on the question that has already been raised in the Council and has caused debate.

**Martov.** In view of the fact that Comrade Lenin has raised a very important question concerning the right of collegial bodies represented in the Council to recall their delegates, I declare that I shall introduce a special proposal for the resolution of this question once and for all. Perhaps this declaration will satisfy Lenin and induce him to eliminate the question of Roux from the present debate.

**Lenin.** Comrade Martov not only does not refute, but confirms the soundness of my intention to subject immediately the question of the withdrawal of Comrade Roux from the Council to proper elucidation. I note that my explanations on this question were only a response to the corresponding remarks of Comrade Martov.

**Plekhanov** points out to Martov and Lenin that the question of Roux is not now subject to discussion, as not entering into the circle of questions on which in the present session of the Council the attention of the members of the Council should be concentrated.

**Lenin.** I protest against the remark of Comrade Plekhanov about the inopportuneness of discussion here of the question of Comrade Roux, which was based on the principle of irreplaceability of members of the Council, so that the withdrawal of Roux from the Council should be regarded as a concession to his opposition in the interests of good peace in the party.

**Plekhanov.** Since the Council has nothing against an exchange of views on the question of Comrade Roux, then I propose to Lenin to continue speaking about this.

**Lenin.** I have already finished.

**Plekhanov.** If you have finished, then I propose the Council move to the discussion of the resolutions proposed yesterday by Comrade Lenin and myself.

**Lenin.** I agree with Comrade Martov that the resolutions of the Council would have not a juridical, but a moral significance. Comrade Plekhanov expressed himself to the effect that it would be desirable if I entered the Editorial Board.

**Plekhanov.** I did not say that.

**Lenin.** In any case, your words were recorded by me precisely thus: "It would be best of all if Lenin entered the Editorial Board, and the Central Committee cooptated three."

**Plekhanov.** Yes, I said that under certain conditions, for the pacification of the party, it is admissible for Comrade Lenin to enter the Editorial Board and for there to be cooptation of representatives of the minority into the Central Committee.

**Lenin.** In response to the question posed to me concerning what exactly change in the composition of the Editorial Board of the Central Organization is considered desirable, it was easy for me to refer to the opinion of the "majority," which was expressed in favor of the desirability of the withdrawal from the Editorial Board of Comrades Axelrod, Zasulich, and Starover. Then I must say that in the actions of the Central Committee there was not a single fact of removing anyone from party work. Equally, I cannot leave without protest the statement of Comrade Martov that the Central Committee became an instrument of war of one side against the other. The Central Committee was appointed to be an instrument for the execution of party functions, not an instrument of "war of one side against the other." Such an assertion of Comrade Martov is completely contradicted by the facts. No one will prove by a single fact that the Central Committee began and waged "war" against the minority. On the contrary, the minority, having begun a boycott, waged a war that provoked inevitable resistance. Then I protest also against the assertion that the existing distrust of the Central Committee hinders the Central Committee more than distrust of the Central Organization hinders peaceful positive work. Regarding the fact that the center of disorder is supposedly not abroad but in Russia, as Comrade Martov insists, I must note that party documents will show the opposite. Comrade Martov, referring to a document from 25 November, said that the Central Committee in principle itself recognized the one-sided character of its composition, having agreed to cooptation of two from the minority. I protest against such an interpretation of this document, because I myself participated in drawing it up. The act of the Central Committee had a completely different significance. It was not in consequence of recognition of the one-sidedness of its composition that the Central Committee decided on cooptation of two, but because we saw a complete factual schism in the party. Whether we conceived the state of affairs rightly or wrongly is another question... At that time rumors reached us that a new organ was being prepared for publication...

**Plekhanov.** If we are going to refer to rumors, we shall get nowhere.

**Axelrod.** And I heard that a new organ is now being prepared for publication...

**Lenin.** I appeal to the Council: since the paper of the Central Committee No. 12 has been interpreted by Comrade Martov in a certain sense, then I am compelled to present my own interpretation on the same matter... I do not understand why my remark caused such agitation here.

**Plekhanov.** The matter is not one of agitation, but of the fact that references to rumors are inopportune here.

**Lenin.** One might say that my motives are unfounded. Possibly! but in any case I note that these motives had precisely the character that I have just indicated.

**Plekhanov** points out that the Council assembled not for this purpose and that such kinds of debate will lead nowhere.

**Lenin** wishes to continue his speech.

**The Chairman** stops him.

**Lenin** declares that he has not yet finished his speech.

**Martov** requests the floor on a point of order.

**The Chairman.** The floor belongs to Martov.

**Lenin*** insists on his right to continue his substantive speech, which he has not yet finished.

**Plekhanov,** referring to Martov's statement, expressing the desire to speak on a point of order, gives the floor to Martov.

**Martov** introduces an amendment to Lenin's speech.

**Lenin.** I continue on substance: Comrade Martov suspected the motives of the Central Committee, which was agreeing to the cooptation of two. And I note that the Central Committee proceeded from the opinion that a factual schism already exists in the party and that we are on the eve of a complete formal schism in the sense of a separate publication of an organ, separate transport, and separate organization in Russia. Now I shall speak to the point of order: Comrade Martov made a substantive remark, not one on a point of order. I appeal to the Council with the question: was it correct for the Chairman to act in this case?

**The Chairman.** I request that it be entered in the minutes that I consider my actions to be correct and that Comrade Martov spoke on a point of order. I put to a vote the question: who considers the Chairman's actions correct?

**Vasiliev** demands a roll-call vote.

(Plekhanov, Martov, and Axelrod consider the Chairman's actions correct; Lenin and Vasiliev consider them incorrect.)

**Martov.** We greeted with pleasure the desire of the representatives of the Central Committee to put the question on common ground and, of course, not in order to again engage in polemics, which would be superfluous after the disputes have been brought into literature. Only this declared readiness of the Central Committee to discuss together possible measures of pacification induced us to change the agenda. We thought that the Central Committee had abandoned its former combative position. Today, however, Comrade Lenin has returned to it. Regarding Comrade Roux and his right not to withdraw, I shall not speak here in order not to complicate the debate on this question, and I only declare that the Editorial Board will propose for discussion of the Council a general question concerning the relation between members of the Council and the institutions from which they were delegated. This question must be resolved once and for all. The text of the proposed appeal attempts to give a moral-political characterization of the "minority" and to justify the actions of the Central Committee. Such an appeal cannot have any political significance; by transferring the question to this ground, Comrade Lenin has assumed the former position; he in no way wishes to leave the ground of disputes about "discipline," "boycott," "inadmissible methods," and "disrespect" to the authorities. We, on the other hand, wish to openly pose the question of the fundamental cause that has created all this abnormality.

