"HOLY FAMILY"
Written no earlier than April 25 (May 7) - no later than September 7 (19) 1895.
First published in 1930 in the Lenin Collection XII

Printed from the manuscript

The first page of V. I. Lenin's manuscript

Summary of Marx and Engels' "Holy Family." - 1895.

Reduced

THE HOLY FAMILY,

OR CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL CRITICISM
2

AGAINST BRUNO BAUER AND COMPANY

BY FRIEDRICH ENGELS AND KARL MARX

FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN
LITERARY PUBLISHING HOUSE

(J. RÜTTEN) 1845
A small booklet, in octavo format, consists of a preface
(p. III-IV). [7-8]* (signed: Paris, September 1844), table of contents (V-VIII p.) [646-
648] and text (p. 1-335) [9-230], divided into 9 chapters (Kapitel). Chapters I, II, III were written by Engels, chapters V, VIII, and IX by Marx, and chapters IV, VI, and VII by both, with each separately signing the sections or paragraphs they wrote, which are provided with special headings. All these headings are satirical up to "the critical transformation of the butcher into a dog" (which is the title of § 1 of Chapter VIII). The pages belonging to Engels are 1-17 [9-21] (Chapters I, II, III, and §§ 1 and 2 of Chapter IV), 138-142 [101-104]
(§ 2a of Chapter VI), 240-245 [167-170] (§ 2b of Chapter VII):
|¯i.e., 26 pages out of 335.¯|
The first chapters are a continuous critique of style (the entire(!) Chapter I, p. 1-5 [9-11]) of the "Literary Gazette" ||¯"Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung" by Bruno Bauer - the preface states that the criticism by Marx and Engels is directed against its first 8 issues ¯||, a critique of its distortions of history (Chapter II, p. 5-12 [12-17], specifically English history), a critique of its themes

* F. Engels und K. Marx. Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik. Frankfurt а. М., 1845. Ed.
** K. Marx and F. Engels. Collected Works, 2nd ed., vol. 2. Ed.

(Chapter III, 13-14 [18-19], mocking the Grundlichkeit* of the exposition of some dispute between Mr. Nauwerk and the Berlin philosophical faculty 3), a critique of the discourse on love (Chapter IV, 3, - Marx), a critique of the presentation of Proudhon in the "Literary Gazette" (IV, 4, - Proudhon, p. 22 [25] u. ff. bis** 74 [59]4. At the beginning, there are numerous corrections of the translation: formule et signification*** were confused, justice was translated as Gerechtigkeit instead of Rechtspraxis etc.****). Following this critique of the translation (Marx calls it Charakterisierende Übersetzung № I, II u. s. w.*****), comes Kritische Randglosse № I u. s. w.******, where Marx defends Proudhon against the critics of the "Literary Gazette," opposing their speculations with his clearly socialist ideas.
Marx's tone towards Proudhon is highly laudatory (although there are minor qualifications, for example, a reference to "Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalokonomie" by Engels in "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher" 5).
Here, Marx moves from Hegelian philosophy to socialism: the transition is clearly observable - one can see what Marx had already mastered and how he transitions to a new circle of ideas.
"Political economy, which takes private property relations as human and rational, continuously falls into contradiction with its fundamental premise - private property, a contradiction similar to that which a theologian falls into when, constantly interpreting religious concepts in human terms, thereby continually sins against his fundamental premise - the superhuman nature of religion. Thus, in political economy, wages initially appear as the proportionate share of the product due to labor. Wages and profit on capital stand in the most

* - thoroughness. Ed.
** - and following until - und folgende bis. Ed.
*** - formula and meaning. Ed.
**** - justice instead of legal practice, etc. Ed.
***** - characterizing translation № I, II, etc. Ed.
****** - critical marginal note № I, etc. Ed.

SUMMARY OF THE BOOK BY MARX AND ENGELS "HOLY FAMILY"
friendly, mutually beneficial, seemingly the most humane relations. Subsequently, however, it turns out that these relations are the most hostile, that wages are in inverse proportion to the profit on capital. Value is initially given a seemingly rational definition: it is determined by the cost of production of the thing and its social utility. Subsequently, however, it turns out that value is a purely accidental determination, standing in no relation either to the cost of production or to social utility. The amount of wages is initially determined as the result of a free agreement between the free worker and the free capitalist. Subsequently, however, it turns out that the worker is forced to agree to the determination of wages by the capitalist, who, in turn, is forced to keep wages at the lowest possible level. The place of the freedom of the negotiating Parthei*» |¯this word is spelled this way in this book¯| «is taken by compulsion. The same applies to trade and all other economic relations. Sometimes the economists themselves feel these contradictions, and the uncovering of these contradictions constitutes the main content of the struggle carried out among the economists. But in those cases when these contradictions are recognized in one way or another by the economists, the latter themselves attack private property in one of its particular forms, accusing one or another of its particular forms of falsifying the rational, in their view, wages, the rational value, the rational trade.
Thus, Adam Smith sometimes attacks the capitalists, Destutt de Tracy - the bankers, Simonde de Sismondi - the factory system, Ricardo - the land ownership, almost all modern economists - the non-industrial capitalists, in whom private property appears only as a consumer.

* - party, side. Ed.

Thus, economists sometimes, as an exception, defend the appearance of humanity in economic relations—especially when they attack some specific abuse—but more often they take these relations precisely in their clearly expressed distinction from the human, in their strictly economic sense.
Not realizing this contradiction and wavering from side to side, they do not go beyond its limits.
Proudhon put an end to this unconsciousness once and for all. He took the humane appearance of economic relations seriously and sharply opposed it to their inhumane reality. He made them actually be what they are in their own conception of themselves, or rather, he made them renounce this conception of themselves and acknowledge their actual inhumanity. Therefore, he quite consistently depicted private property, in its universality, as the factor falsifying economic relations, not one or another form of private property individually, as other economists did. He did everything that can be done by the critique of political economy while remaining within the standpoint of political economy (36-39) [34-36].
Marx dismisses Edgar's (Edgar - from "Literary Gazette") criticism that Proudhon makes a "deity" out of "justice" by arguing that Proudhon's 1840 work does not stand on the *standpoint* of German development in 1844 (39) [36], that this is a general sin of the French, and that one should remember Proudhon's reference to negation, which realizes justice, a reference that allows one to dispense with this absolute in history (um auch dieses Absoluten in der Geschichte überhoben zu sein - at the end of page 39).
"If Proudhon does not reach this consistent conclusion, it is due to the unfortunate circumstance that he was born a Frenchman, not a German" (39-40) [36].

