XI CONGRESS OF THE RCP(b)
FINAL SPEECH ON THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(b)

28 MARCH (Applause.) First and foremost, I must devote some time to critiquing the remarks made here by Comrades Preobrazhensky and Osinsky. In my view, Comrades Preobrazhensky and Osinsky missed the mark entirely on the most fundamental issues—and it was precisely through their speeches that they revealed the fallacy of the line they had in mind for our political strategy.
Comrade Preobrazhensky spoke about capitalism and argued that, according to our program, we ought to launch a broad, general debate on the subject. I believe this would have been the most unproductive and misguided waste of time.
Let us begin with the question of state capitalism.
“State capitalism is capitalism,” Preobrazhensky declared—“and it is only in this way that we can—and should—understand it.” I contend that this is nothing more than scholasticism. To date, no one has ever written a comprehensive treatise on capitalism in the history of humankind, because we are only now experiencing this phenomenon for the first time. Throughout history, all serious works on state capitalism were penned under conditions where state capitalism was understood as simply another form of capitalism. But things have turned out differently now—and neither Marx nor any Marxist could have foreseen this. Nor is there any need to look back. If you write a history book, you will do so with great clarity; but when you compile a textbook, you will describe state capitalism as a form of capitalism so utterly unexpected, so completely unforeseen—after all, no one could have anticipated that the proletariat would seize power in one of the least developed countries and first attempt to organize large-scale production and distribution for the peasantry, and then, when cultural conditions proved too challenging to meet this task, turn to capitalism as an ally. None of this was ever predicted—but it is an incontrovertible fact.
Larin’s speech reveals a profound lack of clarity regarding what the New Economic Policy actually is and how we ought to approach it.
Not a single serious objection was raised against the necessity of transitioning to the New Economic Policy. The proletariat does not shy away from admitting that, in the course of the revolution, some things went splendidly while others did not. All revolutionary parties that have perished thus far did so because they became arrogant, failed to recognize their own strengths, and were afraid to speak openly about their weaknesses. We, however, will not perish—because we are not afraid to acknowledge our shortcomings and we will learn to overcome them. (Applause.) The capitalism we have allowed to take root was, in fact, a necessary step. Even if it is ugly and flawed, we can set it right, for we hold power in our hands and have nothing to fear. Everyone recognizes this—and to conflate this with the sowing of panic is nothing short of laughable. Had we feared to admit this, we would have inevitably met our doom. Yet the very fact that we have learned from these experiences and have shown a willingness to learn demonstrates that, within just three, four, or five years, we have mastered far more complex tasks in even shorter spans of time. Admittedly, at that time, we were driven by sheer necessity: during the war, we were pushed forward with extraordinary vigor, and it seems that on no front, in no campaign, were we ever left without being spurred onward—first we closed in on Moscow to within a hundred versts, advanced toward Orel, came within five versts of Petrograd. It was then that we truly awoke to our responsibilities, began to study, put our learning into practice, and drove the enemy from our lands.
A thousand times more difficult is the situation when one must confront an enemy standing right here, in the everyday— XI CONGRESS OF THE RCP(b)
economic sphere. The debates that have long raged in the literature over state capitalism may, at best, find their place in a historical textbook. I do not at all deny the value of textbooks—and I recently wrote that it would be better if our writers devoted less attention to newspapers and political polemics, and instead focused on writing textbooks,* which many—including Comrade Larin—could have done superbly. His talents would have been extraordinarily useful in that context; we would then have solved the problem that Comrade Trotsky so aptly highlighted when he stated that the primary task today is to educate the younger generation—and yet we have nothing upon which to base that education. Indeed, what do our young people learn about the social sciences? They learn from the old, bourgeois dross. What a disgrace! And this, when we have hundreds of Marxist scholars who could produce textbooks on every social issue—but they do not, because they are occupied with other pursuits, pursuing paths that lead them astray.
With regard to state capitalism, we must bear in mind what ought to become the rallying cry for agitation and propaganda—what we must explain clearly and strive to ensure is understood in practical terms. The truth is that the state capitalism we now embrace is not the kind of capitalism the Germans once wrote about. This is capitalism that we ourselves have permitted. Is this true—or is it not? Everyone knows that it is true!
At the Congress of Communists, we resolved that state capitalism has been permitted by our proletarian state—69, and the state is none other than ourselves. If we have allowed it to develop poorly, the fault lies with us; there is no need to blame anyone else! We must learn from this experience and strive to ensure that state capitalism in the proletarian state neither dares nor is able to stray beyond the bounds and conditions prescribed for it by the proletariat—beyond those conditions that are genuinely beneficial to the proletariat. It was rightly pointed out here that we must take the peasantry into account as a mass and grant them freedom of trade. Every sensible worker understands that this is essential for the dictatorship of the proletariat—and only Comrade Shlyapnikov could afford to jest and mock

* See this volume, pp. 51–52. Ed.