I move on to the individual arguments of Comrade Lenin against the resolution. It is unknown to me on what basis Comrade Lenin makes his categorical assertion that supporters of the "majority" desire the withdrawal from the Editorial Board of Zasulich, Axelrod, and Starover. No written statement on this matter has been received. If the Central Committee had taken upon itself the initiative to express such desires, I would have considered this step politically inopportune for the Central Committee. On the contrary, Comrade Travinsky, officially conducting negotiations on behalf of the Central Committee, categorically declared that he welcomed the cooptation accomplished by Plekhanov, and to Plekhanov he officially declared the gratitude of the Central Committee for the decision to coopt. [Plekhanov: yes!] Falsely does Comrade Lenin assert about the self-withdrawal of the minority from positive work, and I categorically protest against such an accusation: neither the committees of the "minority" nor the writers withdrew from party work, although both writers and members of committees did not take upon themselves a definite kind of work. The assertion about self-withdrawal cannot but appear to be an unjust accusation, which does not accord with a "reconciliatory" appeal. The writers have repeatedly, as Comrade Lenin knows, appealed to the Editorial Board with the request to give them work in the pamphlet publishing house, since they cannot work in the Central Organization without taking responsibility for a policy they do not share. The committees of the minority worked no less than the committees of the majority. Comrade Lenin says that the center of disorder is abroad, but he perfectly knows that even before the emergence of disorder here, he received resolutions from local committees expressing a desire for a change in the composition of the centers. Between the foreign organization (the League) and the Central Committee there are no longer hostile relations, but there the matter has not been settled to this day, and the situation is most sad: the committees (both of the "minority" and of the "majority") do not receive literature from the Central Committee; people are not sent to them. If one takes into account that the local committees are discontented with the absence of positive work, then one cannot agree that the center of disorder lies here in Geneva. If we left the combative ground, then by this very fact we could facilitate the settlement of disorder in Russia. To this it seemed Comrade Lenin was inclined. But his appeal speaks of the sins of local party members toward the centers and may touch on the (I believe, justified) claims of local members about the policy of the Central Committee. The project read by Lenin says nothing about the cessation of "exclusive" measures against certain groups. Publication of such an appeal would create even greater chaos and disorganization. To publish it—means to say that the Council cannot find means, means to discredit the Council, to acknowledge it as what the Central Committee has become.

**Vasiliev.** I cannot agree with much of what Comrade Martov said, but, not wishing to be drawn too far from the theme occupying us, I shall say only that Comrade Martov's assertion, that the fundamental cause of all "friction and squabbles" is discontent in Russia, does not correspond to truth. When, about five months ago, I was at the first session of the Central Committee, everything in Russia was quiet, and our discussion was only about the fact that we should try abroad to make peace with the former editors of Iskra. I now turn to the resolution of Comrade Plekhanov. This resolution has in mind a purely juridical act—cooptation into the Central Committee, and therefore one should more precisely define certain expressions found in it and resolve the doubts it raises: which exactly representatives of the minority are in question? how and where to find these representatives? whom to call "sympathizers" of this minority? what exact number of representatives, in the opinion of the supporters of the resolution, needs to be cooptated—a number corresponding to what? to some arithmetic relation, or to someone's will? Does not such proportional representation in the centers, which was spoken about here yesterday repeatedly, presume the possibility of introducing into the principles on which our party is founded some new nuances? Cannot, for example, the "South Workers," who are undoubtedly the main practical workers from among the representatives of the "minority," demand territory for themselves in Southern Russia? Or might others demand proportional representation on the principles of federation: so many "bureaucratic centralists," so many "genuine centralists," so many "South Workers," so many "Workers' Cause" followers, so many "marsh" people, etc., etc.?

**Axelrod.** The representative of the Central Committee began by toasting to life and ended by toasting to the dead. I fully agree that, in view of the importance of the moment, in view of our responsibility to the entire Social-Democratic workers' party and to history, we must and are obliged to take such practical measures as would eliminate the abnormal state of affairs and establish good peace in the party. Thus did I understand the declaration of the comrades from the Central Committee when they proposed that we place on the agenda first of all the question of establishing peace in the party. But instead of practical measures, we are proposed to address the party members with a pastoral message. When we point out to the representatives of the Central Committee that until such time as the very source of internal discord in the party is eliminated, such an appeal can only cause misunderstandings and even serve as a new occasion for aggravating the conflict, they answer us with insistent emphasis in every conceivable way on the fact that the party has split into two parts and that we cannot establish peace between them. These insistent indications of the depth and intensity of the schism in the party, of the impossibility of pacification, etc., strike me with their extreme inconsistency with what Comrade Lenin said at the beginning of our first session, when presenting the draft of the appeal, and with what is said in the introductory part of this appeal. If internal relations in the party are to the last degree abnormal and ruinous for it, if the general state of affairs in the country and the importance of the events being prepared oblige us to direct all our efforts toward putting an end to these abnormal relations, then it is clear as two plus two equals four that instead of exhortations we need to give advice as to the paths and means for eliminating the internal schism. Instead of this, all we hear from Comrade Lenin are insistent assurances of our powerlessness, of the impossibility for us to do anything in this sense. Yes, certainly, if the opposition is to be treated as a group of malefactors, then there is no point in talking about pacification. The "minority" is reproached with distrust of the Central Committee. But is it so difficult to eliminate this distrust?... I have long been away from Russia, and therefore I do not know how in this autocratic state distrust is eliminated, confidence is acquired, and conflicts are settled. But I know that in the civilized countries of the West, even in bourgeois parties, and all the more so in Social-Democracy, clashes—once they take place not on the basis of program and tactics between a part of members and central institutions—are usually settled through peaceful negotiations and agreements of representatives of both sides. The Vorstand of the German Social-Democratic party has repeatedly encountered strong opposition... But it has not yet occurred to it to refuse comradely negotiations and peaceful agreements with the opposition, even if it concentrated in some local circle of some backwoods town or remote corner of Germany. Thus does act a central institution of a party imbued with a sense of its responsibility and its obligations.

