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STORY OF THE II CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.
2 2 1 with Ю[zhny] Rabochy), 6 irresolute, wavering ("the swamp," as all the Iskrists jokingly, of course, called them),4) then approximately 33 Iskrists, more or less firm and consistent in their Iskriasm. These 33 Iskrists, who, being united, always decided the fate of any question at the congress, split, in turn, into 2 subgroups, finally split only at the end of the congress: one subgroup, approximately 9 votes of Iskrists of the "soft, rather, zigzag line" [(or the female line, as some wits joked, and not without reason)], Iskrists who stood (as will be seen below) for justice, for the resultant force etc. and approximately 24 votes of Iskrists of the firm line, who defended consistent Iskriasm both in tactics and in the personal composition of the central institutions of the party. I repeat, such a grouping finally took shape and became fully clear only post factum *), at the end of the congress (which had up to 40 sessions!)3), and I am jumping ahead, outlining this grouping at the beginning. I will also stipulate that this grouping gives only an approximate number of votes, because on individual minor issues (and once, on the issue of "equal rights of languages," which will be discussed below, and on a major occasion)6) votes were often split, some abstained, groupings mixed, etc.
The composition of the congress was determined in advance by the Organizational] Committee, which had the right, according to the congress charter, to invite anyone it deemed necessary to the congress, with a consultative vote. At the congress, from the very beginning, a commission was elected to verify the mandates, to which (commission) everything relating to the composition of the congress passed. (In parenthesis, a Bundist also entered this commission ... **) who wore out all the members of the commission, detaining them until 3 a.m. and still remaining "with a special opinion" on every issue.)1)
The congress began with the peaceful and friendly work of all Iskrists, among whom there were, of course, always shades of opinion, but these shades, as political disagreements, did not emerge outwardly. By the way, let us note in advance that the split of the Iskrists was one of the main political results of the congress, and anyone wishing to familiarize themselves with the matter should therefore pay special
*) - later. Ed.
**) In the manuscript, a series of words is crossed out at this place, which is impossible to make out. Ed.

LENIN
COLLECTION
attention to all episodes, even remotely related to this split.
A rather important act at the very beginning of the congress was the election of a bureau or presidium. Martov stood for the election of 9 people, who would elect 3 to the bureau for each session8), and he even included a Bundist in the composition of these 9. I stood for the election of only three for the entire congress, and moreover three for "holding in strictness)).9) Elected were: Plekhanov, me, and Comrade T 10) (he will be spoken of often below - an Iskrist of the firm line, a member of the O.C.). The latter, however, passed with a small majority of votes against one Yuzhnorabocheist (also a member of the O.C.)11). The disagreement between me and Martov on the issue of the bureau (a disagreement characteristic from the point of view of everything that followed) did not, however, lead to any split or conflict: the matter was somehow settled peacefully, by itself, "in a family way)) 12), as most matters were generally settled in the Iskra organization and in the Iskra editorial board.
The (secret and informal, of course) meeting of the Iskra organization on the issue of its mandates at the congress also dates back to the beginning of the congress. The meeting also came to a peaceful, "amicable)) solution of the issue.13) I note this meeting only because I consider it characteristic, first, of the friendly work of the Iskrists at the beginning of the congress, and, second, of their decision to resort, in doubtful and controversial cases, to the authority of the Iskra organization (more precisely, of the members of the Iskra organization present at the congress), and, of course, the voting of these meetings did not have mandatory significance, because the rule: "imperative mandates are abolished", everyone can and must vote at the congress according to their personal, free conviction, without any subordination to any organization whatsoever - this rule, I say, was recognized by all Iskrists, and [almost] at the beginning of almost every Iskra meeting, it was loudly proclaimed by the chairman.
Further. The first incident at the Congress, which revealed that not everything was going smoothly among the Iskrists, and which served as the "incitement" of the final drama (or tragicomedy?), was the notorious "incident with the O.C.". This incident must be dwelt on in detail. It took place even when the congress was occupied with its own constitution, when the congress rules were still being discussed (which, by the way, swallowed up a lot of time due to the obstruction of the Bundists, who did not miss the opportunity intentionally and unintentionally ... *) to stall where possible and with what possible). The essence of the incident with the O.C. was that the O.C., on the one hand, rejected
even before the congress the protest of "Bor'ba" (the Bor'ba group), which demanded admission to the congress, and supported this rejection in the commission for verification of mandates, and, on the other hand, the same O.C. suddenly announced at the congress that it was inviting Ryazanov with a consultative vote. This incident played out as follows.
Even before the start of the congress sessions, Martov confidentially informed me that a member of the Iskra organization and a member of the O.C. (let's call this person the letter N) and decided to insist in the O.C. on inviting to the congress with a consultative vote one person whom Martov himself could not characterize other than by the term "deserter" 13). (This person, indeed, leaned towards Iskra for a time, only to later, and within a few weeks, go over to the side of Rabochee Delo, although it was already in a stage of complete decline.) We talked about this with Martov, both indignant that a member of the Iskra organization was taking such a step, knowing, of course* (for Martov had warned comrade N), that this step was a direct blow to Iskra's face, and not considering it necessary to consult with the organization. N did indeed make his proposal to the O.C., but this proposal was rejected, thanks to the heated protest of comrade T, who outlined the entire changeable political figure of the "deserter."
It is characteristic that Martov could no longer then, according to him, even talk to N, despite previous good personal relations: he was so struck by this step. The desire of N to throw a spanner in the works of Iskra [was] also expressed in the reprimand to the Iskra editorial board from the O.C. adopted with his support — a reprimand which, it is true, concerned a very minor case, but nevertheless aroused Martov's particular indignation. 16) Reports from Russia, also conveyed to me by Martov, also indicated a tendency of N to spread rumors of discord between the Iskra émigrés and the Russians. All this set the Iskrists in the most distrustful way towards X, and then such a fact came to hand. The O.C. rejected
*) At this place in the manuscript, a word is crossed out, which has remained un-deciphered. Ed.

2 2 i nil protest of "Borba", members of the Organizing Committee (T and Zh), invited to the commission for verifying credentials, equally spoke both (and N included!!!) against "Borba" in the most decisive way.

Nevertheless, the Organizing Committee suddenly arranged during a break of one *) morning session of the congress, its meeting at the "window" 17) and decided at this meeting to invite Ryazanov with a consultative vote! N was in favor of the invitation. T, of course, was absolutely against it, stating that such a decision of the Organizing Committee was illegal after the question of the composition of the congress had already been transferred to a special commission on verifying credentials, elected by the congress. Of course, the South-Worker members of the Organizing Committee 18) + Bundist 19) + N failed comrade T, and the decision of the Organizing Committee was made.

T informed the editors of Iskra about this decision, which (not in full composition, but with the participation of Martov and Zasulich), of course, decided unanimously to fight the Organizing Committee at the congress, because many Iskrists had already publicly spoken out against "Borba" at the congress, and it was impossible to retreat on this issue.

When the Organizing Committee (in the afternoon session) announced its decision to the congress, 20) T in turn announced his protest. The South-Worker member of the Organizing Committee 21) then attacked T, accusing him of violating discipline (!), because the Organizing Committee had decided not to reveal this at the congress (sic!) **). It is clear that we (Plekhanov, Martov and I) then attacked the Organizing Committee with all our energy, accusing it of restoring imperative mandates, violating the sovereignty of the congress, etc. The congress sided with us, the Organizing Committee was defeated, a resolution was adopted depriving the Organizing Committee, as a collegium, of the right to influence the composition of the congress. 22)

Such was the "incident with the Organizing Committee." Firstly, it finally undermined the political trust of many Iskrists in N (and strengthened trust in T), secondly, it not only proved, but also clearly showed how shaky the Iskra direction still is even in such a central, arch—supposedly—Iskra institution as the Organizing Committee. It became clear that besides the Bundist, there are also in the Organizing Committee 1) South-Workers with their special politics; 23) 2) "Iskrists, ashamed to be Iskrists," 24) and only partly (3) Iskrists who are not ashamed 25).

