V. I.

Lenin

Account of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. [7]

This account is intended for personal acquaintances only, and therefore to read it without the consent of the author
( Lenin )
is tantamount to reading other people’s letters.

In order to make what follows more intelligible, I shall first
say a few words about the composition of the Congress, although
it will mean anticipating somewhat. The number of votes at the
Congress was fifty-one (thirty-three delegates with one vote
each, and nine with two, nine “double-handers"). [8]

There were ten delegates, if I am not mistaken, with a deliberative voice but no vote; that is, fifty-two persons in
all. The political grouping of these votes, as revealed during
the entire course of the Congress, was as follows:

five

Bundists, [9] three Rabocheye Dyelo -ists [10] (two from the Union of Russian Social-Democrats

Abroad [11] and one from the St. Petersburg League of

Struggle [12] four Yuzhny Rabochy -ists (two from the Yuzhny Rabochy group [13]
and two from the Kharkov
Committee, which sided solidly with Yuzhny Rabochy ), six
indecisives or waverers (the “Marsh”, as they were called
by all the

Iskra -ists [14] —in jest, of course), and, lastly, about thirty-three Iskra -ists who
were more or less firm and consistent in their
Iskra -ism. These thirty- three Iskra -ists, who when they stood together decided every issue at the Congress,
split in their turn into two subgroups—a split that took
shape finally only towards the end of the Congress: one
subgroup, with approximately nine votes, consisting of
Iskra -ists of the “soft or rather zigzag line” (or the female line, as certain wits called it, and not without
reason)— Iskra -ists who stood (as will be seen later) for
justice, for a middle course, etc.; and the other, with about
twenty-four votes, consisting of Iskra -ists of the firm
line, who upheld consistent Iskra -ism both as regards tactics and as regards the personal composition of the
central institutions of the Party.

I repeat that this grouping took final shape and became quite
clear only post factum , towards the end of the Congress
(which held close on forty sittings!), and I am anticipating
when I outline it at the start. I must also make the reservation that this grouping only represents the
approximate numbers of votes, for on various minor issues
(and on one occasion—on the question of “equality of languages”, of which I shall speak later—on a major
issue too) the votes not infrequently split, some delegates
abstaining, the groups intermingling, and so on.

The composition of the Congress had been preliminarily determined by the Organising

Committee, [15] which, under the
Regulations for the Congress, had the right to invite to it in a
deliberative capacity such persons as it might think fit. The
Congress itself at the very beginning elected a Credentials
Committee, which thereafter took charge of all matters relating
to its composition. (Let me say in parenthesis that on this
committee too there was a Bundist, who tried to take all the
other members of it by siege, keeping them up until three
o’clock in the morning, and who, even so, entered a “dissenting opinion” on every issue .)

The Congress was marked at the beginning by the peaceful and
harmonious co-operation of all the Iskra -ists; there had
always been different shades of opinion among them, of course,
but they had never manifested themselves as political differences. Incidentally, let us state in advance that the
split among the Iskra -ists was one of the major political
results of the Congress, and anyone who wants to acquaint
himself with the matter should therefore pay special attention
to all episodes even remotely connected with that split.

One rather important event at the very beginning of the Congress
was the election of the Bureau , or Presidium.
Martov was for electing nine persons, who would select three
from their number to act as the Bureau at each sitting, and he
even suggested a Bundist as one of the nine. I was for electing
only three persons for the whole duration of the Congress, and
three, moreover, who would “keep order”. The Bureau elected consisted of Plekhanov, myself and

Comrade

T [16] (a firm-line Iskra -ist and member of the Organising Committee, of whom we shall have frequent
occasion to speak later). The last-named, I might remark, was
elected by only a narrow margin in preference to a Yuzhny Rabochy -ist (also a member of the Organising Committee). My
difference with Martov over the question of the Bureau (a
difference significant in the light of subsequent events) did
not, however, lead to any split or conflict: the matter was
somehow settled in a peaceful, natural, “homely” way, as most questions generally were settled in the
Iskra organisation and the Iskra editorial board.