* - standpoint. Ed.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' BOOK "THE HOLY FAMILY"
This is followed by Critical Commentary No. II (40-46) [37-41], which very clearly brings forward the almost fully formed view of Marx on the revolutionary role of the proletariat.
... "The existing political economy, starting from the fact of wealth created by the movement of private property ostensibly for the peoples, ends up with an apology for private property. Proudhon starts from the opposite fact, sophistically veiled in political economy, from the fact of poverty created by the movement of private property, and arrives at conclusions that negate private property. The first critique of private property naturally proceeds from the fact in which the contradictory essence of private property manifests itself in the most tangible, most glaring, immediately most offensive form for human feeling, from the fact of poverty, destitution" (41) [37].
"The proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such, they form a certain unity. Both are engendered by the world of private property. The whole question is what specific position each of these two elements occupies within the antagonism. It is not enough to declare them two sides of a single whole.
Private property, as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain its own existence, and thereby the existence of its opposite—the proletariat. This is the positive side of the antagonism, the self-satisfied private property.
On the contrary, the proletariat, as the proletariat, is compelled to abolish itself, and thereby the condition that makes it the proletariat—private property. This is the negative side of the antagonism, its unrest within itself, the abolished and self-abolishing private property.
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat represent the same human self-alienation. But the former class feels satisfied and confirmed in this self-alienation, perceives the alienation as a testimony of its own power, and possesses in it the semblance of human existence.
The latter class, however, feels annihilated in this self-alienation, sees in it its own impotence and the reality of inhuman existence. This class, using Hegel's expression, is, within the framework of rejection, the revolt against this rejection, a revolt that is necessarily provoked in this class by the contradiction between its human nature and its life situation, which is an open, decisive, and comprehensive negation of this very nature.
Thus, within the entire antagonism, the private property owner represents the conservative side, the proletarian the destructive side. From the former comes the action aimed at preserving the antagonism, from the latter the action aimed at its destruction.
True, private property, in its economic movement, pushes itself toward its own abolition, but it does so only through a development independent of, unconscious, and against its will, and conditioned by the nature of the object itself, only through the generation of the proletariat as the proletariat—this poverty, conscious of its spiritual and physical poverty, this dehumanization, conscious of its own dehumanization and therefore abolishing itself. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property, in generating the proletariat, pronounces upon itself, just as it executes the sentence that wage labor pronounces upon itself, producing foreign wealth and its own poverty. By winning, the proletariat in no way becomes the absolute side of society, for it wins only by abolishing itself and its opposite. With the victory of the proletariat, both the proletariat and the condition that determines it—private property—disappear.
If socialist writers recognize the world-historical role of the proletariat, then this

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY" in no way arises from the fact that, as critical criticism assures us, they consider the proletarians to be gods. On the contrary. Since in the fully formed proletariat, the abstraction from all that is human, even from the semblance of the human, is practically complete; since in the life conditions of the proletariat, all the life conditions of contemporary society have reached the peak of inhumanity; since in the proletariat, man has lost himself, yet at the same time not only gained a theoretical consciousness of this loss, but is also directly compelled to revolt against this inhumanity by the command of an inevitable, unadornable, absolutely dominant need, this practical expression of necessity—precisely for this reason, the proletariat can and must liberate itself. But it cannot liberate itself without destroying its own life conditions. It cannot destroy its own life conditions without destroying all the inhuman life conditions of contemporary society, concentrated in its own position.
It does not pass through the harsh but hardening school of labor in vain. The point is not what
a particular proletarian or even the entire proletariat sees as its goal at any given moment. The point is what the proletariat actually is, and what it, according to its very being, will be historically compelled to do. Its goal and its historical task are most clearly and unambiguously indicated by its own life situation, as well as by the entire organization of modern bourgeois society. There is no need to elaborate here on the fact that a significant part of the English and French proletariat already recognizes its historical task and is constantly working to bring this consciousness to full clarity (42-45) [38-40].
CRITICAL COMMENTARY NO. 3
"Mr. Edgar should know that Mr. Bruno Bauer based all his arguments on 'infinite self-consciousness' and considered this principle as the creative principle even of the gospels, which, with their infinite unconsciousness, seem to directly contradict infinite self-consciousness. Similarly, Proudhon considers equality as the creative principle of private property, which directly contradicts it.

If Mr. Edgar were to compare French equality with German self-consciousness for a moment, he would find that the latter principle expresses in German, i.e., in the forms of abstract thinking, what the former expresses in French, i.e., in the language of politics and thinking contemplation. Self-consciousness is the equality of man with himself in the sphere of pure thought. Equality is the recognition of man by himself in the sphere of practice, i.e., the recognition of another person as equal to oneself and the relation of man to another person as an equal.
Equality is the French expression for the unity of human essence, for the designation of generic consciousness and generic behavior of man, the practical identity of man with man, i.e., for the social, or human, relation of man to man. Therefore, just as destructive criticism in Germany, before reaching, in the person of Feuerbach, the consideration of real man, tried to get rid of everything definite and existing with the help of the principle of self-consciousness—so, similarly, destructive criticism in France tried to achieve the same with the help of the principle of equality" (48-49) [42-43].

"The opinion that philosophy is the abstract expression of the existing state of affairs originates, not with Mr. Edgar, but with Feuerbach, who first characterized philosophy as speculative and mystical empiricism and proved it" (49-50) [43].

"We return again and again to the same...

Proudhon writes in the interests of the proletarians*." Yes, what impels him to write is not the interest of self-sufficient criticism, not an artificially created, abstract interest, but

* This is Marx's quote from Edgar.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY" a mass, real, historical interest—one that goes beyond mere criticism, an interest that will lead to a crisis. Proudhon not only writes in the interests of the proletarians: he is himself a proletarian, ouvrier*. His work is the scientific manifesto of the French proletariat and therefore has a completely different historical significance than the literary concoctions of some critical critic" (52-53) [45].
"Proudhon's desire to abolish non-possession and the old form of possession is entirely identical with his desire to abolish the practically alienated relation of man to his objective essence, to abolish the political-economic expression of human self-alienation. But since his critique of political economy still remains under the sway of the premises of political economy, the reappropriation of the objective world still appears in Proudhon in the political-economic form of possession.
Critical criticism makes Proudhon oppose non-possession to possession; Proudhon, on the contrary, opposes the old form of possession—private property—to possession. He declares possession to be a 'social function.' In this function, 'interest' is directed not at 'excluding' the other, but at applying and realizing one's own forces, the forces of one's being.
Proudhon did not succeed in giving this idea the appropriate and developed expression it deserves.