This is something that everyone has long since grasped—repeated ad nauseam—and yet you simply refuse to understand it. If, in modern conditions and within certain limits, the peasant needs free trade, then we must grant it; but that does not mean we will allow the sale of illicit spirits. We will punish such activities. Nor does it mean we will permit the trade in political literature—literature that is labeled Menshevik or Socialist-Revolutionary, all of which is funded by capitalists from around the globe.
This is what I had in mind when I spoke of machine guns—and Comrade Shlyapnikov should have understood that. What he’s saying is sheer nonsense!
You won’t frighten anyone with this, nor will you evoke any self‑pity! (Applause. Laughter.)
Poor Shlyapnikov! Lenin was about to line up machine guns against him.
We are talking about party-based measures of influence—not about machine guns at all. The talk of machine guns is directed at those people whom we now label Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries—and who conclude that, “You say you’re retreating toward capitalism, but we say the same thing: we agree with you!” We hear this claim over and over again, both at home and abroad, where a massive propaganda campaign is underway claiming that the Bolsheviks want to lock up the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries while secretly embracing capitalism. Of course, we do allow capitalism—but only within the limits necessary for the peasantry. This is essential! Without it, the peasant cannot live or manage his affairs. And without the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik propaganda, we maintain, the Russian peasant can indeed live. As for those who claim otherwise, we tell them: better that we all perish to a man than yield an inch to you! Our courts must fully grasp this reality. When we transition from the Cheka to state‑political courts, we must make clear at the congress that we do not recognize courts as being “above class.” Our courts must be elected, proletarian courts—and they must understand that we do, in fact, allow for certain forms of state capitalism. Members of the court must firmly grasp what state capitalism truly means.
This is the political slogan of the day—not some debate over how German professors understood the state.
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capitalism—and how we ourselves understand state capitalism. Since then, we have learned so much, and there is absolutely no reason to look back.
To what extent Preobrazhensky is utterly blind to the political realities—is revealed in his reasoning about the Economic Bureau or about the “Program of ’70.” What a splendid document this program is—and yet how we distort it! How can this happen? It happens because people read the text letter by letter, line by line, refusing to look beyond the surface. They pluck out a single quotation and declare: “Here there was a dispute.” They insist that the correct line was that of the workers’ faculties and the youth communist organizations—not that of those who said, “Be more cautious, more moderate with these specialists.” To be sure, the youth communist organizations are excellent, and the workers’ faculties are excellent—but they are not immune to error; they are not saints.
Yes, the youth communist organizations are representatives of our party, and the workers’ faculties are representatives of our class—but that they make mistakes, and that we must correct those mistakes, is a basic truth. As for how we ought to correct them, I do not know, for I did not personally take part in the Central Committee meetings where this question was discussed. But I do know that there is a tendency among us to overemphasize the line of the workers’ faculties and youth communist organizations in opposition to the professors. Yet when the Central Committee, having examined the matter from every angle, recognized that there had been an excess of zeal—and that, in relation to these professors, these outsiders, these representatives of a class other than our own, we needed to adopt a more cautious approach—Preobrazhensky stepped forward, pulled out the program, and declared: “No political concessions to this stratum whatsoever; otherwise, we would be violating the program.”
If we were to begin governing the party in this way, it would likely lead us to ruin—not because Comrade Preobrazhensky misunderstands politics in general, but because he approaches everything from the standpoint of what constitutes his greatest strength: he is a theorist, bound by specific frameworks, familiar and conventional; he is a propagandist, preoccupied with various measures designed to spread his message. Everyone knows and appreciates this strength—but when he turns to matters of politics and administration, the results are nothing short of monstrous.