When the South-Worker members wished to explain themselves to the editors of Iskra (privately, of course) about this sad incident - comrade N, it is very important to note this, expressed not a motda of any desire to explain himself - the editors explained themselves with them, 26) and I directly told the South-Workers that the congress finally revealed this major political fact: the paleness in the party of many Iskrists who are ashamed to be Iskrists, and capable, simply to spite Iskra, of pulling such a trick as inviting Ryazanov.

On the part of N, this trick so outraged me, after N's speech in the commission against Borba, that I publicly said at the congress: "Comrades, who have been to foreign congresses, know what a storm of indignation is always caused there by people who say one thing in commissions and another thing at the congress." 27) Such "Iskrists," who were afraid of Bundist "reproaches" that they were "creatures of Iskra" and only because of this pulled political tricks against Iskra, could not, of course, inspire confidence in themselves.

The general distrust of Iskrists towards N [was sometimes expressed by the fact that this N Iskrists (even Zagorsky [V. N. Krokhmal]... *) This distrust) increased to a great extent when Martov's attempt to explain himself with N led to N's statement about his withdrawal, N, from the Iskra organization!! From that moment on, the "case" about N passes to the Iskra organization, whose members were outraged by such a withdrawal, and the organization had 4 meetings on this issue. 28) These meetings, especially the last one, are extremely important, because in them the split within the Iskrists was finally formed on the question, mainly, of the composition of the Central Committee.

But before moving on to the story of these (private and informal, I repeat once again) meetings of the Iskra organization, I will say about the work of the congress. These works were sung in unison during that time, in the sense of a unified performance by all the Iskrists, both on the 1st item on the agenda (the place of the Bund in the party) and on the 2nd (the program) and on the 3rd (approval of the Central Organ of the party). The agreement of the Iskrists ensured a large united majority at the congress (a compact majority, as the Bundists expressed it with regret!) 29), while the "irresolute" (or "swamp") and the South-Workers also showed themselves here more than once in the pettiness of their instability. The political grouping of [anti-] not entirely Iskra elements of the congress became clearer and clearer.

I return to the meetings of the Iskra organization. At the first meeting, it was decided to ask N for explanations, allowing this N to indicate in what composition of the Iskra organization he, N, wants to explain himself to it. I resolutely protested against such a formulation of the question, demanding the separation of the political question (about the distrust of Iskrists towards N at this congress in the political relation) and the personal question (appointing a commission to investigate the reasons for N's strange behavior). At the 2nd meeting, it was reported that N wants to explain himself without T, although N intends, they say, not to say anything personally about T. I protested a second time, refusing to participate in such an explanation, when a non-member of the organization 30) removes, even for a second, a member, however, not talking about him; I saw in this an unworthy game, and a slap in the face that N was giving the organization: N does not even trust the organization enough to let it determine the conditions of the explanation! At the 3rd meeting, there was an "explanation" by N, an explanation that did not satisfy the majority of the participants in the explanation. The 4th meeting took place with the full composition of all the Iskrists, but this meeting was preceded by a number of important episodes of the congress.

Firstly, it is worth noting the episode with the "equality of languages" 31). The matter concerned the adoption of the program, the formulation of the requirement for equality and equal rights in relation to languages. (Each item of the program was discussed and adopted separately, the Bundists fiercely obstructed it here and almost 2/3 of the congress, in terms of time, was spent on the program!). The Bundists managed here to shake the ranks of the Iskrists, instilling in part of them the idea that Iskra does not want "equality of languages" - whereas in fact the editors of Iskra only did not want this illiterate, in their opinion, absurd and superfluous formulation. The struggle turned out to be desperate, the congress was divided in half into two equal halves (some abstained): on the side of Iskra (and the editors of Iskra) there were about 23 votes (maybe 23-25, I don't remember exactly), and the same number against. 32) The question had to be postponed, handed over to a commission, which found a formula adopted by the whole congress unanimously. The incident with the equality of languages is important because it revealed once again the shakiness of Iskrism, revealed completely the shakiness

*) The word "one" in the manuscript is written above the line and inserted after the word "break".
Red.
**) Sic literally means: so.
This remark, usually, has the meaning of an ironic emphasis: how about that?
Red.

STORY ABOUT THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSS. SOC .-D . L . P.

LENINIST COLLECTION VI

A STORY OF THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY
and irresolute ones (whom, if I am not mistaken, the Iskrists of the Martov type themselves called the swamp even then!) and the *Iuzhno-Rabochists*, who were all against *Iskra*. Passions flared up fiercely, and sharp words were thrown without number against the *Iuzhno-Rabochists* by the Iskrists, especially the Martovites. One “leader” of the Martovites 33) almost went as far as a scandal with the *Iuzhno-Rabochists* during a break, and I hurried then to resume the session (at the insistence of Plekhanov, who feared a fight). It is important to note* that even of these, the most steadfast, 23 Iskrists, the Martovites (i.e., those Iskrists who later followed*) Martov) were in the minority. 34)
Another episode is the struggle over § 1 of the "party statute." This was already point 5 of the *Tagesordnung*, close to the end of the congress. (Resolution against Federalism was adopted on point 1 35); on point 2 – the program; on point 3 – recognition of *Iskra* as the central organ of the party**), on point 4 – hearing of "delegate reports", part of them, and the rest handed over to the commission, 36) because it turned out that the congress no longer had time (funds and personal forces were exhausted).
Point 1 of the statute defines the concept of a party member. In my draft, this definition was as follows: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is considered***) everyone who recognizes its program and supports the party both with material means and with personal participation in one of the party organizations." Martov, however, instead of the underlined words, proposed to say: work under the control and guidance of one of the party organizations. Plekhanov stood for my formulation 40), and the remaining members of the editorial board for Martov's (Axelrod spoke for them at the congress) 41). We argued that it was necessary to narrow the concept of a party member in order to separate those who work from those who chatter, to eliminate organizational chaos, to eliminate such an abomination and such nonsense so that there could be organizations consisting of party members but not being party organizations, etc. 42) Martov stood for the expansion of the party and spoke of a broad class movement requiring a broad – vague – organization, etc. 43) It is curious that almost all of Martov's supporters referred, in defense of their views, to *What Is to Be Done!* 44) Plekhanov vehemently protested against Martov, pointing out that his Jaurèsist formulation opened the doors to opportunists, who were only craving this position in the party and outside the organization. 45)
"Under control and guidance"—I said—"means in reality no more and no less than: without any control and without any guidance." 46)
Martov won a victory here: his formulation was adopted (by a majority of about 28 votes against 23 or thereabouts, I don't remember exactly) 47), thanks to the Bund, which, of course, immediately realized where there was a crack, and with all its [six] five votes pushed through "what is worse" (the delegate from *Rabochee Delo* motivated his vote for Martov precisely in this way!) 48). The heated debates about § 1 of the statute and the ballot once again clarified the political grouping at the congress and showed clearly that the Bund + *Rabochee Delo* could decide the fate of any decision, supporting the minority of Iskrists against the majority.

