Written in the second half of October 1906

Printed according to the text of the pamphlet

---

The question of the electoral campaign for the second Duma has become of great interest to the workers' party. Particular attention is being devoted to "blocs," i.e., permanent and temporary electoral agreements of the S.D.'s with other parties during elections. The bourgeois, Cadet press – both "Rech'" and "Tovarishch" and "Novy Put'" and "Oko"{56}, and so on – are doing everything possible to convince the workers of the necessity of a "bloc" (electoral agreement) between the S.D.'s and the Cadets. The S.D. Mensheviks are partly in favor of such blocs (Cherevarin in "Our Cause" and "Tovarishch"), partly against (Martov in "Tovarishch"). The Bolshevik S.D.'s speak out against blocs, permitting only at the highest stages of the electoral campaign particular agreements concerning the distribution of seats on the basis of the strength of revolutionary and opposition parties in the preliminary voting of electors.

Let us attempt to set forth briefly the grounds for this latter point of view.

## I

Social-democracy regards parliamentarism (participation in representative assemblies) as one of the means of enlightening, educating, and organizing the proletariat into an independent class party, as one of the means of political struggle for the liberation of the workers. This Marxist view decisively separates social-democracy, on the one hand, from bourgeois democracy, and on the other hand, from anarchism. Bourgeois liberals and radicals see in parliamentarism the "natural" and only normal, only legitimate way of conducting state affairs in general, denying class struggle and the class character of modern parliamentarism. The bourgeoisie exerts every effort, employs every conceivable method, and seizes every opportunity to blindfold the workers so they do not see how parliamentarism is an instrument of bourgeois oppression, so they do not become conscious of the historically-conditioned significance of parliamentarism. The anarchists also are unable to evaluate parliamentarism in its historically-determined significance, refusing to employ such a means of struggle altogether. Social-democrats in Russia therefore struggle resolutely both against anarchism and against the bourgeoisie's endeavor to conclude the revolution as quickly as possible through a deal with the old authorities on the basis of parliament. They subordinate all their parliamentary activity entirely and unconditionally to the general interests of the workers' movement and to the special tasks of the proletariat in the contemporary, bourgeois-democratic, revolution.

From this it follows, first of all, that the participation of the S.D.'s in the Duma campaign bears a completely different character than the participation of other parties. Unlike them, we do not recognize any self-sufficient or even predominant significance for this campaign. Unlike them, we subordinate this campaign to the interests of class struggle. Unlike them, we do not make parliamentarism for the sake of parliamentary reforms the slogan of this campaign, but rather revolutionary struggle for a Constituent Assembly, and moreover struggle in its highest forms, flowing from the historical development of forms of struggle in recent years[15].

## II

What conclusion follows from the above with respect to electoral agreements? First of all, this: that our chief and primary task is the development of class consciousness and independent class organization of the proletariat, as the only thoroughly revolutionary class, as the only possible leader of a victorious bourgeois-democratic revolution. Therefore, the class independence of the entire electoral and entire Duma campaign – this is our most important overall task. Other, particular tasks are not denied by this, but they must always be subordinated to it, made consistent with it. From this general premise, confirmed both by the theory of Marxism and by all the experience of international social-democracy, we must absolutely proceed.

It might seem that the special tasks of the proletariat in the Russian revolution at once overturn this general premise. Namely, large-scale bourgeoisie have already betrayed the revolution in the form of the Octobrists, or have set themselves the goal of halting the revolution by means of a constitution (the Cadets); the victory of the revolution is possible only with the support of the proletariat by the most advanced and conscious part of the peasant masses, which their objective position drives toward struggle, not toward a deal, toward the completion and not the blunting of the revolution. From this – some might conclude – agreements between the S.D.'s and peasant democracy throughout all elections become obligatory.