The notion of 'equal possession' is a political-economic one, and thus still an alienated expression of the condition that the object, as being for man, as the objective being of man, is at the same time the being of man for another man, his human relation to another man, the social relation of man to man.

Proudhon overcomes political-economic alienation within the bounds of political-economic alienation" (54-55) [46-47].

* - worker. Ed.

||¯This passage is highly characteristic, for it shows how Marx approaches the central idea of his entire "system," *sit venia verbo* - namely, the idea of social relations of production.¯||
As a minor point, note that on p. 64 [52], Marx dedicates five lines to the fact that "critical criticism" translates *marechal* as "Marschall" instead of "Hufschmied."**
Very interesting are pp. 65-67 [53-55] (Marx approaches the theory of labor value); pp. 70-71 [56-57] (Marx's response to Edgar's reproach that Proudhon confuses matters by saying that the worker cannot buy back his product), 71-72 and 72-73 [57-58] (utopian, idealistic, "ethereal" (atherisch) socialism - and "mass-like" socialism and communism).
P. 76 [61]. (First paragraph of the first §: Feuerbach revealed the real secrets, Schelling did the opposite***).
P. 77 [61]. (Last paragraph: the obsolescence of the naive relationship between rich and poor: "si le riche le savait!"****).
Pp. 79-85 [62-67]. (These seven pages in their entirety are extremely interesting. This is § 2: "The Secret of Speculative Construction" - a critique of speculative philosophy with the well-known example of "fruit" - *der Frucht* - a critique directly aimed at Hegel. Here, there is also an extremely interesting remark that Hegel "very often" within the speculative exposition provides a real exposition, capturing the very subject - *die Sache selbst.*)
Pp. 92, 93 [71, 72] - fragmentary remarks against the *Degradierung der Sinnlichkeit* *****.
P. 101 [76]. "He" (Szeliga) "is incapable... of seeing that industry and commerce create entirely different kinds of universal kingdoms than Christianity and morality, family happiness, and bourgeois prosperity."
P. 102 [77]. (End of the first paragraph - caustic remarks about the significance of notaries in modern society... "The notary is a secular confessor. He is a puritan by profession, and 'honesty,' says Shakespeare, 'is no puritan.' He is at the same time a procurer for all sorts of purposes, a manager of bourgeois intrigues and machinations.")
P. 110 [82-83]. Another example of ridiculing abstract speculation: the "construction" of how man becomes master over beasts; "beast" (*das Tier*) as an abstraction transforms from a lion into a pug, etc.
P. 111 [83]. A characteristic passage regarding Eugène Sue: out of hypocrisy towards the bourgeoisie, he morally idealizes the grisette, bypassing her relationship to marriage, her "naive" connection with the *étudiant* or *ouvrier*. "It is precisely within this connection that she" (grisette) "forms a truly human contrast to the hypocritical, hard, and self-centered wife of the bourgeois and to the entire circle of the bourgeoisie, i.e., to the entire official society."
P. 117 [87]. The "mass" of the 16th and 19th centuries was different "from the outset."**
Pp. 118-121 [88-90]. This passage (in Chapter VI: "Absolute Critical Criticism, or Critical Criticism in the Person of Mr. Bruno." 1) The First Campaign of Absolute Criticism, a) "Spirit" and "Mass") is extremely important: a critique of the view that history was unsuccessful due to the interest of the masses and calculations on the mass, which was content with a "superficial" understanding of the "idea."
"If, therefore, absolute criticism really condemns anything for 'superficiality,' it is precisely the entire previous history in general, whose deeds and ideas were the ideas and deeds of the 'masses.' It rejects mass history and intends to put critical history in its place (see the articles by Mr. Jules Faucher on current issues of English life*)."
NB
"The 'idea' has always discredited itself whenever it separated from 'interest.' On the other hand, it is easy to understand that every mass 'interest' striving for historical recognition, when it first appears on the world stage, far exceeds in 'idea' or 'representation' its actual boundaries and easily confuses itself with the general human interest. This illusion forms what Fourier calls the tone of each historical epoch" (119) [89] - illustrated by the example of the French Revolution (119-120) and the well-known words (120 *in fine*) [90]:
NB
"Therefore, along with the seriousness of the historical action, the scope of the mass, of which it is the affair, will also grow."
To what extent Bauer's sharp division between *Geist* and *Masse* reached can be seen from the following phrase, which Marx attacks: "in the mass, and not in anything else, the true enemy of the spirit must be sought" (121) [90].
Marx responds to this by saying that the enemies of progress are the products of the self-abasement of the mass, but these are not ideal products, but material, externally existing ones. Already in 1789, Loustalot's newspaper had as its motto:
*Les grands ne nous paraissent grands*
*Que parce que nous sommes à genoux.*
*Levons-nous!***
And to rise (122) [90] - says Marx - it is not enough to do so in thought, in the idea.