After the debates and voting on § 1 of the statute, the last (4th) meeting of the *Iskra* organization took place. 49) The disagreement between the Iskrists on the issue of the composition of the Central Committee became fully apparent and caused a split in their ranks: some stood for an Iskra Central Committee (in view of the dissolution of the *Iskra* Organization and the *Emancipation of Labour* Group and the need to complete the *Iskra* cause), others – for the admission of *Iuzhno-Rabochists* and for the predominance of Iskrists of the "zigzag line." Some were absolutely against the candidacy of N, others for. In order to make a final attempt to come to an agreement, this meeting of 46 was convened (members

A STORY OF THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY
of the *Iskra* organization, counting, I repeat, even advisory votes). The voting gave the following results: against N – 9 votes, for – 4, the rest abstained. 50) Then the majority, still not wanting war with the minority, proposed a list of reconciliation, of 5 persons, including 1 *Iuzhno-Rabochist* (pleasing to the minority) and one militant member of the minority, the rest being consistent Iskrists (of whom—and this is important—one participated in the congress brawl only at the end of it and was actually impartial, and two did not participate in the brawls at all and were absolutely impartial in the personal question. 51)) For this list, [II] 10 hands were raised (then another one was added and it became 11), against – 1 (only one Martov!), the rest abstained! The conciliatory list, therefore, was thwarted by Martov. After that, 2 more "militant" lists of one and the other side were voted on, but both gathered only a minority of votes. 52)
Thus, in the last meeting of the *Iskra* organization, the Martovites remained in the minority on both issues, and yet they declared war when one member of the majority (impartial or chairman) 53) went to them after the meeting to make a last attempt at an agreement.

The calculation of the Martovites was clear and correct: the Bundists and Rabocheedeltsy would undoubtedly support the list of the zigzag line, because during a month of congress sessions all the questions had become so clear, all the personalities had been so outlined, that not a single member of the congress would have difficulty in choosing: what is better or which of the evils is the lesser. And for the Bund + *Rabochee Delo*, of course, zigzag Iskrists were the lesser evil and always will be.

After the meeting of the 16, when the Iskrists finally parted ways and war between them was declared, the meetings of the two parties into which the congress split begin, i.e., private unofficial rendezvous of all like-minded people. Iskrists of the consistent line gathered first in a number of 9 (9 out of 16), then 15, finally [22] 24,54) counting decisive votes, not persons. Such rapid growth was explained by the fact that lists (of the Central Committee) had already begun to circulate, and the Martovites' lists repelled the vast majority of Iskrists immediately and irrevocably, as flabby lists: the candidates promoted by Martov had proven themselves at the congress in an absolutely negative way (wavering, inconsistency, tactlessness, *etc.*). 55) This is, first of all; secondly, the explanation to the Iskrists of what was happening in the Iskra organization attracted them en masse to the side of the majority, and Martov's inability to maintain a definite political line became clear to one and all. Therefore, 21 votes rallied easily and quickly around consistent Iskra tactics, around the list to the Central Committee, 56) around the choice of a troika for the editorial board 57) (instead of confirming the old, unworkable, and diffuse six).

The Congress at this time finished discussing the statute, with Martov and Co. once again (and not even once, but several times) defeating the majority of Iskraites with the noble assistance of the Bund and Rabocheye Delo — for example, on the issue of co-option into the centers (this issue was decided by the congress in the spirit of Martov.**)

Despite this spoilage of the statute, the entire statute as a whole was adopted by all Iskraites and the entire congress. But after the general statute, they moved on to the Bund statute, and the congress rejected by an overwhelming majority of votes the Bund's proposal (to recognize the Bund as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in the party*). It seems that the Bund alone stood almost against the entire congress. 59) Then the Bundists left the congress, declaring their withdrawal from the party. 60) Martov's supporters lost five of their faithful allies! Then the Rabocheye Delo-ites also left, when the Foreign League of Russian Revolutionary Social Democracy was recognized as the only party organization abroad. Martov's supporters lost another 2 of their faithful allies! In total, there were 44 (51 — 7) decisive votes at the congress, and the majority of consistent Iskraites (24) came from them; the coalition of Martovites with the Southern Workers and with the "bog" together gave only 20 votes. 61)

The zigzag line of the Iskraites had to submit — as the Iskraites submitted, without a single word, to the firm line when Martov beat and defeated them with a coalition with the Bund. But the Martovites had already gone so far that, instead of submitting, they resorted to scandal and schism.

The scandal was the raising of the question of the confirmation of the old editorial board, for the declaration of even one editor is enough for the congress to be obliged to consider the entire question of the composition of the C.O. [Central Organ], without limiting itself to simple confirmation. A step towards schism was the refusal to elect the C.O. and C.C. [Central Committee].

*) The words "in the party" in the manuscript were originally placed before the words "Jewish proletariat" and then moved by the author to the end of the sentence. Ed.

First, about the election of the editorial board. In the Tagesordnung, as was indicated above, it was under item 21: election of the central institutions of the party. And in my commentary on the Tagesordnung (this commentary was known to all Iskraites long before the congress and to all members of the congress) it was written in the margins: election of 5 to the C.O. and 3 to the C.C. 62) Consequently, there is no doubt that the demand to elect a troika came from the depths of the editorial board and was not protested by anyone from the editorial board. 63) Even Martov and another leader of the Martovites 6S) defended these "two troikas" to a whole series of delegates even before the congress.

Personally, a few weeks before the congress, I declared to Starover and Martov that I would demand the election of the editorial board at the congress; I agreed to the election of 2 troikas, with the understanding that the editorial troika would either co-opt 7 (or even more) people, or remain alone (the latter possibility was specifically stipulated by me). Starover even said directly that the troika meant: Plekhanov + Martov + Lenin, and I agreed with him, — to such an extent it was clear to everyone and always that only such people as leaders could be elected. One had to get angry, offended, and lose one's head after the struggle at the congress in order to begin retroactively to attack the expediency and efficiency of the troika. The old six was so inefficient that it never once gathered in full force in three years — it's unbelievable, but it's a fact. Not one of the 45 issues of Iskra was compiled (in the editorial-technical sense of the word) by anyone other than Martov or Lenin. And never was a major theoretical question raised by anyone other than Plekhanov. Axelrod did not work at all (zero articles in Zarya and 3-4 in all 45 issues of Iskra). Zasulich and Starover limited themselves to cooperation and advice, never doing purely editorial work. Who should be chosen as political leaders, to the center — this was as clear as day to every member of the congress, after its month-long work.

Transferring the question of confirming the old editorial board to the congress was a ridiculous provocation for a scandal.

Ridiculous, because it was pointless. Even if the six had been confirmed, one member of the editorial board (I, for example) would have demanded a reorganization of the collegium, an analysis of its internal relations, and the congress would have been obliged to start the matter anew.

Provoking a scandal, because non-confirmation should have been understood as an insult, — whereas re-election did not include anything offensive in itself. They elect the C.C., — let them elect the C.O. There is no talk of confirming the O.K., — let there be no talk of confirming the old...*) editorial board either.

But it is understandable that, by demanding confirmation, the Martovites provoked a protest at the congress, the protest was perceived as an insult, offense, ousting, removal... [(and the composition of all the horrors that now feed the fantasy of idle gossips began!)]**)

The editorial board left the congress during the discussion of the question of election or confirmation. After desperately passionate debates, the congress decided: the old editorial board is not confirmed.***)

Only after this decision did the former members of the editorial board enter the hall. Martov then gets up and refuses to be elected for himself and his colleagues, saying all sorts of terrible and pathetic words about the "state of siege in the party" (for unelected ministers?), about "exceptional laws against individuals and groups" (of the sort of people who, on behalf of Iskra, present it with Ryazanov and say one thing in the commission, another at the congress?).66)

I answered him, pointing out the incredible confusion of political concepts, leading to a protest against the election, against the reorganization by the congress of the collegiums of [his] party officials.

The elections gave: Plekhanov, Martov, Lenin. Martov refused again. Koltsov (who had 3 votes) also refused. The Congress then adopted a resolution instructing the two members of the C.O. editorial board to co-opt a 3rd member when they find a suitable person.