But such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the completely correct premise that the full victory of our revolution is possible only in the form of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It is still necessary to prove that a bloc with peasant democracy throughout the elections is possible and advantageous from the point of view of the given party relationships (peasant democracy is represented among us now not by one but by different parties) and from the point of view of the given electoral system. It is still necessary to prove that through a bloc with this or that party we will better express and defend the interests of genuinely revolutionary peasantry than through the complete independence of our party in criticizing such-and-such peasant-democratic parties, in opposing some elements of peasant democracy to others. From the premise of the closest proximity of the proletariat to revolutionary peasantry in this given revolution, there follows absolutely a general political "line" of the S.D.'s: together with peasant democracy against the traitorous large-bourgeois "democracy" (the Cadets). But does it follow from this that right now an electoral bloc with the Populist Socialists (n.-s. – the Popular Socialist Party) or with the Socialist-Revolutionaries is necessary? This cannot yet be said without analyzing the distinctions between these parties and between them and the Cadets, without analyzing the present electoral system with its multiplicity of stages. From this follows immediately and absolutely only one thing: in no case can we in our electoral campaign confine ourselves to bare and abstract opposition of the proletariat to bourgeois democracy in general. On the contrary, we must direct all our attention to the precise, derived from the data of the history of our revolution, distinction between liberal-monarchical and revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie, to the distinction between Cadets, Populist Socialists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries, to speak more concretely. Only through such a distinction will we most correctly determine our nearest "allies." We shall not forget, first, that the S.D.'s must watch every ally from bourgeois democracy as an enemy. And second, we must still especially analyze what is more advantageous for us: either to tie our hands with a general bloc with some Populist Socialists (for example), or to preserve complete independence so that at the decisive moment we will always have the ability to split the non-party "toilers" into opportunists (n.-s.) and revolutionaries (s.-r.), to oppose the latter to the former, and so forth.

Thus, the consideration of the proletarian-peasant character of our revolution does not yet give us the right to conclude that agreements with this or that peasant-democratic party at this or that stage of the elections for the second Duma are necessary. This consideration is far from sufficient even for limiting proletarian class independence in elections in general, to say nothing of denying such independence.

## III

In order to approach closer to the solution of our task, we must, first, take a look at the basic party grouping in the elections for the second Duma, and second, penetrate into the peculiarities of the given electoral system.

Electoral agreements exist between parties. What then are the main types of parties that will struggle in the elections? The Black Hundreds will, beyond doubt, unite together even more closely than in the elections to the first Duma. The Octobrists and the "Progressivists" (Party of Peaceful Renewal) will either attach themselves to them, or to the Cadets, or (most likely) will waver between the Black Hundreds and the Cadets. In any case, to consider the Octobrists a "party of the center" (as L. Martov does in his new pamphlet: "Political Parties in Russia") is a fundamental error: in the actual struggle, which must decide the ultimate outcome of our revolution, the center is represented by the Cadets. The Cadets are an organized party that goes independently into the elections, being moreover intoxicated with their success in the elections to the first Duma. But this party has discipline that is not of the strictest sort and cohesion that is not of the strongest. The left Cadets are discontented with their defeat in Helsinki{57} and are creating disturbances. A section of them (recently Mr. Aleksinsky in Moscow) goes over to the Populist Socialists. In the first Duma there were such "exceptionally-rare" Cadets who subscribed even to the draft of the Thirty-Three on the abolition of all private property in land (Badamshin, Zubchenko, Lozhkin). This means that breaking off even a negligible fragment of this "center" toward the left is not hopeless. The Cadets feel perfectly well their weakness among the people's masses (recently the Cadet "Tovarishch" itself was compelled to acknowledge this{58}) and would gladly enter into blocs with the left. It is not for nothing that the Cadet newspapers with touching joy opened their columns to the social-democrats Martov and Cherevarin for discussion of the question of a bloc between the S.D.'s and the Cadets. We, of course, will never forget and will explain to the masses during the electoral campaign that the Cadets have not fulfilled their promises in the first Duma, hindered the Labor Group, engaged in constitutional games, and so on and so forth, up to silence about the four-tailed eagle{59}, to penal bills, and the like.

Next come the "toilers." This type, i.e., petty-bourgeois and predominantly peasant, parties split into the non-party "Labor Group" (which recently held its own congress), Populist Socialists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries (the Polish Socialist Party and similar ones correspond more or less to the Socialist-Revolutionaries). Only the Socialist-Revolutionaries are somewhat consistent and decisive revolutionaries and republicans. The Populist Socialists are opportunists far worse than our Mensheviks, semi-Cadets, strictly speaking. The non-party "Labor Group," perhaps more influential than both the others among the peasant masses, but the degree of decisiveness of their democracy is difficult to determine, although they are undoubtedly far to the left of the Cadets and apparently belong to revolutionary democracy.