It is precisely to adopt this path that the resolution of the Chairman proposes. The Central Committee must convene representatives from the opposition, together with them discuss the state of affairs in the party, weigh all the dangers to it from this state, its obligation to meet the desires of the "minority," which constitutes a significant part of the party, and through mutual compromise restore peace in it and thereby acquire that confidence in itself which is so necessary for the normal and successful development of our party life.

And so, instead of discussing Plekhanov's resolution, the representatives of the Central Committee only go on about the fact that there are mutineers in the party, that "we cannot" put an end to internal discord... And I cannot but say that all these insistent declarations make upon me the impression of a tendency to consolidate in minds the present relations in the party as an already accomplished schism. And I once again note the complete contradiction between the reasoning of Comrade Lenin and his justification of the proposal that he submitted regarding first of all discussing the question of eliminating abnormal relations in the party.

If we really desire peace, if we are aware of the full importance of the moment we are experiencing and of our entire responsibility to our party and to the Russian proletariat, we have no right to evade discussion of practical means for eliminating our internal discord and from indicating to the Central Committee these means and its obligation to enter into direct negotiations with representatives of the so-called minority, which had almost half the delegates at the congress. The resolution of the Chairman points the way out of our abnormal situation. I therefore propose that we finally engage in discussion of this resolution.

**Martov.** Comrade Vasiliev says that when he came abroad in view of the noise raised here, Russia was quiet. This only means that the practitioners expected the Central Committee to try to eliminate the difficulties created at the congress through reasonable measures and did not hasten to express distrust of the Central Committee on account of the conditions under which its election was attended. I must say that the Central Committee was warned as to the delicacy of its position, as chosen with the participation of only half the congress and under special conditions. Immediately after the congress, I wrote to one of the elected members that the Central Committee, elected by half the congress, cannot count on the normal course of its work, that it should begin with such measures as would at once correct the impression produced on the party by unexpected events at the congress. A member of the Central Committee answered me that I could rely on the Central Committee and that Comrade Vasiliev was going abroad. [Plekhanov. I request that this be entered in the minutes.] Unfortunately, the arrival of Comrade Vasiliev only occasioned even greater "noise." When the "noise" with the League was completely settled, just as Comrade Travinsky was leaving here, Comrade Vasiliev complained to the Editorial Board that there, in Russia, was "utter hell." [Vasiliev: that is false.]

**Martov** (reading the letter). Here is what Comrade Vasiliev writes on 12 December: "We have been written from Russia that the opposition is creating 'hell' there." From this it is seen how groundless is Vasiliev's assertion that all the turmoil is abroad. Comrade Vasiliev, in speaking about the proposal of Comrade Plekhanov, permitted himself to call separate party groups "South Workers," "Workers' Cause" followers, and "marsh" people. The comrades from the Central Committee, who deny that the given Central Committee is a Central Committee of only half the party, should have been especially cautious in employing such terminology. There is no group of the South Worker in our party, there is no group of Workers' Cause; both groups were closed by the congress, and to treat certain comrades by the name of their former group means to confirm that in the party, for the Central Committee, there are members without full rights. "Marsh" in the party I do not know; how fitting it is in the Council to call members of the party by this name. How can the Central Committee win the confidence of this whole part of the party when it treats them thus? The question of whom one needs to coopt in order to bring the party to peace is completely futile. The committees have stated quite definitely not about the South Worker, not about Workers' Cause, but about the quite definite "minority," arising from members of different former circles on the basis of struggle against a specific regime. Every European Social-Democratic party knows how in such cases, when there is conflict between the center and a significant part of the party, to resolve it on comradely bases.

Comrade Vasiliev's question, where to seek the "minority," is equally futile; I shall answer it by saying that when the Central Committee applied—using the terminology of Comrade Lenin—"devastating measures" against the minority, it knew how to find it. It would be able to do so now as well, if it wished to appear to them as a comrade.

**Plekhanov.** First of all, I am compelled to point out to Comrade Vasiliev that he did not understand my thought, notwithstanding that I have already more than once explained it. The reference to proportionality had for me only theoretical significance. Lenin asserted that always and everywhere the part expressing the will of the majority is recognized as the whole. I refuted this by reference to proportional representation. But my plan is not to introduce proportional representation into our centers. May Comrade Vasiliev grant me his attention. The facts are such. In our party there are disputes. In Russia—as the quoted letter here states—these disputes have created utter hell. I pointed to the cause of this. Our Central Committee is, properly speaking, an eccentric committee, hence all the abnormalities. I think that the Central Committee itself would find it uncomfortable to feel itself in an eccentric position. I in no way deny the legality of the congress's decision, but if one is to refer to the statutes, then one must have in mind the fullness of its instructions. After all, the statute speaks of the right of cooptation. The Central Committee must make use of this right in order to bring peace to our party life. Regarding the questions of Comrade Vasiliev, I must say the following. If he spoke on substance, then, as I have already noted, he did not fully understand the resolution proposed by me and did not grasp its content. If these questions have the character of a polemical device, then they are simply unsuccessful. Comrade Vasiliev asks, of whom does the opposition consist. Yet he himself speaks of it as something quite definite. Hence, he knows of whom it consists. If it were negligible in size, it would not be worth speaking of; but if it is large—and it is very large—then the encyclical proposed by Comrade Lenin and expressing the idea that peace is better than quarrel would be a homeopathic remedy against an evil requiring allopathic treatment. That same Comrade Vasiliev, who seemingly does not know whom I have in mind, with full confidence says that the South Worker stands at the head of the opposition. Hence, when speaking of the opposition, he has solid ground beneath his feet. Why then does he wish to place my feet on the bog of vague suppositions? This is not comradely. By the way, about the bog, which I mentioned quite accidentally. I was perhaps one of the first to use this expression at the congress in application to delegates who were wavering in their decisions. But I used it, as they say, off the record. This expression was and should remain off the record. Here, in an official session of the Council, it is completely inopportune as insulting, and I would propose that once and for all we eliminate it from our speeches. You ask, in what proportions do I envisage the representation of the minority at cooptation into the Central Committee? I shall say again, You have not honored me with your attention. I deliberately do not give a definite decision on this in the resolution proposed by me; the resolution merely points to appropriate representation, and precisely because in this case algebra should precede arithmetic. Let us acknowledge that the Central Committee is eccentric and that cooptation is necessary, and then let us proceed to arithmetic: let us determine the exact proportions of necessary cooptation.