After that, three members of the Central Committee were elected, and only one of them was named to the congress*) as the teller of ballots, — and also a fifth member of the Party Council was elected (secretly, by ballot) 68).

The Martovites and all the "bog" after them did not submit ballots and submitted a written statement about this to the bureau.

This was a clear step towards schism, towards disrupting the congress, towards non-recognition of the party. But when one Southern Worker directly stated* that he doubted (sic!) the legality of the congress's decisions, Martov was ashamed and refuted him, stating publicly that he did not doubt the legality of the decisions. 69)

*) In this place in the manuscript, several words have been crossed out that have remained unreadable. Ed.

**) The end of the paragraph, starting with the words: "and the composition began," in the manuscript is taken in pencil brackets and crossed out in pencil as well. Ed.

***) One Martovite delivered such a speech at the same time that one delegate shouted to the secretary after it: instead of a period, put tears in the minutes!®5). The most "boggy" people defended the old editorial board especially fervently.

A STORY ABOUT THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY
Unfortunately, Martov's deeds and actions (and those of the Martovites) did not correspond to these good and loyal elephants...
The Congress then submitted to the "protocol commission" the question of publishing the protocols and adopted 11 tactical resolutions:
1) on demonstrations.
2) » professional movement.
3) » work among sectarianism.
4) » » » student youth.
5) » conduct during interrogations.
6) » Factory foremen.
7) » international congress of 1904 in Amsterdam.
8) » liberals (Starover).
9) » liberals (Plekhanov).
10) » Socialists-Revolutionaries.
11) » party literature.
Then the congress was closed by the chairman after a brief speech reminding everyone of the binding nature of the congress decisions.70)
Examining the behavior of the Martovites after the congress, their refusal to cooperate (which the editorial staff of the Central Organ officially requested of them), their refusal to work for the Central Committee,71) their propaganda of boycott - I can only say that this is an insane, unworthy [of honest] *) members of the party attempt to tear the party apart... because of what? Only because of dissatisfaction with the composition of the centers, because objectively we only diverged on this, and subjective assessments (like offense, insult, ejection, removal, staining etc. etc.) are the fruit of offended vanity and sick fantasy.
This sick fantasy and offended vanity lead directly to the most shameful gossip, when,
n o t knowing and n o t seeing yet the activity of the new centers, they spread rumors about their "incapacity", about Ivan Ivanovich's "iron gloves", about Ivan Nikiforovich's "fist", etc.
Proving the "incapacity" of the centers by boycotting them is an unprecedented and unheard-of violation of party duty, and no sophistry can hide this: a boycott is a path to the rupture of the party.
*) Crossed out in pencil.
Ed.

Russian social democracy has to go through the last difficult transition to partisanship from parochialism, to the awareness of revolutionary duty from philistinism, to discipline from acting through gossip and parochial pressure.
Whoever values party work and the cause for the benefit of the social-democratic labor movement will not allow such жалкие sophisms as a "legitimate" and "loyal" boycott of the centers, will not allow the cause to suffer and work to stop because of the dissatisfaction of a dozen people that they and their friends did not get into the centers *), - will not allow officials of the party to be influenced privately and secretly by threatening non-cooperation, by boycott, by cutting off funds, by gossip and false stories.
1) The numbers in parentheses, showing the number of delegates at the congress with 1 vote and the number of delegates with 2 decisive votes, differ somewhat from the exact personal data of this kind from Vladimir Ilyich himself in his post-congress summary of the composition of the II Congress (see above "Composition of the Congress", pp. 190-192) and with the data of the congress protocols ("Protocols", pp. 365-366). The data from both sources completely coincide and show that at the congress there were not 33, but 35 delegates with 1 decisive vote, not 9, but 8 delegates with 2 votes, and finally, the total number of delegates with the right to vote was not 42, but 43. The reason for this discrepancy has not been clarified.
2) According to the sources mentioned in note 1, there were not 10, but more people with advisory votes at the congress: according to Vladimir Ilyich's summary of the composition of the II Congress mentioned above, there were 12 of them (see above p. 191), and according to the congress protocols - even 14 ("Protocols", p. 366).
3) According to the information indicated in notes 1 and 2, the total number of participants in the congress was not 52 people, as indicated in this document, but 55 (according to Vladimir Ilyich's summary mentioned above) or 57 (according to the "Protocols" of the congress).
4) The personal composition of these groups is fully given in Vladimir Ilyich's summary "Composition of the Congress" mentioned above (above, pp. 191-192).
5) The II Congress of the RSDLP had 37 sessions.
6) For more details about this incident, see note 31 below.
*) The words: "they and their friends did not get into the centers" in the manuscript are crossed out in pencil and replaced by the following words: "not those people whom they had in mind got into the centers", written in pencil by an unknown hand above the crossed-out text.
Ed.

