On the Tasks of Rabkrin, Their Understanding, and Their Implementation
The task of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection is not merely—indeed, not even primarily—to “catch” or “expose” (for that is the function of the courts, with which Rabkrin is closely associated yet by no means identical)—but rather to know how to set things right.
Skillful correction at the right moment—that is the primary task of Rabkrin.
To be able to correct, one must, first, study—and thoroughly master—the conduct of affairs in any given institution, enterprise, department, and the like; second, promptly implement the necessary practical changes and bring them to fruition in actual practice.
In the management of affairs across diverse enterprises, institutions, government departments, and the like, there is much that is common—and fundamentally similar. The task of Rabkrin is to draw upon the experience of business inspection to cultivate a cadre of capable, seasoned, and knowledgeable officials who are able to formulate questions (for when questions are posed skillfully and correctly, the very act of posing them often prefigures the success of an audit and opens the way for corrective action)—to guide audits and inspections, to verify corrective measures, and so on.
For example, the establishment of proper reporting procedures is a fundamental matter in every department and institution, regardless of their diversity. Rabkrin must understand this process, master it—and be able to verify, within the shortest possible time (by dispatching an inspector for half an hour, or an hour, to the relevant office), whether reporting has been instituted, whether it has been instituted correctly, what shortcomings exist in its implementation, how those shortcomings can be remedied, and so forth.

The techniques for establishing reporting systems, the methods for penalizing deficiencies, the approaches for detecting instances of deception, and the procedures for verifying actual compliance must all be studied, systematized, and summarized within Rabkrin. Rabkrin should maintain a roster of institutions, departments, and gubernias that have successfully implemented adequate reporting practices: let it be 1 out of 100—or even 1 out of 1,000—no matter; the important thing is to wage a persistent, unwavering campaign, conducted systematically and relentlessly, to expand the scope of good practices. Rabkrin should keep a calendar table charting the progress of this campaign, recording our successes and failures in the struggle.
A review of the preliminary draft report on the work of fuel agencies and on the escalating autumn crisis of 1921 convinces me that the foundations of this work have not been properly laid within Rabkrin. This draft report contains neither a thorough examination of the issues nor a clear approach to corrective action.
For instance, the three-week plan of 1921 is compared with that of 1920. Only bare totals are cited. The comparison is flawed, because it fails to account for (1) the differences in food supply—and both spring 1921 and the entire first half of 1921 were placed under special conditions due to the transition to the grain tax—or for (2) the poor harvest of 1921.
Danishevsky points out: among the gubernias unaffected by the crop failure, more than 100% of the three-week plan was fulfilled in 1921; in contrast, the gubernias hit by the famine suffered massive shortfalls in meeting their targets.
No real analysis is offered in the report.
The shortcomings in reporting at Glavleskho are, apparently, accurately identified in Rabkrin’s preliminary report. Danishevsky himself acknowledges this. The evidence is clear: reporting remains poor.
But precisely on this most fundamental issue, Rabkrin cannot afford to limit itself in its preliminary report to the mere “thesis”: “Reporting is poor; there is no reporting.” So what did the comrades at Rabkrin do to rectify the situation? Many prominent Rabkrin officials personally took part, during the winter and spring of 1921, in numerous

meetings and commissions devoted to the question of the fuel crisis. It was precisely in the spring of 1921—seemingly in March 1921—that a change of leadership occurred at Glavleskho. By March 1921, then, Glavleskho ought to have reorganized its reporting procedures.
Danishevsky did indeed make this change—but his efforts were far from satisfactory. His reporting remained poor. Danishevsky was undoubtedly at fault.
Yet to single out a single individual as the culprit is only a small part of the task. Did Rabkrin fulfill its mission and discharge its duties? Did it truly grasp the nature of its own responsibilities? That is the central question—and the answer to this question must be negative.
Knowing the critical state of fuel supplies, knowing that firewood is of paramount importance, knowing that reporting under the old leadership of Glavleskho (Lomov) had been woefully inadequate, Rabkrin should have

in March 1921 issued its formal recommendation in writing: “Reorganize reporting along these lines.”

In April 1921, it should have inspected how the new leadership (Danishevsky) had implemented the new reporting system—and once again issued its formal recommendation in writing: “Correct it in this manner; otherwise, the work will not proceed smoothly.”

In May 1921, it should have conducted another inspection—

and so on, month after month, until reporting was brought up to an acceptable standard. It was precisely in the spring of 1921 that Rabkrin ought to have appointed a specific auditor—preferably a single individual rather than an entire “department,” though in practice Rabkrin likely already maintained a full “department” responsible for auditing or inspecting forestry matters, or more broadly, fuel-related affairs—to monitor Glavleskho’s reporting, to study it carefully, and to submit monthly reports to a particular member of the collegium or to present consolidated summaries (such-and-such gubernias now have satisfactory reporting; here is the list of those governors; in so-and-so many gubernias, reporting remains entirely lacking, etc. What measures have been taken? To the Central Committee of the RCP? To the All‑Union Central Executive Committee? What results have these measures produced?).
Danishevsky bears responsibility for the poor state of reporting.

