V. I.

Lenin

1.Independent military action.

2.Leadership of the mass.

Thecontingents may be of any strength, beginning with two or three people.

Theymust arm themselves as best they can (rifles, revolvers, bombs, knives,
knuckle-dusters, sticks, rags soaked in kerosene for starting fires, ropes or
rope ladders, shovels for building barricades, pyroxylin cartridges, barbed
wire, nails [against cavalry], etc., etc.). Under no circumstances should they
wait for help from other sources, from above, from the outside; they must
procure everything themselves.

Asfar as possible, the contingents should consist of people who either live
near each other, or who meet frequently and regularly at definite hours
(preferably people of both categories, for regular meetings may be interrupted
by the uprising). They must arrange matters so as to be able to get together at
the most critical moments,, when things may take the most unexpected
turns. Therefore, each group must work out beforehand ways and means of joint
action: signs in windows, etc., so as to find each other easily; previously
agreed upon calls or whistles so that the comrades recognise one another in a
crowd; previously arranged signals in the event of meetings at night, etc.,
etc. Any energetic person, with the aid of two or three comrades, could work out
a whole series of such rules and methods, which should be drawn up, learned and
practised beforehand. It must not be forgotten that the chances are 100 to lb
that events will take us unawares, and that it will be necessary to come
together under terribly difficult conditions.

Evenwithout arms, the groups can play a most important part: 1) by leading the
mass; 2) by attacking, whenever a favourable opportunity presents itself,
policemen, stray Cossacks (as was the case in Moscow), etc., and seizing their
arms; 3) by rescuing the arrested or injured, when there are only few police
about; 4) by getting on to the roofs or upper storeys of houses, etc., and
showering stones or pouring boiling water on the troops, etc. Given sufficient
push, an organised and well-knit combat group constitutes a tremendous
force. Under no circumstances should the formation of the group be abandoned or
postponed on the plea of lack of arms.

Asfar as possible members of combat groups should have their duties assigned in
advance, leaders or chiefs of groups being sometimes selected in this way. It
would be unwise, of course, to play at conferring ranks, but the enormous
importance of uniform leadership and rapid and determined action should not be
forgotten. Determination and push are three-quarters of success.

Assoon as the groups are formed—i.e., right now—they must get down
to comprehensive work—not only theoretical, but most certainly practical
work as well. By theoretical work we mean a study of military science, an
acquaintance with military problems, the arrangement of lecture meetings on
military questions, talks by military men (officers, non-commissioned officers,
etc., etc., including also workers who have served in the army); the reading,
discussion and assimilation of illegal pamphlets and newspaper articles on
street fighting, etc., etc.

Practicalwork, we repeat, should be started at once. This falls into
preparatory work and military operations. The preparatory work includes
procuring all kinds of arms and ammunition, securing premises favourably located
for street fighting (convenient for fighting from above, for storing bombs and
stones, etc., or acids to be poured on the police, etc., etc.; also suitable for
headquarters, for collecting information, for sheltering fugitives from the
police, for use as hospitals, etc., etc.). Further, preliminary activity
includes the immediate work of reconnaissance and gathering
information—obtaining plans of prisons, police stations, ministries, etc.,
ascertaining the routine in government offices, banks, etc., and learning how they are guarded, endeavouring to
establish contacts which could be of use (with employees in police
departments, banks, courts, prisons, post- and telegraph-offices, etc.),
ascertaining the where abouts of arsenals, of all the gunsmiths’ shops in
the city, etc. There is a great deal of this sort of work to be done,
and—what is more—it is work in which even those who are quite
incapable of engaging in street fighting, even the very weak, women,
youngsters, old people, and so on, can be of immense service. Efforts
should be made immediately to get into combat groups absolutely all those
who want to take part in the uprising, for there is no such person, nor can there be one, who, provided he desires to work, cannot
be of immense value, even if he is unarmed and is personally incapable of
fighting.

