V. I. Lenin

Source: en:CW; ru:PSS/v4;es:MT
Translated: machine translation (DeepSeek) from the Russian; AI-translated.

In the January issue of *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* for the current year (1899) my “Note on the Question of the Theory of Markets (Apropos of the Polemic of Messrs. Tugan-Baranovsky and Bulgakov)” was published, and following it an article by P. B. Struve: “On the Question of Markets in Capitalist Production (Apropos of Bulgakov’s Book and Ilyin’s Article).” Struve “rejects to a considerable extent the theory of Tugan-Baranovsky, Bulgakov and Ilyin” (p. 63 of his article) and expounds his own view of Marx’s theory of realisation.

In my opinion, Struve’s polemic against the writers named is due not so much to a difference of principle as to Struve’s erroneous conception of the content of the theory they defend. In the first place, Struve confuses the theory of markets of the bourgeois economists, who taught that products are exchanged for products and that therefore there must be a correspondence between production and consumption, with Marx’s theory of realisation, which by his analysis showed how the reproduction and circulation of the total social capital—i.e., the realisation of the product in capitalist society—takes place.[35] Neither Marx nor the writers expounding him with whom Struve polemises, not only did not deduce from this analysis a harmony of production with consumption, but, on the contrary, emphatically stressed the contradictions inherent in capitalism, which cannot but manifest themselves under capitalist realisation.[36] In the second place, Struve confuses the abstract theory of realisation (which alone his opponents dealt with) with the concrete historical conditions of realisation of the capitalist product in one or another country at one or another epoch. That is just as if someone were to confuse the abstract theory of ground rent with the concrete conditions of development of agricultural capitalism in one or another country. From these two fundamental errors of Struve’s there flowed a whole series of misunderstandings, for the elucidation of which it is necessary to examine the separate propositions of his article.

1. Struve does not agree with my opinion that in expounding the theory of realisation it is necessary to dwell particularly on Adam Smith. If we are to go back to Adam, he writes, we should dwell not on Smith but on the Physiocrats.{18} No, that is not so. It was precisely Adam Smith who did not confine himself to recognising that truth (known also to the Physiocrats) that products are exchanged for products, but also raised the question of how the various component parts of social capital and product are replaced (realised) according to their value.[37] That is why Marx, who fully recognised that the Physiocrats’ teaching, for example, Quesnay’s *Tableau économique*,[38] contained propositions “which were brilliant for their time,”[39] and who recognised that in the analysis of the process of reproduction Adam Smith had even in some respects taken a step backward compared with the Physiocrats (*Das Kapital*, I², 612, Note 22[40]){19}—that is why Marx, nevertheless, devoted to the Physiocrats only about a page and a half in his survey of the history of the question of realisation (*Das Kapital*, II¹, pp. 350–51),{20} whereas he devoted over thirty pages to Adam Smith (ibid., pp. 351–83),{21} analysing in detail Adam Smith’s fundamental error, which was inherited by all subsequent political economy. Thus, it is necessary to dwell on Adam Smith precisely in order to elucidate the theory of realisation of the bourgeois economists, who all repeated Smith’s error.

2. Mr. Bulgakov says quite rightly in his book that the bourgeois economists confused simple commodity circulation and capitalist circulation of commodities, whereas Marx established the distinction between the two. Struve thinks that Mr. Bulgakov’s assertion is based on a misunderstanding. In my opinion, on the contrary, the misunderstanding here is not on Mr. Bulgakov’s side but on Struve’s. Indeed, how does Struve refute Mr. Bulgakov? In a very strange way: he refutes him by repeating his proposition. Struve says: Marx cannot be regarded as a supporter of that theory of realisation according to which the product can be realised within a given society, because Marx “drew a sharp distinction between simple commodity circulation and capitalist circulation” (!! p. 48). But that is precisely what Mr. Bulgakov asserted! That is precisely why Marx’s theory does not reduce itself to a repetition of the truth that products are exchanged for products. That is why Mr. Bulgakov quite rightly classed as “empty and scholastic logomachy” the dispute between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economists on the possibility of overproduction: both contending sides confused commodity and capitalist circulation, both repeated Adam Smith’s error.

