V. I.

Lenin

Russian Marxists have long been pointing to the degeneration of
the old, classical, revolutionary Russian Narodism that has been
going on steadily since the eighties. Faith declined in a
special system of peasant economy, in the village commune as the
germ and basis of socialism, in the possibility of avoiding the
path of capitalism by an immediate social revolution, for which
the people were supposed to be already prepared. The demands for
all kinds of measures to bolster up peasant economy and
“small people’s production” in general were the only ones to retain any political significance. Essentially, this was
already nothing but bourgeois reformism; Narodism melted into
lib eralism; a liberal-Narodnik trend arose that would not or
could not see that the measures envisaged (credits, co operative
societies, land improvement, enlargement of land holdings, and
all the rest) did not go beyond the framework of existing bourgeois society. The Narodnik theories of
Mr. V. V., Mr.

Nikolai on [2] and their numerous echoers only served as a quasi-scientific cloak for this unpleasant but
indubitable fact. Marxist criticism tore off this cloak, and the
influence of Narodnik ideas on Russian revo lutionary circles
began to ebb with. amazing rapidity. These ideas were already
becoming in fact the exclusive pos session of the stratum to
which they were kin in spirit— Russian liberal “society”.

West-EuropeanBernsteinism was a new current that strengthened and at
the same time modified the above- mentioned trend. There is truth, it
seems, in the saying that a prophet is not without honour, save in his
own country”.

Bernstein had no luck in his own country, but, on the other
hand, his ideas were “taken seriously” and applied in practice by certain socialists in France, Italy and Russia,
who rapid ly evolved into exponents of bourgeois reformism. Fructi fied by these ideas, our liberal-Narodnik
trend acquired new followers of the ex-Marxist variety and at
the same time matured inwardly, discarding certain primitive
illusions and reactionary accretions. Bernsteinism served its
pur pose—not by transforming socialism, but by giving artic ulation to the new phase of bourgeois liberalism and
removing the socialist mask from certain quasi-social ists.

Ahighly interesting and instructive example of the mingling and
fusion of European opportunist and Russian Narodnik ideas is to
be found in Mr. L. ’s article “The Agrarian
Question” in No. 9 (33) of Osvobozhdeniye. This is a truly programmatic article; it diligently sets forth the
general credo of the author and systematically applies it to a definite sphere of problems. This article will become a
landmark in the history of Russian liberalism, denoting a big
step forward in its shaping and consolidation.

Theauthor dresses his bourgeois liberalism in a coat cut
according to the latest fashion. Repeating Bern stein almost
word for word, he tries with an amusing earnestness to persuade
the reader that “liberalism and socialism can by no means
be separated from each other, let alone contrasted to each
other: they are identical and inseparable in their fundamental
ideal. Socialism offers no menace to liberalism, as many fear;
it comes not to destroy, but to fulfil the commandments of
liberalism." The wish, as we know, is father to the thought; and
Mr. L. and his like would very much wish the Social-Democrats
not to separate themselves from the liberals, and to have them
understand socialism “not as ready-made dogmas and petri
fied doctrines claiming to take account in advance of the whole
course of historical development” (and so on, quite in the
spirit of Revolutsionnaya Rossiya ), but “as a general ethical ideal” (which, as we know, all
philistines, the lib erals included, regard as unrealisable in
this earthly vale and as belonging to the realm of the hereafter
and of “things in-themselves").

Theliberals, naturally, want—excuse the vulgarism!— to show off their wares to the best advantage, to identify
political liberalism in Russia with social-economic democracy. It is a very “well-meaning” idea, but at
the same time very muddled and very artful. Well-meaning because
it ex presses the kind intention of a certain section of the lib
erals to work for broad social reforms. Muddled, because it is
based on contrasting democratic to bourgeois liberal ism (again
quite in the spirit of Revolutsionnaya Rossiga!); the author apparently has no inkling of the fact that in any
capitalist society there are bound to be some bour geois-democratic elements who stand for broad democratic and
social-economic reforms; like all the Russian

Millerands, [3] he would like to identify bourgeois reformism with
socialism, understood, of course, “not as ready-made dogmas”, etc. Lastly, it is a very artful idea because the
author assures himself and others that the sympathy with
reform—"concern for the needs and interests of the people,
’Narodism’ in the true and fine ethical sense of the term
— which is entertained by a certain section of the liberals a certain historical moment is, or could be, a
permanent attribute of liberalism as such. That is so naive as
almost to be touching. Who does not know that every bourgeois
ex-goverument, every “His Majesty’s Opposition” always clamours about its true, fine and ethical
“Narodism"—as long as it remains in opposition? The
Russian bourgeoisie plays at Narodism (and sometimes sincerely)
just because it is in opposition, and not yet at the helm of
state. The Russian proletariat’s reply to the artful blandishments of the Osvobozhdeniye gentry will be:
“Pas si bite, messieurs! We are not such fools, gentlemen, as to believe that."

