From what has preceded, the reader can see that our "tactical plan" consists in the denial of an immediate call to storm the fortress, in the demand to organize a "proper siege of the enemy stronghold," or in other words, in the demand to direct all efforts toward gathering, organizing, and mobilizing a permanent army. When we ridiculed "Rabochee Delo" for its leap from "economism" to cries about storming (which erupted in April 1901 in No. 6 of "Listok 'R. Dela'"){64}, it naturally came down upon us with accusations of "doctrinairism," lack of understanding of revolutionary duty, appeals for caution, and the like. We were not at all surprised, of course, by these accusations from people who have no firm foundation and get by with the profoundly clever "tactic-as-process," nor were we surprised that such accusations were repeated by Nadezhdin, who generally harbors the most magnificent contempt for firm programmatic and tactical foundations.

It is said that history does not repeat itself. But Nadezhdin is doing his utmost to repeat it and zealously copies Tkachev, railing against "revolutionary culturalism," shouting about the "tocsin of the veche bell," about a special "viewpoint of the eve of revolution," and so forth. He apparently forgets the well-known saying that if the original of a historical event is a tragedy, then the copy of it is merely a farce{65}. The attempt to seize power, prepared by Tkachev's preaching and carried out by means of "excitative" and genuinely terrifying terrorism—that was magnificent, but the "excitative" terrorism of little Tkachev is simply laughable, and especially laughable when supplemented by the idea of organizing the middle strata.

"If only 'Iskra,'" writes Nadezhdin, "had stepped outside its sphere of mere journalism, it would have seen that this (such phenomena as a worker's letter in 'Iskra' No. 7, etc.) are symptoms that very, very soon 'storming' will begin, and to speak now (sic!) of organization, stretching threads from an all-Russian newspaper, is—to produce armchair ideas and armchair work." Look at what an unimaginable confusion this is: on the one hand, excitative terrorism and "organization of the middle strata" alongside the opinion that it is "much closer" to gather around "something more concrete," like local newspapers—and on the other hand, "now" to speak of an all-Russian organization means to produce armchair ideas, i.e., speaking more directly and simply, "now" it is already too late! And is a "broad establishment of local newspapers"—is that not too late, most esteemed L. Nadezhdin? And compare with this the viewpoint and tactics of "Iskra": excitative terrorism—trifles; to speak of organizing precisely the middle strata and of a broad establishment of local newspapers means to throw open the door to "economism." One must speak of a unified all-Russian organization of revolutionaries, and speak of it is not too late until the very moment when real—not paper—storming begins.

"Yes, as regards organization, our affairs are in an extremely unbrilliant state," Nadezhdin continues, "yes, 'Iskra' is quite right in saying that the main mass of our military forces are volunteers and rebels… It is good that you clearly understand the position of our forces, but why then forget that the crowd is not at all ours, and therefore it will not ask us when to begin military action, and will go 'rioting'… When the crowd itself comes forward with its spontaneous destructive force, it can crush and sweep away that 'permanent army' into which we were always preparing to introduce extraordinarily systematic organization, but didn't manage to." (Emphasis ours.)

Amazing logic! Precisely because "the crowd is not ours," it is unreasonable and improper to cry about "storming" this very moment, for a storming is an attack by a permanent army, not a spontaneous explosion of a crowd. Precisely because the crowd can crush and sweep away the permanent army, it is absolutely necessary for us to "keep pace" with the spontaneous upsurge with our work of "introducing extraordinarily systematic organization" into the permanent army, for the more we "keep pace" with introducing such organization, the more probable it is that the permanent army will not be swept away by the crowd, but will stand before it and at the head of the crowd. Nadezhdin is confused because he imagines that this systematically organized army is occupied with something that separates it from the crowd, whereas in reality it is occupied exclusively with comprehensive and all-embracing political agitation, i.e., precisely the work that brings together and unites the spontaneously destructive force of the crowd and the consciously destructive force of the organization of revolutionaries. Really, gentlemen, you are transferring the malady from the sick head to the healthy one, for it is precisely the "Svoboda" group, by introducing terrorism into the program, thereby calls for the organization of terrorists, and such an organization would indeed divert our army from drawing closer to the crowd, which is still, unfortunately, not ours, which still, unfortunately, does not ask or asks little of us about when and how to begin military action.

"We will overlook the very revolution," Nadezhdin continues to frighten "Iskra," "just as we overlooked the recent events, which fell upon us like snow on the head." This phrase, in connection with the foregoing, vividly shows us the absurdity of the special "viewpoint of the eve of revolution" concocted by "Svoboda"{99}. The special "viewpoint" amounts, if we speak directly, to the notion that "now" it is already too late to reason and prepare. If so, most esteemed enemy of "mere journalism,"—then why was it necessary to write on 132 printed pages "on questions of theory{100} and tactics"? Don't you think that the "viewpoint of the eve of revolution" would be more befitting if it issued 132,000 leaflets with a brief proclamation: "beat them!"?