Also at the beginning of the Congress, there was a meeting of
the Iskra organisation (confidential and informal, of course) on the subject of its Congress mandates. This meeting
likewise settled its business in a peaceful and amicable
manner. I only mention this meeting because I think it significant, firstly, that at the beginning of the Congress the

Iskra -ists worked together harmoniously, and, secondly,
that they had decided to appeal, in doubtful and debatable
cases, to the authority of the Iskra organisation (or, rather, of the Iskra organisation members present at the
Congress); although the decisions of these meetings were not
binding, of course, for the rule that “binding instructions are abolished” and that it was everyone’s
right, and indeed duty, to vote at the Congress according to his
own free convictions, without owing obedience to any organisation—this rule, I say, was recognised by all the
Iskra -ists, and was loudly proclaimed by the chairman at
the beginning of practically every meeting of the Iskra
organisation.

To proceed. The first incident at the Congress to disclose that
all was not well among the Iskra -ists, an incident that
“set the scene” for the final drama (or tragicomedy?), was the celebrated "incident of the Organising Committee”. This must be dealt with at length. It
occurred while the Congress was still engaged in constituting
itself and discussing its Standing Orders (which, by the way,
consumed a tremendous amount of time on account of the obstruction of the Bundists, who, deliberately or otherwise,
never missed an opportunity to cause delay). The substance of
the Organising Committee incident was that, on the one hand,
that body had, even before the Congress opened, rejected the
protest of the Borba group, [17] which demanded representation at the
Congress, and had stood by this decision in the Credentials
Committee; and, on the other hand, on the floor of the Congress this same Organising Committee suddenly declared
that it was inviting Ryazanov in a deliberative capacity. The
course of events in regard to this incident was as follows.

Before the sittings of the Congress began, Martov confidentially
informed me that a certain member of the
Iskra organisation and of the Organising Committee (whom
we shall call

N [18] )
had decided to insist in the
Organising Committee that it invite to the Congress in a
deliberative capacity a certain individual whom Martov himself
could not describe otherwise than as a “renegade”. [19]
(And it was true that this individual had inclined at one time towards Iskra but
afterwards, within a few weeks, in fact, had gone over to
Rabocheye Dyelo , even though the latter was already in a
state of complete degeneration.) Martov and I discussed the
matter and we were both indignant that a member of the
Iskra organisation should do such a thing, knowing, of course (for Martov had warned Comrade N), that it was a direct
slap in the face for Iskra, yet not considering it necessary even
to consult the organisation. N did in fact put forward his
proposal in the Organising Committee, but it was rejected owing
to the vigorous protest of Comrade T, who described the wholly
unstable political character of the “renegade”. It is worth noting that Martov, as he said, could not even speak
any longer to N, although they had previously been on friendly
personal terms, so shocked was he by this action. N’s wish to
put spokes in Iskra’s wheel was further revealed in his
supporting a vote of censure passed by the Organising Committee
on the Iskra editorial board; a censure which, to be sure, concerned a very minor matter, but which nevertheless
aroused Martov’s profound indignation. Furthermore, information
from Russia, also communicated to me by Martov, indicated a
tendency on N’s part to circulate rumours of dissension between
the Iskra -ists in Russia and the Iskra -ists abroad. All this disposed the Iskra ists to be very
distrustful of N; and on top of it all came the following. The
Organising Committee had rejected the pro test of Borba; the
Organising Committee members attending the meeting of the
Credentials Committee (T and N) had both (including N !!!) likewise spoken in the most
emphatic terms against Borba. Yet during an adjournment at one
of the morning sittings of the Congress, the Organising Commit
tee suddenly held a meeting of their own “by the window” and decided to invite Ryazanov in a deliberative
capacity! N was infavour of inviting him.

T, of course, was categorically against, declaring moreover
that the Organising Committee had no right to make such a
decision inasmuch as everything relating to the composition of
the Congress had already been referred to the Credentials
Committee specially elected by the Congress for the purpose. Of
course, the Yuzhny Rabochy members of the Organising
Committee+ the Bundist+N outvoted Comrade T, and the decision
went through.