Create an Economic Bureau?! Just moments ago, everyone was speaking and everyone agreed; there was complete unanimity—and this is crucial: it is precisely from this unity that action flows. We had agreed that party and Soviet organs should be clearly separated.
Doing this is incredibly difficult: there are no people! Here, Preobrazhensky easily dismissed the idea that Stalin held seven positions in two different commissariats. But who among us is without sin? Who has never taken on multiple responsibilities at once? And how could things possibly be done differently? What can we do now to ensure the continued functioning of the People’s Commissariat, to address all the issues concerning Turkestan, the Caucasus, and the like? After all, these are all political questions! And these questions must be resolved—questions that have occupied European states for centuries, questions that have been resolved only in a tiny fraction of cases in democratic republics. We are resolving them, and we need someone whom any representative of the nationalities can turn to and explain their concerns in detail. Where are we to find such a person? I doubt even Preobrazhensky could name another candidate besides Comrade Stalin.
The same holds true for Rabkrin. The task is immense. But in order to effectively carry out inspections, we need a leader endowed with genuine authority; otherwise, we will sink into petty intrigues and become mired in trivial squabbles.
Comrade Preobrazhensky proposes the Economic Bureau—but then all that we have said about separating party work from Soviet work will come to naught. Comrade Preobrazhensky presents what seems like a sound plan: on one side—the Politburo; then—the Economic Bureau; then the Organizational Bureau. But this scheme looks smooth only on paper—it is laughable in practice! I simply cannot fathom how a man who possesses a keen sense for living politics, after five years of Soviet power, could propose and insist upon such a plan!
How, then, does the Organizational Bureau differ from the Politburo? After all, it is impossible to draw a sharp line between what constitutes a political question and what is an organizational one. Any political question may also have an organizational dimension—and vice versa. And only

XI CONGRESS OF THE RCP(b)
The established practice—namely, that any issue could be transferred from the Organizational Bureau to the Politburo—enabled the Central Committee to function effectively and efficiently.
Has anyone ever proposed anything different? No one has ever proposed otherwise, because from a rational standpoint, there simply is no other viable course of action. It is impossible to mechanically separate the political from the organizational. Politics is conducted through people; if different individuals were to draft the documents, nothing would come of it.
After all, you know that revolutions have occurred in which parliamentary assemblies merely scribbled notes on paper, while the actual implementation was carried out by people from entirely different classes. Such arrangements often led to abrupt reversals—and those who had been entrusted with the task were swiftly ousted. Organizational matters cannot be divorced from politics; politics is, in essence, concentrated economics.
Comrade Kosior has lodged complaints against the Central Committee, even naming specific individuals (I’ve recorded them all)—though I personally am unfamiliar with these cases and cannot offer an answer. However, if you—as a Party Congress—are genuinely concerned, then it is your duty to establish commissions for each individual named and to subject Kosior and the relevant officials to thorough, in-depth questioning. 72 The crux of the matter is this: if the Central Committee is stripped of its authority to direct the allocation of personnel, it will lose its capacity to guide policy. Although we may make mistakes when transferring certain individuals from one post to another, I nonetheless venture to believe that, over the course of its existence, the Politburo of the Central Committee has made at most a few errors. This is not self‑flattery. The work of the Politburo is not evaluated by commissions or by party members appointed by our own organization—but rather by White Guard forces, by our enemies. The proof lies in the outcomes of our policies, which have been free of major blunders.
Osin’s greatest strength lies in his energetic, forceful approach to whatever task he undertakes. We must ensure that this strength is properly harnessed while simultaneously curbing his weaker tendencies—though Osin may protest loudly, for he is a man of great energy, yet we must still take this step, lest he, as a worker, ultimately falter and fail. I believe that the Central Committee has taken measures to balance Osin’s weaknesses with his strengths.

The best piece of evidence against Osin—if I wished to engage in polemics with him—and I do not wish to do so—the most compelling material would be to print and publicly display Osin’s speech delivered today… There once was a man…
As Deputy People’s Commissar and a leading figure in one of the most crucial People’s Commissariats, standing among those who, on every issue, would readily articulate their platform—this very same man proposed shifting to a “cabinet system.” 73 I maintain that this man has, without question, been utterly ruined. I will not delve into the details or engage in lengthy debate; the real concern is that such a formidable force as Osin should be put to proper use. If Comrade Osin does not treat the advice frequently offered to him within the Central Committee—with which I myself have played a significant role—in a spirit of camaraderie, and if he fails to moderate himself in this regard, then he will inevitably and irrevocably sink into the mire, just as has already happened today.
It is often deeply unpleasant for those who are eager to express their true nature; such a desire is perfectly legitimate, especially when a person is richly endowed with natural talent and seeks to bring that talent to light. May everyone be blessed with such a gift. Yet the Central Committee must ensure that this innate disposition is channeled in ways that serve the common good. The Central Committee must see to it that discussions about the “cabinet” are kept in check—even if the individual who is, so to speak, “curtailed” continues to voice complaints. In fact, this very restraint will prove beneficial. One must temper one’s abilities so as not to plunge headlong into the swamp—and consult with fellow comrades in the various People’s Commissariats, striving to uphold a unified line. But have we, in even a single People’s Commissariat, accomplished anything without dispute? Not a single thing.
“Improving the System of Governance and Psychologically Mobilizing the Masses.” What a deadly proposition! Had the Congress adopted such a viewpoint—had it embraced the political reaction’s stance—it would have been the surest, indeed the best, path to self-destruction.
“Improving the System of Governance”?! May we at least manage to extricate ourselves from the chaos that currently prevails.
Do we not already possess a system?! For five years, our finest minds devoted themselves to creating this very system! And this system represents the greatest leap forward we have ever made.