I draw the Council's attention to the fact that we have now for a second day been discussing an extremely important proposal of Lenin regarding the working out of radical measures for the restoration of normal life in the party. It is unknown how much longer our disputes will drag on. Will not the Council consider it necessary to limit the time of speakers. Yesterday there was talk of amendments. I propose that on each amendment only 2 speakers speak—1 for and 1 against—and each for no more than 5 minutes.

**Lenin.** Comrade Martov asserted that I supposedly immediately began with polemics instead of peaceably and calmly proceeding to discuss the general question of seeking measures for the pacification of the party. I disagree with this, because no one other than Comrade Martov himself began the polemics. In my resolution draft, there is nothing polemical. Not for nothing did Comrade Axelrod call this resolution a "pastoral appeal." And as we know, there is no polemics in pastoral appeals. And indeed, I spoke only about the limits within which internal party struggle should be conducted, what forms of such struggle can be considered admissible and which must be recognized as inadmissible and representing a danger not only to the normal course of party life, but even to the very existence of the party itself. Moreover, I carefully tried to avoid such a formulation of the question as might lead us to new fruitless polemics—I tried in my proposal not to proceed from an evaluation of those methods of struggle that have already marked nearly a half-year war between two parts of the party. Comrade Martov, however, would not refrain from this ground and resorted to polemics. But I am still ready, if it pleases you, to return later to that with which I began. Now I point out the following. Comrade Martov referred to the fact that Travinsky welcomed the cooptation into the composition of the Editorial Board of its former members. I consider it necessary to emphasize here the circumstance that private conversations or negotiations have no significance. All official negotiations were conducted by Travinsky in writing. His private statements were understood incorrectly, apparently, by Comrade Martov, and at another time, if necessary arises, I can prove this.

Then Comrade Martov expressed himself to the effect that in the activities of the Central Committee there are many deficiencies; by this very fact Comrade Martov again enters into the domain of polemics. Perhaps there are deficiencies in the Central Committee's activities, but criticism of this activity by the representative of the Central Organization is precisely nothing other than polemics. I, for example, in my turn find the activities of the Central Organization to have gone astray, but I nonetheless did not begin here with criticism of the direction that the Central Organization's activities have taken, but with the statement that there exists mutual dissatisfaction between the Central Committee and the Central Organization. I protest moreover against the assertion that my resolution, if adopted by the Council, would make the latter an "instrument of war." In my appeal there is talk only of which forms of struggle are admissible and which are inadmissible... What have these to do with "instrument of war"? Comrade Axelrod said that I "began by toasting to life and ended by toasting to the dead" and reproached me for directing all my attention to proving the existence of a schism in the party. But didn't we begin only yesterday by declaring the existence of a schism?... Then, in confirmation of the fact that the center of disorder is not abroad, Comrade Martov cited Comrade Vasiliev's letter of 12 December, in which it is said that there is utter hell in Russia. Let me note that "creating hell" can be done by not strong groups, for precisely small and petty squabbles most often and most easily create major obstacles to work. I already mentioned my letter from 13 September to one of the former editors. This letter I shall publish. Comrade Plekhanov says that the word "bog" is insulting. Let me remind you that in German socialist literature and in the German party at congresses the term versumpf sometimes provokes laughter, but never—cries of insult. Neither I nor Comrade Vasiliev, in using this word, thought of insulting anyone. When one speaks of two sides with a definite direction, then the irresolute and wavering between these two directions are characterized by the term "bog," instead of which one could perhaps say "golden mean." To call the Central Committee eccentric—this may perhaps be clever, but also leads to polemics. After all, in the same sense I could express myself about the Central Organization. It is pointed out to me that my "appeal" is a homeopathic remedy against an allopathic evil. I do not deny that the remedy I am proposing is only a palliative, but there are no allopathic remedies to be found here. When you bring up the necessity of "allopathic," radical means against the existing evil, then go to the end. There is such a remedy, and this sole radical remedy is nothing other than a congress. We have already vainly tried to come to terms for five months [this is not true!]... no, this is true, and I shall prove it to you in documents... We began trying to come to terms from 15 September and to this day have not come to terms. In that case is it not better to appeal to that collegial body of which Comrade Martov spoke yesterday, and such a collegial body can only be a congress of party workers. A party congress is precisely that collegial body which decides the question of the "conductor's baton." At a congress we are present in order, among other things, to "fight" over the "conductor's baton" (not in a crude sense, of course). There occurs a struggle by means of ballots, by means of communications with comrades, etc., and there such a struggle over the composition of centers is admissible, while outside the congress it should not take place in party life. Thus, if my "pastoral message" is a palliative, then there is no other, more radical remedy except a congress, if you do not want to make the evil chronic. Comrade Axelrod pointed out that in Western Europe representatives of central institutions take the opposition into account even in the most remote corners of the party and through negotiations with it strive to settle conflicts that have arisen... But the same thing is done by our Central Committee. The Central Committee sent two of its members abroad for this, the Central Committee repeatedly conferred with various representatives of the opposition, proving to them the absurdity of their arguments, the falseness of their fears, etc. It must be noted that this is an impossible waste of forces, money, and time, and in this sense we are indeed responsible to history. Returning again to the question of practical proposals, I repeat that you have only one radical remedy to eliminate this sad period of polemics—a congress. My resolution was calculated to introduce struggle within the party into more normal bounds... They say that the splinter will remain all the same, that the illness lies deeper... In that case only by the convening of a congress can one remove the entire splinter.

**The Chairman** asks Lenin if he will not introduce a corresponding resolution with a proposal for convening a congress for discussion by the Council.

**Lenin** answers in the affirmative.

**Martov.** Regarding the reference to the private character of Comrade Travinsky's statement, I express regret that by such a reference Comrade Lenin invites us to recall the protest already filed once by the Editorial Board to the Central Committee against the anarchy reigning in it, in consequence of which statements of one member of the Central Committee are disavowed by other members.

[Lenin: "not accurate."]

**Martov.** Comrade Travinsky declared to us on his departure that he considers it his political duty to achieve the agreement of the Central Committee to cooptation. No rupture occurred—after rejection by us of the "ultimatum"—and Comrade Travinsky, as he left, asked us to consider that reconciliatory attempts were not yet concluded by the ultimatum of the Central Committee. If one does not hide behind words, one must acknowledge that the proposed text of the appeal least of all can be called "reconciliatory." Reproaches to party members accused of "boycott" cannot be called a step toward the restoration of peace.