T reported this decision to the Iskra editorial board, which (not all its members were present, but Martov and Zasulich
were) unanimously decided, of course, to take the field at the
Congress against the Organising Committee, for many
Iskra -ists bad already spoken publicly at the Congress
against Borba and it was impossible to yield on this issue.

When the Organising Committee (after the dinner interval)
informed the Congress of its decision, T, in his turn, informed
it of his protest. Thereupon a Yuzhny Rabochy member of
the Organising Committee fell upon T and accused him of
violating discipline (! ), on the grounds that the
Organising Committee had resolved not to disclose (sic! )
this fact to the Congress. Naturally, we (Plekhanov, Martov and I) came down hard on the Organising Committee
at
that, accusing it of reviving binding instructions, violating
the sovereignty of the Congress, and so on. The Congress
supported us, the Organising Committee was defeated, and a
resolution was adopted depriving the Organising Committee as a
body of the right to influence the composition of the Congress.

Such was the “Organising Committee incident”. Firstly, it finally undermined the political
confidence of many Iskra -ists in N (and strengthened their confidence in T); secondly, it not only proved, but
palpably demonstrated how shaky the Iskra trend still was even in a central and, as it seemed, super-Iskra-ist
institution like the Organising

Committee. It became clear that, besides the Bundist, the
Organising Committee included 1) Yuzhny Rabochy -ists with
their own specific policy, and 2)

“ Iskra -ists who were ashamed of being
Iskra -ists”, and that only some of its members were 3) Iskra -ists who were not ashamed of being
such. When the Yuzhny Rabochy -ists expressed a desire to
discuss this deplorable incident with the Iskra editorial
board (privately, of course)— Comrade N, it is very important to note, expressed no desire at that time to do so —the
editorial board did discuss It with them, and I plainly told them that the Congress had definitely revealed an
important political fact, namely, that there were many
Iskra -ists in the Party who were ashamed of being
Iskra ists and were capable, just to spite Iskra , of playing such a trick as inviting Ryazanov. So angry was I at
this trick on N’s part, after he had spoken against Borba
in the committee, that I publicly declared at the Congress that
“comrades who have attended foreign congresses know what
a storm of indignation is always aroused when people say one
thing at committees and. another on the floor of the

Congress”. [1] "Iskra -ists” who were afraid of being “reproached” by the Bundists with being
“ Iskra puppets”, and who for this reason alone played political tricks on Iskra ,
naturally could not inspire any confidence.

The Iskra -ists’ general distrust of N grew immensely when
Martov’s attempt to discuss the matter with him resulted in
N’s announcing his resignation from the “Iskra” organisation!! Thereafter the N “affair” was
taken up in the Iskra organisation, whose members were outraged by such a resignation, and the organisation
held four meetings on the subject. These meetings, especially the last, are extremely important, for it was there
that the split among the Iskra -ists, chiefly over the composition of the Central Committee, definitely took shape.

But before embarking on an account of these meetings of the
Iskra organisation (which, I once more repeat, were private and informal), let me say something about the work of
the Congress. That work proceeded harmoniously for the time
being, in the sense of all the Iskra -ists acting together, both on the first agenda item (the position of the Bund in the
Party), and on the second (the programme), and on the third
(endorsement of the Central Organ of the Party). The united
stand of the Iskra -ists ensured a big and solid majority
at the Congress (a compact majority, as the Bundists ruefully
called it!), although here too the “indecisives” (or “Marsh") and Yuzhny Rabochy -ists more than once
displayed, on minor issues, their utter instability. The
political grouping of not fully Iskra -ist elements at the
Congress stood out more and more clearly.

To return to the meetings of the Iskra organisation. At
the first of them it was resolved to request N to give an
explanation, leaving it to him to say before whom of the members
of the Iskra organisation he wished to do so. I protested
emphatically against this approach, demanding that the political
issue (the Iskra -ists’ lack of political confidence in N
at this Congress) be separated from the personal issue (the
appointment of a commission to investigate the reasons for N’s
strange conduct). At the second meeting it was announced that N
wished to give his explanation without T present , although he did not intend, he intimated, to say anything about
T personally. I again pro tested and refused to be present at an
explanation at which a non-member of the organisation could
demand the withdrawal, even for a moment, of a member, when it
was not that member he was going to discuss.I considered this an
unworthy manoeuvre and a slap in the face for the organisation
on N’s part: N did not even trust the organisation so far as to
leave it to it to determine under what conditions the explanation should be given! At the third meeting, N gave his
“explanation”, which failed to satisfy the majority of those present. The fourth meeting was attended
by all the Iskra -ists; but it was   preceded by a number of important episodes at the Congress itself.