3. Struve wrongly calls the theory of realisation the theory of proportional distribution. This is inexact and inevitably leads to misunderstandings. The theory of realisation is an abstract[41] theory which shows how the reproduction and circulation of the total social capital takes place. The necessary premises of this abstract theory are, firstly, the abstraction of foreign trade, of foreign markets. But, by abstracting foreign trade, the theory of realisation by no means asserts that a capitalist society without foreign trade has ever existed or could exist.[42] Secondly, the abstract theory of realisation assumes and must assume a proportional distribution of the product among the various branches of capitalist production. But, by assuming this, the theory of realisation by no means asserts that in capitalist society products are always or can be proportionally distributed.[43] Mr. Bulgakov quite rightly compares the theory of realisation with the theory of value. The theory of value assumes and must assume the equality of supply and demand, but it by no means asserts that in capitalist society such equality is always or can be observed. Like every other law of capitalism, the law of realisation “is realised only through its non-realisation” (Bulgakov, quoted in Struve’s article, p. 56). The theory of the average and equal rate of profit assumes, in essence, the same proportional distribution of production among its various branches. But on that ground Struve would not call this theory the theory of proportional distribution!

5. Struve not only did not refute Marx’s assertion that Ricardo inherited Smith’s error, but himself repeated the same error in his article. “It is strange… to think,” writes Struve, “that one or another division of the social product into categories could have any essential significance for the general understanding of realisation, the more so that actually all parts of the realised product assume in the process of realisation the form of (gross) income, and the classics regarded them as incomes” (p. 48). The point is that not all parts of the realised product assume the form of (gross) income; it was precisely this error of Smith’s that Marx explained, showing that a part of the realised product never assumes and cannot assume the form of income. This is that part of the social product which replaces the constant capital used for the manufacture of means of production (constant capital in Department I, in Marx’s terminology). For example, seed in agriculture never assumes the form of income; coal used again for coal-mining never assumes the form of income, and so on and so forth. The process of reproduction and circulation of the total social capital cannot be understood unless we separate that part of the gross product which can serve only as capital, which can never assume the form of income.[45] In a developing capitalist society this part of the social product must necessarily grow faster than all other parts of the product. It is only by this law that one of the most profound contradictions of capitalism can be explained: the growth of national wealth proceeds with tremendous speed, whereas the growth of popular consumption proceeds (if it proceeds at all) very slowly.

6. Struve “does not at all understand” why Marx’s distinction between constant and variable capital “is necessary for the theory of realisation” and why I “particularly insist” on it.

This lack of understanding on Struve’s part is, on the one hand, the result of a simple misunderstanding. In the first place, Struve himself admits one merit of this distinction, namely, that it covers the whole product, and not only incomes. Its other merit is that it logically connects the analysis of the process of realisation with the analysis of the process of production of individual capital. What is the task of the theory of realisation?—to show how the reproduction and circulation of the total social capital takes place. Is it not clear at first glance that the role of variable capital must in this connection be fundamentally different from the role of constant capital? The products that replace variable capital must ultimately be exchanged for articles of consumption for the workers and cover the ordinary consumption of the workers. The products that replace constant capital must ultimately be exchanged for means of production and must be used as capital for new production. Hence the distinction between constant and variable capital is absolutely necessary for the theory of realisation. In the second place, Struve’s misunderstanding is due to the fact that here, too, he quite arbitrarily and erroneously understands by the theory of realisation a theory which shows that products are proportionally distributed (see especially pp. 50–51). We have already spoken above and repeat once more that such a conception of the content of the theory of realisation is wrong.

On the other hand, Struve’s lack of understanding is due to the fact that he considers it necessary to draw a distinction between “sociological” and “economic” categories in Marx’s theory and makes several general remarks against this theory. To this I must say, firstly, that all this has nothing whatever to do with the question of the theory of realisation; secondly, that I consider the distinction drawn by Struve to be unclear and see no real use in it. Thirdly, I consider not only disputable but even directly wrong Struve’s assertions that “Marx himself, unquestionably, was not clear about the relation of the sociological foundations” of his theory to the analysis of the phenomena of the market, that “the theory of value, as expounded in Volumes I and III of *Capital*, unquestionably suffers from contradictoriness.”[46] All these assertions of Struve’s are absolutely groundless. They are not arguments, but decrees. They are anticipated results of that criticism of Marx’s theory which the Neo-Kantians[47] intend to undertake. We shall live and see what this criticism yields. Meanwhile, let us note that on the question of the theory of realisation this criticism has yielded nothing.