This appeal singles out from all the pile of mutual accusations circulating in the party only one, directed against the "minority." When there is talk of boycott, of withholding money, etc., one might at first glance think that this refers to both sides, but he who knows that all these reproaches are addressed to the minority (since the minority does not descend to substituting principal disputes with accusations of "uncomradely methods") will regard Comrade Lenin's resolution as an accusation directed against one side. In meeting Comrade Lenin's proposal to take measures to establish party peace, Comrade Plekhanov proposed a corresponding resolution; to the proposal of Comrade Plekhanov, Comrade Lenin gives no answer (I call it an evasive answer) under the pretext that there is still a more radical remedy—a congress. If dissatisfaction with the policy of the Central Committee could be eliminated in no other way than by convening a new congress, this would be complete testimonium paupertatis, proof of the bankruptcy of the Central Committee. By this very fact the Central Committee would confirm that it conducts a Scharfmacher political line...

**Plekhanov.** Please do not use such words here, even conditionally.

**Martov.** I take this expression back. The policy of the Central Committee, which knows no more flexible means of settling conflicts than only aut—aut, i.e., as passive submission of discontented elements of the party to everything the center does, or a new congress—such a policy cannot be recognized as wise. If all measures proved objectively impossible, then, of course, the congress would remain as our ultima ratio. But in order to have the right to resort to this last remedy, one must first use all the means at our command and not evade direct response to Comrade Plekhanov's proposal for a reform of the composition of the Central Committee. From a juridical point of view, Comrade Lenin's proposal about convening a congress is unacceptable, since the procedure for convening a congress is determined by the direct meaning of the statute (initiative of a certain proportion of all party organizations) and the Council can only answer that a proposal not signed by the established number of committees cannot be discussed. Moreover, the Council, as an organization, has no voice at the congress; members of the Council are represented individually.

**Plekhanov.** It would be better first to finish with the question of the practical measure for restoring peace in the party that I have proposed.

**Lenin** (on a point of order) expresses himself against debates of this kind and proposes to compare all three proposed measures.

**Plekhanov.** I draw attention to that part of Comrade Lenin's speech which was occasioned by my remark about "bog." I made this remark, first, as Chairman, secondly, as the author of the resolution, answering Comrade Vasiliev's question. Comrade Lenin, in defense of this expression, put forward a whole chain of syllogisms, proving that the expression "bog" is in no way insulting. I spoke not of "bog." This latter expression is indeed completely admissible, and I propose to use it instead of "bog." Comrade Lenin refers to the practice of speeches in the German party. In the German party, the word "bog" is used when one wishes to characterize a certain tendency or probable consequences of a tendency; one says: it will lead us into a bog. But it is unknown to me that any part of the German party bore the official name of a bog. The very supposition of this is laughable. But enough of this. There arose such a question: is the composition of the Central Committee normal or not normal? To this Comrade Lenin answers that the composition of the Editorial Board is also abnormal; even if he had proved this, this still would not prove the normality of the composition of the Central Committee. But I must say that Comrade Travinsky repeatedly, on behalf of the Central Committee, declared that if I accomplished the cooptation that I subsequently did accomplish, this institution would not consider the Editorial Board of the Central Organization to be abnormally composed. This declaration was made to me, it is true, not on paper. And no statement of Comrade Travinsky was made on paper. But I hope that Comrade Lenin will not try to convince me that Comrade Travinsky did not conduct negotiations with me. These negotiations did occur, and oral statements of the representative of the Central Committee retain all their significance. I remember well Travinsky's repeated declaration: "you are cooptating all these persons, and while you are there, we are completely at peace." As regards the question of convening a congress, I propose to first discuss my resolution, because discussion of my proposal—if we adopt it—in no way prejudges the question of convening a congress.

**Axelrod.** I shall say a few words regarding the declaration of Comrade Lenin. He says that there can be no question of cooptation into the Central Committee, while Comrade Travinsky said that he left with the firm conviction that such cooptation would be carried out. Then I consider insulting Comrade Lenin's statement that only those agreements have force that are expressed on paper.

**Lenin.** It is absurd to speak of the insulting nature of a requirement that comes down to definiteness and precision. We have dozens of times seen (and especially at the congress of the League) what a mass of misunderstandings and even scandals improper representations of private conversations lead to. It would be strange to deny this fact. I declare that private conversations of Comrade Travinsky have been incorrectly understood both by the representative of the Central Organization and partly by Comrade Plekhanov. Here is what, by the way, Comrade Travinsky writes me in a letter of 18 December: "Just received word of the distribution by the Editorial Board of an official letter to the committees of a most unfortunate (I am moderating a stronger expression) character. The Editorial Board directly goes at the Central Committee, threatens that by way of the Council it could now force cooptation of whomever it wished, but does not yet wish to resort to such measures and appeals to the committees with an indication of nepotism, incapacity of the Central Committee, illegality of Lenin's cooptation,... A mass of personal outbursts. In a word, a revolting and... (I again omit an excessively harsh expression) violation of all the promises given me. I am furious. Did Plekhanov participate in this?" The Ekaterinoslav committee is deeply outraged by this letter and sent a very sharp reply... Now the minority is madly tearing the connecting threads. The letter distributed to the committees is, in my view, the last straw and an open challenge. And as for me personally, I find that Lenin has every right to publish his letter outside of Iskra. I think that other comrades will have nothing against it.

Here are circumstances proving that an incorrect conception has been formed about Comrade Travinsky's opinion. Comrade Travinsky could suppose cooptation, hoping for the establishment of good peace in the party, but his hopes were completely not fulfilled. It turned out that the Editorial Board of Martov and company instead of peace began war with the majority. And Travinsky hoped and could hope for peace. It turned out that attempts by Plekhanov to restrain the "anarchist individualists" did not meet with success (contrary to his efforts). Therefore, the hopes that both I and Travinsky nurtured—hopes that Plekhanov would succeed in restraining the new Editorial Board from war with the majority—these hopes were not fulfilled. This only proves that not all hopes are realized; I myself left the Editorial Board, hoping that this would contribute to peace, but my hopes were also not realized. No one denies the fact of private negotiations; one must only distinguish between expressions of hope, yearnings of individual persons from decisions of entire collegial bodies. There is nothing insulting to members of the Council in my remark to the effect that it is inconvenient here to draw conclusions from private negotiations. I decisively reject the assertion that Comrade Travinsky categorically promised cooptation into the Central Committee. It is certain that he left with the hope for peace and as a result of this peace could foresee cooptation, but not categorically promise it.

