# Notes on the Moscow City-Wide Party Conference
# Source: Lenin Miscellany XI, p. 85
# Date: 1918-05-13

The documents printed below, the "Draft Theses" and "Theses
on the Current Political Situation", characterize the inter-
national and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic in the
middle of May 1918.
The history of the drafting and discussion of these theses is as follows:
Shortly after the meeting of the Central Committee of the party on May 6, at which Lenin's proposals were adopted (see document 30, p. 76), Lenin wrote the "Draft Theses on the Current Political Situation", which was discussed at the Central Committee, in all probability,
on May 10, along with the draft resolution by G. Ya. Sokolnikov
(see appendix,
p. 79).
The resolution of G. Ya. Sokolnikov was rejected by the Central Committee, while Lenin's theses in their final ver-
sion were discussed at the meeting of the Central Committee on May 13, and on the basis of them
Lenin was instructed to deliver a report on the same day
at the meeting of the Moscow city-wide party conference.
Lenin's theses were adopted as a resolution at the city-wide conference by an overwhelming majority.
The following day, they were also adopted by the district conference by
43 votes against 42 who voted for N. I.
Bukharin's resolution, with 2 abstentions.
The "Theses on the Current Political Situation" were most fully developed in Lenin's report on foreign policy
at the joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet on May 14,
1918 (see Works, vol. XXIII, pp. 3–46).
The discussion of the theses ended with their adoption by the Moscow
Regional Conference on May 15, 1918 (see Works, vol. XXIII,
p. 47 and footnote 2 p. 536). The theses were not pub-
lished in the press. Printed from the manuscript.
31.
[symbol]

* DRAFT THESES ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL
SITUATION *.
[May 10-13, 1918]
The political situation has worsened in recent days, firstly, due to the approaching offensive by
Japan;
* The manuscript document bears an inscription in Denin's hand to the
following effect: "will still be corrected. Cannot be printed, copies cannot be made."
The inscription was made in pencil after the main text, which was written in ink. Ed.

secondly, due to the emerging turn in German politics from a more or less diplomatic inclination towards
peace with Russia — a turn towards the likely victory of the German war
party, striving for an immediate offensive; thirdly, due to the restoration of bourgeois monarchism by the
Cadet-Octobrist party in the Ukraine, with the help of the German
army; fourthly, due to the greatest exacerbation of famine and
food shortages in connection with the occupation of Ukraine and the cutting off
of us from Rostov and the [Northern] Caucasus.
This exacerbation of the political situation, this intensification
of the counter-revolutionary pressure obliges the Soviet government to intensify
agitation and explanation to the masses of the created formidable dan-
ger and the need for increased military preparation; on the other
hand, to intensify the most decisive measures against our
bourgeoisie [Russian],* who are raising their heads with their counter-
revolutionary plans.
The foreign policy of the Soviet government should in no way
be changed. We are still threatened in the most real way
— and at this moment more strongly and closely than yesterday,—
by the movement** of Japanese troops with the aim of diverting German troops
by advancing deep into European Russia, and on the other hand,
by the movement of German troops against Petrograd and Moscow, in the event of the victory of the German war party. We still need
to respond to these dangers with tactics of retreat, waiting,
and maneuvering, continuing the most intensive military preparation.
Along with this, it should be recognized that the Russian
bourgeoisie is using the weapon of sowing panic with extreme impudence and that
our agitation, aimed at tightening discipline in
* Originally Lenin wrote; "against the bourgeoisie Russian]", but
already in mid-word he crossed out "Russ" and added "our", indicating with numbers above the order of rearrangement of the words. Ed.
** In the manuscript — a typo: "движения" [movements] is written. Ed.

DRAFT THESES ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUAT. POSITION!!

for intensified military preparation, should not cross the line
when we ourselves contribute to panic (which is noticeable in the unstable
political statements of some comrades, sometimes playing at "leftism").
Appendix.
RESOLUTION OF G. YA. SOKOLNIKOV
(PROPOSED
BY HIM AT THE MEETING
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.
MAY 10
1918)*
The Central Committee believes that the coup d'état in Ukraine means
the creation of a new political situation, characterized by the alliance
of the Russian bourgeoisie with German imperialism. Under these conditions, war
with Germany is inevitable, the respite — given by the Brest Peace —
is over. The task of the party is to begin immediate open
and mass preparation for military operations and the organization of resistance
through broad mobilizations. At the same time, it is necessary to conclude
a military agreement with the Anglo-French coalition on the subject of military
cooperation on specific terms.
* Printed from the manuscript in the archive of the Lenin Institute
(archive No. 3277). Ed.