7. On the question of the significance of Marx’s diagrams in Section III of Volume II of *Capital*, Struve asserts that the abstract theory of realisation can be well expounded by means of the most diverse methods of dividing the social product. This astonishing assertion is wholly explained by Struve’s fundamental misunderstanding that the theory of realisation “is entirely exhausted” (??!) by the banality that products are exchanged for products. It is only thanks to this misunderstanding that Struve could write such a phrase as: “What is the role of these” (realised) “masses of commodities in production, distribution, etc., whether they represent capital (sic!![48]) and what kind, constant or variable, is for the essence of the given theory quite indifferent” (51). For Marx’s theory of realisation, which consists in an analysis of the reproduction and circulation of the total social capital, it is indifferent whether commodities represent capital!! That is just as if someone were to say that for the essence of the theory of ground rent it is indifferent whether the rural population is divided into landowners, capitalists and workers or not, because this theory is supposed to reduce itself to pointing to the different fertility of different plots of land.

It is only thanks to the same misunderstanding that Struve could assert that “the natural interrelation between the elements of social consumption—the social metabolism—can best be shown” not by Marx’s division of the product, but by the following division: means of production + articles of consumption + surplus value (value, p. 50).—What does the social metabolism consist of? First of all, in the exchange of means of production for articles of consumption. How can this exchange be shown by separating surplus value from means of production and from articles of consumption? Why, surplus value is embodied either in means of production or in articles of consumption! Is it not clear that such a division—logically untenable (for it confuses division according to the natural form of the product with division according to the elements of value)—obscures the process of social metabolism?[49]

8. Struve says that I ascribed to Marx the apologetic-bourgeois theory of Say-Ricardo (52),—the theory of harmony between production and consumption (51),—a theory that stands in crying contradiction to Marx’s teaching on the evolution and final disappearance of capitalism (51–52); that therefore my “perfectly correct argument” that Marx, both in Volume II and in Volume III, emphasised the contradiction inherent in capitalism between the boundless expansion of production and the limited consumption of the masses of the people, “completely throws overboard that theory of realisation of which in other cases” I am “the defender.”

And this assertion of Struve’s is likewise incorrect and likewise based on the above-mentioned misunderstanding into which he has fallen.

Where did Struve get the idea that by the theory of realisation I understand not an analysis of the process of reproduction and circulation of the total social capital, but a theory which merely says that products are exchanged for products, a theory teaching the harmony between production and consumption? Struve could not show by an examination of my articles that I understood the theory of realisation in the second sense, for I directly and definitely said that I understand the theory of realisation precisely in the first sense. In the article “A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism,” in the paragraph devoted to the elucidation of the error of Smith and Sismondi, it is said: “The question is precisely how realisation takes place, i.e., how each part of the social product is replaced. Hence, the starting-point in discussing social capital and income—or, what is the same thing, the realisation of the product in capitalist society—must be the division… into means of production and articles of consumption” (*Studies*, p. 17).[50] “The question of realisation consists precisely in analysing the replacement of all parts of the social product both in value and in material form” (ibid., p. 26).[51] Does not Struve repeat the same thing when he says—as if against me—that the theory which interests us “shows the mechanism of realisation… in so far as such realisation takes place” (*N. Obozr.*, p. 62)? Do I contradict that theory of realisation which I defend when I say that realisation takes place “only amidst difficulties, amidst constant fluctuations, which become ever more violent as capitalism grows, amidst a frantic competitive struggle, etc.” (*Studies*, p. 27)?[52]—when I say that the Narodnik theory “not only shows a failure to understand realisation, but also contains an extremely superficial understanding of the contradictions inherent in this realisation” (pp. 26–27)?[53]—when I say that the realisation of the product, which takes place not so much at the expense of articles of consumption as at the expense of means of production, “is, of course, a contradiction, but it is precisely a contradiction that actually exists, that springs from the very essence of capitalism” (p. 24),[54] which “fully corresponds to the historical mission of capitalism and to its specific social structure: the former” (i.e., the mission) “consists precisely in the development of the productive forces of society (production for production’s sake); the latter” (i.e., the social structure of capitalism) “precludes the utilisation of them by the mass of the population” (p. 20)?[55]

9. On the question of the relation of production and consumption in capitalist society there is apparently no disagreement between Struve and myself. But if Struve says that Marx’s proposition (which states that consumption is not the aim of capitalist production) “bears the clear imprint of the polemical character of Marx’s whole system. It is tendentious…” (53), then I decidedly dispute the appropriateness and justice of such expressions. That consumption is not the aim of capitalist production is a fact. The contradiction between this fact and the fact that in the final analysis production is connected with consumption, is dependent on consumption, also in capitalist society—this contradiction is not one of doctrine but of real life. Marx’s theory of realisation is, among other things, of immense scientific value precisely because it shows how this contradiction is accomplished, because it brings this contradiction to the forefront. Marx’s “system” has a “polemical character” not because it is “tendentious,”[56] but because it gives an exact theoretical picture of all the contradictions that exist in life. That is why, among other things, all attempts to assimilate Marx’s “system” without assimilating its “polemical character” will remain and will continue to remain unsuccessful: the “polemical character” of the system is merely an exact reflection of the “polemical character” of capitalism itself.