Against my appeal, Comrade Martov puts forward the argument that it contains attacks only on one side. Nothing of the kind. Finally, I can introduce an additional resolution and change those expressions which do not please Comrade Martov, but his assertion that my resolution is one-sided is simply nonsense. Before, regarding my resolution there was talk that it resembles a pastoral appeal, that it is full of truisms, etc., but no one ascribed to it the tendency of inflicting new wounds. Comrade Martov reproaches me for evading direct response to the question posed by Comrade Plekhanov, as to whether or not the Central Committee desires to coopt representatives of the "minority." How could we give you an answer to the question posed if we do not know how the remaining 9 members of the Central Committee now regard this question?

[Plekhanov: You did not understand Comrade Martov.]

To say that I am intentionally evading is absurd. I could not give the answer for the absence of which I am reproached with evasiveness. I definitely said that dissatisfaction with the composition of central institutions is mutual. One must take into account the opinion of other comrades as well. I am told: we must come to terms, but we have been trying to come to terms for five months. Therefore, Comrade Martov's supposition that the Central Committee, by proposing a congress, thereby confesses its own incompetence and powerlessness is simply absurd. Were not all possible attempts already made on the part of the Central Committee to resolve the conflict through domestic means? "The Central Committee will demonstrate its incapacity"... incapacity for what? for struggle? for creating peace in the party? Oh, yes! And my criticized proposal here showed it plainly. Your resolution speaks of taking territory, so to speak, from the opponent, but such a demand leads to counter-demands, and I would pose the question thus: is the Central Committee entitled to begin negotiations again on these bases? After all, there are committees that have blamed the Central Committee for concessions to the League. You wish us to take the minority into account without taking the majority into account. This is amusing. And evasion of a congress under such conditions would be like fear of a congress. That is why we acknowledge our powerlessness, but not in the sense that Comrade Martov understands it. The Central Committee is indeed powerless to settle the disputes in the party, and precisely because of this we appeal to the Council with a proposal to convene a congress. Then, the purely juridical question of the right to convene a congress by the Council is interpreted by Comrade Martov in the highest degree incorrectly. The statute says: "The Congress is convened (if possible no less than once in 2 years) by the Council of the Party." Hence, the Council has the right to convene the congress always. The Council is obliged to convene the congress only in one specific case.

**Martov.** From the statute it directly follows that the Council is obliged to convene a congress when required by a specified number of properly constituted organizations or after two years have passed since the last congress. Thus, until two years have passed and before a specified number of organizations declare the necessity of a congress, the Council cannot convene it.

**Plekhanov.** I would consider the question of the conditions of convening a congress at the present time as not subject to discussion here, as a question extraneous in view of the tasks facing us.

**Lenin.** Comrade Martov raised this question, and we have not decided to remove it from the agenda. Martov says the Council cannot convene a congress, while I say that it can. The Congress is convened by the Council of the Party whenever it wishes—if possible not less than once in 2 years. Comrade Martov says that convening a congress is an ultima ratio. Yes, and the fruitlessness of our debates right now confirms this.

Let me recall that Comrade Martov himself in principle recognized that a collegial body of persons who have not participated in our disputes can play a useful role in the work of pacifying the party. And since our own reconciliatory attempts have led to no results, since even in literature we shall hardly be able to refrain from crossing the bounds of admissible forms of polemics, I assert that only comrades from outside can speak their decisive word. We, representatives of the Central Committee, do not take upon ourselves responsibility for further attempts at pacifying the party, and we see no other honest means to put an end to our disputes except appeal to the congress. I move on to the remark of Comrade Plekhanov about the word "bog."

**Plekhanov.** I answered Comrade Vasiliev's question, applying this term to a certain part of the party; I repeat, I, as Chairman, cannot permit such expressions in the Council of the party.

**Lenin.** It is remarked to me here that I say nothing about the abnormal and one-sided composition of the Central Committee, but I note the fact that in the party there exist two sides that struggle with inadmissible means. We have moved to ground where no positive work whatever is possible.

**Plekhanov** appeals to the members of the Council with a request not to protract the debate. Noting that Comrade Martov is on the list of speakers and he himself, and that Comrade Lenin has spoken for 40 minutes, he proposes to close the list of speakers.

**Lenin** (on a point of order). Please first enter me on the list of speakers.

**Plekhanov.** I cannot enter you, since you have just finished your speech and have spoken for 40 minutes, and no one has yet had a chance to respond to you. I appeal with a question to the Council whether or not they wish to close the list of speakers.

**Lenin** (on a point of order). I petition the Council to enter me on the list of speakers before closing it. I have just finished, and now I again wish to register in order to respond to the objections that Comrades Martov and Plekhanov will make in their speeches.

**Martov** (on a point of order). I request that I too be entered, because I wish to respond to the objections that Comrade Lenin will make to me.

**Plekhanov.** Comrade Martov requests that I enter him after you, and I want to register myself after Comrade Martov.

**Lenin** requests that these petitions be entered in the minutes.

**Martov.** I for my part request that it be entered in the record that I do not express fears that Comrade Lenin will speak last. Personally, I am ready to sacrifice myself and yield the honor of speaking last to Comrade Lenin.

**Lenin.** I request that I be entered not as the last speaker, but after Comrade Plekhanov.

**Martov.** In that case I request that I be entered after Comrade Lenin.

**Plekhanov** puts to a vote the question of granting Lenin and Martov the floor.

The Council votes in favor of such a grant.

**Plekhanov** announces a 5-minute recess.

**After the recess.**

**Plekhanov.** First of all, I consider it necessary to settle the question of the "bog." Once again I remind you that I stopped Comrade Vasiliev, first, as Chairman, and second, as the one questioned by him concerning whether I had in mind swampy elements in my resolution about cooptation into the Central Committee. I answered that I did not know which particular swampy elements he was talking about. Once again I repeat that in Germany the word Sumpf is used to characterize certain tendencies, and not as the proper name of a part of the Social-Democratic party.

In any case, this is a minor incident.