Social-democracy is the only party that will enter the elections, despite its internal disputes, in disciplined fashion to the end – which has a wholly defined and strictly class basis – which has united all S.D. parties of all peoples of Russia.

But how can one make a general bloc with the "toilers" given the composition of this type of parties outlined above? Where are the guarantees for the non-party toilers? Is a bloc of a party with non-party elements even possible? Why do we know that Messrs. Aleksinsky will not tomorrow return from the Populist Socialists to the Cadets?

It is clear that genuinely party agreement with the toilers is impossible. It is clear that in no case can we help to unite the opportunist Populist Socialists and revolutionary Socialist-Revolutionaries, but must instead split them and oppose them to one another. It is clear that given the existence of a non-party Labor Group it is advantageous to us in all respects to preserve complete independence in order to influence them in an absolutely revolutionary spirit than to tie our hands and obscure the distinctions between monarchists and republicans, and so on. Such obscuring is absolutely impermissible for the S.D.'s, and on this ground alone one must absolutely reject blocs, as long as the present grouping of parties unites non-party toilers, Populist Socialists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Are they truly combinable and actually combined? They are undoubtedly combinable, because the petty-bourgeois class basis is one and the same. They were actually combined in the first Duma, and in the newspapers of the October period, and in the newspapers of the Duma period, and in the voting among the students (si licet parva componere magnis – if it is permissible to compare small things to great ones). Indeed, this is a small, but characteristic, symptom in connection with others: in the voting of "autonomous" student bodies, three lists frequently clashed: Cadets, a bloc of toilers, Populist Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and similar parties, and finally the S.D.'s.

From the point of view of the proletariat, clarity in the class grouping of parties stands above all else, and the advantage of independent influence on non-party (or vacillating between Populist Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries) toilers is obvious compared to attempts at agreement of a party with non-party elements. The data about the parties inevitably push toward the conclusion: no absolute blocs at the lowest stage, in agitation before the masses; at the highest stages direct all efforts so that in the distribution of seats we defeat the Cadets through a particular agreement of S.D.'s and toilers – defeat the Populist Socialists through a particular agreement of S.D.'s and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Some will object to us: while you, incorrigible utopian Bolsheviks, dream of defeating the Cadets, you will all be defeated by the Black Hundreds, because you will split the vote! The social-democrats, toilers, and Cadets together would surely defeat the Black Hundreds decisively, but acting separately, you may hand easy victory to the common enemy. Let us suppose that the Black Hundreds have 26 votes out of 100, the toilers and Cadets 25 each, the social-democrats 24. A Black Hundred representative will win if there is no bloc of S.D.'s, toilers, and Cadets.

This objection is often taken as serious, and it must be analyzed carefully. But in order to analyze it, one must examine the given, i.e., the present, Russian electoral system.

## IV

Elections to the Duma in our country are not direct, but occur in multiple stages. In multiple-stage elections, the splitting of votes is dangerous only at the lowest stage. Only when the preliminary electors go to vote do we not know how the votes will split; only in agitation before the masses do we act "in the dark." At the higher stages, when elections occur through elected electors, the general battle is already finished; what remains is the distribution of seats through particular agreement of the parties, knowing the exact number of their candidates and their votes.

The lowest stage of elections is the selection of electors in cities, the selection of village headmen in the countryside, and the selection of delegates in the workers' curia.

In the cities we appear in each electoral district (ward, etc.) before a large mass of electors. The danger of splitting votes is indisputable. It is indisputable that in the cities Black Hundred electors can in some places pass exclusively thanks to the absence of a "bloc of the left," exclusively thanks to the distraction, for example, of a section of votes from a Cadet by social-democrats. It is remembered that in Moscow Guchkov received something around 900 votes, the Cadets – around 1400. It would have been enough for the social-democrats to take away 501 votes from the Cadet, and Guchkov would have turned out to be the winner. And it is beyond doubt that the ordinary bourgeoisie will note this simple mechanics, will fear the splitting of votes, will be inclined because of this to vote only for the most moderate of the opposition. The result will be what is called in England "triangular" elections, when the urban petty bourgeoisie fears voting for a socialist so as not to take votes away from a liberal and thereby hand victory to a conservative.