10. “What is the real significance of the theory of realisation?” asks Struve, and quotes Mr. Bulgakov’s opinion that the possibility of expanding capitalist production is realised in practice, although through a series of crises. “Capitalist production is growing all over the world,” Mr. Bulgakov points out. “This argument,” objects Struve, “is absolutely untenable. The fact is that the real ‘expansion of capitalist production’ takes place not at all in that ideal or isolated capitalist state which Bulgakov assumes and which, according to his assumption, is self-sufficient, but on the arena of world economy, where the most diverse stages of economic development and various forms of economic life come into collision” (57).

Thus, Struve’s objection reduces itself to the fact that in reality realisation takes place not in an isolated, self-sufficient capitalist state, but “on the arena of world economy,” i.e., by means of the sale of products in other countries. It is easy to see that this objection is based on an error. Does the question of realisation change in any way if we do not confine ourselves to the home market (“self-sufficient” capitalism) but refer to the foreign market? if instead of one country we take several countries? If we do not assume that the capitalists throw their goods into the sea or give them away free to foreigners—if we do not take isolated, exceptional cases or periods, then it is obvious that we must assume a certain evenness of exports and imports. If a given country exports certain products, realising them “on the arena of world economy,” it imports other products in return. From the standpoint of the theory of realisation, it must be assumed that “foreign trade only replaces home products (Artikel—commodities) by products of a different use- or natural-form” (*Das Kapital*, II, 469.{25} Quoted by me in *N. Obozr.*, p. 38[57]). Whether we take one country or a complex of countries, the essence of the process of realisation is not changed in the least. In his objection to Mr. Bulgakov, Struve therefore repeats the old error of the Narodniks, who connected the question of realisation with the question of the foreign market.[58]

As a matter of fact, there is nothing in common between these questions. The question of realisation is an abstract question relating to the theory of capitalism in general. Whether we take one country or the whole world, the basic laws of realisation discovered by Marx remain the same.

The question of foreign trade or of the foreign market is a historical question, a question of the concrete conditions of development of capitalism in one or another country at one or another epoch.[59]

11. Let us dwell a little more on that question which “has long occupied” Struve: what is the real scientific value of the theory of realisation?

Exactly the same as the value of all the other propositions of Marx’s abstract theory. If Struve is troubled by the circumstance that “perfect realisation is an ideal of capitalist production, but by no means its reality,” we would remind him that all the other laws of capitalism discovered by Marx likewise depict only the ideal of capitalism, but by no means its reality. “We have in view,” wrote Marx, “to present the inner organisation of the capitalist mode of production only in its, so to speak, ideal average type” (*in ihrem idealen Durchschnitt*. *Das Kapital*, III, 2, 367; Russ. trans., p. 688).{26} The theory of capital assumes that the worker receives the full value of his labour-power. That is the ideal of capitalism, but by no means its reality. The theory of rent assumes that the entire agricultural population is completely split up into landowners, capitalists and wage-workers. That is the ideal of capitalism, but by no means its reality. The theory of realisation assumes a proportional distribution of production. That is the ideal of capitalism, but by no means its reality.

The scientific value of Marx’s theory lies in the fact that it has elucidated the process of reproduction and circulation of the total social capital. Further, Marx’s theory has shown how that contradiction inherent in capitalism is accomplished, namely, that a tremendous growth of production is by no means accompanied by a corresponding growth of popular consumption. Hence, Marx’s theory not only does not restore the bourgeois-apologetic theory (as Struve imagined), but, on the contrary, provides a most powerful weapon against apologetics. It follows from this theory that, even with an ideally smooth and proportional reproduction and circulation of the total social capital, the contradiction between the growth of production and the limited limits of consumption is inevitable. In reality, moreover, the process of realisation does not take place with ideally smooth proportionality, but only amidst “difficulties,” “fluctuations,” “crises,” etc.