* - sit venia verbo. Ed.
** - "marshal" instead of "blacksmith." Ed.
*** - vice versa. Ed.
**** - "if the rich knew!" Ed.
***** - degradation of sensuality. Ed.
* - see the articles by Mr. Jules Faucher on current issues of English life. Ed.
* - in the end. Ed.
* - spirit and mass. Ed.
* - The great seem great to us only because we are on our knees. Let us rise! Ed.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY" "Meanwhile, absolute criticism has learned at least one art from Hegel’s 'Phenomenology'—to transform real, objective, chains existing outside of me into exclusively ideal, exclusively subjective, chains existing only within me, and thus to transform all external, sensory struggles into battles of pure ideas" (122) [90].
With this, Marx jests, one can prove the pre-established* harmony between critical criticism and censorship, presenting the censor not as a police lackey (Polizeischerge), but as my own personified sense of tact and measure.
Absolute criticism, engrossed with its 'Geist', does not investigate whether there is any phrase, self-deception, or hollowness (Kernlosigkeit) in its airy (windigen) pretensions.
"Just as it is with 'progress'. Despite the claims of 'progress', cases of regression and circular motion are constantly observed.
Not realizing that the category of 'progress' is devoid of any content and abstract, absolute criticism is so profound that it recognizes 'progress' as absolute in order to explain regression by substituting a 'personal opponent' of progress, the mass" (123-124) [91].
"All communist and socialist writers started from the observation that, on the one hand, even the most favorably arranged brilliant deeds apparently remain without brilliant results and degenerate into trivialities; on the other hand, that every progress of the spirit has so far been a progress at the expense of the majority of humanity, which has fallen into an increasingly inhuman condition. They therefore declared 'progress' (see Fourier) an unsatisfactory abstract phrase; they suspected (see, among others, Owen) the existence of a fundamental vice in the civilized world; they therefore subjected the actual foundations of modern society to ruthless criticism. This communist criticism was from the very beginning matched in practice by the movement of the broad masses, at whose expense historical development had hitherto taken place. One must be familiar with the scientific zeal, the thirst for knowledge, the moral energy, and the tireless striving for self-development among French and English workers to form an idea of the human nobility of this movement" (124-125) [92].
"What a great advantage over the communist writers—to free oneself from the investigation of the sources of spiritual emptiness, mental laziness, superficiality, and self-satisfaction, and, having discovered in these qualities the opposite of spirit, progress, to engage in their moral condemnation!" (125) [93].

"The relationship between 'spirit and mass' has, however, another, hidden meaning, which will be fully revealed in the further course of the argument. Here we will only outline it. The relationship between 'spirit' and 'mass' openly presented by Mr. Bruno is nothing but the critically caricatured completion of Hegel's understanding of history, which, in turn, is nothing but the speculative expression of the Christian-German dogma of the opposition between spirit and matter, God and the world. Within the bounds of history, within the bounds of humanity itself, this opposition is expressed in such a way that a few chosen individuals, as the active spirit, stand opposed to the rest of humanity as an unspirited mass, as matter" (126) [93].
Marx points out that Hegel's Geschichtsauffassung* presupposes an abstract and absolute spirit, of which the mass is the bearer. Parallel to Hegel's doctrine, the teaching of the doctrinaires 13 (126) developed in France, who proclaimed the sovereignty of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of the people, in order to exclude the mass and rule alone.
Hegel is "guilty of a twofold half-heartedness" (127) [94]: 1) by declaring philosophy the being of the absolute spirit, he does not thereby declare the philosophical individual to be this spirit;

* - understanding of history. Ed.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY"
2) he only ostensibly (nur zum Schein) makes the absolute spirit the creator of history, only post festum*, only in consciousness.
Bruno eliminates this half-heartedness: he declares criticism to be the absolute spirit and the creator of history in reality.
"On one side stands the mass as a passive, unspirited, unhistorical, material element of history; on the other side, the spirit, criticism, Mr. Bruno and company as the active element, from which all historical action emanates. The task of transforming society is reduced to the brainwork of critical criticism" (128) [94-95].
As the first example of "the campaigns of absolute criticism against the mass," Marx cites Bruno Bauer's approach to the Judenfrage, referring to Bauer's rebuttal in the "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher" 14.
"One of the main tasks of absolute criticism is, above all, to give all contemporary questions the correct formulation.
Namely, it does not answer the actual questions but substitutes entirely different ones... Thus, it distorted the 'Jewish question' in such a way that it no longer needed to deal with the political emancipation, which constitutes the content of this question, and could, on the contrary, be content with criticizing the Jewish religion and describing the Christian-German state.
Like all other original manifestations of absolute criticism, this method is a repetition of the speculative trick. Speculative philosophy, especially Hegelian philosophy, considered it necessary to translate all questions from the form of sound human common sense into the form of speculative reason and to transform the real question into a speculative one in order to be able to answer it. By distorting my questions and putting their own questions in my mouth, like a catechism, speculative

* - after the fact. Ed.

philosophy, of course, could, like a catechism, have a ready-made answer for each of my questions" (134-135) [99].
In the section written by Engels § 2a (... "Critique" and "Feuerbach." Condemnation of philosophy" ...) - p. 138-142 [101-104] - we find enthusiastic praises for Feuerbach. Regarding
the attacks of "criticism" on philosophy, setting it (philosophy) against the real wealth of human relations, "the vast content of history," "the significance of man," and so forth and so forth, up to the phrase: "the secret of the system is revealed" - Engels says:
"But who revealed the secret of the 'system'? Feuerbach. Who destroyed the dialectic of concepts - this war of the gods, known only to philosophers? Feuerbach.
Who replaced the old rubbish, including the 'infinite self-consciousness' - not with 'the significance of man' - as if man had any other significance than that he is a man! - but with the actual 'man'? Feuerbach and Feuerbach alone. He did even more. He long ago destroyed the categories which 'criticism' now hurls about:
'the real wealth of human relations, the vast content of history, the struggle of history, the struggle of the mass with the spirit,' and so on and so forth.
After man has been recognized as the essence, as the basis of all human activity and all human relations, only 'criticism' is capable of inventing new categories and transforming man himself, as it does, once again into some sort of category and the principle of a whole series of categories. In doing so, it indeed embarks on the only
path of salvation still available to the agitated and persecuted theological inhumanity.
History does nothing, it 'possesses no vast wealth,' it 'fights no battles'! Not 'history,' but precisely man, the actual, living man - he is the one who does everything, possesses everything, and fights for everything.
'History' is not some special personality that uses man as a means to achieve its own ends. History is nothing but the activity

SUMMARY OF THE BOOK BY MARX AND ENGELS "THE HOLY FAMILY"
of man pursuing his own aims. If, after Feuerbach's brilliant discoveries, absolute criticism still allows itself to resurrect all the
old rubbish in a new form"... (139-140) [102] and so on - then this fact alone is enough to judge the critical naivety, etc.
And then, regarding the opposition of "spirit" to "matter" (criticism called the mass "matter"), Engels says:
"So, is not absolute criticism truly Christian-German?
After the old opposition between spiritualism and materialism has exhausted itself in all directions through struggle and has been definitively overcome by Feuerbach, 'criticism' once again transforms it, and in the most repulsive form, into a fundamental dogma and delivers victory to the 'Christian-German spirit'" (141) [103].