What can be the remedy for this danger? Only one: agreements at the lowest stage, i.e., a general list of electors, in which the party candidates are selected in a number determined by agreement between the parties before the struggle. All parties entering into the agreement then call upon the entire mass of electors to vote precisely for this one general list.

Let us analyze the arguments for and against the use of such a procedure.

Arguments for: agitation can be conducted in a strictly party manner. Let the S.D.'s criticize the Cadets as much as they wish before the masses, only let them add: and yet they are better than the Black Hundreds, and we have agreed on a general list.

Arguments against: a general list will be a glaring contradiction with all the independent, class policy of the S.D.'s. By recommending a general list of Cadets and S.D.'s to the masses, we inevitably confuse the clarity of class and political divisions to an extreme degree. We undermine the principled and general-revolutionary significance of our campaign for the sake of winning a seat in the Duma for a liberal! We subordinate class policy to parliamentarism instead of subordinating parliamentarism to class policy. We deprive ourselves of the ability to take stock of our forces. We lose that which is lasting and solid in all elections: the development of consciousness and cohesion of the socialist proletariat. We gain that which is transitory, conditional, and uncertain: the advantage of a Cadet over an Octobrist.

And for what do we expose to danger the solid work of socialist education? For the danger of Black Hundred candidates? But all the cities of Russia together give only 35 deputy seats in the Duma out of 524 (St. Petersburg – 6, Moscow – 4, Warsaw and Tashkent – 2 each, the remaining 21 cities – one each). This means that the cities by themselves in no case can substantially change the physiognomy of the Duma. And then one cannot limit oneself to a mere formal consideration of the arithmetic possibility of vote-splitting. One must examine whether the political probability of this is great. And such an examination shows that the Black Hundreds even in the elections to the first Duma had an insignificant minority, and cases like the "Guchkov case" cited above are exceptions. According to data from the "Herald of the Cadet Party"{60} (1906, 19/IV, no. 7), in 20 cities that sent 28 deputies to the Duma, of 1761 electors there were 1468 Cadets, 32 Progressivists, and 25 non-party members. Octobrists – 128, commercial-industrial – 32, and rightists – 76, i.e., a total of 236 rightists, less than 15%. In 10 cities not a single rightist elector passed, in 3 cities – no more than 10 electors (out of 80) from the rightists. Is it reasonable, under such conditions, to refuse to fight for our own, class, candidates out of exaggerated fear of the Black Hundreds? Will not such a policy be guilty, aside from principled instability, of shortsightedness even from a narrow practical point of view?

And what about a bloc with the toilers against the Cadets? – some will object to us. But we have already shown those peculiarities of party relations among the toilers which make such a bloc undesirable and inexpedient. In the cities, where the working population is most concentrated, we should never, without extreme necessity, renounce fully independent S.D. candidates. And this extreme necessity does not exist. A few more, a few fewer Cadets or toilers (especially of the Populist Socialist type!), this has no serious political significance, since the Duma itself is capable at best of playing only an auxiliary, secondary role. The politically decisive significance in determining the outcome of the Duma elections is possessed by the peasantry, by the provincial assemblies of electors, not by the cities[16]. In the provincial assemblies of electors we will realize our general political alliance with the toilers against the Cadets far better and more reliably, without any violation of strict principle, than at the lowest stage of elections in the countryside. We shall now turn to the elections in the countryside.