32.
[symbol]
THESES ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL
SITUATION.
[May 13, 1918]
I.
It has been repeatedly pointed out in the Bolshevik press and
acknowledged in the Official resolutions of the highest Soviet
authorities [the] extreme* precariousness of the international
position of the Soviet republic, surrounded by imperialist
powers.
In recent days, i.e., in the first third of May 1918, the poli-
tical situation has become extremely acute both due to external
and due to internal reasons:
First, the direct offensive of counter-revolutionary troops (Semyonov and others) with the help of the Japanese in the Far East has intensified, and in connection with this, a number of signs indicated the possibility
of an agreement of the entire anti-German imperialist coalition on
the program of presenting Russia with an ultimatum: either fight with Ger-
many or [do] the invasion of the Japanese with our help.
Secondly, in German politics in general, the war party has gained the upper hand after
Brest, which could at any moment and now gain the upper hand on the issue of an immediate general offensive
against Russia, i.e., completely reject the other policy
of the bourgeois-imperialist circles of Germany, striving for new
annexations in Russia, but for a time** for peace with it, and not for a
general offensive against it.
* In the manuscript, Lenin corrected from "extreme".
Ed.
** "For a time" is written above, apparently, in the process of reviewing the
theses. Ed.

theses on the current political situation

Third, the restoration of bourgeois-landlord monarchism in
[text unclear] with the support of the Cadet-Octobrist elements of the All-Russian bourgeoisie and with the help of German troops could not but sharpen the struggle against counter-revolution among you, could not but inspire plans, and raise the spirit of our counter-revolution.
Fourth, the food crisis has become extremely acute and has led to outright famine in many places, both as a result of Rostov-on-Don being cut off from us, and as a result of the efforts of the petty bourgeoisie and capitalists in general to disrupt the grain monopoly, with an insufficiently firm, disciplined and ruthless rebuff from the ruling class, i.e., the proletariat, to these aspirations, efforts, and attempts.

II.
The foreign policy of the Soviet power should by no means be changed. Our military preparations are not yet complete, and therefore the general slogan remains the same as before: to maneuver, to retreat, to wait, continuing this preparation with all our might.

Without in any way rejecting [in principle against] military agreements in general with one of the imperialist coalitions against another in such cases when this agreement, without violating the foundations of Soviet power, could strengthen its position and paralyze the onslaught on it of any imperialist power, we cannot at the present moment enter into a military agreement with the Anglo-French coalition. For what is really important to it is the diversion of German troops from the West, i.e., the advance of many Japanese corps into European Russia, and this condition is unacceptable as a complete collapse of Soviet power. If the Anglo-French coalition were to present us with an ultimatum of this kind, we would answer with a refusal, for the danger of Japanese movement can be paralyzed with less difficulty (or can be delayed for a longer time) than the danger of the Germans occupying Petrograd, Moscow, and most of European Russia.*

* Before the bracket at the beginning of this paragraph and after the bracket at the end of it there is a note by Deviv: "Not for printing". Ed.
Leninist Collection XI

82
Leninist Collection

III.
When taking into account the tasks of the foreign policy of the Soviet power at the present moment, the greatest caution, circumspection and restraint are required, so as not to help, by an ill-considered or hasty step, the extreme elements of the military parties of Japan or Germany.

The fact is that in both these countries the extreme elements of the military party stand for an immediate and general offensive against Russia in order to occupy its entire territory and overthrow the Soviet power. And from minute to minute these extreme elements may gain the upper hand.

But, on the other hand, it is an undoubted fact that in Germany the majority of the imperialist bourgeoisie is against such a policy, preferring at the present moment* an annexationist peace with Russia to further war, on the grounds that such a war would divert forces from the West, would increase the already sensitive** precariousness of the internal situation in Germany, would make it difficult to obtain raw materials from places engulfed in revolt or damaged by the destruction of railways, from underseeding, etc., etc.

And the Japanese desire to advance against Russia is restrained, first, by the danger of movements and uprisings in China; second, by [a certain] antagonism of America, fearing the strengthening of Japan and hoping to obtain raw materials from Russia more easily in peacetime.

