The League's rejection of the resolution on the necessity of having the Central Committee approve its statutes (p. 105 of the League protocols) was, as the entire party majority immediately noted, a "glaring violation of the party statute." Such a violation, if regarded as an act of principled people, was the purest anarchism; in the context of the post-congress struggle, however, it inevitably produced the impression of "settling accounts" by the party minority with the party majority (p. 112 of the League protocols). It signified an unwillingness to submit to the party and remain within the party. The League's refusal to accept the resolution based on the Central Committee's declaration about the necessity of changing the statute (pp. 124–125) inevitably led to the recognition that the assembly, which wished to be considered a party organization assembly while simultaneously refusing to obey the party's central institution, was unlawful. Supporters of the party majority immediately abandoned this quasi-party assembly so as not to participate in an unworthy farce.

Intelligentsia individualism, with its platonic recognition of organizational relations—which had revealed itself in the wavering of thought on the question of § 1 of the statute—thus reached, in practice, its logical conclusion, which I had predicted back in September, that is, a month and a half earlier: the destruction of the party organization. And at that very moment, on the evening of the same day on which the League congress ended, comrade Plekhanov declared to his colleagues from both central institutions of the party that he was unable to "shoot at his own people," that "a bullet through the head is better than a split," and that to prevent greater evil, maximal personal concessions must be made—concessions over which, in essence (far more than over the principles that gleamed through in the incorrect position on § 1), this devastating struggle was being waged. To characterize this turning point of comrade Plekhanov more precisely—a turning point which acquired a certain all-party significance—I consider it more expedient to rely not on private conversations and not on private letters (that refuge in case of extremity), but rather on Plekhanov's own exposition of the matter before the entire party, on his article "What Not to Do" in no. 52 of *Iskra*, written precisely after the League congress, after my departure from the Editorial Board of the Central Organ (November 1, 1903) and before the cooption of the Martovites (November 26, 1903).

The basic idea of the article "What Not to Do" consists in this: one should not be rectilinear in politics, one should avoid untimely sharpness and untimely intransigence; sometimes it is necessary, to avoid a split, to make concessions both to revisionists (from among those drawing closer to us or from among the inconsistent) and to anarchical individualists. Quite naturally, these abstract general propositions provoked universal bewilderment among *Iskra*'s readers. It is impossible to read without laughter comrade Plekhanov's magnificent and proud declarations (in subsequent articles) that he was not understood due to the novelty of his thoughts, due to unfamiliarity with dialectics. In reality, the article "What Not to Do," at the time it was written, could have been understood only by some ten people in two Geneva suburbs whose names begin with two identical first letters[113]. Comrade Plekhanov's misfortune consisted in the fact that he put into circulation before tens of thousands of readers a sum of hints, reproaches, algebraic signs and riddles that were addressed only to those ten persons who had participated in all the vicissitudes of the post-congress struggle with the minority. Comrade Plekhanov fell into this misfortune because he violated the fundamental principle of the very unfortunately mentioned dialectics: there is no abstract truth; truth is always concrete. For precisely this reason it was inappropriate to clothe in abstract form a quite concrete thought about making concessions to the Martovites after the League congress.

Concessions, put forward as a new fighting watchword by comrade Plekhanov, are lawful and necessary in two cases: either when the one making concessions has become convinced of the correctness of those demanding concessions (honest political figures in this case directly and openly acknowledge their error), or when a concession to an irrational and harmful demand is made to avoid greater evil. From the article under review it is perfectly clear that the author has in mind the second case: he directly speaks of concessions to revisionists and anarchical individualists (that is, to the Martovites, as all party members now know from the League protocols), concessions obligatory to avoid a split. As you see, comrade Plekhanov's allegedly new thought reduces entirely to the not very new wisdom of life: little annoyances should not interfere with great pleasure; a little opportunistic foolishness and a small anarchical phrase are better than a great party split. Comrade Plekhanov clearly saw, when he wrote this article, that the minority represents the opportunistic wing of our party and that it struggles by anarchical means. Comrade Plekhanov put forward a project—to struggle with this minority by means of personal concessions, rather like (again, *si licet parva componere magnis*) as German social-democracy struggled with Bernstein. Bebel publicly at his party's congresses declared that he knew no man more susceptible to environmental influence than comrade Bernstein (not Herr Bernstein, as comrade Plekhanov liked to express it earlier, but comrade Bernstein): we will take him into our midst, we will take him into the Reichstag delegation, we will struggle against revisionism without fighting with untimely sharpness (*à la* Sobakevich-Parvus) against the revisionist; we will "kill this revisionist through kindness" (*kill with kindness*), as comrade M. Beer (M. Beer) characterized it, if I recall correctly, at one English social-democratic meeting, defending German conciliatoriness, peacefulness, softness, flexibility and circumspection against the attacks of the English Sobakevich-Hyndman. Precisely in the same way did comrade Plekhanov wish to "kill through kindness" the little anarchism and little opportunism of comrades Axelrod and Martov. True, alongside completely clear hints at the "anarchical individualists," comrade Plekhanov deliberately expressed himself unclearly regarding revisionists—expressed himself as if he had in mind workers' circles turning away from opportunism toward orthodoxy, rather than Axelrod and Martov, who had begun turning away from orthodoxy toward revisionism—but this was an innocent military stratagem[149], this was a puny fortification, incapable of withstanding the artillery fire of party publicity.

