Date: 1903-12-10

In direct connection with the letter from N. K. Krupskaya of December 10 cited above (document 127), the following letter from Lenin to members of the Central Committee in Russia is presented, written and sent simultaneously with N. K. Krupskaya's letter. Proceeding from the situation that had developed, detailed in N. K. Krupskaya's letter, Lenin in the present letter gives directives for establishing the Central Committee's internal party policy for the immediate future, for the first time advancing as a fighting slogan of the moment for the Central Committee the idea of convening an emergency party congress, thereby opening a new period in the history of the party split—the period of struggle for the Third Congress. This document represented Lenin's first step, which initiated the first stage of the struggle for the Third Congress, namely Lenin's struggle within the very central institutions (within the Central Committee and the Party Council) for the recognition and affirmation of the slogan of an emergency congress.

128.

TO MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN RUSSIA

[December 10, 1903, Geneva]

Dear friends! A new political position has become fully apparent from No. 53 of Iskra¹. It is clear that the quintet in the Central Organ wants to hunt down both Lenin (even to the slander about expelling from the party southern workers, even to vile insinuations about Schweitzer²), and the Central Committee, and the entire majority. Plekhanov directly states that the quintet of the Central Organ fears no Central Committee whatsoever. The attack on the Central Committee is coming both from here and in Russia (a letter from St. Petersburg about Martynov's³ trip). The question is posed point-blank. If we lose time and the slogan for struggle, then complete defeat is inevitable, both 1) because of the desperate struggle of the quintet in Iskra, and 2) because of failures of our people in Russia. There is only one salvation — a congress. The slogan for it: struggle against disorganizers. Only on this slogan can we catch the Martovites, attract the broad masses, and save our position. In my opinion, the only possible plan is this: keep absolutely quiet about the congress to everyone, complete secrecy. Throw all forces, everything and everyone, into the committees and into the circuits. Struggle for peace, for the cessation of disorganization, for submission to the Central Committee. Strengthen the committees with our people with all our might. Catch the Martovites and southern workers on disorganization with all our might, with documents, with resolutions against disorganizers; committee resolutions must fly to the Central Organ⁴. Then work our people into the shaky committees. The conquest of committees in the name of the slogan: against disorganization — such is the main task. A congress is necessary no later than January⁵, therefore get to work more energetically, we shall also throw all our forces into it. The purpose of the congress: to strengthen the Central Committee and the Council, and perhaps even the Central Organ, either through a trio (in case we manage to win over Plekhanov, which is unlikely), or through a sextet, into which I shall enter under terms honorable for us. Worst case: their Central Organ, our Central Committee and Council⁶.

I repeat: either complete defeat (the Central Organ will hunt us down) or immediate preparation of a congress⁷. It must be prepared first secretly in the course of a maximum of one month⁸, then in three weeks gather the demands of one-half of the committees and convene the congress. Again and again: this is the only salvation.

The Old Man⁹.

[Postscript by F. V. Lengnik]

Indeed, our affairs without a congress are bad and are becoming worse day by day, because the Russian public has grown accustomed to worshipping "Iskra." In my opinion, a congress must be convened immediately, if possible, before February, perhaps at Christmas.

Kol.

**EDITORIAL NOTES:**

¹ This letter was written simultaneously with the aforementioned letter of N. K. Krupskaya of December 10, as indicated by the identity of content at the beginning of this letter with the struck-out point (fifth) of N. K. Krupskaya's letter, and this is confirmed also from the subsequent correspondence with the Russian section of the Central Committee (see Lenin's letter of December 30, below, document 148, p. 115).

* The word "January" represents a pencil correction in Lenin's hand in place of the struck-out "February." Ed.

** — at most. Ed.

*** The word "one" in the manuscript represents a pencil correction in Lenin's hand in place of the struck-out "two." Ed.

**** "Month" corrected from "months." Ed.

***** The signature was made by F. V. Lengnik. Ed.

In No. 53 of "Iskra" there appeared an editorial article by Martov "Our Congress" (see in more detail footnote 16 to N. K. Krupskaya's letter of December 10, p. 43 above) and an editorial reply by Plekhanov to Lenin's letter to the editorial board (printed in the same No. 53) regarding Plekhanov's article "What Not to Do." These two editorial articles Lenin had in mind when speaking here of the "new political position" of "Iskra." Almost simultaneously, he developed his evaluation of "Iskra's" new position in more detail in the aforementioned note on this theme (document 126, p. 36).