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The administrative apparatus is woefully inadequate! Do we truly understand how things stand? We do not! Yet Osin claims to know everything—as if he did. He might sit down and craft a management system in just ten minutes—and if we fail to rein in this impulse, it will only prove harmful, a grave political error. On the other hand, if he continues to approach his work with the same fervor he displays today, his contributions will be immensely valuable.
Here is an illustrative example. When I spoke about the most critical issues, Preobrazhensky and Osin demonstrated this point clearly—and Larin proved it beyond doubt. Look at what he did. He accused me, yet he also joked and laughed heartily.
Larin excels at this; it is precisely where his strengths lie. Were it not for the demands of state service that compel him to apply his talents in this way, Comrade Larin could have brought a thousandfold more benefit to the republic—because he is a highly capable man, endowed with a vivid imagination. This capacity is of immense value. Many mistakenly believe that imagination is a quality reserved solely for poets; what a foolish misconception! Even in mathematics, imagination is indispensable—even the discovery of differential and integral calculus would have been impossible without it. Imagination is a quality of supreme worth—but Comrade Larin possesses only a modest surplus of it. For instance, I would say that if we were to divide Larin’s entire store of imagination equally among all members of the RCP, the result would be truly remarkable. (Laughter, applause.) Until we can accomplish this feat, however, we cannot entrust Larin with matters of state, economic planning, or national administration; it would be the same as in the old VSNKh, when Rykov had not yet recovered but was still working—and signing his name “Yu. Larin” on behalf of the entire Vysokonarhoz. The problem was not that Comrade Larin displayed only his worst traits; on the contrary, it was his finest qualities that caused trouble, for no one doubted his dedication or his deep understanding of the tasks at hand—but the overall approach to governance was, after all, fundamentally flawed!

I have been saying as much. To be sure, these are all mere platitudes—but back at the Socialist-Revolutionary Party Congress, Kamkov himself once mocked me for them. Kamkov declared: “Today Lenin preaches, ‘Thou shalt not steal,’ and tomorrow he adds, ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery.’ That, in a nutshell, is the entirety of Lenin’s wisdom.” I first heard this from Kamkov, a SR, way back in 1918—74. And if Kamkov, who accompanied his arguments with the thunder of cannon fire, failed to make any real impression, then Larin will certainly make no more impact. Now we must apply these principles to the central tenets of our New Economic Policy. Here, Comrade Larin sought to lead the Party down a misguided path; had he instead devoted himself to work where his talents could truly shine—and where he might have rendered great service to the youth, avoiding the kind of blunder he committed at Gosplan—we would have seen an entirely different outcome. In that case, the younger generation would have retained a lasting legacy of Comrade Larin’s contributions. As far as I recall, I made my point quite clearly. And there would have been none of the confusion that Larin has now introduced here—75.
I mentioned that Kamenev had submitted a proposal—or rather, a directive—to the Politburo: to recognize the importation of foodstuffs as beneficial, and to authorize the purchase of canned goods using Soviet currency. Larin was sitting right there, hearing everything perfectly well—and remembering it all just as vividly. Yet as soon as he took to the podium, he declared: “Lenin has forgotten, due to illness—let us forgive him this time—that in order to spend from the gold reserve, one must first gain admission to the Politburo.” If Comrade Kamenev had proposed that we hand over our gold reserves to French speculators in exchange for canned goods, we would never have even listened to him. Not a single kopeck of gold was allocated for canned goods; instead, we issued Soviet paper money—and, believe it or not, those funds were used to make the purchases. Yesterday, Wulfson even assured me that the canned goods were of high quality (though they had not yet arrived). But I do not trust him—I prefer to wait until we’ve had a chance to sample them ourselves, since there remains the possibility of deception. The real issue, however, is that Larin himself became utterly confused: not a single kopeck of gold was spent; instead, we issued 160 billion in Soviet paper money.
Of course, it would be both laughable and absurd to suppose that Larin, when he speaks in this manner, does so out of malicious intent; no, that is not the point. Rather, his imagination soars beyond the bounds of reason—and it is precisely because of this that matters become hopelessly entangled.