First of all, mention should be made of the “equality of
languages” episode. It concerned the adoption of the pro
gramme—the formulation of the demand for equality and equal rights in regard to language. (The programme was discussed
and voted on point by point, the Bundists engaged in desperate
obstruction, and practically two-thirds of the time of the
Congress was spent on the programme!) On this issue the Bundists succeeded in shaking the unity of the
Iskra -ists, leading some of them to believe that
Iskra objected to “equality of languages”, when actually all the Iskra editorial board objected to
was this illiterate, in its opinion, bizarre and superfluous
formula. A desperate struggle ensued, and the Congress was split
in half , into two equal halves (with a few abstentions): about twenty-three votes (perhaps 23-25, 1 do not
remember exactly) were on the side of Iskra (and the
Iskra editorial board), and as many were against. The question had to be postponed, it was referred back to the
committee, which found a formula that the Congress adopted unanimously . The equality of languages incident is important because it once more revealed
the shakiness of Iskra -ism, plainly and definitely revealed the shakiness both of the indecisives (it was then, if
I am not mistaken, that they were dubbed the Marsh , and
by none other than the Iskra -ists of the Martov persuasion!) and of the Yuzhny Rabochy -ists, who were all
against Iskra . Passions ran high and innumerable cutting remarks were flung at the Yuzhny Rabochy -ists
by the Iskra-ists, especially the Martovites. One “leader” of the Martovites nearly came to blows with
the Yuzhny Rabochy ists during the interval, and I hastened to. resume the sitting (at the urgent request of
Plekhanov, who feared a scuffle). It is important to note that
among these twenty- three staunchest of the Iskra -ists
too, the Martovites (i.e., the Iskra -ists who subsequently followed Martov) constituted
a   minority .

Another episode was the struggle over Paragraph I of the
“Party Rules”. This was already the fifth item of the

Tagesordnung , [2] towards the end of the
Congress. (Under Item 1, a resolution against federalism was
adopted; under Item 2, the programme; under Item 3, Iskra
was adopted as the Central Organ of the

Party; [3] under Item 4, the “delegates’ reports” were heard, part of them, that is, the rest being
referred to a committee, for the time at the disposal of the
Congress was already too short—both funds and endurance
had been exhausted.)

Paragraph 1 of the Rules defines a Party member. The definition given in my draft was: “A member of the Russian
Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts its pro gramme
and who supports the Party both financially and by personal
participation in one of the Party organisations." In place of the words I have underlined, Martov proposed:

“ work under the control and direction of one of the Party organisations ”. My formulation was supported by
Plekhanov, Martov’s by the rest of the editorial board (Axelrod
was their spokesman at the Congress). We argued that the concept
Party member must be narrowed so as to separate those who worked from those who merely talked, to eliminate
organisational chaos, to eliminate the monstrous and absurd
possibility of there being organisations which consisted of
Party members but which were not Party organisations, and so
on. Martov stood for broadening the Party and spoke of a
broad class movement needing a broad—i.e., diffuse— organisation, and so forth. It is amusing to note that in
defence of their views nearly all Martov’s supporters cited
What Is To Be Done? [4]

Plekhanov hotly opposed Martov, pointing out that his Jauresist formulation would fling open the
doors to the opportunists, who just longed for such a position
of being inside the Party but outside its organisation. “Under the control and direction”, I
said, would in practice mean nothing more nor less than without any control or direction. Martov won: his formulation was
adopted (by about twenty-eight votes to twenty-three, or
something like that—I cannot recall exactly), thanks to the Bund, which, of course, at once sensed a
loophole and brought all its five votes to bear to secure the adoption of “the worse alternative” (that
is precisely how a Rabocheye Dyelo delegate explained his motive for voting for Martov!). The heated controversy and
the voting on Paragraph I of the Rules once more revealed the
political grouping at the Congress and demonstrated that the
Bund+ Rabocheye Dyelo could decide the fate of any issue by supporting the minority of the Iskra -ists
against the majority.