A STORY ABOUT THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY
7) The Credentials Committee was elected at the 1st session of the congress after hearing the report of the Organizing Committee in the following composition: L. G. Deich, Sablina (N. K. Krupskaya), V. I. Lenin, Yudin (P. L. Aizenshtadt) and Koltsov (V. A. Ginzburg) ("Protocols" of the congress, p. 24). P. L. Aizenshtadt was a Bundist in the committee. The Credentials Committee had one session from the evening and into the night of July 30-31 (between the 1st and 2nd sessions of the congress).
8) See also Martov's proposal in Lenin's report at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League", Geneva, 1904, p. 44).
9) See also Lenin's proposal there.
10) Comrade T is Pavlovich (P. A. Krasikov).
11) P. A. Krasikov received 18 votes against 12 cast for the "Yuzhno-Rabochist" V. N. Rozanov (see above "Diary of Sessions" of the congress, p. 87).
12) Vladimir Ilyich speaks a lot about the "family" ways of settling affairs and arising disagreements in the editorial office of "Iskra" before the congress in the above-mentioned letters to A. M. Kalmykova and A. I. Potresov (see above, pp. 205 and 216).
13) Vladimir Ilyich told more about this meeting of members of the "Iskra" organization before the congress in his report at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress of the League", Geneva, ed. 1901, p. 44).
14) The member of the "Iskra" organization and member of the Organizing Committee, designated here by Vladimir Ilyich by the letter N, is E. M. Alexandrova (according to the congress protocols - Shtein).
15) There is reason to believe that here we are talking about a member of the "Bor'ba" group Yu. M. Steklov.
Yu. M. Steklov (born 1873) (Nevzorov) - a social democrat, initially adhering to the "Emancipation of Labor" Group and collaborating in "Iskra", after the split of the foreign Social Democrats at the second congress of the "Union of Russian Social Democrats Abroad" in April 1900, who, together with Ryazanov and the "Bor'ba" group they founded, took a conciliatory position towards the Rabochedelets; S. participated in the revolutionary labor movement from the beginning of the 90s; in 1893-94 he worked on creating a labor social-democratic organization in Odessa; at the end of January 1894 he was arrested and received 10 years of exile in Eastern Siberia; in 1899 he escaped from exile and at the beginning of 1900 he emigrated abroad, where he joined the "Emancipation of Labor" Group and for the first time collaborated in "Iskra"; in April 1900 he participated as a delegate from the "Emancipation of Labor" Group at the second congress of the "Union of Russian Social Democrats" in Geneva; after the split at the congress of the "Union", together with Ryazanov, he began to organize a special social-democratic group "Bor'ba", which claimed to "unite all social-democratic forces willing to stand on the ground of revolutionary Marxism", starting with supporters of the "Emancipation of Labor" Group and the revolutionary social-democratic organization "Social-Democrat" organized by it and ending with the Rabochedelets - "economists"; after a meeting with the editorial board of "Iskra" in the summer of 1900, not satisfied with the proposals of the editorial board of "Iskra" about the nature of his work in "Iskra", he completely moved away from participating in "Iskra"; during the revolution of 1905, he stood on a position close to Bolshevism, and practically worked together with the Bolsheviks; subsequently he collaborated in Bolshevik organs - in "So cial-Democrate," in "Prosveshchenie," in "Mysl'," in "Pravda": in 1917,
he collaborated in "Novaia Zhizn'," during the Kornilov days he joined the communist party; after the October Revolution he was appointed editor of
"Izvestiia," in which position he remained until the end of June 19*25.
16) Before the start of the congress, in the O.K. at the initiative of the representative from the Bund
(K. Portnoi) and with the support of E. M. Aleksandrova, the question was raised
about one action of the "Iskra" editorial board, in which the members of the O.K. saw
improper use of the name of the O.K. without its knowledge or consent. This
action consisted in the fact that the "Iskra" editorial board transferred a sum of money to the German social democrats for the elections on its own behalf and on behalf of the O.K., without
receiving prior permission from it. On this matter, in the O.K. a resolution was adopted, in the words of Vladimir Ilyich, to
reprimand the editorial board, and in the words of Martov — to express regret.
See more about this in Lenin's report (Collected Works, vol. IV, p. 908) and
in Martov's co-report at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols"
of the League, Geneva, 1904, pp. 45 and 55).
17) The extraordinary meeting of the O.K. on the question of inviting the "Bor'ba" group to the congress
took place at the 2nd (morning) session of the congress (above,
pp. 89 and 110. "Diary of sessions" of the congress and note 23 to it, as well as
"Protocols," p. 34). About this meeting of the O.K. at the "window," Lenin and Martov
speak in their reports at the 2nd Congress of the League ("Protocols of the 2nd Congress
of the League," Geneva, 1904, pp. 45, 46 and 56). The most detailed account is given by
Pavlovich (P. A. Krasikov) in his "Letter to
Comrades about the Second Congress of the R.S.-D.R.P." (Collected Works of V.I. Lenin, vol. V, pp.
526-527).
18) The Yuzhnorabochii members of the O.K. who participated in this meeting
at the "window" were V. N. Rozanov (according to the congress protocols — Popov) and E. Ia.
Levin (according to the protocols, Egorov).
19)
The Bundist member of the O.K. is K. Portnoi (according to the congress protocols —
Abramson).
20) This statement on behalf of the O.K. at the 3rd session of the congress was made
by member of the O.K. V. N. Rozanov ("Protocols," p. 38).
21) The Yuzhnorabochii member of the O.K. who spoke on this issue
against P. A. Krasikov was E. Ia. Levin (according to the congress protocols — Egorov)
("Protocols," p. 39).
22) See the debate on the statement of the O.K. at the 3rd session of the congress and
the adoption of a resolution ("Protocols," pp. 38-44).
23) The Yuzhnorabochii members in the O.K. are V. N. Rozanov and E. Ia. Levin.
Their "special policy," among other things, was formulated by E. Ia. Levin
in his speech against I. A. Krasikov at the 3rd session of the congress as follows: "The O.K. adopted this decision [on inviting Riazanov. Ed.] not because
it has changed its attitude towards the "Bor'ba" group, but because it wants
to remove unnecessary obstacles on the path of the future central organization
of the Party in the first steps of its activity." ("Protocols," p. 39.)
24) "An Iskraite ashamed to be an Iskraite" is E. M. Aleksandrova.
25) "An Iskraite not ashamed" is P. A. Krasikov.
26) More detailed information about this explanation of the Yuzhnorabochii
members of the O.K. with the "Iskra" editorial board is not available.

ACCOUNT OF THE II CONGRESS OF THE R.S.-D.R.P.
27) This was said by Lenin in his speech after the second speech
of Egorov (E. Ia. Levin) at the 3rd session of the congress in the debate on the statement
of the O.K. ("Protocols," pp. 40-41).
28) Vladimir Ilyich speaks in more detail about these four meetings of the members of the "Iskra" organization
during the congress here below, dwelling separately on each meeting. Also, in his report at the
2nd Congress of the League, Vladimir Ilyich notes that "during all four
meetings of the "Iskra" organization, debates were held about comrade NN, to whom
a part of the Iskraites wanted to express political distrust..." ("Protocols of the
2nd Congress of the League," Geneva 1904, p. 49.)
29) The expression "compact majority" addressed to the Iskraite
majority of the congress belongs to the delegate of the Foreign Committee of the Bund
Kossovskii (according to the protocols — Hofmann, at the congress — Shvartsman). This
expression was used by him in his speech at the 6th session of the congress on the issue
of the Bund's place in the Party, in which he stated: "From the very beginning of the congress,
a compact majority was formed, which acted towards us as a party." ("Protocols," p. 80.) Lenin in his subsequent
speech at the same session of the congress regarding these words replied:...
"... we should not be ashamed, but proud that there is a compact
majority at the congress." And further in his speech, almost the entire
first paragraph is devoted to this topic ("Protocols," p. 83).
30) E. M.
Aleksandrova had by this time left the "Iskra" organization.
31) The episode with "equality of languages" took place at the 10th and 17th sessions
of the congress and was finally resolved at the 21st session of the congress.
During the discussion of the program by points at the 16th session, a dispute arose
around § 7 (§ 6 according to the draft of "Iskra" and "Zaria") of the political part of the
program, which in the wording of the program commission read: "Abolition
of estates and full equality of all citizens, regardless of gender,
religion, race, nationality and language." The commission's wording of this
paragraph differed from the original draft of the "Iskra" and
"Zaria" editorial board (see "Lenin Miscellany" II, p. 156) by the addition of the last two
words: "nationality and language." In connection with this point, a dispute
erupted: the opposition on this issue, led by the delegates of the Bund, demanded
the inclusion in the program of a special point on the equality of languages.
This demand caused great confusion even in the ranks of the supporters of the
"Iskra" organization, and a significant part of them spoke and voted for
the need to specially emphasize the demand for equality of languages.
In the 16th session, after a series of votes on other amendments, the
amendment of Kostrov (N. Zhordania) to § 7 was adopted in the form of a special addition
of a separate paragraph on the equality of languages ("Protocols" of the congress, p. 160). In the 17th
session, when voting on the entire point as a whole, together with the Zhordania
amendment, it was rejected, and heated debates arose again on the question of
what to do with this paragraph. It was unanimously decided to hand it over to the commission.
But on the question of the purpose of the transfer to the commission and on the question of to which commission to transfer it (to the previous program commission or
to a special one), the votes were sharply divided into two parts. By a majority of 1 vote
(26 against 25), Martynov's proposal was adopted: "to transfer for

LLLSHNSKIN COLLECTION
of editing and agreement of individual parts” — against Lenin's proposal: “to transfer the paragraph to the commission without special instructions.” Among others, 3 supporters of the "Iskra" organization, delegates from the Caucasus (6 votes), voted for Martynov's proposal. By a majority of 27 votes against 24, it was decided to transfer § 7 to the old program commission. This last vote, after all the struggle, was an expression of confidence in the commission, which, by a majority of its members (Plekhanov, Lenin, Axelrod, Potresov), represented the editorial board of "Iskra" and "Zarya", — thereby it was a vote of confidence in the ideological center of the Iskra or 1annization. (Details of the struggle in the 17th meeting around § 7 — see in the "Protocols" of the congress, pp. 161 - 16*2.)

82)
In three votes on the point about equal rights of languages in the 16th and 17th meetings, the votes were divided as follows: 1) on Liber's (Goldman's) proposal: “to create a special paragraph on equal rights of languages” — they voted (both simply and by name) 23 for and 23 against; among those who voted for Liber's proposal were 4 Iskra members (3 delegates from the Caucasus and a delegate from the St. Petersburg Committee Gorsky (A. Shotman), — a total of 7 votes) and 1 — L. G. Deich abstained; 2) for Zhordania's amendment in the 16th meeting, see above, footnote 31) in the roll-call vote: 24 — for and 23 — against (3 Caucasian delegates and L. G. Deich again voted for the amendment from among the Iskra members — a total of 7 votes); when voting on § 7 as a whole (together with Zhordania's amendment) in the 17th meeting of the congress, the votes were divided: 24 — for and 24 — against.