Further, Marx’s theory of realisation provides a most powerful weapon not only against apologetics, but also against the philistine-reactionary criticism of capitalism. It was precisely such a criticism of capitalism that our Narodniks tried to support with their erroneous theory of realisation. Marx’s conception of realisation, however, inevitably leads to the recognition of the historical progressiveness of capitalism (development of the means of production, and consequently of the productive forces of society), without thereby glossing over, but, on the contrary, elucidating the historically transient character of capitalism.

12. “Concerning the ideal or isolated self-sufficient capitalist society,” Struve asserts that extended reproduction in it is impossible, “because there is no source from which to obtain the absolutely necessary additional workers.”

I cannot at all agree with this assertion of Struve’s. The impossibility of obtaining additional workers from the reserve army—Struve has not proved, and cannot prove it. Against the possibility that additional workers can be obtained from the natural increase of population, Struve declares, quite without foundation, that “extended reproduction based on natural increase may perhaps be arithmetically not identical with simple reproduction, but practically-capitalistically, i.e., economically, it fully coincides with it.” Feeling that theoretically it is impossible to prove the impossibility of finding additional workers, Struve evades the question by referring to historical and practical conditions. “I do not think that Marx could have decided a historical (?) question on the basis of this, a completely abstract, construction”… “Self-sufficient capitalism is a historically (!) unthinkable limit”… “The intensification of labour that can be imposed on the worker is confined not only in reality but also logically within very narrow limits”… “The unceasing increase in the productivity of labour cannot but weaken the very compulsion to labour”…

The illogicality of all these references is obvious! None of Struve’s opponents anywhere or at any time said such an absurd thing as that a historical question could be decided by means of abstract constructions. But at the present time Struve himself raised a question that is not at all historical, but a completely abstract, purely theoretical question “concerning the ideal capitalist society” (57). Is it not clear that he is simply evading the question? That there are numerous historical and practical conditions (not to speak of the immanent contradictions of capitalism) which lead and will lead much sooner to the downfall of capitalism than to the transformation of modern capitalism into ideal capitalism—this, of course, I do not think of denying. But on the purely theoretical question “concerning the ideal capitalist society” I maintain my former opinion that there are no theoretical grounds for denying the possibility of extended reproduction in such a society.

13. “Messrs. V. V. and N. —on pointed to the contradictions and stumbling-blocks in the capitalist development of Russia, and they are shown Marx’s diagrams and told: capitals are always exchanged for capitals…” (quoted in Struve’s article, p. 62).

This is said in a most caustic manner. It is only a pity that the matter is depicted quite incorrectly. Anyone who reads Mr. V. V.’s *Sketches of Theoretical Economics* and Section XV of the second part of Mr. N. —on’s *Sketches* will see that both these writers raised precisely the abstract-theoretical question of realisation, the question of the realisation of the product in capitalist society in general. That is a fact. It is also a fact that against them other writers “deemed it necessary first of all to elucidate the fundamental, abstract-theoretical points of the theory of markets” (as stated in the very first lines of my article in *N. Obozr.*). Tugan-Baranovsky wrote about the theory of realisation in that chapter of his book on crises which bears the subtitle: “Theory of Markets.” Bulgakov gives his book the subtitle: “A Theoretical Study.” The question is, who confuses abstract-theoretical and concrete-historical questions—Struve’s opponents or Struve himself?

On the same page of his article Struve quotes my statement that the necessity of a foreign market follows not from the conditions of realisation, but from historical conditions. “But,” objects Struve (this is a very characteristic “but”!), “Tugan-Baranovsky, Bulgakov and Ilyin elucidated only the abstract conditions of realisation, and did not elucidate the historical conditions” (p. 62).—Precisely because all the writers named did not elucidate the historical conditions, they undertook to speak about abstract-theoretical and not about concrete-historical questions. In my book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (*The Process of the Formation of a Home Market for Large-Scale Industry in Russia*), the printing of which is now (III. 1899)[60] completed, I raise the question not of the theory of markets, but of the home market for Russian capitalism. Hence the abstract truths of theory play there the role only of guiding propositions, only of instruments for the analysis of concrete data.

14. Struve “fully supports” his “point of view” on the theory of “third persons,” which he advanced in his *Critical Remarks*. I, for my part, fully support what I said on this score when the *Critical Remarks* appeared.{27}

On page 251 of the *Critical Remarks* Struve says that Mr. V. V.’s argumentation “rests on a whole original theory of markets in a developed capitalist society.” “This theory,” Struve remarks, “is correct in so far as it establishes the fact that surplus value cannot be realised in the consumption either of the capitalists or of the workers, but presupposes the consumption of third persons.” By these third persons Struve “means in Russia the Russian peasantry” (p. 61 of the article in *N. Obozr.*).