Regarding Bauer's words: "To the extent that the Jews have advanced in the realm of theory, they are indeed emancipated; to the extent that they want to be free, they are free" 15, Marx says:
"This proposition allows us to immediately measure the critical abyss that separates the mass, earthly communism and socialism from absolute socialism. The first proposition of earthly socialism rejects the emancipation exclusively in the realm of theory as an illusion and demands, for real freedom, besides the idealistic 'will,' very tangible, very material conditions.
How lowly, compared to the holy criticism, stands the 'mass' - the mass, which considers material, practical revolutions necessary even to win the time and means needed at least for engaging in 'theory'!" (142) [104].
The further part (p. 143-167 [104-120]) - the most tedious, incredibly nitpicking critique of the "Literary Gazette," some kind of line-by-line commentary of the "tearing apart" type. Nothing interesting at all.
The end of §-fa (b) The Jewish Question No. II. 142-185 [104-131]) - p. 167-185 [120-131] provides an interesting response from Marx to Bauer's defense of his book "Judenfrage," which was criticized in the "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher" (Marx constantly refers to them). Here, Marx sharply and clearly emphasizes the fundamental principles of his entire worldview.
"Religious questions of the day now have social significance" - this was already
pointed out in the "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher." There, the "actual position of the Jews in modern bourgeois society" was characterized. "Mr. Bauer explains
the actual Jew from the Jewish religion instead of explaining the mystery of the Jewish religion from the actual Jew" (167-168) [120-121].
Mr. Bauer does not suspect "that the actual secular Jewry, and thus the religious Jewry, is constantly generated by the present bourgeois life and finds its highest development in the monetary system."
In the "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher," it was indicated that the development of Jewry should be sought "in commercial and industrial practice" - that practical Jewry is the "completed practice of the Christian world" (169) [121].
"It was proven that the task of overcoming the Jewish essence is, in reality, the task of abolishing the Jewish spirit of bourgeois society, the inhumanity of contemporary life practice, the culmination of which is the monetary system" (169) [122].
Demanding freedom, the Jew thereby demands something that in no way contradicts political freedom (172) [123-124] - the issue is political freedom.
"Mr. Bauer was shown that the division of man into a non-religious citizen of the state and a religious private individual in no way contradicts political emancipation."
Immediately following the above:
"He was shown that, just as the state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from state religion and leaving religion to itself within civil society, so too

SUMMARY OF THE BOOK BY MARX AND ENGELS "THE HOLY FAMILY"
and the individual is politically emancipated from religion, regarding it not as a public, but as a private matter. Finally, it was shown that the terrorist attitude of the French Revolution towards religion by no means contradicts this view, but, on the contrary, confirms it (172) [124].
The Jews want allgemeine Menschenrechte*.
"In the 'Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher' it was demonstrated to Mr. Bauer that this 'free humanity' and its 'recognition' are nothing other than the recognition of the egoistic civil individual and the unbridled movement of spiritual and material elements that constitute the content of this individual's life situation, the content of modern civil life; that therefore human rights do not liberate man from religion, but only grant him freedom of religion; that they do not liberate him from property, but grant him freedom of property, do not liberate him from the sordid pursuit of gain, but only grant him freedom of trade.
It was shown that the recognition of human rights by the modern state has the same meaning as the recognition of slavery by the ancient state.
Namely, just as the ancient state had slavery as its natural basis, so too the modern state has civil society as its natural basis, as well as the individual of civil society, i.e., the independent individual, connected with another individual only by the bonds of private interest and unconscious natural necessity, a slave to his trade and to his own, as well as to others' selfish needs. The modern state has recognized this, its natural basis, in the universal rights of man" (175) [125-126].
"The Jew has all the more right to the recognition of his 'free humanity,' as the 'free bourgeois society' is thoroughly commercial, Jewish in character, and the Jew is already in advance a necessary member of it."
That "human rights" are not innate but have arisen historically, Hegel already knew (176) [126].
Pointing out the contradictions of constitutionalism, "criticism" does not generalize them (fasst nicht den allgemeinen Widerspruch des Constitutionalismus*) (177-178) [127].
If it did, it would move from constitutional monarchy to the democratic representative state, to the perfected modern state (178) [127].
Industrial activity is not abolished by the abolition of privileges (guilds, corporations, etc.), but, on the contrary, develops even more strongly. Land ownership is not abolished by the abolition of landownership privileges, "on the contrary, only after the abolition of landownership privileges does its universal movement begin through free parceling and free disposal" (180) [129].
Trade is not abolished by the abolition of trade privileges, but only then becomes truly free trade, and so with religion: "in the same way, religion unfolds in its full practical universality only where there is no privileged religion (let us remember the United States of America)."

... "Precisely the slavery of bourgeois society, in appearance, is the greatest freedom"... (181) [129].
The dissolution (Auflösung) (182) [130] of the political existence of religion (the abolition of the state church), property (the abolition of the electoral franchise), etc. - corresponds to their "powerful life, which from now on freely submits to its own laws and unfolds in full breadth."
Anarchy is the law of the bourgeois society emancipated from privileges (182-183) [130].

* - does not understand the general contradiction of constitutionalism. Ed.

SUMMARY OF THE BOOK BY MARX AND ENGELS "THE HOLY FAMILY"
... C) CRITICAL BATTLE

WITH THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
"The ideas, Marx quotes Bauer, generated by the French Revolution, did not, however, lead beyond the order that it sought to violently overthrow."
Ideas can never lead beyond the old world order: in all cases, they can only lead beyond the ideas of the old world order.
Ideas in themselves can achieve nothing. For the realization of ideas, people are needed who must apply practical force" (186) [132].
The French Revolution gave rise to the ideas of communism (Babeuf), which, when developed consistently, contained the idea of a new Weltzustand*.
Regarding Bauer's statement that the state should hold back the individual egoistic atoms, Marx says (188-189) [133-134] that the members of bourgeois society are not actually atoms, but only imagine themselves to be such, for they do not suffice for themselves like atoms, but depend on other people, and their needs constantly place them in this dependence.
"Thus, natural necessity, the properties of human beings, however alienated they may appear, interest - these are what link the members of civil society together. The real bond between them is not political, but civil life... Only political superstition can still imagine in our time that the state should hold together civil life, whereas in reality, the opposite is true: civil life holds together the state" (189) [134].
Robespierre, Saint-Just, and their party perished because they confused the ancient, realistically democratic society based on slavery with the modern, spiritually democratic representative state based on bourgeois society. Before his execution, Saint-Just pointed to the table (Tabelle* - poster? hanging) of human rights and said: "C'est pourtant moi qui ai fait cela"*.
"Exactly on this board were proclaimed the rights of man, who, to the same extent, cannot be a man of the ancient republic, as his economic and industrial relations are not ancient" (192) [136].
On 18 Brumaire, Napoleon's prize was not the revolutionary movement, but the liberal bourgeoisie. After the fall of Robespierre, during the Directory, the prosaic realization of bourgeois society began: Sturm und Drang**

* - of the world order. Ed.
* - "But it was I who did this." Ed.
** - Storm and Stress. Ed.

the material intellect to produce a form, which is not in the potentiality of matter?» (201) [142]. The materialism of the 18th century was a direct continuation of this line. 