*) It is not clear who exactly is being referred to here.

*4) Of the 23 votes of the Iskra members, who consistently voted firmly during the episode with "equal rights of languages" (see "Protocols" of the congress, pp. 160 and 161), the Iskra members of the "soft line" (the "Martovites") had only 7 votes (S. Zborovsky — from Odessa, M. S. Makadzyub from the Crimean Union, V. N. Krokhmal — from Ufa, L. D. Trotsky — from the Siberian Union and Yu. O. Martov — a total of 5 people).

85) Martov's resolution on the place of the Bund in the Party ("Protocols", p. 11).

8e) Tagesordnung (agenda) of the congress, compiled by V. I. Lenin, see in his "Program of the II Ordinary Congress of the R.S.-D.R.P." cited above (pp. 56 — 60).

87)
The Rabocheye Delo member, whom Vladimir Ilyich mentions here, was Akimov (V. P. Makhnovets). He disputed the placing of the question of the Central Organ of the party in point 3 when discussing the agenda of the congress at the 2nd meeting. He also spoke 6 times at the 10th meeting of the congress with objections against recognizing "Iskra" as the Central Organ of the party, and he is also the author of the question mentioned by Vladimir Ilyich: “Who are we confirming? the title, or what? we don't even know the editorial board!” ("Protocols", pp. 127 — 129 and 134.) As for the indicated response of Martov to Akimov, there is no trace of this speech by Martov in the "Protocols".

When discussing the agenda of the congress at the 2nd meeting, Martov, answering Akimov, says the following: "Point three of the list speaks only about the appointment of the organ, and the organizational relations between the c. o. and c. c. should be considered separately when discussing the question of the organization of the Party in general." In the protocol of the 10th meeting, when the very question of the Central Organ was discussed, only one speech by Martov is noted

A STORY ABOUT THE II CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY
with a proposal to cancel the decision of the 1st congress on the recognition of "Rabochaya Gazeta" as the Central Organ of the Party. As for the objections to Akimov at the 10th meeting, a whole series of delegates spoke with such objections, including L. D. Trotsky, whose answer to Akimov in content largely corresponds to the tone of the speech that Vladimir Ilyich attributed to Martov ("Protocols", pp. 131 — 132).

88)
In the protocol records of Martov's speeches at the II Congress after the discussion of the question of the Central Organ, the expression: “former members of the editorial board of «Iskra»” is not found at all. Apparently, when editing the protocols, Martov omitted those places where he used this expression.

89) The hearing of part of the delegates' reports was devoted to the 11th, 12th and 13th meetings of the congress, during which the congress heard the reports of the following 11 organizations: the Bund, the Baku and Saratov committees, the Union of Mining and Factory Workers, the Russian organization "Iskra", the "Southern Worker" group, the Don, Yekaterinoslav, Tula, Tver and Moscow committees. The reports of the remaining organizations were considered only in the commission for reviewing reports according to the congress's resolution at the 10th meeting ("Protocols", p. 136). This commission was elected with V. N. Krokhmal, V. I. Zasulich and V. N. Rozanova ("Protocols" of the congress, p. 10).

40) See Plekhanov's speech at the 23rd meeting of the congress for Lenin's formulation of § 1 of the charter in the "Protocols", pp. 226 — 227.

41) Axelrod spoke twice in the debate on § 1 of the charter at the 22nd meeting of the congress ("Protocols", pp. 220 and 224).

42) All the provisions briefly indicated here by Lenin were developed by him in his two speeches on § 1 of the charter at the 22nd and 23rd meetings of the congress ("Protocols", pp. 222 and 230 — 232).

43) Martov also spoke twice on § 1 of the charter: at the 22nd and 23rd meetings of the congress ("Protocols", pp. 220 and 226).

44) In the protocol records of the speeches of Martov's supporters on § 1 of the charter, direct references to "What is to be Done?" have not been preserved. Apparently, these references were eliminated by the speakers when editing the protocols. According to the report of Vladimir Ilyich, it is fully confirmed by Martynov in his speech at the 22nd meeting of the congress, which begins with the following words: "We have to observe a strange picture. Comrades, who defend Martov's resolution, which expands the framework of our party, refer in their argumentation to Lenin's pamphlet "What is to be Done?" ("Protocols", p. 224).

46) This passage of Plekhanov's speech is formulated in the protocol record as follows: "Workers who want to join the Party will not be afraid to join the organization. They are not afraid of discipline. Many intellectuals, thoroughly imbued with bourgeois individualism, will be afraid to join it. But that's good. These bourgeois individualists are usually also representatives of all kinds of opportunism. We must distance them from ourselves. Lenin's project can serve as a bulwark against their invasions into the Party, and for this reason alone all opponents of opportunism should vote for it.” ("Protocols", p. 227.)

4в) In the protocol record of Lenin's speech at the 23rd meeting of the congress, this passage is formulated as follows: "In fact... the words "under the control and leadership" stvo" will lead to the absence of both control and guidance. Never will the C.C. be able to extend real control to all those working but not belonging to the organizations." ("Protocols," p. 232.)
47) Lenin's formulation was rejected (by roll-call vote) by 28 votes to 23. Those voting in favor: 19 votes from Iskra-ites — Bekov (A. G. Zurabov from Batum 2 votes), Gusev (from Rostov-on-Don), Osipov (R. S. Zemlyachka — from Odessa), Pavlovich (P. A. Krasikov — from Kyiv), Stepanov (Andrey — from Kyiv), Sorokin (N. E. Bauman — from Moscow), Lyadov (from Saratov), Gorin (from Saratov), Muravyov (Petukhov — from Ufa), Lange (A. M. Stopani) and Dedov (L. M. Knipovich — both from the Northern Union), Orlov (Malkin — from Yekaterinoslav), Gorsky (A. Shotman — from St. Petersburg), Plekhanov, Lenin (2 votes), Hertz (D. I. Ulyanov) and Braun (Stepanov — both from Tula); 2 votes from "Southern Laborites" — Egorov (E. Ya. Levin) and Medvedev (L. V. Nikolaev — from Kharkiv); 1 vote from "Kolot" — Tsarev (A. S. Lokerman — from Rostov-on-Don); 1 vote from an Economists — Brooker (L. P. Makhnovets — from St. Petersburg).

Martov's formulation was adopted by 28 votes to 22. Of the 23 who voted for Lenin's formulation, Orlov (Malkin) abstained during the vote on Martov's formulation. The following voted against Lenin's formulation and for Martov's formulation: 14 votes from Iskra-ites — Rusov (B. M. Knunyants) and Karsky (Topuridze — both from the Caucasus — 2 votes each), Kostich (S. Zborovsky — from Odessa), Panin (M. S. Makadzyub — from Crimea 2 votes), Fomin (V. I. Krokhmal — from Ufa), Trotsky and Posadovsky (Mandelberg — both from the Siberian Union), Lensky (Vilensky — from Yekaterinoslav), Deich, Martov (2 votes); 5 votes from the "Swamp" — Makhov (D. P. Kalafati from Nikolaev — 2 votes), Lvov (I. N. Moshinsky — from the Mining Union — 2 votes), Belov (L. S. Zeitlin — from Moscow); 2 votes from "Southern Laborites" — Ivanov (E. S. Levina — from Kharkiv), Popov (V. N. Rozanov); 2 votes from "Economists" — Akimov (V. P. Makhnovets) and Martynov; 5 votes from the Bund (the entire delegation) ("Protocols" of the congress, p. 234).
48) The Economist Akimov (Makhnovets), in both his speeches on § 1 of the charter in the 22nd and 23rd sessions of the congress, repeats this motivation for his vote for Martov's formulation.

