V. I.

Lenin

Letter to Iskra [1]

Thearticle “What Should Not Be Done” raises issues in our Party life tbat are so important, and at this partic ular
juncture so urgent, that it is difficult to repress the desire
to respond immediately to the editorial board’s kind and
hospitable offer to throw open the columns of their paper; and
it is all the more difficult for one who has been a constant
contributor to Iskra , especially at a time when to delay voicing one’s opinion for a week may mean forfeiting the
opportunity altogether.

AndI would like to contribute my opinion in order to prevent certain
possible, if not inevitable, misunderstand ings.

Letme say, first of all, that I think the author of the article
is a thousand times right when he insists that it is essential
to safeguard the unity of the Party and avoid new splits—especially over differences which cannot be con
sidered important. To appeal for peaceableness, mildness, and
readiness to make concessions is highly praiseworthy in a leader
at all times, and at the present moment in par ticular. To
anathemise or expel from the Party, not only former

Economists, [2] but even little groups of Social-Democrats who suffer from “a certain
inconsistency” would certainly be unreasonable, so unreasonable that we quite
understand the irritable tone of the author of the article
towards those whom he considers arbitrary, stiff-necked and
stupid

Sobakeviches [3] capable of advocating expul sion. We even go further: when we have a Party programme and a
Party organisation, we must not only hospitably throw open the
columns of the Party organ for exchanges of opinion, but must
afford those groups—or grouplets, as the author calls them—which from inconsistency support some of the dogmas
of revisionism, or for one reason or another insist upon their separate and individual existence as
groups, the opportunity of systematically setting forth their
differences, however slight these may be. Precisely in order to
avoid being too harsh and stiff-necked d la Sobakevich towards “anarchistic individualism”, it is
necessary, in our opinion, to do the utmost—even if it involves a certain departure from tidy patterns of centralism
and from absolute obedience to discipline—to enable these
grouplets to speak out and give the whole Party the opportunity
to weigh the importance or unimportance of these differences and
determine just where, how and on whose part inconsistency is shown.

Indeed,it is high time to make a clean sweep of the tra ditions
of circle sectarianism and—in a party which rests on the
masses—resolutely advance the slogan: More light/—let the Party know everything , let it
have all, abso lutely all the material required for a judgement of all and sundry differences, reversions to
revisionism, departures from discipline, etc. More confidence in
the independent judgement of the whole body of Party workers!—they, and they alone, will be able to curb the
excessive hothead edness of grouplets inclined to splits, will
be able, by their slow, imperceptible but persistent influence,
to imbue them with the “good will” to observe Party discipline, will be able to cool the ardour of anarchistic
individualism and, by the very fact of their indifference,
document, prove and demonstrate the triviality of differences
exaggerated Thy the elements tending towards a split.

Tothe question—"what should not be done?" (what should not be done in general, and what, in particular, should not be
done so as to avoid a split), my reply is, first of all: do not
conceal from the Party the appearance and growth of potential
causes of a split, do not conceal any of the circumstances and
events that constitute such causes; and, what is more, do not
conceal them not only from the Party, but, as far as possible,
from the outside public either. I say “as far as possible” having in mind the things that, in a secret
organisation, must necessarily be concealed— hut in our
splits things of this kind play next to no part. Broad publicity—that is the surest, the only reliable means of
avoiding such splits as can be avoided, and of reducing to a minimum the harm of splits that are no longer avoidable.

Forindeed, just reflect on the obligations devolving on the
Party from the fact that it is dealing now with the masses , not with mere circles. To be a party of the
masses not only in name, wg must get ever wider masses to share
in all Party affairs, steadily elevating them from political
indifference to protest and struggle, from a general spirit of
protest to the conscious adoption of Social-Democratic views,
from the adoption of these views to support of the movement,
from support to organised membership in the Party. Can we
achieve this result without giving the widest publicity to
matters on whose decision the nature of our influence on the
masses will depend? The workers will cease to understand us and
will desert us, as a general staff without an army, if splits
take place in our ranks over trivial differences, says the
author; and it is quite true. And in order that the workers
may not cease to understand us, in order that their fighting experience and proletarian instinct may teach us “leaders” something too , the
organised workers must learn to keep an eye on any potential
causes of splits (in any mass party such causes have always
arisen and will always recur), to properly evaluate these
causes, to appraise what happens in some “backwater”, in Russia or abroad, from the
standpoint of the interests of the entire Party, of the entire
movement.