## V

In large cities the political party organization has in some places, as is known, swept away one of the stages of elections. According to the law, elections were to be two-stage. In reality they turned out sometimes to be direct, or nearly direct, because the electors knew clearly the character of the struggling parties, knew even in individual cases the persons whom a given party intended to pass through to the Duma. In the countryside, on the other hand, there are so many stages, the concentration of electors is so slight, the obstacles to the open appearance of parties are so enormous, that elections in the first Duma took place and will take place in the second in an extraordinarily "veiled" manner. In other words: here very often, even in the majority of cases, party agitation will speak of parties in general, deliberately saying nothing about persons, for fear of the police. Radicals and revolutionaries among the peasants (and not only peasants) will deliberately hide behind the disguise of non-partisanship. In elections of village headmen the deciding factor will be acquaintance with a person, confidence in him personally, sympathy with his social-democratic speeches. Social-democrats relying on local party organization will here be in insignificant numbers. But social-democrats who draw the sympathy of the local rural population toward themselves may turn out to be incomparably more numerous than one might think from the data on the lower cells of our party.

Petty-bourgeois romantics, like the Populist Socialists, who dream of an open socialist party under our conditions, do not understand how the confidence and sympathy for a conspiratorial party is strengthened by its steady, compromise-free, fighting spirit, and at the same time by the elusiveness of its organization, acting on the masses far from exclusively through party members alone. A genuinely revolutionary party, hardened in the fire of illegal struggle, which has become accustomed to Messrs. Pleve and is not disturbed by any of the strictures of Messrs. Stolypin, may prove in an epoch of civil war capable of wider influence on the masses than some legal party, capable of "with yellow-beak naiveté" taking to "strictly constitutional paths."

Social-democrats who enter the party and S.D.'s who do not enter it will have many chances of success in the elections of village headmen and delegates. For success at these stages of elections in the countryside the bloc with the toilers or the general list will be wholly unimportant. On the one hand, the electoral units are too small here. On the other hand, genuinely party, or even somewhat approaching party, toilers will be very rare. The strict partisanship of the S.D.'s, their absolute subordination to the party, which has managed for year after year to remain illegal, reaching 100–150 thousand members of all nationalities, which alone among the extreme left put forth a party faction in the first Duma, this partisanship will be enormous recommendation and guarantee in the eyes of all those who do not fear decisive struggle but desire it with all their hearts, not fully trusting their own forces, fearing to take the initiative upon themselves, fearing to appear openly. We must use this advantageous side of strict, "illegal," partisanship in every way, and it is not at all in our interests to weaken it in any respect through some permanent bloc. The only competitor to us who could be similarly party and similarly decisively, relentlessly revolutionary would be here only the Socialist-Revolutionaries. But a bloc with them at the first stage of rural elections could be possible on the basis of genuine partisanship only as an exception: it is sufficient to imagine realistically and concretely the conditions of elections in the countryside to convince oneself of this[17]. Insofar as non-party revolutionary peasants will act, not deliberately adhering to any one party exclusively, it is advantageous to us in all respects to influence them in the sense desirable for us in the direction of strict partisanship. The non-partisanship of a union, of agitation cannot constrain a party S.D., since the revolutionary peasants will never want to exclude him, and to participate in a non-party revolutionary union is permitted to him specifically by the resolution of the Unification Congress on support for the peasant movement. Thus, we, preserving our partisanship, defending it to the end, drawing all the enormous moral and political benefit from it, can at the same time fully adapt ourselves to work in a non-party revolutionary peasant milieu, in non-party revolutionary unions, circles, assemblies, to work through non-party revolutionary connections, and so forth. Instead of a limiting and constraining bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who organizationally embrace only a negligible fraction of revolutionary peasantry, we use still more widely and still more freely both our party position and all the advantages of work in the non-party "toiler" milieu.

The conclusion from this is that at the lowest stages of the electoral campaign in the countryside, i.e., at the elections of village headmen and delegates (sometimes the election of delegates will probably in reality reduce to the role of the first stage of elections), we have no need of any electoral agreements. The percentage of politically defined people, suitable as candidates for the post of village headman and delegate, is so negligible that S.D.'s, who have inspired the confidence and respect of the peasants (and without this condition no serious candidacy is conceivable), have every chance of almost universally getting into the posts of village headmen and delegates without needing any agreements with other parties.

And in the assembly of delegates one will already be able to rely on the exact results of the initial and decisive electoral battles. Here become possible and necessary… not blocs, of course, not tight, not permanent agreements, but particular agreements on the distribution of seats. Here, and even more so in the assemblies of electors for the election of deputies to the Duma, we must together with the toilers defeat the Cadets, together with the Socialist-Revolutionaries defeat the Populist Socialists, and so forth.

