V. I.

Lenin

Report to the Conference of the St. Petersburg Organisation on the Question of the Duma Campaign and Duma Tactics [1]

Brief Newspaper Report

Thespeaker pointed out that the question of Duma tactics was undoubtedly the
central policy question at that time, and was therefore the main point around
which the congress campaign would revolve. Two of the questions that the Central
Committee had included in its proposed congress agenda, as reported in the
newspapers, were brought into the foreground—that of immediate political
tasks and that of the State Duma.

Thefirst question, he said, had been formulated very vaguely. The Mensheviks
may have taken it to mean support for a Cadet ministry, but did not care to say
so openly. At all events they had shown a noticeable desire to shelve once again
the fundamental questions of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian
revolution, just as they had done at the Fourth (Unity) Congress. By that time,
experience too had taught them that if these questions were evaded the
Social-Democrats would have no consistent party tactics of any sort. It would
be sufficient to recall that the Central Committee’s tactics on the
question of supporting the Duma (i.e., Cadet) ministry (June 1906) failed to
receive the backing, not only of the Party in general, but of the
Social-Democratic group in the Duma in particular. After the dissolution of the
Duma, the famous “partial mass expressions of protest”, proposed by
the Central Committee, had shared the same fate. The attitude towards the Cadets in the elections was then so uncertain in the Party that among
the most influential and responsible Mensheviks—a special
opinion was expressed—by Cherevanin before the All-Russian Conference
of the R.S.D.L.P. in November (1906), and by Plekhanov (not to mention
Vasilyev) after it.

Suchbeing the situation, it was the duty of revolutionary Social-Democrats to
take advantage of full representation at the Fifth Party Congress, where the
Poles, Letts and Bundists would be represented for the first time, in order to
raise fundamental questions of the tactics of Social-Democracy in the Russian
bourgeois revolution. It would be no use discussing “immediate political
tasks” without first clearing up the basic questions—the tasks of
the proletariat in our revolution in general, whether objective conditions
existed for the further development of the revolution, the alignment of classes
and parties at the time and, especially, the class character of the Cadet
Party. Unless these questions were settled—and that would be facilitated
by the wealth of experience gained from the First Duma and the elections to the
Second—it would be impossible to find a principled and intelligent
solution to the problem of the Cadet ministry, that of the tactics to be pursued
in the event of the dissolution of the Second Duma, etc., etc.

Thespeaker therefore went on to cover these questions briefly. The economic
conditions of the masses of the population offered clear evidence that the
fundamental aims of the revolution had not been accomplished; an objective basis
for immediate mass movements existed. This was reflected, in politics, in an
intensification of the conflict between the autocracy, which was then coming to
an understanding with the organised Black-Hundred landlords, and the
masses—not only of the proletariat but also of the rural poor (after the
worker curia, the peasant curia had yielded the largest percentage of
Left electors!), and the urban poor (Cadet hegemony over the petty-bourgeois
urban democrats had undoubtedly been seriously shaken by tile elections to the
Second Duma). It therefore followed that a revolutionary, and not a
constitutional crisis was approaching, and that the struggle inside the Duma
was, owing to objective conditions, again engendering a struggle outside the Duma, the
transition to which would be accelerated if the activities of the
Social-Democrats and bourgeois democrats inside the Duma were successful. It was
the task of the proletariat, as leader in the democratic revolution, to develop
the revolutionary consciousness, determination and organisation of the masses,
and to free the petty bourgeoisie from the leadership of the liberals. Support
for a liberal ministry, ostensibly responsible to the Duma but actually
dependent on the Black-Hundred tsarist gang, was out of the question. The
possibility of utilising such a ministry (supposing it proved a reality and not
an empty promise to fool the Cadets, like Stolypin’s promise to legalise
the Cadets, made in January 1907 to keep the Cadets from entering into blocs
with the Lefts) would depend entirely on the strength of the
revolutionary classes, their political consciousness and solidarity.

Asfar as the class character of the various parties was concerned, the past
year had been universally marked by the rightward swing of the upper classes and
the leftward swing of the lower classes. The Centre was growing weaker and being
eroded by the flood of advancing revolutionary development. The Black Hundreds
had gained strength and were better organised; they had established close
relations with one of the strongest economic class forces of old
Russia—the feudal landlords. The Octobrists were still the party of the
counter-revolutionary big bourgeoisie. The Cadets had made a sweeping swing to
the Right. It was becoming more and more evident that their mainstay was the
liberal (middle) landlords, the middle bourgeoisie and the top bourgeois
intelligentsia. They carried the urban poor with them by force of tradition,
deceiving them with loud-sounding phrases about “the people’s
freedom”. The elections to the Second Duma had proved directly that the
Lefts, even under most adverse conditions, had to a very large extent captured
the “lower section” of urban democrats from the Cadets, at the very
first onslaught.

The Cadets had shifted to the Right, towards the Octobrists. The democratic
petty bourgeoisie in the towns, and still more in the country, had gained
greater strength and had gone more to the Left than the rest. The speaker recalled that up to the spring of 1906 this petty bourgeoisie had had no
extensive political experience of legal party organisation. Considerable
experience had now been gained—beginning with that of the Trudoviks
in the First Duma to that of the unexpectedly large number of
“Lefts” and ’Trudoviks” elected to the Second Duma.