Of course, it is quite possible that in both Japan and Germany the extreme elements of the military party may gain the upper hand from minute to minute. There can be no guarantees against this until the revolution breaks out in Germany. The American bourgeoisie may collude with the Japanese; the Japanese with the German.*** Therefore, the most intensive military preparation is our unconditional duty.

But as long as there remains at least some chance of preserving peace, or of concluding, at the cost of certain new annexations,
* "At the present moment" is written above. Ed.
** The words: "already sensitive" are written above. Ed.
*** The phrase: "The American bourgeoisie may collude with the Japanese; the Japanese with the German" was inserted by Lenin as a footnote. Ed.

THESES ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

or new losses, peace with Finland, Ukraine, and Turkey, we must by no means take a single step that could help the extreme elements of the military party of the imperialist powers.

IV.
In the question of intensified military preparation, as in the question of the fight against hunger, the organizational task comes first.

There can be no question of any serious military preparation without overcoming food difficulties, without ensuring the population a proper supply of bread, without introducing the strictest order in railway transport, without creating among the masses of the working population * (and not only in its upper echelons) truly iron discipline. It is precisely in this area that we are most lagging behind.

[Precisely] It is precisely with a complete misunderstanding of this truth that the Left SR and anarchist elements sin the most, with their cries about "insurgent" committees, with their wails: "to arms," etc. Such cries and wails are the height of stupidity and the most жалкие, презренные п отвратительные phrases, for it is ridiculous to talk about "insurrection" and "insurgent committees" when the central Soviet power is doing its utmost to persuade the population to learn military affairs and to arm; — when we have much more weapons than we know how to count and distribute; — when it is precisely ruin and lack of discipline that prevents us from using the available weapons, forces us to miss precious time for preparation.

Intensified military preparation for a serious war requires not an impulse, not a call, not a battle slogan, but prolonged, tense, most persistent and disciplined work on a mass scale. It is necessary to give a merciless rebuff to the Left SR and anarchist elements who do not want to understand this, and not to allow them to infect some elements of our, proletarian-communist, party with their hysteria.

* Initially, Lenin wrote "in the masses of the population," but immediately added "working" and indicated the transposition of words with numbers above. Ed.
** "Precisely" is written above the crossed-out word "exactly", apparently, in the process of reviewing the theses. Ed.

V.
Against the bourgeoisie, who have raised their heads in recent days as a result of the circumstances mentioned above, a merciless struggle is necessary, the introduction of martial law, the closure of newspapers, the arrest of ringleaders, etc., etc. These measures are as necessary as a military campaign against the rural bourgeoisie who are withholding surplus* grain and disrupting the grain monopoly. Without the iron discipline of the proletariat, it is impossible to save ourselves either from counter-revolution or from hunger.

In particular, it must be borne in mind that the bourgeoisie in recent days have used such a weapon against the proletarian power with inimitable skill, with the dexterity of a virtuoso, as the sowing of panic. And some of our comrades, especially those unstable in relation to Left SR and anarchist revolutionary phrase-mongering, allowed themselves to be carried away, falling into a state of panic or not observing the thin line that separates legitimate and necessary warnings against impending dangers from the sowing of panic.

It is necessary to firmly remember the basic features of the entire current economic and political situation in Russia, by virtue of which it is impossible to help the cause with any impetuous actions. It is necessary to firmly assimilate and ensure the assimilation by all workers of the truth that "only sustained and patient work of creating and restoring iron proletarian discipline with merciless reprisals against hooligans, kulaks, and disorganizers is capable of defending Soviet power at the present moment, at the moment of one of the most difficult and dangerous transitions, which became** *** inevitable due to the delay of the revolution in the West.

*«Surplus» written above, apparently in the process of reviewing the theses. Ed.

**The beginning of the phrase "It is necessary to firmly assimilate and ensure the assimilation by all workers of the truth that"... was inserted by Lenin already in the process of reviewing the theses. Initially, this place in the theses was formulated as follows: after the word "impetuous actions" there was a comma and then it was written above: "but only sustained and patient work," etc. Reviewing the theses, Lenin, after the word "impetuous actions," instead of a comma, put a period, inserted the above beginning of the phrase, and instead of "but" wrote "that." Ed.

***In the manuscript—a typo, written: "which became" [stavshikh]. Ed.