In the first speech, he says: "I join the formulation given by Martov, not because it accurately defines the relationship between the Party and the organization that I desire, but only because it takes a step forward towards a correct solution to the question." ("Protocols," p. 225.) In the second speech, Akimov twice motivates his support for Martov's formulation. At the beginning of the speech, he says: "Comrade Martov and Lenin are arguing which [formulation] better achieves their common goal; I and Brooker want to choose the one that achieves the goal less. In this regard, I choose Martov's formulation." At the end of the speech, he repeats the same thing in a different way: "If Comrade Lenin finds that Martov's text is not such an important worsening of that plan, then I recognize it as, although not a very large, but still an improvement." ("Protocols," pp. 233 and 234.)
49) Below, Vladimir Ilyich indicates that at the 4th meeting of the "Iskra" organization there were 16 people from among the congress participants (including

A STORY OF THE II CONGRESS OF THE R. S.-D. L. P.
and persons with the right to a consultative vote). P. A. Krasikov, in a "Letter to Comrades about the II Congress of the R. S.-D. L. P.," personally lists these members of the "Iskra" organization present at the congress: 9 Iskra-ites of the "hard line" — Plekhanov, Lenin, Krupskaya (consultative vote), D. I. Ulyanov (Tula Committee), Zemlyachka (Odessa Committee), Knipovich (Northern Union), Bauman (Moscow Committee), Noskov (consultative vote), Krasikov (Kyiv Committee) and 7 Iskra-ites of the "soft line" — Martov, Axelrod (consultative vote), Zasulich (consultative), Potresov (consultative), Deich, Trotsky (Siberian Union), Krokhmal (Ufa Committee) (Collected Works of Lenin, vol. V, p. 529). The remark with which Lenin accompanies the mention of the 4th meeting of the "Iskra" organization (above, p. 226 and this remark make it possible to establish the time of this meeting: it took place after the debates and voting on § 1 of the charter, i.e., after the 23rd session of the congress, i.e., either in the evening of the 15th or in the morning of August 16th, old style. In addition, the first of these remarks (p. 226) indicates that the first three meetings of the members of the "Iskra" organization as a whole took place before the episode with "equal rights for languages," before its beginning at the 16th session of the congress, i.e., before August 12th, old style.
50) Plekhanov, Lenin, Krupskaya, D. I. Ulyanov, Zemlyachka, Knipovich, Bauman, Noskov, Krasikov were against the candidacy of N (E. M. Aleksandrova). As for the remaining votes, Martov was among the 4 who voted in favor, but it was not possible to accurately determine who was for, who abstained regarding the other Martovites.
51) The personal composition of the conciliatory list put forward by Lenin and the "hard" majority of the meeting of 16 was as follows: "Southern Laborite (pleasing to the minority)" — V. N. Rozanov, "combative member of the minority" — L. D. Trotsky, the rest — "consistent Iskra-ites," "participated in the congress brawl only at the end of it" — V. A. Noskov, "two who did not participate in the brawls" — F. V. Lengnik and G. M. Krzhizhanovsky. Both of the latter were not present at the congress (see also Collected Works, vol. V, pp. 485 and 528 — 529).
52) The "combative" lists of both sides were: 1) the list of "hard" Iskra-ites — Krzhizhanovsky, Popov (Rozanov), Noskov, 2) the list of "soft" (or Martovites) — Rozanov, Trotsky, Noskov (Collected Works, vol. V, p. 402, as well as 374).
53) "Member of the majority (impartial or chairman)" was V. A. Noskov.
54) The personal composition of the group of 20 "hard" Iskra-ites with 24 decisive votes is given in Lenin's post-congress summary of the composition of the congress (see above, pp. 191 — 192).
55) The following lists of Martovites circulated at the congress: 1) the "combative" list of three, given in footnote 52; 2) the list, opposed to the "conciliatory" list of the majority of the "Iskra" organization (footnote 51) numbering five — V. N. Rozanov, L. D. Trotsky, V. I. Krokhmal, V. A. Noskov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky; 3) the list that later served as a reason on the part of Martov to accuse Gusev of spreading false information (see "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," appendix "The Incident of Comrade Gusev with Comrade Deich," Collected Works, vol. V, p. 484),—Lenin Collection VI

LKSH SH COLLECTION
This list is also from five — V. N. Rozanov, L. D. Trotsky, V. I. Krokhmal, E. M. Aleksandrova and E. Ya. Levin. Vladimir Ilyich's words: “The candidates put forward by Martov have proven themselves at the congress from an absolutely negative side (wavering, inconsistency, tactlessness etc.)” — refer,
mainly, to the two last candidacies of this third list.
6b) The "Combat" list in the C.C. from the "hardliners" see above in note 52.
After V. N. Rozanov's refusal, ittn in the list of "hardliners" he was replaced by F. V. Lengnik.
67) The "Troika" to the editorial board of the C.O., carried out by the majority of Iskra supporters, was: Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov. The editorial board of the C.O. was elected in this composition at the 31st meeting of the congress ("Protocols, ed. 1924, p. 308).
58) The question of co-option to the centers during the discussion of § 12 of the Charter consisted in the fact that Lenin put forward a proposal that co-option to the C.C. and to the editorial board of the C.O. be carried out by each center with the consent of the other center (mutual co-option), while Martov and his supporters stood for the independence of each center from each other and objected to mutual co-option. At the 27th meeting of the congress, Martov's proposal: "To throw out the point about mutual co-option" - was adopted by 26 votes against 24. Lenin's further amendment to the point about co-option - on the admissibility of co-option to the centers "only with the consent of all members of the Party Soviet" - was rejected by a roll-call vote by 27 votes against 22, but the list of those who voted has not been preserved in the protocols of the congress. Finally, Martov's amendment on transferring the question of co-option, in the absence of unanimity, to the Party Soviet and, in the event of cassation in the Soviet, on the subsequent decision of the question by a simple majority was adopted by 24 votes against 23 (see this moment in "Protocols", pp. 258 - 259).
b9)
The proposal of the Bund, which is being discussed here, was Formulated in § 2 of the amended charter of the Bund, submitted by the Bund delegation at the 7th meeting of the congress as a result of the debate on the place of the Bund in the party. This paragraph read: "The Bund is a social-democratic organization of the Jewish proletariat, unlimited in its activities by any regional cancers, and is part of the Party as its sole representative" ("Protocols", p. 90). At the 27th meeting of the congress, during the discussion of the question of the Bund on the point on national organizations, this proposal of the Bund was rejected by 41 votes against 5 with 5 abstentions. Only the Bund delegation (5 votes) voted for the proposal (§ 2 of the Bund's charter), D. P. Kalafati (2 votes) and Rabochedelets - A. S. Martynov, V. P. and L. P. Makhnovets ("Protocols", p. 267, note) abstained.
®°) The Bund delegation made its statement about leaving the congress and the Bund's withdrawal from the party immediately after the indicated vote on § 2 of the Bund's charter ("Protocols", pp. 2 6 7 - 268).
6l)
The coalition of Martovites (9 votes) with other opportunist groups at the congress after the departure of the Bundists (5 votes) and the Rabochedelets (2 votes) covered the "Southern Laborites" (4 votes), the "swamp" (6 votes) and the Rabochedelets L. I. Makhnovets (1 vote). See the personal composition of the entire coalition in Lenin's post-congress summary of the composition of the congress (above, pp. 191 - 192).