Fromthese general arguments as to the identity of liberalism and
socialism, Mr. L. passes to the general theory of the agrarian
question. In a matter of a dozen lines he demolishes Marxism (once
again in the spirit of Revo lutsionnaya Rossiya ), presenting
it for this purpose, as is customary, in a vulgarly simplified form
and proclaiming it to be contrary to experience, scientifically
unproved, and generally false! It is highly characteristic that the
only confirmation he adduces is a reference to European
socialist (his own italics) literature— Bernsteinian, evidently.

A very convincing reference. If European (Euro pean! )
socialists are beginning to think and argue like bourgeois, why
should not Russian bourgeois proclaim them selves both Narodniks
and socialists? If the Marxist view of the peasant question
“were incontestable and the only possible one, it would,"
Mr. L. assures us, “place all of Zemstvo [sic!]
Russia in a terrible, a tragic position and doom it to inaction,
in view of the demonstrated impossibil ity of a progressive
agrarian policy and of rational and effective aid to peasant
economy in general." The argument, as you see, is unanswerable:
because Marxism demonstrates the impossibility under capitalism of any degree of lasting prosperity for at all broad
sections of the peasantry, it the relore places “Zemstvo” (a slip of the pen for “land
owning"?) Russia—the Russia, that is, that lives by ruining and proletarising the peasantry—in a terrible, a
tragic position. Why, yes, that is one of the historic services
of Marxism: it has once and for all placed in a terrible, a
tragicomic position—the ideologists of the bourgeoisie who
deck themselves in the toga of Narodism, social-economic
democracy, etc.

Tofinish with Mr. L. ’s theoretical exercises we have now only
to quote the following gem. “Here” (in agri culture), we are told, “there is not and cannot be that
auto matic I! I progress which is to a certain extent possible
in industry, depending on the objective [LI development of
technology." This inimitable profundity has been borrowed in its
entirety from Messieurs the Kablukovs, Bulgakovs, E. Davids and
tutti quanti , who in their “learned” works justify the backwardness of their own ideas by the tech nical,
economic and social backwardness of agriculture. The backwardness of agriculture is indubitable, it has long been
recognised by Marxists and is fully explainable; but as for this
“automatic [if only to a certain extent I progress in industry”, and the objective development of technol
ogy—it is just sheer gibberish.

However,excursions into the realm of science are no more than an
architectural ornament to Mr. L.’s article. True practical politician
that he is, he offers us, along with sheer muddle-headedness in
general reasoning, an extremely sober and business-like practical
programme. True, he makes the modest reservation—in his stilted official
Russian—that he disclaims all intention of adumbrating a
programme and confines himself to intimating his atti tude—but that is just his modesty. Actually, we have in
Mr. L. ’s article a very complete and detailed agrarian pro
gramme for the Russian liberals, which only lacks stylistic
editing and paragraphing by clauses. It is a programme in a
consistent liberal spirit: political liberty, democratic tax
reform, freedom of movement, a peasant democratic agrarian
policy aiming at the democratisation of landownership. With a
view to this democratisation, it demands freedom to leave the
village commune, the conversion of the latter from a compulsory
into a voluntary association similar to any economic association, and democratic rent laws. The state” should
facilitate “the transfer ·of land to the Ia bouring masses” by means of a number of measures, namely:
extension of the activities of the Peasant Bank, conversion of
the royal demesne into state demesne, “the creation of small farms, individual or co-operative, not using hired
labour”, and, lastly, compulsory alienation or redemption
of lands essential to the peasants. “Of course, this compulsory redemption must be placed on a firm basis of law and
attended in each particular case by reliable guarantees”,
but in some cases it must be effected “almost
[sic! I uncondition ally"—for example, in relation to the “cut-off lands”, [4]
which create something in the nature of feudal relations. In order to abolish
semi-feudal relations, the state should be given the right of
compulsory alienation and compulsory demarcation of the plots in
question.

Suchis the agrarian programme of the liberals. A paral lel
between it and the Social-Democratic agrarian pro gramme
naturally suggests itself. Where they resemble each other is in
the identity of the immediate tendency and the similarity of
most of the demands. Where they differ is in the two following
cardinally important points. Firstly, the Social-Democrats want
to effect the abolition of the remnants of feudalism (which both
programmes directly advance as the aim) by revolutionary means
and with rev olutionary determinatioji the liberals—by reformist means and half-beartedly. Secondly, the
Social-Democrats stress tkat the system to be purged of the
remnants of feudalism is a bourgeois system; they already now, in advance, expose all its
contradictions, and strive immediately to extend and render more
conscious the class struggle that is inher ent in this new system and
is already coming to the sur face. The liberals ignore the bourgeois
character of the system purged of feudalism, gloss over its
contradictions and try to damp down the class struggle inherent in it.

Letus consider these differences.

