Date: 1921
Source: ru:PSS/v42

I find the tone of today’s discussion somewhat surprising. It seems to me that the political moment is not quite what it ought to be. We must confront the situation as it has unfolded—worsening both domestically and on the international stage. Peace with Poland has yet to be secured; at home, banditry is on the rise, and kulak uprisings are breaking out. The supply of food and fuel has deteriorated dramatically. Last year, in the first half of the year, we consumed 15 million poods of grain; in the second half, that figure dropped to 8 million. This year, in the first half alone, we’ve already used up 25 million poods—and now we’re being forced to cut rations, with no certainty even that those rations will be distributed regularly. The obvious mistake was our misallocation of grain in the first half of the year; we should never have allowed consumption to swell to 25 million poods. At present, there is no grain coming in from Siberia, as the railway line has been disrupted by kulak insurgents. Our comrades in Siberia have warned of the possibility of a kulak uprising, though its scale remains extremely difficult to gauge. This is not a war where one can simply count the forces involved. The Siberian peasantry has not yet fully acclimatized to hardship—though they bear less of it than their counterparts in European Russia—and the resulting breakdown in communications with Siberia has brought supplies to a halt. From March 1st to around the 10th, there will be little improvement in the food situation. We have left no reserves behind. All our efforts must now be directed toward holding firm, enduring the current conditions with maximum resilience. There has been some slight improvement in grain deliveries from the Caucasus, but there is also a real risk that conditions could worsen again. While the uprising in Armenia appears to be subsiding{137}, the grain shipments from the Caucasus can by no means compensate for the loss of supplies from Siberia—though pressure is being exerted on the South-Eastern Railway to make up for these shortfalls. The news is grim, but there is nothing we can do about it.

The influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is clearly evident in the rise of banditry. Their main forces operate abroad; every spring, they dream of overthrowing Soviet power. Recently, Chernov wrote about this in a Russian newspaper published overseas. The SRs maintain close ties with local arsonists. This connection is further underscored by the fact that uprisings consistently erupt in precisely those regions from which we draw our grain. Implementing the grain requisition system proved unimaginably difficult. While requisitioning is also carried out in Siberia, that region still retains substantial grain reserves from previous years.

The deterioration has spread to fuel as well. There are no precise figures available, so it is impossible to draw clear conclusions—and it is equally difficult to pinpoint the root causes of the fuel crisis.

We have come to the conclusion that there exists a widespread sense of discontent. If we cannot address this discontent quickly through the Soviet apparatus, then we must tackle it from the grassroots, directly through the Party’s own organizational structures.

Beyond pointing to bureaucratic tendencies, there are also errors in the planning process itself. Plans must be scrutinized as they are formulated—discussed openly in the press and at Party meetings. We are compelled to shut down enterprises, thereby disrupting the operations of factories that still have fuel on hand. What is the problem? Clearly, beyond mere mistakes, the plan contains elements that could lead to legal proceedings. We must bring more proletarian cadres into the Party’s institutions.

There is no doubt that we will not emerge from the fuel crisis until the end of the spring thaw. We must make the most of whatever snow‑transport routes remain open and exploit the spring flood season to the fullest. The fuel crisis has hit textile enterprises hard, leaving them unable to meet even their minimal production targets.

These are the difficulties arising from banditry and the disruption of communications with Siberia. According to Smirnov’s report, the situation in Siberia is expected to improve as banditry is brought under control—but he offers no guarantees regarding an improvement in grain deliveries. Therefore, rather than indulging in broad generalizations about the overall situation, we must focus our efforts on finding a way out of this predicament.

A few words about the state of the Moscow organization. Some comrades blame the majority of the Moscow Committee for the factional strife. If the minority is dissatisfied, it may appeal the conference resolution to the Central Committee. I do not know how the Central Committee will resolve this matter, but my personal view is that the responsibility lies with the minority. The resolution of the All‑Russian Conference stipulates that the opinions of the minority must be taken into account—and that internal debate and discussion within the Party are essential{138}. In November, at the provincial conference, the Moscow Committee was elected on this very platform{139}. The two‑chamber system had already begun to show cracks; but we can no longer tolerate such practices. We introduced criticism not for the sake of criticism itself, but in order to arrive at sound, well‑reasoned decisions. Moscow set a record for the intensity of its debates. In November, delegates debated the Moscow Committee’s misguided policies—and 120 votes were cast against it. As the discussions progressed and each side presented its own platform, opposition to the Moscow Committee steadily diminished. What kind of democracy is it if the conference cannot even elect its own Moscow Committee? After three months of heated debate, the blame for factionalism ultimately falls on those who are dissatisfied. Of course, everyone has the formal right to appeal a decision—but the revolutionary’s duty is to stand united in times of hardship and to refrain from abusing the formal right of appeal.

In 67 Russian newspapers published abroad, we read how the Socialist-Revolutionaries and other factions are plotting to launch a campaign in the spring, seeking to drag us into non‑Party conferences. And in such moments, they declare: “We will appeal the conference resolution.” We must understand why, when, and to what extent we ought to appeal. We have given everyone the opportunity to speak, we have engaged in thorough debate—and the Congress will decide. But right now, we are on the front lines. We must unite and recognize that one more step into endless debate would mean we cease to be a Party. Without in the least denying the right to appeal, I would say that we fulfilled our duties even without debate—and now we must act with that same awareness. We must send Communists into every non‑Party organization to explain this grave situation.

First published here, based on a typewritten copy of the official minutes.