And so, whoever becomes acquainted with the concrete conjuncture of the political moment under description, whoever fathoms the psychology of comrade Plekhanov, will understand that I could not then have acted otherwise than I did. I say this to those supporters of the majority who reproached me for relinquishing the editorial board. When comrade Plekhanov turned after the League congress and from a supporter of the majority became a supporter of reconciliation at any cost, I was obliged to interpret this turning in the best possible sense. Perhaps comrade Plekhanov wished to give in his article a program of good and honest peace? Any such program reduces to sincere acknowledgment of errors by both sides. What error did comrade Plekhanov point out in the majority?—Untimely, worthy of Sobakevich, sharpness toward revisionists. It is unknown what comrade Plekhanov had in mind in this regard: whether his own wit about asses, or his extremely incautious, in Axelrod's presence, mention of anarchism and opportunism; comrade Plekhanov preferred to express himself "abstractly" and moreover with a nod to Peter. That is a matter of taste, of course. But I acknowledged my personal sharpness openly both in a letter to an *Iskra* member and at the League congress; how then could I not acknowledge such an "error" in the majority? As for the minority, comrade Plekhanov clearly indicated their error: revisionism (cf. his remarks about opportunism at the party congress and about Jaurèsism at the League congress) and anarchism, which led to a split. Could I prevent an attempt, through personal concessions and every sort of "kindness" (courtesy, softness, etc.), to achieve recognition of these errors and to paralyze their harm? Could I prevent such an attempt when comrade Plekhanov directly urged in the article "What Not to Do" to "spare opponents" from among revisionists who are revisionists "only due to a certain inconsistency"? And if I did not believe in this attempt, could I have acted otherwise than to make a personal concession regarding the Editorial Board and to move, to defend the position of the majority, into the Central Committee?[150] I could not absolutely deny the possibility of such attempts and take upon myself alone the responsibility for the threatening split, if only because I myself was inclined, in my letter of October 6, to explain the row as "personal irritation." And I considered it and consider it my political duty to defend the position of the majority. To rely in this regard on comrade Plekhanov was difficult and risky, because it was apparent in every respect that comrade Plekhanov was ready to interpret dialectically his own phrase: "the leader of the proletariat has no right to indulge his bellicose inclinations when they contradict political calculation" in the sense that if one must shoot at all, it is more calculating (depending on the state of Geneva weather in November) to shoot at the majority… It was necessary to defend the position of the majority because comrade Plekhanov—in mockery of dialectics, which demands concrete and comprehensive examination—in touching on the question of the good (?) will of the revolutionary, modestly bypassed the question of trust in the revolutionary, of faith in such a "leader of the proletariat" who led a definite wing of the party. Speaking of anarchical individualism and advising "at times" to close one's eyes to violations of discipline, "sometimes" to yield to intelligentsia dissoluteness, which "is rooted in a feeling having nothing in common with devotion to the revolutionary idea," comrade Plekhanov, it seems, forgot that one must also reckon with the good will of the majority of the party, that the determination of the measure of concessions to anarchical individualists must be left precisely to practitioners. Insofar as literary struggle with childish anarchical nonsense is easy, so much is practical work with an anarchical individualist in one and the same organization difficult. A literary man who took upon himself the determination of the measure of possible concessions to anarchism in practice would thereby display only his immoderate, truly doctrinaire, literary presumption. Comrade Plekhanov majestically remarked (for the sake of importance, as Bazarov expressed it[114]) that in case of another split the workers would cease to understand us, while simultaneously he himself laid the foundation for an endless series of such articles in the new *Iskra*, articles which in their actual, concrete significance remained inevitably incomprehensible not only to the workers but to the whole world in general. It is not surprising that a Central Committee member[115] who read the article "What Not to Do" in proof warned comrade Plekhanov that his plan for a certain reduction of certain publication (the protocols of the party congress and the League congress) was destroyed precisely by this article, which inflames curiosity, brings out something piquant and at the same time completely unclear before the judgment of the street[151], inevitably provokes bewildering questions: "what has happened?" It is not surprising that precisely this article of comrade Plekhanov's, due to the abstractness of his reasoning and the unclearness of his hints, caused jubilation in the ranks of the enemies of social-democracy: both cancan on the pages of *Revolutionary Russia* and enthusiastic praise from the consistent revisionists of *Osvobozhdenie*. The source of all these amusing and sad misunderstandings from which comrade Plekhanov then so amusingly and so sadly extricated himself[116] lay precisely in a violation of the fundamental principle of dialectics: concrete questions must be examined in all their concreteness. In particular, Mr. Struve's jubilation was quite natural: he cared nothing for the "good" aims (kill with kindness) which comrade Plekhanov pursued (but might well have failed to achieve); Mr. Struve hailed and could not but hail that turning toward the opportunistic wing of our party which began in the new *Iskra*, as everyone now sees. Not only Russian bourgeois democrats hail every, if only the most petty and temporary, turn toward opportunism in all social-democratic parties. In an intelligent enemy's assessment there is rarely a complete misunderstanding: tell me who praises you, and I will tell you wherein you have erred. And vainly does comrade Plekhanov rely on the inattentive reader, thinking to present matters as if the majority absolutely opposed a personal concession regarding cooption, rather than opposed the shift from the left wing to the right wing of the party. The point does not lie at all in the fact that comrade Plekhanov, to avoid a split, made a personal concession (this is highly praiseworthy), but in the fact that, while fully acknowledging the necessity of struggling with inconsistent revisionists and anarchical individualists, he preferred to struggle with the majority, with which he had disagreed over the measure of possible practical concessions to anarchism. The point does not lie at all in the fact that comrade Plekhanov changed the personal composition of the editorial board, but in the fact that he departed from his position of struggling against revisionism and anarchism, ceased to defend this position in the Central Organ of the party. As for the Central Committee, which at that time served as the sole organized representative of the majority, comrade Plekhanov departed from it at that time exclusively over the question of the measure of possible practical concessions to anarchism. Nearly a month passed from November 1, when my departure untied the hands of the policy of *kill with kindness*. Comrade Plekhanov had the fullest opportunity through every sort of contact to verify the suitability of this policy. Comrade Plekhanov released at that time the article "What Not to Do," which was—and remains—the sole, so to speak, admission ticket for the Martovites into the editorial board. The slogans: revisionism (with which one should struggle, sparing the opponent) and anarchical individualism (which one must court, killing through kindness) are printed on this ticket in impressive italics. Please, gentlemen, you are most welcome, I will kill you through kindness—that is what comrade Plekhanov says with this invitation to his new editorial colleagues. Naturally, the Central Committee had only to speak its final word (ultimatum, that is what it means: the final word about possible peace) concerning the measure of practical concessions to anarchical individualism permissible in its view. Either you want peace—and then here you have such and such a quantity of little concessions proving our softness, peacefulness, conciliatoriness etc. (we cannot give more while guaranteeing peace in the party, peace not in the sense of absence of disputes but in the sense of the non-destruction of the party by anarchical individualism), take these concessions and turn gradually back again from Akimov to Plekhanov. Or you wish to maintain and develop your point of view, to turn finally (if only in the sphere of organizational questions alone) toward Akimov, to convince the party of your correctness against Plekhanov—then take yourselves a literary group, receive representation at the congress and begin through honest struggle, through open polemics to conquer a majority for yourselves. This alternative, set out with complete clarity before the Martovites in the ultimatum of the Central Committee of November 25, 1903 (see "Martial Law" and "Commentary to the League Protocols"[152]), stands in complete correspondence with my and Plekhanov's letter of October 6, 1903 to the former editors: either personal irritation (and then one can, in a pinch, even "cooption"), or a principled disagreement (and then one must first convince the party, and only afterwards speak of remaking the personal composition of the central institutions). The Central Committee was able to leave the solution of this delicate dilemma to the Martovites themselves all the more because it was precisely at that time that comrade Martov wrote in his *profession de foi*[153] ("Once Again in the Minority") the following lines:

"The minority lays claim to one honor—to give the first example in the history of our party of how one can, having been 'defeated,' not form a new party. Such a position of the minority flows from all its views on the organizational development of the party; it flows from consciousness of its firm connection with the previous party work. The minority does not believe in the mystical force of 'paper revolutions' and sees in the deep vital groundedness of its strivings the pledge that through pure ideological propaganda within the party it will achieve the triumph of its organizational principles." (Italics mine.)

What beautiful, proud words! And how bitterly was I convinced by experience that these were merely words… You must pardon me, comrade Martov, but now I declare a claim on behalf of the majority to this "honor," which you did not deserve. This honor will truly be great, worth fighting for, because the traditions of circle-ism left us as an inheritance extraordinarily easy splits and extraordinarily zealous application of the rule: either in the teeth or hand over the pen.

In response to the mention of peace came an opening of fire from all enemy batteries, including even the Soviet. Charges rained down like hail. Autocrat, Swiss, bureaucrat, formalist, super-center, one-sided, rectilinear, stubborn, narrow, suspicious, disagreeable… Very well, my friends! Are you finished? Do you have nothing more in reserve? Your charges are poor indeed…

Now it is my turn to speak. Let us look at the content of the new organizational views of the new *Iskra* and at the relation of these views to that division of our party into "majority" and "minority," the true character of which we have shown through analysis of the debates and votes of the Second Congress.