## VI

Thus, examination of the operative electoral system shows that blocs at the lowest stages of elections are especially undesirable in the cities and are not necessary. In the countryside at the lowest stages (i.e., in the elections of village headmen and delegates) blocs are both undesirable and completely unnecessary. The deciding political significance is possessed by the district assemblies of delegates and the provincial assemblies of electors. Here, i.e., at the highest stages, particular agreements are necessary and possible without the undesirable violation of partisanship, since the struggle before the masses has ended, no appearance before the people with direct or indirect defense of (or even permission for) non-partisanship is required, no slightest obscuring of the strictly class independent policy of the proletariat threatens from this[18].

Let us now examine, first from a formal, arithmetic, so to speak, point of view, what kind of particular electoral agreements these will be at the highest stages.

Let us take approximate percentage relationships, i.e., the distribution of electors (and delegates, which are implied in what follows) by parties within each hundred electors. To win in an assembly of electors, one needs to have, for a definite candidate, not less than 51 votes out of 100. The general rule of the tactics of S.D. electors follows from this: it is necessary to try to attract to one's side such a number of the most closely approaching the S.D.'s or most deserving of support bourgeois-democratic electors, so that together with them one will defeat the rest and thereby pass, partly social-democratic, partly the best of the bourgeois-democratic electors[19].

Let us illustrate this rule with simple examples. Let us suppose that 49 electors out of 100 are Black Hundreds, 40 are Cadets, 11 are S.D.'s. A particular agreement of S.D.'s and Cadets is necessary to pass a completely common list of deputies to the Duma on the basis, of course, of proportional distribution of Duma seats by the number of electors (i.e., in this example, one-fifth of the Duma mandates from the entire province, let us say two out of ten, would be obtained by the S.D.'s, and four-fifths, eight out of ten, by the Cadets). If there are instead 49 Cadets, 40 toilers, and 11 S.D.'s, then we should strive for an agreement with the toilers in order to defeat the Cadets and conquer one-fifth of the mandates for ourselves and four-fifths for the toilers. In a case of this kind we would have an excellent opportunity to check the consistency and decisiveness of the democracy of the toilers: will they agree to turn completely away from the Cadets and defeat them together with the electors of the workers' party, or will they want to "save" this or that Cadet, will they perhaps want a bloc not with the S.D.'s but with the Cadets? Here we will be able and must prove on the spot and show to the entire people in what measure one or another petty bourgeois tends toward monarchical bourgeoisie or toward revolutionary proletariat.

In the last example the toilers have a crude calculation to bloc with the S.D.'s rather than with the Cadets, since they then obtain 4/5 while in the second case only 4/9 of the general number of mandates. Even more interesting would therefore be the reverse cases: 11 Cadets, 40 toilers, 49 S.D.'s. Crude calculation in such a case would push the toilers toward a bloc with the Cadets: then "we," supposedly, will receive more seats in the Duma for ourselves. But principled fidelity to democracy and the interests of genuinely laboring masses would require absolutely a bloc with the S.D.'s, even at the cost of sacrificing several seats in the Duma. Representatives of the proletariat must carefully take into account all such and similar cases, explaining both to the electors and to the entire people (it is necessary that the results of agreements in assemblies of delegates and electors be published for general knowledge) the principled significance of this electoral arithmetic.

Further, in the last example, we see such a case when both crude calculation and principled considerations push the S.D.'s to split the toilers. If among them there are, let us suppose, two fully party Socialist-Revolutionaries, then we must direct all efforts to attaching them to ourselves and defeating with 51 votes all the Cadets and all the other, less revolutionary, toilers. If among the toilers there are 2 Socialist-Revolutionaries and 38 Populist Socialists, then we would have the opportunity to check the devotion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the interests of democracy and the interests of laboring masses: for republicans-democrats, we would say, against those permitting monarchy, Populist Socialists – for confiscation of landlord's land against those permitting redemption, Populist Socialists – for supporters of arming the entire people against those permitting a standing army, Populist Socialists. And we would see whom the Socialist-Revolutionaries prefer: social-Cadets[20] or social-democrats.