The hustle and bustle (Taumel) of new bourgeois life; "the actual enlightenment of French soil, whose feudal structure was shattered by the hammer of revolution, and which numerous new owners, in their first frenzied activities, now subjected to all-round processing; the first movements of liberated industry - these are some of the manifestations of the life of the newly born bourgeois society" (192-193) [136-137].

CHAPTER VI. ABSOLUTE CRITICAL CRITICISM,
OR CRITICAL CRITICISM IN THE PERSON OF MR. BRUNO
...3) THE THIRD CAMPAIGN OF ABSOLUTE
CRITICISM
...
d) THE CRITICAL BATTLE
WITH FRENCH MATERIALISM
(195-211) [138-148]
||¯This chapter (§ d in Part 3 of Chapter VI) is one of the most valuable in the book. There is no line-by-line criticism here, but rather a continuous positive exposition. This is a brief outline of the history of French materialism. One should transcribe the entire chapter, but I limit myself to a brief summary of its content.¯||

* - "And yet, I created it." Ed.
** - Sturm und Drang. Ed.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' BOOK "THE HOLY FAMILY"
French Enlightenment of the 18th century and French materialism is not only
a struggle against existing political institutions, but also an equally open
struggle against the metaphysics of the 17th century, specifically against the metaphysics of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz. "Philosophy was opposed to metaphysics, just as Feuerbach, in his first decisive move against Hegel, opposed sober philosophy to drunken speculation" (196) [139].

The 17th-century metaphysics, defeated by the 18th-century materialism, experienced a victorious and substantial (gehaltvolle) restoration in German philosophy, especially
in speculative German philosophy of the 19th century. Hegel ingeniously combined it with
all metaphysics and German idealism, and founded a metaphysical universal kingdom*. This was followed again by "an assault on speculative metaphysics and on all metaphysics in general. It will be forever defeated by materialism, which has now, thanks to the work of speculation itself, reached its completion and coincides with humanism. And just as Feuerbach became the exponent of materialism coinciding with humanism in the theoretical sphere, French and
English socialism and communism became the exponents of this materialism in
the practical sphere" (196-197) [139].
There are two directions of French materialism: 1) from Descartes, 2) from Locke. The latter leads directly to socialism** (197) [139].
The first, mechanical materialism, transforms into French natural science.
Descartes, in his physics, declared matter to be the only substance. Mechanical French materialism took Descartes' physics and discarded his metaphysics.
"The physician Leroy laid the foundation for this school, in the person of the physician Cabanis it reached its peak, and the physician La Mettrie was its center."

* - a metaphysical universal kingdom. Ed.
** - leads directly to socialism. Ed.

Descartes was still alive when Leroy transferred the mechanical construction of the animal to man, declaring the soul to be a mode of the body, and ideas to be mechanical movements (198)
[140]. Leroy even thought that Descartes had concealed his true opinion. Descartes protested.
At the end of the 18th century, Cabanis completed Cartesian materialism in the book "Rapports du physique et du morale de l'homme" 18.
The 17th-century metaphysics, from the very beginning, had an antagonist in materialism. Descartes - Gassendi, the restorer of Epicurean materialism 19, in England - Hobbes.
Voltaire (199) [140] noted that the indifference of the 18th-century French to Jesuit and other disputes was due more to financial speculations of Law than to philosophy. The theoretical movement toward materialism can be explained by the practical organization* of contemporary French life. Materialist practice corresponded to materialist theories.
The 17th-century metaphysics (Descartes, Leibniz) was still connected with positive (positivem) content. It made discoveries in mathematics, physics, etc. In the 18th century, positive sciences separated, and metaphysics became flat**.
In the year of Malebranche's death, Helvétius and Condillac were born (199-200) [141].
Pierre Bayle theoretically undermined 17th-century metaphysics with his weapon of skepticism 20. He primarily criticized Spinoza and Leibniz.
He proclaimed an atheistic society. He was "the last metaphysician in the sense of the 17th century and the first philosopher in the sense of the 18th century" (200-201) [142] - words of a French writer.
To this negative refutation, a positive, anti-metaphysical system was needed. This was provided by Locke.
Materialism - the son of Great Britain. Even its scholastic Duns Scotus asked himself: "Is the material intellect not capable of producing a form that is not in the potentiality of matter?" (201) [142].

* - organization. Ed.
** - became flat. Ed.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY" "Can matter think?". He was a nominalist. Nominalism is, in general, the first expression of materialism 21.
The true founder of English materialism is Bacon. ("The first and most important of the inherent properties of matter is motion - not only as mechanical and mathematical motion, but even more so as striving, as vital spirit, as tension, as agony (Qual) ... of matter" - 202 [142].)
"In Bacon, as its first creator, materialism still harbors in a naive form the seeds of comprehensive development. Matter smiles with its poetic-sensuous brilliance to the whole person."
In Hobbes, materialism becomes one-sided, menschenfeindlich, mechanisch*.
Hobbes systematized Bacon, but did not develop (begründet) his fundamental principle: the origin of knowledge and ideas from the world of senses (Sinnenwelt) - p. 203 [143].
As Hobbes destroyed the theistic prejudices of Baconian materialism, so Collins, Dodwell, Goward, Hartley, Priestley, etc., destroyed the last theological boundaries of Lockean sensationalism 22.
Condillac directed Locke's sensationalism against the metaphysics of the 17th century; he published a refutation of the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Malebranche 23.
The French "civilized" (205) [144] the materialism of the English.
In Helvétius (who also starts from Locke), materialism takes on a distinctly French character.
La Mettrie - a combination of Cartesian and English materialism.
Robinet - stands most closely in connection with metaphysics.
"As Cartesian materialism flows into natural science in the strict sense, so another direction of French materialism flows directly into socialism and communism" (206) [145].
From the premises of materialism, nothing is easier than to derive socialism (the reorganization of the sensory world,