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He went on to say that Gosplan had proposed leasing three-quarters of the nation’s rail transport. It was fortunate that he raised this matter at a Party Congress, where Krzhizhanovsky immediately refuted him. Such instances are rare indeed. But do you think that attempts to speak in this way occur only at Party Congresses? You might wish to consult the Central Control Commission—how did they handle the case concerning Moscow’s Discussion Club? 76 Why, in the first place, was the case about the Moscow Discussion Club brought before the Commission, where Comrades Larin and Ryazanov… (Ryazanov interjects from his seat: “He didn’t talk about the gold reserve there—he spoke even worse!”) I was not in Moscow, nor did I take part in the investigation of this case; I had only received a brief report. (Ryazanov: “One should not believe every rumor.”) I learned of this from a conversation with Comrade Solts; it was no mere rumor—it was a discussion with a man appointed by the highest Party Congress to serve on the Central Control Commission, and what he told me left no room for doubt. To call it a rumor would require a great deal of carelessness. The Central Control Commission had examined the conduct of the Discussion Club, and unanimously concluded that the case had been framed incorrectly. For me, the error was clear. Today, Larin casually mentioned, carried away by his own enthusiasm—his own speech had led him astray—that the state was planning to lease railway transport, and the Central Committee promptly corrected him. Krzhizhanovsky insists that nothing of the sort occurred—the Central Committee did not correct Larin, and Larin had simply gotten things wrong. This happens all too often.
In just four short years, we have yet to learn how to assign Larin, a capable and resourceful worker, to genuinely useful tasks—and to relieve him of the duties in which, against his better judgment, he ends up doing more harm than good.
It seems rather unnatural: the dictatorship of the proletariat, a regime of terror, the victory over every army in the world—except for the defeat of Larin’s army. Here, the defeat is absolute! He always reaches for tasks that he ought not to undertake. His vast knowledge and his remarkable ability to inspire others could have brought immense benefit to the young generation, which is still groping its way forward in darkness. We have failed to harness his talents, and so friction and resistance arise; the Politburo, the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, the Plenums of the Central Committee—all of whom are accused of wielding excessive power— find themselves lacking either the authority or the influence necessary to properly allocate and distribute our comrades.
We must reflect deeply upon this matter and engage in serious discussion. This is where the true focus of our work lies—and it is here that we must make amends. If we can set things right, we shall emerge from our difficulties. We will achieve this through correction—not by endlessly debating new objectives for the agrarian program, as Osinsky and Larin have done. I wrote a review of that program for the Central Committee*. I will not dwell on it now; any Party member who takes an interest in it is free to obtain a copy and read it in the Secretariat. Please, feel free to do so! If we can channel the energies of Larin and Osinsky in the right direction—while firmly cutting off their misguided aspirations—we will reap tremendous benefits from their combined efforts.
I will conclude with a few words about Shlyapnikov. I had intended to speak more at length about him. Trotsky, who, on behalf of the Central Committee and together with Zinoviev, had responded to the declaration of the Twenty-Two 77 within the Comintern, had already exhausted this topic to nearly ninety-nine percent.
Comrade Shlyapnikov, to begin with, pretended not to understand what I was talking about—about machine guns and panic-mongers; he even joked that I had been tried so many times. Of course, jokes are a fine thing. One cannot, after all, hold a large gathering without some humor—people grow weary, and we must approach each other with human understanding. But there are certain matters that simply do not lend themselves to jesting; there are issues like the unity of the Party.
When we are surrounded on all sides by enemies, when the international bourgeoisie is shrewd enough to move Milukov to the left, to supply the Socialist-Revolutionaries with funds to publish whatever newspapers they please, to rally Vandervelde and Otto Bauer, to launch a campaign against the Socialist-Revolutionaries, shouting that the Bolsheviks are beasts; when these men have spent centuries honing their political craft, when they command billions in gold rubles, francs, and the like—when we face all this head-on—then to joke, as Comrade Shlyapnikov does, about “my trials in the Central Committee,” and the like—well, comrades, that is truly lamentable. The Party Congress must draw certain conclusions.