Further,revolutionary army groups should under no circumstances confine
themselves to preparatory work alone, but should begin military action as soon
as possible so as to

1) train their fighting forces;

2) reconnoitre the enemy’s
vulnerable spots;

3) inflict partial defeats on the enemy;

4) rescue prisoners (the arrested);

5) procure arms;

6) obtain funds for the uprising (confiscation of government funds),
and so on and so forth. The groups can and should immediately take
advantage of every opportunity for active work, and must by no means
put matters off until a general uprising, because fitness for the
uprising cannot be acquired except by training under fire .

Allextremes, of course, are bad. All that is good and useful, if carried to
extremes, may become—and beyond a certain limit is bound to
become—bad and injurious. Disorderly, unorganised and petty terrorist
acts may, if carried to extremes, only scatter and squander our forces. That is
a fact, which, of course, should not be forgotten. On the other hand, under no
circumstances should it be forgotten that a slogan calling for an uprising
has already been issued , that the uprising has already begun .
To launch attacks under favourable circumstances is not only every
revolutionary’s right, but his plain duty. The killing of spies, policemen,
gendarmes, the blowing up of police stations, the liberation of prisoners, the
seizure of government funds for the needs of the uprising—such operations
are already being carried out wherever insurrection is rife, in Poland and in the Caucasus, and every
detachment of the revolutionary army must be ready to start such operations at a
moment’s notice. Each group should remember that if it allows a favourable
opportunity for such an operation to slip by today, it will be guilty of
unpardonable inactivity , of passivity—and such an offence is the
greatest crime a revolutionary can commit at a time of insurrection, the
greatest disgrace that can befall anyone who is striving for liberty in deed,
and not in word alone.

Asfor the composition of these combat groups, the following may be
said. Experience will show how many members are desirable in each group, and how
their duties should be distributed. Each group must itself begin to acquire this
experience, without waiting for instructions from outside. The local
revolutionary organisation should, of course, be asked to send a revolutionary
with military experience to deliver lectures, conduct discussions and give
advice, but if such a person is not available it is absolutely incumbent upon
the group to do this work itself.

Asregards Party divisions, it is natural that members of the same Party will
prefer to belong to the same group. But there should be no hard and fast rule
debarring members of other parties from joining. It is precisely here that we
must put into practice the alliance, the working agreement (without any merging
of parties, of course), between the socialist proletariat and revolutionary
democracy. Who ever wants to fight for liberty and proves in fact his readiness
to do so may be regarded as a revolutionary democrat, and we must strive to
carry on with such people the work of preparing for the uprising (provided, of
course, the given person or group is quite trustworthy). All other
“democrats” should be emphatically rejected as quasi-democrats, as
liberal windbags who must not be relied on at all, and whom it would be criminal
for a revolutionary to trust.

Itis, of course, desirable for combat groups to unite their activities. It
would be extremely useful to work out the forms and terms of joint action. Under
no circumstances, however, should this be carried to the extreme of inventing
complex plans and general schemes, or of postponing practical work for the sake
of pedantic concoctions, etc. The uprising will inevitably take place under circumstances in which the unorganised
elements will outnumber the organised thousands of times over; there will
inevitably be cases when it will be necessary to take immediate action,
right then and there, in twos or even singly—and one must be
prepared to act on ones s own initiative, and at one’s own risk. All
delays, disputes, procrastination and indecision spell ruin to the cause
of the uprising. Supreme determination, maximum energy, immediate
utilisation of each suitable moment, immediate stimulation of the
revolutionary ardour of the mass and the direction of this ardour to more
vigorous and the most determined action—such is the prime duty of a
revolutionary.

Thefight against the Black Hundreds is an excellent type of military action,
which will train the soldiers of the revolutionary army, give them
their baptism of fire, and at the same time be of tremendous benefit to the
revolution. Revolutionary army groups must at once find out who organises the
Black Hundreds and where and how they are organised, and then, without confining
themselves to propaganda (which is useful, but inadequate) they must act with
armed force, beat up and kill the members of the Black-Hundred gangs, blow up
their headquarters, etc., etc.

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