* - hostile to humanity, mechanical. Ed.

to link private and general interest - to destroy antisocial Geburtsstätten* of crime, etc.).
Fourier proceeds directly from the teachings of the French materialists.
The Babouvists were crude, undeveloped materialists 24.
Bentham bases his system on the morality of Helvétius, and Owen derives from Bentham's system to justify English communism.
Cabet brings communist ideas from England to France (the most popular, though the shallowest** representative of communism) 208 [146]. "More scientific" are Dezamy, Gay, and others, who develop the teaching of materialism as real humanism.
On pages 209-211 [147-148], Marx provides, in a footnote (two pages of small print), excerpts from Helvétius, Holbach, and Bentham to prove the connection between 18th-century materialism and 19th-century English and French communism.
From the further sections, the following passage is worth noting:
"The dispute between Strauss and Bauer about substance and self-consciousness is a dispute within the limits of Hegelian speculation.
In Hegel's system, there are three elements: Spinozist substance, Fichtean self-consciousness, and the necessarily contradictory unity of both elements in Hegel - absolute spirit. The first element is nature, metaphysically disguised in its separation from man, the second is spirit, metaphysically disguised in its separation from nature, and the third is the metaphysically disguised unity of both factors, the actual man and the actual human race" (220) [154], and the following paragraph on Feuerbach:
"Strauss and Bauer both consistently applied Hegel's system to theology. The former took Spinozism as his starting point, the latter - Fichte. Both criticized Hegel because in Hegel each

* - sources. Ed.
** - the most popular, though the shallowest. Ed.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY" of the two mentioned elements is distorted by the intrusion of the other, while they developed each of these elements to its one-sided and, therefore, consistent development.
- In their criticism, both go beyond Hegel's philosophy, but at the same time, both remain within the limits of his speculation, and each represents only one side of his system.

Only Feuerbach completes and criticizes Hegel, starting from the Hegelian viewpoint.
By reducing the metaphysical absolute spirit to "actual man based on nature," Feuerbach completed the critique of religion and at the same time masterfully outlined the main features of the critique of Hegelian speculation and, thereby, of all metaphysics in general" (220-221) [154].
Marx ridicules Bauer's "theory of self-consciousness" for its idealism (sophisms of absolute idealism - 222 [155]), pointing out that it is a rephrasing of Hegel, quoting his "Phenomenology," and citing Feuerbach's critical remarks (from "Philosophy of the Future" 25, p. 35, on how philosophy negates - negiert - "materially sensuous," as theology negates "nature poisoned by original sin").
The next chapter (VII) begins again with a series of extremely tedious, nitpicking criticisms 1), pages 228-235 [159-164]. In § 2a - there is an interesting place.
Marx quotes from the "Literary Gazette" a letter from a "representative of the masses," who demands the study of reality, natural science, and industry (236)
[164] and who was insulted by "criticism":
"Or (!) do you think," - exclaimed the "critics" against this representative of the masses, - "that the cognition of historical reality is already complete? Or (!) do you know of a single historical period that has been truly cognized?"
"Or does critical criticism believe," - replies Marx, - "that it has at least reached the beginning of the cognition of historical reality, having excluded

No

ta

be

Is not the theoretical and practical relation of man to nature, natural science and industry, part of the historical movement? Or does it think that it has truly known any historical period without knowing, for example, the industry of this period, the immediate mode of production of life itself? Indeed, the spiritual, theological critical criticism is familiar—familiar, at least, in its imagination—only with the loud political, literary, and theological deeds of history.
Just as it separates thought from sensation, soul from body, itself from the world, so too it tears history away from natural science and industry, seeing the maternal womb of history not in the coarse material production on earth, but in the misty cloud formations in the sky (238) [165-166].
Criticism dubbed this representative of the masses a *massenhafter Materialist* (239) [166].
"For the French and the English, criticism is not some abstract, otherworldly entity standing outside humanity; it is the actual human activity of individuals who are active members of society, who, as people, suffer, feel, think, and act. Therefore, their criticism is also imbued with practice; their communism is a socialism in which they point out practical, tangible measures, in which not only their thinking but even more so their practical activity finds expression; their criticism is thus a living, real criticism of existing society, an understanding of the causes of 'decay'" (244) [169].
||¯The entire Chapter VII, 228-257 [159-178], except for the quoted passages, contains only the most incredible nitpicking, parodies, catching of the most trivial contradictions, and ridiculing of all sorts of foolishness in the "Literary Gazette" and the like.¯||
* - mass-like materialist. Ed.

SUMMARY OF THE BOOK BY MARX AND ENGELS "THE HOLY FAMILY"
In Chapter VIII (258-333 [179-228]) - we have a section on the "critical transformation of the butcher into a dog" - and further on Fleur de Marie by Eugène Sue (must be a novel under this title or one of the heroes of some novel 26) with some
"radical," but uninteresting remarks by Marx. Perhaps worth noting only p. 285 × [196-197] - a couple of remarks on Hegel's theory of punishment, p. 296 [203-204] against Eugène Sue's defense of solitary confinement (Cellularsystem).
((Apparently, Marx is protesting here against the superficial socialism propagated by Eugène Sue and apparently defended in the "Literary Gazette."))
For example, Marx ridicules Sue for the idea of rewarding virtue by the state, just as vice is punished (p. 300-301 [207] even a comparative table of *justice criminelle* and *justice vertueuse*!).
P. 306-306 [209-210]: Critical remarks against Hegel's "Phenomenology."
307 [211]: But sometimes in his "Phenomenology," Hegel gives—despite his theory—a real characterization of human relations.
309 [212]: Charity as the **play** of the rich (309-310) [212-213].
312-313 [214]: Quotes from Fourier on the degradation of women, very striking 27
||¯against the moderate wishes of "criticism" and Rudolph, - a character in Eugène Sue?¯||
× "According to Hegel, punishment is the sentence that the criminal pronounces over himself.
Hans developed this theory more extensively. In Hegel, this theory is a speculative veil over the ancient *jus talionis*, which Kant developed as the only legal theory of punishment. In Hegel, the self-condemnation of the criminal remains only an 'idea,' a speculative interpretation of common empirical criminal punishments. Therefore, he leaves the choice of the form of punishment to each given stage of state development, i.e., he leaves punishment as it exists. In this, he is a greater critic than his critical echo. A theory of punishment that recognizes the criminal as a person can do so only in abstraction, in imagination, precisely because punishment, coercion, contradicts human behavior. Moreover, the practical implementation of such a theory would prove impossible. The place of the abstract law would be taken by purely subjective arbitrariness, for it would depend on the discretion of official 'respectable and decent' persons how to adapt the punishment to the individuality of the criminal in each case. Plato already understood that the law must be one-sided and must abstract from individuality. On the contrary, in human relations, punishment will indeed be no more than a sentence that the offender pronounces over himself. No one would think of convincing him that the external violence inflicted upon him by others is violence he has inflicted upon himself. In other people, he will, on the contrary, find natural saviors from the punishment he has imposed on himself, i.e., the relationship will be directly opposite" (285-286) [196-197].
"The secret of this" (305) [209] (a quote from "Anekdota" 28 above) "Bauerian boldness lies in Hegel's 'Phenomenology.' Since Hegel in the 'Phenomenology' places self-consciousness in the place of man, the most diverse human reality appears here only as a certain form of self-consciousness, as a determinacy of self-consciousness.
But bare determinacy of self-consciousness is a 'pure category,' bare 'thought,' which I can therefore abolish in 'pure' thinking.