* See this volume, pp. 43–47. Ed.

XI Congress of the RCP(b)
We are wrong to indulge in petty squabbles within the Central Committee! A trial was held for Shlyapnikov, yet the Central Committee fell three votes short of expelling him from the Party. 78 Members of the Party gathered at the Party Congress should take a close look at this matter and obtain the official minutes of that Central Committee meeting. This is no trivial issue!
You have every legal right to appeal to the Comintern. But long before that appeal was made, an overwhelming majority of the Central Committee had already voted in favor of expelling Comrade Shlyapnikov—though the required two-thirds majority was still lacking. We cannot afford to treat this lightly! It would do you well to familiarize yourself with the fact that, at a meeting of the faction composed of metallurgists attending the Congress, Comrade Shlyapnikov openly engaged in direct agitation for schism. 79
Regarding the role of Comrade Kolontai’s pamphlet, Comrade Trotsky remarked:
If we continue to treat such matters with levity, then there can be no question of our enduring the difficult circumstances in which we now find ourselves. To ensure our survival, I have set forth three conditions: first, that there be no intervention; second, that the financial crisis not become excessively severe; and third, that we avoid making political errors.
One of the speakers here claimed that I had spoken of “political complications.” No, what I spoke of were “political errors.” If we refrain from committing political errors, then I can confidently assert that 99 percent of the Party will stand with us—as will the non‑Party workers and peasants who will come to understand that now is the time for learning.
I recall that in his article commemorating the anniversary of the Red Army, Comrade Trotsky declared: “a year of learning.” This slogan remains just as valid—for the Party as well as for the working class. Over the past year, we have nurtured countless heroic individuals who have irrevocably secured a turning point in world history. Yet this does not excuse our failure to fully grasp the task now before us: “a year of learning.”
Today, we stand far more firmly than we did a year ago. Of course, the bourgeoisie will undoubtedly attempt another intervention—but it will prove far more difficult for them than before; indeed, it is harder today than it was yesterday.
To truly achieve meaningful learning, we must avoid making political errors. We must not waste time playing games aimed at preserving party unity, as Comrade Shlyapnikov so often does.

We simply cannot afford to play such games! We know full well that our internal struggles exact a heavy toll on the Party. Comrades, we must never forget this lesson! And over the past year, the Central Committee can rightfully say that the Party arrived at the Congress less factionalized and more united than it had been the previous year. I do not wish to boast that all traces of factionalism have vanished from our Party—but the undeniable fact remains that factional tendencies have been significantly reduced, a truth that has already been conclusively established.
You know that the “Workers’ Opposition” is but a fragment of its former self. Compare the signatures on the declaration signed by 22 comrades with those on the platform presented prior to the X Congress. 80 Here, not all signatures are included. To those who are lawfully exercising their right to appeal to the Comintern, we must make clear that it was entirely unlawful to petition on behalf of Myasnikov. The Myasnikov affair unfolded last summer. 81 At that time, I was not in Moscow, but I wrote him a lengthy letter *—a letter he later incorporated into his own pamphlet. I recognized that this man possessed considerable talent and that it was worth engaging him in dialogue; however, we must also make it clear to him that if he were to voice such criticism publicly, it would be utterly unacceptable.
He writes a letter urging: “Gather together all those dissatisfied within your respective districts.” Indeed, gathering all the discontented in any given district is remarkably easy. Consider the speeches delivered here by Shlyapnikov—and compare them with the remarks made by Comrade Medvedev, who is speaking now. (Medvedev, from his seat: “Who is informing you?”) I am informed by the bodies established by the Congress of the RCP: the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the Control Commission of the Central Committee. If you wish, turn to these institutions—and you will see the kinds of speeches Comrade Medvedev delivers. If we fail to put a stop to this, we will not preserve our unity—and yet unity is perhaps the most crucial of all our achievements: to relentlessly expose our mistakes and speak openly about them. If we clearly recognize this truth—and this Congress has succeeded in doing just that—then there is not the slightest doubt that we shall overcome them. (Loud applause.)
A brief newspaper report was published on March 29, 1922, in Izvestia of the VTsIK, No. 71.

* See Collected Works, 5th ed., Volume 44, pp. 78–83. Ed.