V. I. Lenin

Source: ru:PSS/v5;es:MT
Translated: machine translation (DeepSeek) from the Russian; AI-translated.

Three main circumstances strike the eye from the circular of August 17:

A) Bureaucratic organisation: governors, district marshals of the nobility, land captains.

B) Norms in determining need and loans.

[Clauses 5 and 10]          (“As long as they don’t die.”
(“Starve, but don’t die.”)

C) “Anti-government agitation.”

[Clause 16]      This is a lie, for there have been no cases of utilising relief for riots, demonstrations, etc.

This is not a struggle against famine, but a struggle against the starving, and chiefly a struggle against relief for the starving.

(Ad[180] A.)

(1) All these are officials, overwhelmed with office work and mainly police duties. The Ministry finally decides the question of recognising the percentage of distress.

(2) Governors: “the principal condition” for the success of their efforts… all other officials are subordinate to them; the relief of the Red Cross is directed on their instructions; private individuals report to them; they authorise the choice of assistants in organising canteens, etc.

(3) District marshals of the nobility

– manage the landed interests in the districts     |“district central food supply administration”|

(4) Land captains – compile lists – manage public works in the precinct (Clause 14).

(5) Office expenses are provided for (Clauses 7 and 8).

(6) General instruction: to economise the allocated funds and – “demoralisation”, “exaggerated hopes”…

Original features in the circular of August 17.

1. Extent of the calamity (12 gubernias).

2. Non-fulfilment of the new organisation of the food supply system (June 12, 1900).

3. “The principal condition” for the success of “all” (!) measures – that the governors should take “special” measures (etc.)

(And this Article 322 also speaks of “raising the welfare of towns and villages”, and Article 323: division of measures for ensuring the people’s food supply into “general” and “special”.)

4. Discussion as to which uyezds are “distressed as regards the harvest”. “The final decision of this question is within the competence of the Ministry” (!!)

(5) The following are not considered distressed—

1. when < 1/3 of the volosts

2. when the grain shortage is “usual” and “year after year” is made up by “earnings”

3. when it is possible to manage with local resources.

(6) The “uyezds distressed as regards the harvest” will be published in the *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik*.

(7) Special persons in charge of food supply in the uyezds – “district marshals of the nobility”

*So! Ed.

[= “district central food supply administration”].

(8) In gubernias (with a considerable number of distressed uyezds) + 1,000–1,500 rubles for “office expenses of the gubernia boards”.

(9) Harm of premature compilation of lists: “exaggerated hopes”, etc.

(10) Norm:

(a) average yield per desyatin – average food norm

(b) 48 poods per family

(c) 48: 2.

(d) 48: 2 = 24. 24 – (33%—10%)…

“… rarely exaggerated to any extent…”

(11) For sowing not 1/2 of the three-soul allotment [according to the peasant statutes].

Moreover:

(a) to economise the allocated funds;

(b) to avoid “demoralising” grants to the well-to-do.

(12) Aid to those “who can manage without it” is “no less harmful from the standpoint of state interests and needs” – than leaving the truly needy without aid (!)

(13) Public works… chiefly from road funds, of which… > 2½ million (!!) [only that much!]

(14) Small public works by order of the land captains (“possible and useful works”) and under their control of the money.

(15) “Usually” “on a very extensive scale” relief from the Red Cross.

(16) “Anti-government agitation” (“frequently”, “usually”) “arouses discontent and exactingness” (“need not fully satisfied”, “inevitable disruption of the economy”, etc.)