The Bolshevik view that the Russian revolution could not be achieved by the
liberals but only by the proletariat, if it succeeded in winning the peasant
masses to its side, had been remarkably well confirmed by the experience of 1906
and 1907.

The Duma tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy emerged logically from these
premises. Social-Democrats would have to regard the Duma as one of the
instruments of the revolution and resolutely, openly and clearly unfurl their
consistent, proletarian revolutionary banner in full view of the masses. They
would have to engage in agitation, propaganda, and organisation to develop the
revolution and explain to the masses that another great struggle out side the
Duma would be inevitable. The Cadet phrases about “blowing up the
Duma” were a vile provocation on the part of a liberal who had secret
talks with Stolypin. Don’t “blow up” the Duma, don’t allow the Duma to be dissolved— these phrases meant “do nothing that
would be too unpleasant for Stolypin & Co.”. The Social-Democrats would
have to expose the provocative nature of this police-like Cadet catchword and
show that even in the First Duma the con duct of the Social-Democratic Party
(Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike) had made all artificial revolutionary
“paths”, “proclamations”, etc., impossible. The Cadets knew this and in true Novoye Vremya style were substituting
“blowing-up” tactics for the tactics of developing a mass,
people’s revolution.

The Social-Democrats in the Duma would have to do the same as they had done in
the St. Petersburg elections— unfurl their revolutionary banner, compel
the vacillating petty bourgeoisie to choose between them and the Cadets; and
consent, in periods of decisive action, to partial agreements in particular
cases with those petty-bourgeois democrats who would follow them against the
Black Hundreds and the Cadets. After explaining the significance of the “Left bloc” in the Duma and the conditions under which it should be
termed, the speaker voiced a strong warning against regarding it as a permanent
agreement that would in any way tie the hands of the Social-Democrats, or as a
long-term agreement concluded against future contingencies. There would have
been no Left bloc in the St. Petersburg elections if the Social-Democrats there
had bound themselves by a permanent agreement or even by a provisional
agreement with the Narodniks, all of whom, even the “revolutionary”
Socialist-Revolutionaries, had gone with the Mensheviks to the Cadets to sell
out democracy! Only by pursuing a firm and independent policy, and not by
diplomacy arid petty bargaining, could the Social-Democrats secure, where
necessary, the co-operation of those elements of the democratic bourgeoisie that
are really capable of fighting.

Concluding Speech

Thespeaker opposed this in his concluding speech. [2] On the one hand, even during the most militant actions the
Social-Democrats would absolutely have to remain a free and independent
party with its own organisation even in the “joint” Soviets of Workers’
and Peasants’ Deputies, etc. On the other hand, they could not commit the
error of the Mensheviks, whose conception of a “political bloc” was
something opposed to a “fighting alliance”, because all agreements are
permissible only within the limits of a certain political line. Of
course, in opposing the Cadets on a given question, the Social-Democrats in
the Duma could not reject agreements with the Lefts, if the latter
followed the Social-Democrats on that question and if such an agreement
were essential to gain a parliamentary victory over the Cadets (e.g., to
amend a law, to delete some particularly objectionable passage from an
address, declaration or decision, etc.). But it would be folly and a crime
for Social-Democrats to tie their hands by means of ally thing like
permanent and restricting agreements with anyone.

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Notes:
[1]
The Conference of St. Petersburg ( City and Regional )
Organisations took place in February 1907. It was attended by Bolsheviks
only, 27 with the right to vote, and 14 with consultative voice. The Conference
adopted the following agenda:

(1) the forthcoming elections to the State Duma in St. Petersburg and in the
worker curia; (2) the Duma campaign and the Duma tactics of Social-Democracy; (3) the campaign for a congress, i. e., preparations for a Party congress; (4) the reorganisation of the St. Petersburg organisation; (5) the tribunal to examine the case of N. Lenin (the occasion when Lenin was
arraigned before the Party tribunal by the Menshevik C.C. for his pamphlet
“The Elections In St. Petersburg and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One
Mensheviks”); (6) the attitude to the breakaway Mensheviks; (7) agitational literature in St. Petersburg.

The Conference discussed the first point and nominated two candidates for
election as deputies to the State Duma and elected a commission to draw up
instructions for workers’ delegates, electors and deputies.

Lenindelivered a report on the second point, which was approved, as were the
fundamental principles for the structure of the St. Petersburg organisation as
elaborated by the St. Petersburg Committee.

Onthe question of Lenin’s arraignment before the Party tribunal by the
Menshevik C.C., the Conference gave full support to Lenin, recognised the guilt
of the Mensheviks in engineering the split in the St. Petersburg
Social-Democratic organisation on the eve of the elections to the Second State
Duma, and condemned the schismatist activities of F. I. Dan, Menshevik member of
the C.C. The Conference decided to set up a commission to control the Party
press and send representatives of the St. Petersburg Party organisation to the
editorial boards of Proletary and Vperyod . The Conference
elected delegates to a meeting of a number of Bolshevik organisations, called to elaborate a platform for the Fifth Congress
of the R.S.D.L.P.

[2]
In the discussion on Lenin’s report to the Conference, the question had been raised of limiting the agreement between Social-Democracy
and revolutionary democracy to purely combat questions (insurrection, strikes);
it was asked whether in such cases a single, common revolutionary organisation
would not be necessary.