² This passage of Lenin's letter refers to Plekhanov's editorial "remarks" with which Lenin's letter to the editorial board was accompanied in No. 53 of "Iskra." Regarding the "expulsion from the party by [Lenin. Ed.] southern workers," the editorial "remarks" stated as follows: "It was also very timely that comrade Lenin decisively declared his negative attitude toward the "Sobakaevich" methods of organizational policy. The more frequently influential comrades in the party remind us of the harmfulness of such methods, the more impossible will become statements such as we have heard — that it will be possible to undertake positive organizational work in our Party only after all "Bund supporters," "labor people," and "southern workers" (from the group "Southern Worker") have been expelled from it. Such statements can only compromise the point of view of revolutionary social democracy, and comrade Lenin did very well to emphasize his mockingly negative attitude toward revolutionary Sobakaeviches"... The comparison of Lenin to Schweitzer in Plekhanov's article was made as follows: "Comrade Lenin thinks that light is needed for us, among other things, so that we could distribute roles among our leaders, handing one of them a sentimental violin, another a fierce (?) double bass, and a third a conductor's baton. We have nothing against the violin and the double bass, but as for the conductor's baton, we hold a special opinion on that score. The history of the western movement shows that the question of it played a particularly important role precisely in the period of sectarian 'group cliquishness' and lost its significance directly in proportion to the growth of class self-consciousness of the proletariat. Thus, in Germany it no longer comes on the agenda already from the time of the not always skillful 'conductor' Schweitzer." (Italics by the author. Ed.)

³ Martynov's (V. N. Rozanov's) trip to Petersburg is discussed in more detail in N. K. Krupskaya's letter cited above (p. 39).

⁴ Regarding the resolutions of committees on their attitude toward the Second Congress of the R.S.-D.R.P. and the central institutions elected by it, the disagreements that had arisen in the party and the split, see in more detail footnote 18 to N. K. Krupskaya's letter cited above (p. 44).

⁵ The "worst case" position ("their Central Organ, our Central Committee and Council") as a result of the expected emergency party congress, Lenin apparently envisaged as the retention of the "Iskra" editorial board in the same composition as it had formed after Plekhanov's cooptation of the Martovites, while at the same time strengthening the Central Committee with firmer representatives of the majority and the re-election of the fifth member of the Council (with the replacement of Plekhanov by a firm representative of the majority).

⁶ Later, the entire course of the internal party struggle throughout 1904 showed that Lenin was right in categorically pointing here to only two outcomes of the situation that had developed ("either complete defeat (the Central Organ will hunt us down) or immediate preparation of a congress"). The irresolute, half-hearted policy of the Central Committee in relation to the minority — in words — recognition of the necessity of struggle, but in deed — complete sabotage of the idea of an emergency congress — subsequently led to the fact that the Central Organ actually nearly "hunted down" the foreign members of the Central Committee, while the Central Committee itself, after the most firm and consistent representatives of the majority were partly arrested and partly withdrew from it, slid toward complete reconciliation with the minority, and, ultimately, the question of convening a congress became for the entire party a question of: "to be or not to be?"

Alongside the note on the position of the new "Iskra" (above, document 126, p. 36), sketched out after the appearance of No. 53 of "Iskra," Lenin then decided to speak on this theme in the pages of "Iskra" itself, linking his evaluation of the position of Martov's "Iskra" with an illumination of the actual causes of the disagreement at the Second Congress and with an explanation of the reasons for his own withdrawal from the editorial board. He did this in the immediate days following the appearance of No. 53, writing in the form of a letter to the editorial board the article: "Why Did I Withdraw from the Editorial Board of Iskra?" (Collected Works, vol. IV, p. 348—324). Somewhat later, in a note to the separate publication of this article, Lenin wrote: "This letter to the editorial board was sent by me to 'Iskra' immediately after the appearance of No. 53." From a comparison of these indications and the related facts cited in the documents printed below, it can be concluded that Lenin sent this article to the editorial board on December 12. Immediately upon receiving it, Martov asked the foreign representative of the Central Committee F. V. Lengnik whether "it was possible to print about the negotiations of the Central Committee with the Geneva opposition." This inquiry was intended to provoke the Central Committee to give a negative answer regarding the publication of the Central Committee's negotiations with the opposition, and to use this opinion of the Central Committee as a motive for the editorial board's refusal to print Lenin's article in "Iskra."

Such a calculation by Martov and the opposition led by him was based, first, on F. V. Lengnik's former negative attitude toward the printing of the protocols of the League congress (see above his unfinished letter to G. V. Plekhanov, document 118, p. 22), which might have been known to the Martovites, and, second, on a similar opinion held by another member of the Central Committee G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, expressed by him while he was abroad in the second half of November in a private conversation with representatives of the opposition, as stated by F. I. Dan in his letter to V. I. Lenin of December 3 (above, document 117, p. 20). But this calculation did not justify itself.

From this moment onward there began between Martov on behalf of the editorial board of "Iskra" and the foreign representative of the Central Committee a prolonged — almost daily for the next one and a half months — correspondence-polemic about the mutual relations between the editorial board of the Central Organ and the representative of the Central Committee. This polemic on the part of Martov and the editorial board represented by him had as its aim to discredit the foreign section of the Central Committee and to make its work impossible, creating by its entire tone and content an atmosphere inadmissible for business relations — one of personal petty squabbles and bickering. Below we print this correspondence according to the documents preserved in V. I. Lenin's papers, arranged in...