Least of all risks overlooking the revolution precisely he who puts at the head and corner of all his program, and tactics, and organizational work—nationwide political agitation, as "Iskra" does. People engaged throughout all of Russia in twisting the threads of organization stretching from an all-Russian newspaper not only did not overlook the spring events, but gave us, on the contrary, the possibility to predict them. They did not overlook either those demonstrations which are described in Nos. 13 and 14 of "Iskra"{66}: rather, they participated in them, vividly conscious of their obligation to come to the aid of the spontaneous upsurge of the crowd and helping at the same time, through the medium of the newspaper, to familiarize all Russian comrades with these demonstrations and to utilize their experience. If they live, they will not overlook the revolution, which will demand from us above all and most of all experience in agitation, the ability to support (to support in a social-democratic manner) every protest, the ability to direct spontaneous movement, protecting it both from the mistakes of friends and from the traps of enemies!

We have thus arrived at the last consideration which compels us to insist especially on the plan of organization around an all-Russian newspaper, through the common work on a common newspaper. Only such an organization will ensure the flexibility necessary for a social-democratic fighting organization, i.e., the ability to adapt immediately to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle, the ability, "on the one hand, to withdraw from battle in the open field with an enemy overwhelming in its force, when it has concentrated all its forces at one point, and on the other hand, to take advantage of the unwieldiness of this enemy and to attack it where and when it is least expected"{101}. It would be the greatest error to construct a party organization in the reckoning only on an explosion and street struggle or only on "the progressive course of gray everyday struggle." We must always conduct our daily work and always be ready for anything, because to foresee in advance the alternation of periods of explosion with periods of lull is very often almost impossible, and in those cases where it is possible, one could not use this foresight for the reorganization of the organization, for this alternation in an autocratic country occurs astonishingly quickly, sometimes being connected with a single nighttime raid of the tsar's janissaries{67}. And revolution itself must not be represented as anything like a single act (as it apparently seems to Nadezhdin), but as several rapid alternations of more or less violent explosions and more or less complete lulls. Therefore, the basic content of the activity of our party organization, the focus of this activity, must be such work as is both possible and necessary, both in the period of the strongest explosion and in the period of complete lull, namely: the work of political agitation, unified throughout all of Russia, illuminating all aspects of life and directed toward the broadest masses. And this work is inconceivable in contemporary Russia without an all-Russian newspaper, appearing very frequently. The organization, forming itself naturally around this newspaper, the organization of its contributors (in the broad sense of the word, i.e., all those laboring on it) will precisely be ready for everything, beginning with the preservation of the honor, prestige, and continuity of the party in the moment of greatest revolutionary "oppression" and ending with the preparation, designation, and carrying out of a nationwide armed uprising.

Indeed, imagine a very usual case with us of a complete collapse in one or several localities. In the absence of a single common regular activity for all local organizations, such collapses are often accompanied by an interruption of work for many months. But with the presence of a common activity for all, it would be sufficient, even in the strongest collapse, for a few weeks of work by two or three energetic people to connect with the common center new circles of youth, which arise, as is known, very quickly even now; and when this common activity, suffering from the collapse, is visible to all, then new circles can arise and connect with it even more quickly.

On the other hand, imagine a popular uprising. At the present time, probably all will agree that we must think about it and prepare for it. But how to prepare? Shall we not appoint the Central Committee agents in all places to prepare for the uprising! If we even had a CC, such an appointment would accomplish precisely nothing under present Russian conditions. On the contrary, the network of agents{102} forming itself naturally in the work of establishing and distributing a common newspaper should not "sit and wait" for a signal to uprising, but should do precisely such regular work as would guarantee it the greatest probability of success in case of an uprising. Precisely such work would consolidate connections both with the broadest masses of workers and with all strata discontent with autocracy, which is so important for an uprising. Precisely in such work would develop the ability to correctly evaluate the general political situation and, consequently, the ability to choose the appropriate moment for an uprising. Precisely such work would accustom all local organizations to respond simultaneously to the same political questions, incidents, and events that agitate all Russia, to respond to these "events" as energetically as possible, as uniformly as possible and as expeditiously as possible—and after all, an uprising is, in essence, the most energetic, most uniform, and most expeditious "response" of the entire people to the government. Precisely such work, finally, would accustom all revolutionary organizations in all corners of Russia to maintain the most constant and at the same time the most conspiratorial relations, creating a factual unity of the party—and without such relations it is impossible to collectively discuss the plan of the uprising and to take those necessary preparatory measures on the eve of it which must be kept in the strictest secrecy.

In a word, the "plan of an all-Russian political newspaper" represents not only no fruit of armchair work by persons infected with doctrinairism and mere journalism (as it seemed to those who gave it poor thought), but rather, it is the most practical plan to begin from all sides and at once to prepare for an uprising, not forgetting for a single moment one's daily necessary work.