Theauthor is thrice justified when he stresses that much will
be given to our central bodies and much will be asked of
them. Just so. And for that very reason the whole Party
must constantly, steadily and systematically train suitable persons for the central bodies, must see clearly, as in
the palm of its hand, all the activities of every candidate for these high posts, must come to know even their
personal characteristics, their strong and weak points, their
victo ries and “defeats”. The author makes some remarkably acute observations, evidently based on extensive
experience, about some of the causes of such defeats. And just
because these observations are so acute, it is necessary that
the whole Party should benefit by them, that it should always see every “defeat”, even if partial,
of one or other of its “leaders”. No political leader has a career that is without its defeats, and if we are serious vhen we talk about influencing
the masses, about winning their “good will”, we must strive with all our might not to let these defeats be hushed up
in the musty atmosphere of circles and grouplets, but to have
them submitted to the judgement of all. That may appear
embarrassing at first sight, it may seem “offensive” sometimes to individual leaders—but we must overcome this
false feeling of embarrassment, it is our duty to the Party and
to the working class. In this way, and in this way alone, shall
we enable the whole body of influential Party workers (and not
the chance assortment of persons in a circle or grouplet) to
know their leaders and to put each of them in his proper category. Only broad publicity will correct all bigoted,
one-sided, capricious deviations, it alone will convert the at
times absurd and ridiculous “squalls” between “grouplets” into useful and essential material for
the self-education of the Party.

Light,more light! We need a vast orchestra; and we must acquire
experience in order correctly to distribute the parts, in order
to know to whom to assign the sentimen tal violin, to whom the
gruff double-bass, to whom the con ductor’s haton. Let the
columns of the Party organ and of all Party publications indeed
be thrown open hospitably to all opinions, in keeping with the
author’s admirable appeal; let all and sundry judge our
“janglings and wran glings” over any “note” sounded too sharp, in the opinion of some,
too flat, in the opinion of others, too raggedly, in the opinion
of others still. Only through a series of such open discussions
can we get a really harmonious ensemble of leaders; only given
this condition will it he impossible for the workers to
cease to understand us; only then will our “general staff” really be backed by the good and con scious will of an army that follows and at the same time
directs its general staff!

Lenin

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Notes:
[1]
This Letter to “Iskra” was written by Lenin in reply to
Plekhanov’s article “What Should Not Be Done” in Iskra ,
No. 52 (November 7, 1903).

[2]
Economism was the opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy at
the turn of the century, a Russian variety of international oppor tunism;
its organs were the newspaper Rabochaya Mysl (Worker’s Thought;
1897-1902), published in Russia, and the journal Ra bocheye Dyelo (Workers’ Cause; 1899-1902), published abroad.

The Economists restricted the tasks of the working-class move ment to the
economic struggle for higher wages, better working conditions, etc.,
asserting that the political struggle was the busi ness of the liberal
bourgeoisie, and denied the leading role of the workers’ party, which, they
considered, should merely observe the spontaneous development of the
movement and follow in its wake. In their glorifying of
“spontaneity” they belittled the importance of revolutionary
theory and consciousness, declaring that the social ist ideology could grow
out of the spontaneous movement; and by thus denying the need to imbue the
workers’ movement with socialist consciousness, they cleared the way for
bourgeois ideology. They championed the scattered, isolated circles, with
their parochi al amateurish approach, fostering disunity, confusion, and
wavering in the Social-Democratic ranks and opposing the creation of a
centralised working-class party. Economism threatened to divert the working
class from the revolutionary, class path and re duce it to a political
appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The Economists’ programme was set forth in the Credo , a mani festo
drawn up in 1899 by Y. D. Kuskova. When this Credo reached Lenin,
then in exile in Siberia, he replied with A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats—a trenchant criticism of the Economist
ideas. This protest was discussed and unanimously adopted by a meeting of 17
Marxists serviiig terms of political exile, held in the village of
Yermakovskoye, Minusinsk Region.

Amajor part in the fight against Economism was played by Lenin’s
Iskra; and by his book What Is To Be Done? , published in
March 1902, Lenin completed its ideological defeat.

[3]
Sobakevich—the reference is to the notorious character in
Gogol’s Dead Souls .