We have thus arrived at the principled-political side and significance of this electoral arithmetic. Our duty here is to oppose pursuit of seats with an impeccably steadfast and consistent defense of the point of view of the socialist proletariat and the interests of the complete victory of our bourgeois-democratic revolution. In no case and under no circumstances should our S.D. delegates and electors be silent about our socialist aims, our strictly class position as a proletarian party. But it is insufficient merely to repeat the word "class" in order to prove the role of the proletariat as the vanguard in the contemporary revolution. It is insufficient to expound our socialist doctrine and the general theory of Marxism to prove the advanced role of the proletariat. For this it is still necessary to know how to show in practice, in analyzing the burning questions of the contemporary revolution, that members of the workers' party are most consistent, most correct, most decisive, most skillful in defending the interests of this revolution, the interests of its complete victory. This is a difficult task, and in preparing for it consists the basic and primary obligation of every S.D. going into the electoral campaign.

The distinguishing of parties and party shades in assemblies of delegates, electors (and also in the entire electoral campaign, this goes without saying) will be a small, but not useless practical undertaking. On this undertaking, incidentally, life will give a check to many controversial questions agitating the S.D. workers' party. Its right wing, beginning from the extreme opportunists of "Our Cause" and ending with the moderate opportunists of "Social-Democrat," in every possible way blurs and distorts the distinction between toilers and Cadets, and does not seem to notice, moreover, a new and very important phenomenon: the division of toilers into Populist Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and those gravitating toward one or the other. Of course, already the history of the first Duma and its dispersal gave documentary data absolutely requiring the distinction of Cadets and toilers, proving the more consistent and decisive democracy of the latter. The electoral campaign before the second Duma must even more vividly, precisely, fully, and widely prove and show this. The electoral campaign itself will teach, as we have tried to show through examples, the correct distinction by social-democrats of one or another bourgeois-democratic party, and will factually refute, or rather push aside, that deeply erroneous opinion which considers the Cadets the main or even serious representatives of our bourgeois democracy in general.

Let us note further that in the electoral campaign in general and in the matter of concluding electoral agreements at the highest stages the S.D.'s must be able to speak simply and clearly, in language accessible to the masses, resolutely discarding far away the heavy artillery of intricate terminology, foreign words, memorized, ready phrases, but incomprehensible to the masses, unfamiliar to it slogans, definitions, conclusions. One must be able without phrases, without exclamations, with facts and figures in hand to explain the questions of socialism and the questions of the present Russian revolution.

In doing so two fundamental questions of this revolution will emerge of themselves: the question of power and the question of land. On these fundamental questions agitating all the masses we must concentrate both purely socialist preaching – the distinction between the point of view of the petty proprietor and the point of view of the proletariat – and the distinction of the parties struggling for influence over the people. The Black Hundreds, up to and including the Octobrists, are against power to the people, against giving land to the people. They want to halt the revolution through violence, bribery, deception. The liberal-monarchical bourgeoisie, the Cadets, also strive to halt the revolution through a series of concessions. They do not want to give the people either full power or all the land. They want to preserve landlord land ownership through redemption and the arrangement of local land committees not on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret voting. The toilers – i.e., petty bourgeoisie, especially rural – want to achieve all the land and all the power, but are moving toward this goal unsteadily, unconsciously, uncertainly, wavering between the opportunism of social-Cadets (Populist Socialists), who justify the hegemony of liberal bourgeoisie over the peasantry and elevate it to theory, and between the utopianism of leveling, supposedly possible under commodity production. Social-democracy must consistently stand on the point of view of the proletariat, cleansing the revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry from Populist Socialist opportunism and from utopianism obscuring the genuinely urgent tasks of the contemporary revolution. And the working class, as well as the whole people, only with the complete victory of our revolution will be able in a proper manner, swiftly, boldly, freely, and broadly to take up the solution of the fundamental task of all civilized humanity: the liberation of labor from the oppression of capital.