It was after the debate and voting on Paragraph I of the Rules that the fourth (and last ) meeting of the
Iskra organisation took place. The disagreement among the Iskra -ists over the personal composition of the
Central Committee had already become quite clear and had caused
a split in their ranks: one section stood for an
Iskra -ist Central Committee (in view of the dissolution
of the Iskra organisation and the Emancipation of
Labour

group [20] and the need to complete Iskra’s work), the other—for admitting the Yuzhny Rabochy -ists too
and for predominance of Iskra -ists of the “zigzag line”. The first section was categorically against N’s
candidature, the other in favour of it. It was in a last attempt
to reach agreement that this meeting of the sixteen (members of the Iskra organisation, including, I
repeat, those present in a deliberative capacity) was called. The result of the voting was: nine against N, four in
favour, the rest abstaining. The majority, anxious nonetheless
to avoid war with the minority, thereupon proposed a compromise
list of five, including one Yuzhny Rabochy -ist (acceptable to the minority) and one militant member of the
minority, while the rest were consistent Iskra -ists (of
whom—it is important to note—one joined in the fight at the Congress only towards the end and was to all intents and
purposes impartial, while the other two took no part at all in
the fight and were absolutely impartial as regards personalities). Ten hands were raised for this list (then one
more was added, making eleven) and one against (only Martov’s!),
the rest abstained! Thus the compromise list was wrecked by Martov. After this, two
“militant” lists, one from each side, were put to the vote, but neither secured more than a minority.

And so, at the last meeting of the Iskra organisation the Martovites proved in the minority on both issues;
nevertheless, when a member of the majority (the above-mentioned impartial member, or chairman) approached them
after the meeting in a last attempt to reach agreement, they
declared war.

The Martovites’ calculation was clear and sure: the
Bundists and Rabocheye Dyelo -ists would undoubtedly have supported the list of the zigzag line , for during
the month the Congress had been sitting all issues had become so
plain and all personalities so clearly delineated that not one of the Congress delegates would have had any difficulty
in deciding which was the better alternative, or the lesser
evil. And for the Bund+ Rabocheye Dyelo , of course, the
zigzag Iskra -ists were the lesser evil, and always will
be.

After the meeting of the sixteen, when the
Iskra -ists had definitely divided and war had been declared among them, meetings began of the two parties into
which the Congress had split, that is, private and unofficial
gatherings of all who thought alike. The Iskra -ists of
the consistent line assembled at first to the number of nine
(out of sixteen), then fifteen, and finally twenty-four , counting votes, not persons. This
rapid increase was due to the fact that the lists of candidates
(for the Central Committee) were already beginning to circulate,
and the vast majority of the Iskra ists were immediately and permanently repelled by the Martovite lists
because of their flabbiness: Martov’s candidates were people
who had made a definitely bad impression on the Congress (by
paltering, inconsistency, tactlessness, etc.). That in the first
place; in the second place, when it was explained to the
Iskra -ists what had taken place in the Iskra organisation, the bulk of them were drawn towards the majority,
and Martov’s inability to stick to a definite political line
became apparent to all and sundry. So it was that twenty-four
votes were quickly and easily mustered for the consistent
Iskra -ist tactics, for the list of Central Committee candidates, and for electing a trio to the editorial board (instead of endorsing the old, ineffectual and
amorphous board of six).

By this time the Congress had finished discussing the Rules, and
Martov and Co. had once again (and not once, in fact, but
several times) defeated the majority of the
Iskra -ists with the generous assistance of the Bund+“Rabocheye Dyelo ”—as, for example, over the
question of co-optation to the central bodies (this question was
decided by the Congress along Martov’s lines ).