Rabkrin—namely, the designated, accountable auditor or inspector, whose name I do not know—bears responsibility for failing to fulfill its duty, beginning in March 1921.
The practical question, the business-oriented question—not a bureaucratic one—is this: How can we improve Glavleskho’s reporting?
Not finding an answer to this most crucial question in the preliminary report of Rabkrin—which was supposed to provide such an answer—I sought the answer myself, but I could easily err, since I had not studied the matter in depth. My proposals, which I would gladly revise if better suggestions were offered:
1) Instead of relying on postal delivery—as is currently the case—introduce a telegraphic reporting system, submitted every two weeks;
2) Develop a kind of “code” for this purpose: a combination of 7–9 digits and letters, allowing key figures to be conveyed in just a few lines (cubic sazhens of timber stock prepared; timber transported; grain, fodder, and other supplies received and distributed, etc.);
3) Either codify into law the authority for Danishevsky to arrest individuals who fail to submit reports within the prescribed deadline—or, if that proves impossible, if for some reason it does not pass—appeal to the Presidium of the All‑Union Central Executive Committee with a request to authorize arrests for non‑submission of reports; issue the appropriate directive through the Central Committee of the RCP; and oversee its implementation;
4) Explore ways to verify on-site, directly and in person: Is the work being carried out as planned? How is it progressing? What difficulties arise in the process?
Danishevsky claims that he has deployed traveling inspectors across Russia, who have already visited every gubernia, reaching down to the grassroots level—and that many gubernias have, in turn, improved their reporting practices.
But is this really the case? Has Danishevsky been misled by his own officials?
It is highly probable that he has been.
And what of Rabkrin? It must study this matter and gain a thorough understanding of it. Yet the preliminary report says nothing about it. When were the traveling inspectors deployed? How many were there? What was their level of expertise? What were the outcomes of their work? And if the reporting system is still unsatisfactory, how can we set it right? This is the crux of the matter—and yet Rabkrin’s auditor deliberately sidestepped this very core issue.
I repeat: the question of establishing proper reporting procedures is a fundamental one. It has not been studied by Rabkrin. The task—namely, to monitor the implementation of reporting systems and to strive for—and ultimately achieve—improvements in reporting—has not been fulfilled.

Through the All‑Union Central Executive Committee, through the Central Committee of the RCP, and via every available channel, Rabkrin must learn to “bring” this matter to the highest party and Soviet authorities, securing corrections in the organization and implementation of reporting procedures.
I have focused at length on the most critical—and simplest—issue: the establishment of reporting systems. But soon we will turn to other important, and even more challenging, questions, such as the management of contract work (monitoring performance, accounting, and the like), and so on.
One particularly interesting question is raised in the preliminary report—but it is only touched upon, without being pursued in a concrete, practical manner. Specifically, the author of the preliminary report writes: “Responsible leaders are overwhelmed with work to the point of exhaustion, while the technical staff of subordinate bodies—such as the Main Fuel Administration, the Main Coal Administration, the Main Forestry Administration, and others—are filled with idle personnel.”
I am convinced that this is a valuable and utterly accurate observation—and that it applies not only to the Main Fuel Administration, but to virtually all institutions and government departments, or perhaps to 99% of them.
This malady afflicts every organization.
When Rabkrin was founded—in March, or at the latest in April—it should have formally, in writing, submitted the following proposal:
“Correct it in this manner.”
But this was never done.
How, then, are we to remedy this scourge?
I do not even have a rough idea of the solution. Rabkrin must know—after all, its very mission is to study such matters, to compare different government departments, to propose various practical solutions, to test them in practice, and so on.
When I speak of “Rabkrin,” I am referring above all to the author of this preliminary report. But it is clear to me that this problem does not rest solely with that individual.
We must identify several individuals—perhaps two or three—at least—who are genuinely conscientious,

competent, and experienced within Rabkrin, and compel them to develop a sound plan of action for auditors, starting with the task of improving reporting procedures. Better to take on fewer tasks, but to see them through to completion.
The author of the preliminary report touches upon a host of topics—but these topics remain unexplored, hastily sketched out, yielding little real insight. It is a game of “parliamentary reports”—not what we need, but practical corrective action.
The lack of thorough study becomes evident, for example, in Question 52 (39): to identify only the model mines. It was precisely this conclusion that the STO Commission—composed of Smilga and Ramzin—reached after visiting the Donbas region in September 1921. It was precisely this conclusion that the State Planning Commission also reached.
Why do I know about the work of the State Planning Commission and the Smilga Commission, while the specialized auditor tasked with reviewing the Main Fuel Administration report is unaware of this?
The approach to the matter is fundamentally flawed.
As a practical outcome, I propose:
1) Focus on the issue of reporting procedures—and carry it through to completion;
2) Assign this task to specific individuals, and share their names with me;
3) Inform me of the name of the auditor entrusted with the forestry administration’s affairs.
Lenin
27 September 1921.
First published on 6 February 1927 in the newspapers Pravda, No. 30, and Izvestia of the All‑Union Central Executive Committee, No. 30.

Printed from manuscript