And we will also carefully stop on the question of the means of struggle in the electoral campaign and in the matter of concluding particular agreements between parties. We will clarify what the Constituent Assembly is and why the Cadets fear it. We will ask the liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadets, what measures they intend to defend and independently implement in practice so that no one can deal with the people's representatives the way they "dealt with" the deputies of the "first convocation." We will remind the Cadets and explain to the broadest possible masses their base-traitorous attitude toward the October-December forms of struggle of last year. We will ask all and any candidates whether they intend to subordinate completely all their Duma activity to the interests of extra-Duma struggle, to the interests of the broad popular movement for land and for power. We must use the electoral campaign for the organization of the revolution, i.e., for the organization of the proletariat and genuinely revolutionary elements of bourgeois democracy.

Such is the positive content which must be sought to be brought into the entire electoral campaign and in particular into the matter of concluding particular agreements with other parties.

## VII

Let us sum up.

The point of departure for the general electoral tactics of social-democracy must be the complete independence of the class party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Deviations from this general position are possible only in case of extreme necessity and under specially-limiting conditions.

The peculiarities of the Russian electoral system and political groupings among the predominant mass of the population, the peasantry, do not cause this extreme necessity at the lowest stages of the electoral campaign, i.e., in the elections of electors in major cities, village headmen and delegates in the countryside. In major cities there is no such necessity, since the elections here are important not at all by the number of deputies in the Duma, but by the appearance of the S.D.'s before the broadest, most concentrated, "most social-democratic" by all their position strata of the population.

In the countryside the political underdevelopment of the masses, their political non-formation, fragmentation, sparseness of population, and external conditions of elections cause the special development of non-party (and non-party revolutionary) organizations, unions, circles, assemblies, views, and aspirations. Under such conditions blocs at the lowest stages are not at all needed. Strict partisanship of the S.D.'s in all respects is the most correct and most expedient.

The general position on the necessity of an alliance of the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry thus leads to the recognition of the necessity of only particular agreements (of the type: with toilers against Cadets) at the highest stages of the electoral system, i.e., in assemblies of delegates and electors. The peculiarities of political divisions within the toilers speak for such the same solution of the question.

In all these particular agreements the S.D.'s must strictly distinguish bourgeois-democratic parties and shades between them by the degree of consistency and decisiveness of their democracy.

The ideological-political content of the electoral campaign and particular agreements will be the clarification of the doctrine of socialism and the independent slogans of the S.D.'s in the contemporary revolution both with respect to its tasks and in the question of the paths and means of realizing these tasks.

This pamphlet was written before the appearance of the fifth issue of "Social-Democrat." Before this issue our party had full grounds to hope that agreements inadmissible for socialists at the first stage with bourgeois parties the Central Committee of our party would absolutely not approve. We were obliged to think so, since so influential a Menshevik as Comrade L. Martov spoke out decisively against any agreements at the first stage, spoke out not only in "Tovarishch" but also in the letter dispatched to the organizations by the Central Committee (Martov's letter) on the question of preparation for the electoral campaign.

Now it has turned out that our Central Committee has shifted toward Cherevarin or at least has wavered. The leading article of no. 5 of "Social-Democrat" permits blocs at the first stage without even precisely stipulating which bourgeois parties! Plekhanov's letter of today (October 31), who has moved to defend the bloc with the Cadets in the Cadet newspaper "Tovarishch," shows everyone under whose influence the Central Committee wavered. Plekhanov himself speaks, as is his custom, in the manner of an oracle; utters the most banal commonplaces; completely bypasses the class tasks of socialist proletariat (probably out of courtesy to the bourgeois newspaper that has sheltered him) and does not even attempt to touch on the concrete data and arguments.

Surely this "cry" from Geneva will not be enough to cause the Central Committee to slip from Martov… toward Cherevarin?

Surely the decision of the Unification Congress, which forbids any agreements with bourgeois parties, will not be torn away by the Central Committee elected at the congress?

The united electoral campaign of the S.D.'s is threatened by the greatest danger.

The Socialist Workers' Party is threatened by agreements at the first stage with bourgeois parties that corrode it and destroy the cause of the class independence of the proletariat.

Let then all revolutionary S.D.'s unite and declare a merciless struggle against opportunist turmoil and wavering!