In spite of having been thus impaired, the Rules as a whole were
endorsed by all the Iskra -ists and by the entire
Congress. But after the general Rules, the Congress passed on to
the Rules of the Bund, and by an overwhelming majority rejected the Bund’s proposal (to recognise the Bund as the
sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in the
Party). I think on this issue the Bund stood alone against
practically the whole Congress. Thereupon the Bundists withdrew from the Congress, announcing their withdrawal from the Party. The Martovites had lost five of their faithful
allies! Then the Rabocheye Dyelo -ists too withdrew, after the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy

Abroad [21] was recognised as the sole Party organisation abroad. The Martovites had lost another two of
their faithful allies! The total number of votes at the Congress
was now forty- four (51—7), of which the majority (twenty-four) were those of consistent Iskra -ists; the
coalition of the Martovites with the Yuzhny Rabochy -ists and the “Marsh” resulted in only
twenty votes.

The Iskra -ists of the zigzag line were faced with the prospect of submitting—just as the Iskra -ists of
the firm line had submitted without a murmur when Martov set out to beat and did beat them in coalition with the
Bund. But the Martovites were so unbridled that instead of
submitting they set out to cause a row and a split.

It was causing a row to raise the question of endorsing the old
editorial board, for the request of even one of the editors
would be enough to oblige the Congress to scrutinise the question of the composition of the Central Organ in its
entirety, instead of confining itself to mere endorsement. It
was a step towards a split to refuse to take part in the elections to the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

First as regards the election of the editorial board. As I have
already mentioned, what the Tagesordnung said, in Item
24, was: election of the central institutions of the
Party. And my commentary on the

Tagesordnung [22] (which commentary was known to all the “Iskra”-ists long before the Congress and to all the delegates at the Congress) said marginally: election of threepersonstothe Central 0 rgan and three
to the Central Committee. Hence it is beyond all doubt that the
demand for the election of a trio originated within the
editorial board itself and none of the editors protested against it. Even Martov and another Martovite leader
defended the proposal for “two trios” prior to the
Congress, before a number of delegates .

Several weeks before the Congress, I personally informed

Starover [23] and Martov that at the Congress I would demand
the election of the editorial board; I agreed to the election of two trios, the idea being that the editorial trio
would either co-opt seven (or even more) persons or would remain as it was (I specially stipulated this
latter possibility). Starover even said outright that the trio
would mean Plekhanov+Martov+Lenin, and I agreed with him—so clear had it been to everyone all along that
these alone could be elected to the leadership. One had to be
actuated by resentment and pique and lose one’s head after the
struggle at the Congress to proceed after the event to attack
the trio as inexpedient and ineffectual. The old board of six
was so ineffectual that never once in all its three years did it meet in full force. That may seem incredible,
but it is a fact. Not one of the forty-five issues of
Iskra was made up (in the editorial and technical sense) by anyone but Martov or Lenin. And never once
was any major theoretical issue raised by anyone but
Plekhanov. Axelrod did no work at all (he contributed literally
nothing to

Zarya [24] and only three or four articles to all the forty-five issues of Iskra).
Zasulich and Starover only contributed and advised, they
never did any actual editorial work. Who ought to be elected to the political leadership , to the centre , was as clear as daylight to every delegate at the
Congress, after the month it had been in session.

To propose at the Congress to endorse the old editorial board
was a stupid attempt to provoke a row .

It was stupid because it was futile. Even if the board of six
had been endorsed, one member of it (myself, for example) would
have demanded that it be reviewed, that the relations within it
be examined, and the Congress would have been obliged to go into
the matter all over again.

It was an attempt to provoke a row because non-endorsement was bound to be taken asaninsult —whereas in a new election there was nothing insulting
whatever. The Central Committee was being elected—why not
the Central Organ too? There was no question of endorsing the
Organising Committee—why should there be any of endorsing
the old editorial board?

Naturally, however, by demanding endorsement the
Martovites provoked a protest at the Congress, the protest
was taken as an insult , as an affront, as an attempt to
oust them, to shut them out ... and all the bogy-tales began to be invented on which the fancy of idle gossips is now
feeding!