I move on to the question of documents and negotiations with Comrade Hans. I pointed them out not to prove the normality of the composition of the Editorial Board of the Central Organization, but to prove that the Central Committee found it normal. And I am interested in who exactly expressed a desire that Comrades Zasulich, Axelrod, and Starover be removed from the Editorial Board of the Central Organization? Comrade Lenin says that the hopes for peace that Comrade Hans, among others, harbored, have not been realized. Oh, comrades! As regards unrealized hopes, I find I have very many of them; I too, for example, had great hopes for the Central Committee. They were not realized. But this has nothing to do with the fact: did Comrade Hans speak or did he not speak that the Central Committee would consider the composition of the Editorial Board of the Central Organization normal on condition of a certain cooptation? I note the fact: he spoke. I have no record of this. And if the truthfulness of my words were to be questioned, I would answer as once a minister of Louis-Philippe answered him when he disputed his words: I assert that it was so. You say—no. Let us see whom France will believe.

I draw your attention, comrades, to the fact that my proposal and that of Comrade Lenin are completely different in character. I say that in order to make the composition of the Central Committee normal, it is necessary to coopt, while Comrade Lenin says that from the Editorial Board of the Central Organization it is necessary to remove... After the reading of the draft of the peaceable appeal of Comrade Lenin, this proposal of his seems strange and unexpected. It shows that even Comrade Lenin himself was not able to be disposed toward peace by his own peaceable appeal. If it did not affect its author, then it will even less affect the public. It must be rejected precisely as being unable to have influence. Comrade Lenin says: we have conducted five months of fruitless negotiations. Yes, we have been conducting them fruitlessly because throughout all this time Comrade Lenin has conducted these negotiations not on the basis of concessions. (Poor mother, how you are tired from beating father.) For five months, Comrade Lenin with diligence worthy of a better cause has been telling the opposition: "Obey and do not reason!" But on such a principle one cannot build peace. One can speak thus until the end of time and arrive at nothing. Concessions are necessary. Comrade Lenin wishes peace in the party, but without concessions. Thus Schulze-Geverntiz wishes "social peace," but on the condition that the bourgeoisie retains its economic privileges.

**Lenin.** Before speaking on substance, let me note in passing that the word Sumpf has never insulted anyone.

Then regarding negotiations with Travinsky. From my words here, a conclusion was drawn that I supposedly deny the fact of negotiations with Travinsky. Nothing of the kind. I did not deny the fact of negotiations, but merely established the distinction between the significance which private negotiations can have and that which official ones have. I cited here a letter from Travinsky himself in proof of that, if Comrade Travinsky previously looked at things as Comrade Plekhanov looks at them, he later changed his view. In view of this, I would consider it quite inopportune to pose the question as to whom France will believe. Appeal to "France" is unnecessary.

Comrade Plekhanov remarked that my peaceable "appeal" did not even affect me myself. I repeat that in my "appeal" I only express my desire not to resort to certain methods of struggle. I call for peace. I am answered with attacks on the Central Committee, and then it is wondered why I then attack the Central Organization. After an attack on the Central Committee has been made, I am reproached for the absence of peaceableness for my response to this attack! It is enough to trace all the debate in our Council to see who began offering peace on the basis of status quo and who continued with war against the Central Committee. I am told that Lenin only did one thing: constantly repeat to the opposition: "obey and do not reason!"... This is not quite true. All our correspondence from September and October attests to the opposite. Let me remind you that at the beginning of October I (with Plekhanov) was ready to coopt two into the Editorial Board. Then, regarding the ultimatum in which I myself participated, I conceded to you two places in the Central Committee. After this came on my part another concession in the form of my withdrawal from the Editorial Board—a withdrawal made in order not to hinder the entry of others. From this it follows that I did not merely say: "obey and do not reason," but also made concessions. I move on to the substance. The attitude toward my resolution seems to me very strange. Indeed, does it accuse anyone, or has it the character of an attack on anyone? It only deals with the question of whether such and such a struggle is admissible or not. That struggle exists is a fact, and the whole question is only whether to separate the admissible forms of this struggle from the inadmissible. And so I ask: is this idea acceptable or not? Thus, the expressions "instrument of struggle," "attack on the minority," etc.—in application to my resolution are completely inopportune. Perhaps its form is unsuccessful—I would not particularly dispute this and would be ready to change its text, but its essence, which comes down to presenting to the struggling sides within the party the requirement to conduct this struggle not going beyond certain admissible bounds, this essence cannot be disputed. Such an attitude toward the resolution as it receives here seems to me one-sided, for one of the interested sides rejects it, seeing in it some danger to itself.

**Plekhanov.** I remind you that here several times already I have noted that in the Council there are not two sides.

**Lenin.** I may note that I speak of two sides existing in fact, not of a juridical division of the Council into two parts. Regarding the resolution of Comrade Plekhanov, about which nothing substantive has been said here, the representatives of the Editorial Board added nothing. I was all this time waiting for a change in the one-sided character of this resolution.

**Martov.** Specifically about Comrade Lenin's appeal, I shall speak below; now I merely note that an appeal such as that proposed by Comrade Lenin can take place only after the adoption of practical measures for establishing good peace in the party. Comrade Lenin said, and this has been entered in the minutes, that from Comrade Travinsky's letter it supposedly is evident that he now regards the matter differently than before. As secretary of the Council, I assert that Comrade Travinsky's remarks were made officially at a session of the Council. His categorical declaration stated: he has become convinced here that the Central Committee made many mistakes, and he considers it his obligation to achieve the fact that the Central Committee as soon as possible implements all the demands of the opposition, meanwhile hoping that the opposition will preserve its former tactics of passive "boycott."

[Plekhanov. As Chairman of that session, I confirm the words of Comrade Martov and request that this be entered in the minutes.]

**Martov** (continuing). Now I shall read you a letter from Comrade Travinsky, written at the very same time when Comrade Travinsky wrote the letter read by Comrade Lenin. He writes me: "Keep in mind that Travinsky continues to follow the very same policy that he conducted in the Council." I repeat: We, three members of the Council, understood that his task in the Central Committee would be to achieve the cooptation which he did not succeed in accomplishing here. I shall say a few words about the concessions which, according to Comrade Lenin, were offered in the ultimatum. Comrade Lenin knows well that the opposition regarded this act not as a concession, but as an illegal threat; that is why it was rejected by the opposition without consideration of separate proposals, and it was declared that until the Central Committee renounces a bureaucratic attitude toward the "opposition," the statute of the party, and its obligations, there is no point in negotiations concerning particular mutual concessions.