Thus, Mr. V. V. advances a whole original theory of markets in a developed capitalist society, and he is referred to the Russian peasantry! Is that not a confusion of the abstract-theoretical question of realisation with the concrete-historical question of capitalism in Russia? Then, if Struve recognises Mr. V. V.’s theory as even partly correct, it means that he passes over Mr. V. V.’s fundamental theoretical errors on the question of realisation, passes over the erroneous view that the “difficulties” of capitalist realisation are confined to surplus value or are specially connected with this part of the value of the product;—passes over the erroneous view which connects the question of the foreign market with the question of realisation.

Struve’s reference to the fact that the Russian peasantry, by its disintegration, creates a market for our capitalism is quite correct (in the above-mentioned book I prove this proposition in detail by an analysis of the data of the zemstvo statistics). But the theoretical substantiation of this proposition does not belong at all to the theory of realisation of the product in capitalist society, but to the theory of the formation of capitalist society. It must also be noted that the designation of the peasants as “third persons” is very unfortunate and may give rise to misunderstandings. If the peasants are “third persons” for capitalist industry, then the industrialists, big and small, the factory owners and the workers, are “third persons” for capitalist agriculture. On the other hand, the peasant farmers (“third persons”) create a market for capitalism only in so far as they disintegrate into the classes of capitalist society (the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat), i.e., only in so far as they cease to be “third” persons and become active persons in the system of capitalism.

15. Struve says: “Bulgakov makes the subtle remark that no fundamental distinction can be established between the home and the foreign market for capitalist production.” I fully subscribe to this remark: indeed, a customs or political frontier is very often quite unsuitable for dividing the “home” and the “foreign” market. But, for the reasons just indicated, I cannot agree with Struve that “from this follows… the theory asserting the necessity of third persons.” What directly follows from this is only the demand: not to stop, when examining the question of capitalism, at the traditional division into home and foreign markets. Unsound from a strictly theoretical standpoint, this division is particularly unsuitable for such countries as Russia. It might be replaced by another division, distinguishing, for example, the following aspects in the process of development of capitalism: (1) the formation and development of capitalist relations within the limits of a given, fully populated and occupied territory; (2) the extension of capitalism to other territories (partly quite unoccupied and settled by emigrants from the old country, partly occupied by tribes standing aside from the world market and world capitalism). The first aspect of the process might be called the development of capitalism in depth, the second—the development of capitalism in breadth.[61] Such a division would cover the whole process of the historical development of capitalism: on the one hand, its development in old countries, which for centuries have been evolving forms of capitalist relations up to large-scale machine industry inclusive; on the other hand, the powerful urge of developed capitalism to expand to other territories, to populate and cultivate new parts of the world, to form colonies, to draw wild tribes into the whirlpool of world capitalism. In Russia this latter urge of capitalism has been and continues to be particularly pronounced in our border regions, whose colonisation received such a tremendous impetus in the post-Reform, capitalist period of Russian history. The South and South-East of European Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia serve as colonies of Russian capitalism and ensure it a tremendous development not only in depth, but also in breadth.

Finally, the proposed division is convenient in that it clearly defines the sphere of questions which alone the theory of realisation covers. It is clear that this theory relates only to the first aspect of the process, only to the development of capitalism in depth. The theory of realisation (i.e., the theory elucidating the process of reproduction and circulation of the total social capital) must necessarily take for its constructions a closed capitalist society, i.e., abstract from the process of the extension of capitalism to other countries, from the process of commodity exchange of one country with another, because this process contributes nothing to the solution of the question of realisation, merely shifting the question from one country to several countries. It is also clear that the abstract theory of realisation must take as its premise an ideally developed capitalist society.

Speaking of the literature of Marxism, Struve makes the following general remark: “Orthodox repetitions still continue to dominate, but they cannot stifle the new critical current, because in scientific questions true strength is always on the side of criticism, not of faith.” As can be seen from the foregoing, we have had occasion to convince ourselves that the “new critical current” does not guarantee against the repetition of old errors. No, let us rather remain “under the sign of orthodoxy”! Let us not believe that orthodoxy permits taking anything on faith, that orthodoxy excludes critical assimilation and further development, that it permits historical questions to be obscured by abstract diagrams. If there are orthodox disciples guilty of these really grievous sins, the blame falls entirely on such disciples, and not at all on orthodoxy, which is distinguished by diametrically opposite qualities.