V. I.

Lenin

An Unissued Statement [1]

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., meeting in Geneva on November
27, 1903, unanimously adopted the following decision.

Comrade Plekhanov’s co-optation of the Martovites to the
editorial board constitutes outright defection on his part to
the side of the Party Congress minority, a minority that
Plekhanov himself more than once publicly character ised as
inclining towards opportunism and anarchism. From the minutes of
the Party Congress and the Congress of the League this will be
seen quite clearly. This defection is a direct violation of the
will of the Party Congress under the influence of the League
Abeoad and in defiance of the emphatically stated decision of
the majority of the Party committees in Russia. The Central
Committee cannot allow such a violation of the will of the
Congress, particularly since in taking advantage of Comrade
Lenin’s resignation to commit this act, Comrade Plekhanov was
guilty of a direct breach of trust; for Comrade Lenin resigned
on cer tain conditions, in the interests of peace and good will
in the Party, whereas the Martovites, by turning down the
Central Committee’s ultimatum of

November

25, [2] rejected peace and thereby declared war.

The Central Committee therefore, by revolutionary ac tion, takes the
Party Central Organ into its own hands and declares that it will do
everything in its power to secure that the will of the Party as a
whole, not the will of the League Abroad or the treachery of an
individual, shall determine the Party’s future.

Central Committee

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Notes:
[1]
This Unissued Statement was proposed by Lenin as a decision of the
Central Committee at a meeting of the latter on November 14 (27), 1903. It
was not adopted because of the conciliationist attitude of some of the
Central Committee members towards the Mensheviks.

[2]
The Central Committee’s ultimatum to the Mensheviks was present ed
on November 12 (25), 1903. On October 22 (November 4) Lenin had sent the
Central Committee a letter (present edition, Vol. 34) in which he proposed
offering the Mensheviks the following conditions:

1) co-optation of three of the ex-editors to the editorial board of the Central
Organ;

2) re-establishment of the status quo in the League Abroad;

3) allowing the Mensheviks one seat on the Party Council.

These initial conditions did not meet with the support of the con ciliationist
members of the Central Committee. In the same letter Lenin outlined and
proposed simultaneously approving but not yet presenting to the Mensheviks
the main points of an ultimatum, that is, a statement of the practical
concessions the Central Com mittee could permissibly make to them: 1)
co-optation of the four ox-editors to the editorial board; 2) co-optation to
the Cantral Committee of two members of the opposition, to be chosen by the
Central Committee itself; 3) re-establishment of the status quo in the
League; 4) allowing the Mensheviks one seat on the Party Council. “If
the ultimatum is rejected," Lenin wrote, “then—war to a
finish. An extra condition: 5) cessation of all talk, gossip, and arguments
about the dissensions at the Second Party Congress and after." These
proposals of Lenin’s (except the extra condition) were includ ed in the
ultimatum of November 12 (25), but were toned down somewhat by the
conciliationist members of the Central Committee.

The Mensheviks, whom Plekhanov helped greatly by co-opting all the ox-editors to
the editorial hoard the day after the Central Committee’s ultimatum,
rejected the ultimatum and took the way of open war against the majority of
the Party.

An evaluation of the Central Committee’s ultimatum is given by Lenin in One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (pp. 375-77 of this
volume).