Thereformist and half-hearted character of the liberal agrarian
programme is clearly apparent first of all from the fact that it
does not go beyond “compulsory redemp tion”, and only “almost” unconditional at that, whereas the
Social-Democratic agrarian programme demands the alien ation of
the cut-off lands from their old owners without compensation,
and countenances compensation only in spe cial cases, and then
at the expense of the land of the nobility. Nor, as is well known, [1] do the Social-Democrats reject expropriation of the
landed estates in their entirety, but only regard it as
impermissible and irresponsible to include this demand, which is
not appropriate under all circumstances, in the programme. The
Social-Democrats from the very start call on the proletariat to
take the first revolutionary step in conjunction with the
well-to-do peasants in order then at once to go farther, either
in conjunction with the peas ant bourgeoisie against the
landlord class, or against the peasant bourgeoisie and the
landlord class if they have joined forces. The liberals even at
this stage, in the struggle against semi-feudal relations,
shrink from class action and struggle. They want to entrust the
reform to the “state” (forgetting the class character of the state) with the help of local self-government
bodies and “ad hoc” commissions, drawing a parallel—nothing could be more
characteristic—between the compulsory alienation of the
cut-off lands and the compulsory alienation of land for building
railways!! Our liberals could not have more clearly expressed,
or rather betrayed , their cherished wish of surrounding
the new reform with the same “conveniences” for the ruling classes as always and everywhere attend the sale of land to the railways. And this in the same breath with
the fine phrases about substituting a peasant democrat ic
agrarian policy for the agrarian policy of an aristocratic
caste! In order to effect that substitution in practice, you
have to appeal, not to the “public interest”, but to the oppressed class—the peasantry—against the
oppressing class—the nobility; you have to rouse the former against the latter, have to call for revolutionary action
by the peas antry, not for reformist activity by the state. Farther, when they talk about abolishing semi-feudal
relations, the liberals refuse to see the precise nature of the
relations that they propose to purge of feudalism. Mr. L., for
example, repeats the catchphrases of Mr. Nikolai—on, Mr. V. V. and the rest about “the principle of recognising
the tiller’s right to the land he cultivates” and about
the “virility” of the peasantry, but is modestly silent about the “principle” of bourgeois farming
and the exploitation of wage-labour by these virile peasants. That it is the position of the petty-bourgeois members
of the peasantry which would inevitably be strengthened and
consolidated by the consistent application of democracy in the
agrarian sphere, the bourgeois democrats do not and will not
realise. In the proletarisation of the peasantry Mr. L. (again
like the Narodniks and in the spirit of Revolutsionnaya Rossiya ) refuses to see a “type of
development”, declaring it to be due to “the survivals of serfdom” and “the general p athological
condition of the countryside"! Presumably after we get a
constitution we shall see the end of the growth of the towns, of
the flight of the poor peasants from the countryside, of the
change-over of the landlords from the labour-rent sys tem to the
use of wage-labour, and so on! Depicting the beneficent effect
of the French Revolution on the French peasantry, Mr. L. speaks
glowingly of the disappearance of famines and the improvement
and progress of agricul ture; but about the fact that this was
bourgeois progress, based on the formation of a “stable” class of agricultural wage-labourers and on
chronic pauperism of the mass of the lower strata of the peasantry, this Narodnik-like bour geois, of course, says
never a word.

Inshort, the difference between Mr. L. ’s agrarian pro gramme and the
Social-Democratic agrarian programme reproduces in miniature with remarkable fidelity all the gen eral
differences between the minimum programmes of liber al and
proletarian democracy. Whether you consider these programmes as
theoretically expounded by their respective ideologists or as
practically applied by their respective parties and trends, or
whether you look at the history of, say, 1848, you will find
just these two fundamental differ ences between the liberal and
the Social-Democratic approach to the immediate practical aims:
on the one hand, reformist haif-heartedness in the struggle
against the survivals of feudalism and a glossing over of the
class antagonisms of “modern” society; on the other, a revolutionary struggle against the remnants of the old order
with a view to extending, developing and intensifying the
struggle of classes in the new society. Of course, these
fundamental differ ences, which spring from the very nature of
developing capitalist society, assume very different forms in
different national states and at different times. An inability
to rec ognise the “old” bourgeois democracy behind the new and peculiar forms is characteristic of its ideologists,
con sistent and inconsistent. Under the latter head we must, for
example, class Mr. P. Novobrantsev (see Revotutsion naya Rossiya , Nos. 32 and 33), that representative of “dis
traught Narodism” who, in reference to Iskra’s attacks on Osvobozhdeniye for being a bourgeois class
publication, ironically remarks: “A fine bourgeoisie, we
must say!" “Mr. Struve," Revolul sionnaya Rossiga condescends to inform us, “is a representative of the
’intelligentsia’, and not of the ’bourgeoisie as a class’, for
he does not set out to unite or lead any classes or social
estates." That is all very well, gentlemen! But had you given a
little thought to the matter you would have seen that Mr. Struve
is a repre sentative of the bourgeois intelligentsia. As to the bour geoisie as a class, the Russian
proletariat will see it as such on the historical scene only
when there is political freedom and the government is almost
directly a “commit tee” of one or another section of the bourgeoisie. And only “socialists by mistake”
can fail to know that it is their duty to teach the working
class to recognise the bourgeoisie both in its activities and in
its ideas, both in its mature state and in its dreamy youth.

Asfor dreaminess, Mr. Novobrantsev is your man for that. But our
article is already so long, and Mr. Novo brantsev’s world outlook and
agrarian-historical views present so much that is interesting,
especially when taken parallel with those of Mr. L., that we must
postpone their discussion until another time.