If Comrade Lenin sees a concession in his withdrawal from the Editorial Board of the Central Organization (I shall not dwell on this), then how does such a conciliatory attitude accord with Comrade Lenin's statement about the necessity of removing from the Editorial Board Zasulich, Axelrod, and Starover. I cannot understand how the requirement of their withdrawal from the editorial collegium can be in the interests of good peace... I move on to the question of the text of the appeal proposed by Comrade Lenin, which, I repeat, can take place only after the adoption of positive measures. Comrade Lenin speaks in his appeal of admissible or inadmissible methods of struggle, but the dispute is conducted most hotly precisely about accusations on this score against one side. I, as a member of the Council, would propose to entirely eliminate here the question of who is guilty of what. On behalf of the Central Committee we were declared a desire to put the question on a common ground. I hoped that, proceeding from such a desire, Comrade Lenin would attempt to raise us above the surface of those trifles into which is poured this organized struggle. This appeal has nothing whatever to do with peaceableness. The question of admissible and inadmissible methods of struggle would necessitate reviewing all similar cases of manifestation of abnormal forms of struggle from both sides. One would have to submit to examination even the methods of struggle of the Central Committee. One would have to touch on the response to the ultimatum and many other documents, which would hardly be convenient and politically appropriate. We cannot fail to understand that the various forms of struggle are determined not by ethical notions about what is admissible, but by the actual situation in which one side or another finds itself. The representative of the Central Committee himself categorically declared to us that there are situations when "exclusive measures" are permissible; consequently, an attempt to classify which forms of struggle are admissible would be fruitless...

The proposal of the Central Committee about the immediate convening of a congress is a sign of its powerlessness and incapability of settling the conflict through its own measures. We were pleasantly surprised yesterday when on behalf of the Central Committee we were told that the Central Committee, not being able to put an end to the struggle, appeals to the Council to use its authority to assist in resolving the question. Having appealed to us, the comrades from the Central Committee must become reconciled to the fact that our answer, given conscientiously, will point to the measure against which the majority of the Central Committee has protested until now, but which alone will pave the way toward healing the wounds.

It is not true that the Editorial Board is powerless; for it is continuously working, not being distracted by the existing disorganization; it will work in the same direction and does not consider it impossible gradually to eradicate the evil. If the Central Committee cannot follow the same path, it should not pretend that measures are being indicated to it for eliminating the conflict! The Editorial Board does not complain of a boycott, refusal to work, etc., which supposedly hinder it in working.

The adoption of Comrade Plekhanov's resolution would only indicate that the majority of the Council sees the root of the evil in the one-sided character of the composition of the Central Committee. By legitimizing, according to Lenin's resolution, certain methods of struggle, the Council would thereby sanction the Central Committee's treatment of individual party members. We cannot sign the appeal only if there are no practical measures indicated for pacifying the party. To the question of the Central Committee, addressed to the Council, as to how to eliminate the abnormal state of affairs, the Council answers: reorganize your composition.

**Plekhanov** proposes closing the list of speakers.

**Vasiliev** asks whether the list is closed for today's session or on the given question.

**Plekhanov** clarifies that the list of speakers is always closed on the given question.

**Lenin** asks whether the list is closed on the question of the congress.

**Plekhanov.** No, tomorrow the question of convening the congress will be placed on discussion. So, we have two projects; now there arises the question, which of them to put to a vote first.

**Martov** proposes to put to a vote first Plekhanov's resolution, since it proposes a practical measure, after which one can vote on Comrade Lenin's resolution as well, which has a general character.

**Lenin** insists that his resolution be put to a vote first, citing the existing custom of giving priority to the resolution that was introduced first.

**Axelrod.** I do not see particular reasons why we should not put Comrade Lenin's resolution to a vote first, but I would ask Comrade Lenin to state it briefly.

**Martov.** Indeed, Comrade Lenin has the legal right to demand that his resolution be put to a vote first, but I would propose to change the formulation of the question.

1) Is it necessary to issue an appeal to all party members?
2) Plekhanov's concrete proposal.

**Lenin.** From the point of view of the order of the session, the right to introduce special opinions is always recognized. Comrade Martov made an attempt to separate the general from the specific. I fully agree with this, but I would only phrase his proposal somewhat differently.

**Vasiliev** asks when the amendments of Comrade Martov to Comrade Plekhanov's resolution will be introduced and whether there will be a reopening of debate on this.

**Plekhanov.** That is for the Council to decide.

**Lenin** (reads his resolution): "For the establishment of peace in the party and normal relations between those members of the party who think differently, it is necessary that the Council of the Party clarify the question of what forms of internal party struggle are correct and admissible, and what forms are incorrect and inadmissible."

For this resolution: Plekhanov, Lenin, and Vasiliev.

Against: Martov and Axelrod.

(Resolution passed.)

**Martov and Axelrod** request that the following be entered in the minutes: "Not having in principle anything against this resolution, we considered such clarification superfluous if the Central Committee does not take measures that would restore confidence in it."

**Plekhanov** proposes moving to a vote on his resolution.

**Lenin.** I protest against this and think that now, after the just-adopted resolution, we shall discuss which forms of struggle the Council considers admissible and which inadmissible; it seemed to me that this is what Comrade Martov's proposal comes down to.

**Plekhanov.** Comrade Lenin, according to the general wish, singled out the idea of his resolution, and I voted for it. I recognize this idea, and now I find it necessary to put my practical proposal to a vote.

**Martov.** I, as the author of the proposal concerning this formulation of the question, must note that there are two methods. Comrade Lenin himself formulated them. One method has been adopted; now it is necessary to decide on the second method of influencing the party, which Comrade Plekhanov proposes.

**Lenin.** Comrade Martov speaks of two methods of influence on the party; one of them had to be chosen and it has already been chosen. (Noise.)

**Plekhanov.** I put to a vote my resolution.

In favor: Plekhanov, Martov, and Axelrod; Against: Lenin and Vasiliev.
(Resolution passed.)

**Lenin** requests that it be entered in the minutes that the representatives of the Central Committee will submit a special opinion regarding Comrade Plekhanov's adopted resolution.

(The session was closed.)

**[Statement by Council Member Vasiliev.]**

At the end of the session, before closing it, I requested the floor for a personal remark, and, having received it, declared: "Comrade Plekhanov did not understand me. I used the term 'marsh people' not in relation to any particular group in the party and not even in reference to any particular persons. I said literally the following: Might not others demand proportional representation on the principles of federation: so many "bureaucratic centralists," so many "genuine centralists," so many "South Workers," so many "Workers' Cause" followers, so many "marsh" people, etc., etc.?