* - criminal justice and virtuous justice! Ed.
** - play. Ed.
*** - law of identical retribution. Ed.

SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY"
The material, sensory, and objective foundations of the various forms of human self-alienation are left untouched in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and all the destructive work resulted in the most conservative philosophy |*Sic!*|, because such a viewpoint imagines that it has overcome the objective, sensuously real world, once it has transformed it into a "thought-thing," into pure self-consciousness, and can now dissolve the etherealized opponent in the "ether of pure thought."
Therefore, the *Phenomenology* quite consistently ends by placing "absolute knowledge" in place of all human reality—knowledge because this is the only mode of existence for self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is considered the only mode of existence for man—absolute knowledge because self-consciousness knows only itself and is no longer constrained by any objective world.
Hegel makes man the man of self-consciousness, instead of making self-consciousness the self-consciousness of man—the real man, i.e., one living in the real, objective world and conditioned by it. Hegel puts the world on its head and for this reason can overcome all limits in the mind, which, of course, does not at all prevent them from continuing to exist for the bad senses, for the real man.
Moreover, for him, everything that testifies to the limitations of universal self-consciousness—every sense, reality, individuality of people and their world—inevitably becomes a limit. The entire *Phenomenology* aims to prove that self-consciousness is the sole and all-encompassing reality... (306) [210].
... "Finally, it goes without saying that if Hegel's *Phenomenology*, despite its speculative original sin, provides many elements of a real characterization of human relations,

* - indeed! Ed.

then Mr. Bruno and company, on the contrary, provide only a contentless caricature"... (307) [211].

"Thus, Rudolf unwittingly expressed the long-discovered secret that human poverty, infinite rejection, forced to beg, should serve as entertainment for the monetary aristocracy and the aristocracy of education, should exist to satisfy their vanity, to tickle their pride, for amusement.
Numerous charitable unions in Germany, numerous charitable societies in France, numerous quixotic charitable enterprises in England, concerts, balls, performances, dinners for the benefit of the poor, even collections for victims of accidents—all of this has no other meaning" (309-310) [212].
And Marx quotes from Eugène Sue:
"Oh, madam! It is not enough to dance for the benefit of these poor Poles... let us be philanthropists to the end... let us now go to dinner for the benefit of the poor/” (310) [213].
On pages 312-313, there are quotations from Fourier (adultery—good form, infanticide by seduced women—a vicious circle... "The degree of women's emancipation is a natural measure of general emancipation"... (312) [214]. Civilization transforms every vice from simple to complex, ambiguous, and hypocritical), and Marx adds:
"It is entirely unnecessary to counterpose Rudolf's arguments with Fourier's masterful characterization of marriage, as well as the works of the materialist faction of French communism" (313) [214].

Page 313 [215] and following, against the political-economic projects of Eugène Sue and Rudolf (is he the hero of Sue's novel?), projects on the association of the rich and the poor and the organization of labor (which the state should do) etc.—for example, the Armenbank*— SUMMARY OF MARX AND ENGELS' "THE HOLY FAMILY"
b) "Bank for the Poor," pages 314-318 [215-217] = interest-free loans to the unemployed. Marx takes the figures from the project and shows their insignificance compared to the need.
And the idea behind the Armenbank is no better than savings banks*... that is, the institution** of the bank rests on the "fantastic notion that it suffices to change the distribution of labor remuneration for the worker to live throughout the year" (316-317) [217].
In § c 318-320 [218-219], "Model Farm in Bukvale," the praised "critique" project of Rudolf, depicting a model farm, is criticized: Marx declares it utopian, as on average, each Frenchman gets only 1/4 pound of meat per day, only 93 frs. annual income, etc., and in the project, they work twice as much as usual, etc. etc. ((Uninteresting.))
320 [219]: "The miraculous means by which Rudolf accomplishes all his saving deeds and miraculous cures lies not in his beautiful words but in his ready cash. Such are the moralists, says Fourier. One must be a millionaire to be able to imitate their heroes.

Morality is 'impuissance, mise en action'* 29. Every time it enters into conflict with some vice, it suffers defeat. And Rudolf does not even rise to the level of independent morality, which, at least, rests on the consciousness of human dignity. His morality, on the contrary, rests on the consciousness of human weakness. He is a representative of theological morality" (320-321) [219].
... "As in reality, all differences increasingly merge into the difference between the poor and the rich, so in idea, all aristocratic differences transform into the opposition between good and evil. This distinction is the final form given by the aristocrat to his prejudices"... (323-324) [221].

* - savings banks. Ed.
** - the institution. Ed.

... "Rudolf ascribes infinite importance to every movement of his soul. He, therefore, constantly observes and evaluates them..." (Examples). "This high-ranking gentleman resembles the activists of 'Young England,' who also want to reform the world, perform noble deeds, and are subject to similar hysterical attacks"... (326) [223].
|

|

|

|——|

|

|

Is Marx not referring here to the English philanthropic Tories who pushed for the 10-hour bill? 30
——