STORY ABOUT THE II CONGRESS OF THE ROSS. S.-D. R. P.
62)
See above, 15. II. Jem m a "Program of the II ordinary congress of the R.S.-D. R. P." (p. 60).
®8) Vladimir Ilyich dwells on this in more detail in his speech at the 31st meeting of the congress in response to Martov ("Protocols", pp. 306-307).
®4) Who exactly was this "other leader of the Martovites" is not exactly established. Perhaps A. N. Potresov, about whom Vladimir Ilyich in his present "Story" speaks, as a participant in the discussion of the project of electing "two troikas" to the centers. But it is more likely that it was L. D. Trotsky, as indicated in Rusov's (B. M. Knunyants) speech at the 30th meeting of the congress, where he says: "I am surprised how Comrade Trotsky, and no one else, attacks the election of troikas. Didn't he defend the adopted agenda with foam at the mouth at preliminary meetings? And he didn’t mention a word about such a heresy in it as the election of troikas" ("Protocols", p. 301); this speech in the protocols is mistakenly (misprint or typo) attributed to Gusev, while it belongs to Rusov (B. M. Knunyants), and further in Gusev's speech: "If the assumption about the editorial troika so outraged Comrade Trotsky today, then one has to wonder why it not only did not outrage him before, but on the contrary, forced him to deliver ardent speeches in its defense..."
вб) The remark about the "tear" apparently refers to the speech of L. D. Trotsky, since it was after his very passionate speech that Lappo (A. M. Stopani)
speaks of "pathos", of "newly shed tears" ("Protocols", pp. 301 and 302).
®в) Here Vladimir Ilyich again has in mind E. M. Aleksandrova and her statements in connection with the invitation to the congress of the "Bor'ba" group and D. B. Ryazanov.
®7) Of the three members of the C.C. elected by the congress, Glebov (V. A. Noskov) was named to the congress ("Protocols", p. 314).
®8) G. V. Plekhanov was elected the fifth member of the Party Soviet.
69) This question about the legality of the congress decisions was raised by Popov (V. I. Rozanov) ("Protocols", p. 315).
70) The following concluding part of the "Story", concerning the behavior of the Martovites after the congress, judging by the facts noted in it and
by the external appearance of its record (in the manuscript it is separated from the main part by an ending), represents a later addition. The main part of the "Story" was apparently written by Lenin immediately after the congress, under
fresh impression from it, no later than the end of August n. st.
Concluding the part, judging by the mention in it of the fact that the Martovites refused to cooperate in Iskra, in response to the official invitation of the editorial board
C.
O. could only be written after this fact. And it took place
shortly after the congress twice: firstly, in London, immediately after the end
congress with the mediation of V. A. Noskov, secondly, already in Geneva, during
Lenin's personal meeting with Martov (see about this above the introductory note
comment to Lenin's letter—Potresov, p. 213). In both cases
the proposal of the editorial board
C.
O. to Martov about
cooperation was, according to according to the testimony of Lenin and Martov, fully official. Concluding
the part to his "Story" Vladimir Ilyich could write only after the second
formal attempt to attract Martov to the editorial

C. O. It is very likely that the concluding part was written
Lenin even after his letter to Potresov of September 13 n. st. (above,
pp. 215 - 217).
71)
Refusal to work for the C.C. and for the C.O., which was started by
Martov already at the congress, having refused to join the elected by the congress in the composition
editorial board of the C.O., after the congress was expressed in the actual refusal of a number of Martovites to occupy certain positions under the C.C. In a letter to Axelrod
from August 31 n. st. ("Letters of P. B. Axelrod and 10. O. Martov",
ed. 1924 п, p. 87) Martov writes: "Dimka [I* G. Smidovich-Loman], De-
mentiev [I. B. Basovsky], Lyu6[ov] Nikolaevna [Radchenko], [M. G.] Tur-
sky and another émigré worker from Peter ("Erepa" [A. A. Shnserson])
joined to our "boycott."
Blum[enfeld
I.
S.] posre- dina: he is deeply indignant, but considers it necessary "not to irritate" the "winners" and avoid a final break." In a letter to Axelrod from
September 13 (see there, p. 91) Martov already writes: "Those of the reconcilers
who acted with pure intentions, now resolutely joined the "boycott": thus, Blum yesterday quit the printing house."

The foreign group of the "minority" headed by
Martov immediately after the end of the congress placed as the basis
of their intra-party behavior a tactic of boycotting the central institutions
of the party.
Soon the leaders of the "minority" recognized the necessity
for the purpose of factional unification of their supporters
and of planned intra-party struggle for seizing the centers to
collectively develop a definite program of actions, binding
on the supporters of the "minority".
In a letter to Axelrod of
September 4, 1903, Martov wrote:
"... By struggling resolutely we will achieve our ends.
Now, with the arrival of Starover, we together (there are
4-6 of us here)
will discuss practical steps for the first time..."
("Letters of P.
B.
Axelrod and Yu.
O.
Martov", Berlin, p.
92).
The corresponding resolution - platform was soon developed at a
three-day conference in Geneva.
4-7 supporters of the minority participated in the conference.
We include this "platform of the 47" here, reprinting it from
the collection "Letters of P.
B.
Axelrod to Yu.
O.
Martov
1904 -
1916" (pp. 94-96), in view of the importance of this document for
a more complete coverage of the course of the party split.
The conference of the 47
Genevan
Mensheviks, who were engaged in the development of this
platform, took place later than the 13th (the date of the cited
above letter of Martov to Axelrod)
and earlier than the 20th of September (the date of the letter
of L.
G. Deich to P.
B. Axelrod,
written after this conference).
These two limit dates approximately determine the time of writing
this document.
In the form of a footnote we also reprint the commentary of the editors
of "Letters," establishing the authors of the re- solution
and giving a detailed external description of the manuscript
of the docu- ment.

215.
L. D. Trotsky and Yu. O. Martov.
RESOLUTION ON THE IMMEDIATE TASKS
OF INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLE, ADOPTED AT THE
5-DAY MEETING OF 17 SUPPORTERS
OF THE MINORITY OF THE II CONGRESS. *)
[Between September 13 and 20, 1903. Geneva.]
Taking into account that at the
II Congress of our party a tendency clearly and - in a number of questions - victoriously emerged
to sharply change the previous tactics of the "Iskra" and to place legally fixed power of the new edition - above the idea-educating and idea-organizing influence of the newspaper;
taking into account that this tendency was embodied in the establishment of a Soviet composed in a certain way, which

*) Note from the editors of "Letters" of P. B. Axelrod and Yu. O. Martov.
We are printing this resolution from the original; its first part, up to the words:
"ideological and organizational education of the party", was written by L. D.
Trotsky; the rest is in Martov's handwriting. From the manuscript, it can be judged that
initially Trotsky's draft was a complete resolution, but, obviously, in the course of discussion, the practical part of his resolution turned out to be
insufficient, and therefore the final paragraph of the resolution was cut short
(we have only its beginning, which is of no independent interest), and instead of it, Martov drew up a special resolution
on the means that the opposition intends to use in its struggle.
In both parts of the resolution - both Trotsky's and Martov's - there are a number of corrections; as a rule, we do not restore the original text, because in the vast majority these amendments are purely stylistic and made by the authors themselves, obviously, in the course of drawing up the text of the resolutions. The only significant correction in Trotsky's resolution is the correction of its final paragraph, but even here we do not restore the original text, since, as we have already stipulated, the original version has been preserved without an end and does not represent a complete whole.
As for the amendments to Martov's resolution, in addition to stylistic amendments made in the course of drawing up the resolution, a number of interesting amendments (written in pencil) have been made, in essence, "which undoubtedly resulted from the discussion of the resolution at the meeting; we considered it necessary to note such amendments, taking them in simple
[1 We have square brackets. Ed. "Lenin Collection," VI] brackets."