The editorial board left the hail while the Congress discussed
the election-or-endorsement issue. After a desperately hot
debate, the Congress decided nottoendorsetheoldeditorialboard . [5]

Only after this decision was taken did the ex-members of the
editorial board return to the hall. Martov then got up and, in
his own name and that of his colleagues, declined to stand for election, uttering all sorts of dreadful and wretched
words about a “state of siege in the Party” (for blackballed Ministers?) and “emergency laws against
particular individuals and groups” (such as those who, in
the name of Iskra , try to palm off Ryazanov on it, and who
say one thing at committees and another on the floor of the
Congress?).

I replied to him by pointing to the incredible confusion of political ideas which had led to this protest against
election, against the Congress making changes in official Party bodies. [6]

Plekhanov, Martov, and Lenin were elected. Martov again declined. Koltsov (who received three votes) likewise
declined. Thereupon the Congress passed a resolution instructing
the two members of the editorial board of the Central Organ to
co-opt a third, when they should find a suitable person .

Next came the election of three members to the Central
Committee—the name of only one of whom was disclosed to the Congress by the teller of the votes—and of the
fifth member of the Party

Council [25] (likewise by secret ballot).

The Martovites, followed by the whole of the “Marsh”, would not hand in their ballots
and submitted a written statement to the Bureau to that effect.

This was manifestly a step towards a split, towards wrecking the Congress and refusing to recognise the Party. Yet when
one of the Yuzhny Rabochy -ists said in so many words that he doubted (sic! ) the validity of the Congress
decisions, Martov, overcome by shame, controverted him,
publicly declaring that he had no doubt as to their validity .

Unfortunately, these well-spoken and loyal words have been
contradicted by the actions and behaviour of Martov (and of the
Martovites)....

The Congress then entrusted the publication of the minutes to a
Minutes Committee, and adopted eleven resolutions on tactical
questions, viz.:

1) On Demonstrations;

2) On the Trade Union Movement;

3) On Work Among the Sects;

4) On Work Among the Student Youth;

5) On How To Behave Under Interrogation;

6) On Shop Stewards;

7) On the 1904 International Congress in Amsterdam;

8) On the Pberals (Starover’s resolution);

9) On the Pberals (Plekhanov’s resolution);

10) On the

Socialist-Revolutionaries [26] ;

11) On Party Pterature.

Then, after a brief speech reminding the delegates that the
decisions of the Congress were binding, the chairman closed the
Congress.

Examining the behaviour of the Martovites since the Congress,
their refusal to collaborate on the Central Organ (although officially invited by the editorial board to do so ), their
refusal to work on the Central Committee, and their propaganda of a boycott—all I can say is that this is an
insensate attempt, unworthy of Party members, to disrupt the
Party—and why? Only because they are dissatisfied with the composition of the central bodies; for, speaking
objectively , it was o n 1 y over this that our ways parted, while their subjective verdicts (insult, affront,
slurs, ousting, shutting out, etc., etc.) are nothing but the fruits of offended vanity and a morbid imagination .

This morbid imagination and offended vanity are leading directly
to the most disgraceful scandal-mongering , when, without yet knowing or seeing anything of the activities of the new central bodies , people spread rumours about their
being “ineffectual”, about Ivan Ivanovich “ruling with a rod of iron” or Ivan

Nikiforovich [27] with an “iron hand”, and so on.

To try to prove that the central bodies are “ineffectual” by boycotting them is an
unprecedented and unparalleled violation of Party duty ,
and no sophistry can conceal the fact: the boycott is a step towards disrupting the Party .

The Russian Social-Democratic movement is in the throes of the
last difficult transition from the circles to a Party ,
from philistinism to a realisation of revolutionary duty , from acting by means of scandal-mongering and circle
pressure to discipline .

Anyone who values Party work and action in the interests of the Social-Democratic labour movement will refuse
to tolerate such wretched sophistries as a “legitimate” and “loyal” boycott of the
central bodies; he will not allow the cause to suffer and the
work to be brought to a standstill because a dozen or so
individuals are displeased that they and their friends were not
elected to the central bodies; he will not allow Party officials to be subjected to private and secret pressure through
threats of non-collaboration, through boycotts, through cutting
off of funds, through scandal-mongering and lying tales.