V. I.

Lenin

The key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the
question of state power. Which class holds power decides
everything. When
Dyelo Naroda , the paper of the chief governing party in Russia, recently complained (No. 147) that, owing to
the controversies over power, both the question of the
Constituent Assembly and that of bread are being forgotten, the
Socialist-Revolutionaries should have been answered, “Blame
yourselves. For it is the wavering and indecision of your party
that are mostly to blame for ‘ministerial leapfrog’, the
interminable postponements of the Constituent Assembly, and the
undermining by the capitalists of the planned and agreed
measures of a grain monopoly and of providing the country with
bread.”

The question of power cannot be evaded or brushed aside,
because it is the key question determining everything in a
revolution’s development, and in its foreign and domestic
policies. It is an undisputed fact that our revolution has
“wasted” six months in wavering over the system of power; it
is a fact resulting from the wavering policy of the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In the long run, these
parties’ wavering policy was determined by the class position of
the petty bourgeoisie, by their economic instability in the
struggle between capital and labour.

The whole issue at present is whether the petty-bourgeois
democrats have learned anything during these great, exceptionally
eventful six months. If not, then the revolution is lost, and only
a victorious uprising of the proletariat can save it. If they have
learned something, the establishment of a stable, unwavering power
must be begun immediately.

Only if power is based, obviously and unconditionally, on a majority of the population can it be stable
during a popular revolution, i.e., a revolution which rouses the
people, the majority of the workers and peasants, to action. Up to
now state power in Russia has virtually remained in the hands of
the bourgeoisie , who are compelled to make only particular
concessions (only to begin withdrawing them the following day), to
hand out promises (only to fail to carry them out), to search for
all sorts of excuses to cover their domination (only to fool the
people by a show of “honest coalition”), etc., etc. In words it claims to be a popular, democratic, revolutionary
government, but in deeds it is an anti-popular, undemocratic,
counter-revolutionary, bourgeois government. This is the
contradiction which has existed so far and which has been a source
of the complete instability and inconsistency of power, of that
“ministerial leapfrog” in which the S.R.s and Mensheviks
have been engaged with such unfortunate (for the people)
enthusiasm.

In early June 1917 1 told the All-Russia Congress of
Soviets [1] that either the Soviets would be dispersed and die an inglorious
death, or all power must be transferred to them. The events of
July and August very convincingly bore out these words. No matter
what lies the lackeys of the bourgeoisie—Potresov, Plekhanov
and others, who designate as “broadening the base” of power
its virtual transfer to a tiny minority of the people, to the
bourgeoisie, the exploiters—may resort to, only the power of
the Soviets can be stable, obviously based on a majority of the
people.

Only Soviet power could be stable and not be overthrown even in
the stormiest moments of the stormiest revolution. Only this power
could assure a continuous and broad development of the revolution,
a peaceful struggle of parties within the Soviets. Until this
power is created, there will inevitably be indecision, instability, vacillation, endless “crises of power”, a
constant farce of ministerial leapfrog, outbreaks on the Right and
on the Left.

The slogan, “Power to the Soviets”, however, is very often, if not in most cases, taken quite incorrectly to mean a
“Cabinet of the parties of the Soviet majority”. We would
like to go into more detail on this very false notion.

A “Cabinet of the parties of the Soviet majority” means a
change of individual ministers, with the entire old government
apparatus left intact—a thoroughly bureaucratic and thoroughly
undemocratic apparatus incapable of carrying out serious reforms,
such as are contained even in the S.R. and Menshevik programmes.

“ Power to the Soviets” means radically reshaping the entire old state apparatus, that bureaucratic apparatus which
hampers everything democratic. It means removing this apparatus
and substituting for it a new, popular one, i.e., a truly
democratic apparatus of Soviets, i.e., the organised and armed
majority of the people—the workers, soldiers and peasants. It
means allowing the majority of the people initiative and
independence not only in the election of deputies, but also in
state administration, in effecting reforms and various other
changes.

To make this difference clearer and more comprehensible, it is
worth recalling a valuable admission made some time ago by the
paper of the governing party of the S.R.s, Dyelo Naroda . It wrote
that even in those ministries which were in the hands of socialist
Ministers (this was written during the notorious coalition with
the Cadets, when some Mensheviks and S.R.s were ministers), the
entire administrative apparatus had remained unchanged, and
hampered work.

This is quite understandable. The entire history of the
bourgeois-parliamentary, and also, to a considerable extent, of
the bourgeois-constitutional, countries shows that a change of
ministers means very little, for the real work of administration
is in the hands of an enormous army of officials. This army,
however, is undemocratic through and through, it is connected by
thousands and millions of threads with the landowners and the
bourgeoisie and is completely dependent on them. This army is
surrounded by an atmosphere of bourgeois relations, and breathes
nothing but this atmosphere. It is set in its ways, petrified,
stagnant, and is powerless to break free of this atmosphere. It
can only think, feel, or act in the old way. This army is bound by
servility to rank, by certain privileges of “Civil”

Service; the upper ranks of this army are, through the medium of shares and
banks, entirely enslaved by finance capital, being to a certain
extent its agent and a vehicle of its interests and influence.

It is the greatest delusion, the greatest self-deception, and a
deception of the people, to attempt, by means of this state
apparatus, to carry out such reforms as the abolition of landed
estates without compensation, or the grain monopoly, etc. This
apparatus can serve a republican bourgeoisie, creating a republic
in the shape of a “monarchy without a monarch”, like the
French Third Republic, but it is absolutely incapable of carrying
out reforms which would even seriously curtail or limit the rights
of capital, the rights of “sacred private property”, much
less abolish those rights. That is why it always happens, under
all sorts of “coalition” Cabinets that include “socialists”, that these socialists, even when individuals
among them are perfectly honest, in reality turn out to be either
a useless ornament of or a screen for the bourgeois government, a
sort of lightning conductor to divert the people’s indignation
from the government, a tool for the government to deceive the
people. This was the case with Louis Blanc in 1848, and dozens of
times in Britain and France, when socialists participated in
Cabinets. This is also the case with the Chernovs and Tseretelis in
1917. So it has been and so it will be as long as the bourgeois
system exists and as long as the old bourgeois, bureaucratic state
apparatus remains intact.

The Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies are
particularly valuable because they represent a new type of state
apparatus, which is immeasurably higher, incomparably more
democratic. The S.R.s and Mensheviks have done everything, the
possible and the impossible, to turn the Soviets (particularly the
Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russia Soviet, i.e., the Central
Executive Committee) into useless talking shops which, under the
guise of “control”, merely adopted useless resolutions and
suggestions which the government shelved with the most polite and
kindly smile. The “fresh breeze” of the Kornilov affair,
however, which promised a real storm, was enough for all that was
musty in the Soviet to blow away for a while, and for the
initiative of the revolutionary people to begin expressing itself
as something majestic, powerful and invincible.

Let all sceptics learn from this example from history. Let
those who say: “We have no apparatus to replace the old one,
which inevitably gravitates towards the defence of the bourgeoisie,” be ashamed of themselves. For this apparatus
exists . It is the Soviets. Don’t be afraid of the people’s
initiative and independence. Put your faith in their revolutionary
organisations, and you will see in all realms of state affairs the
same strength, majesty and invincibility of the workers and
peasants as were displayed in their unity and their fury against
Kornilov.

Lack of faith in the people, fear of their initiative and
independence, trepidation before their revolutionary energy
instead of all-round and unqualified support for it—this is
where the S.R. and Menshevik leaders have sinned most of all. This
is where we find one of the deepest roots of their indecision,
their vacillation, their infinite and infinitely fruitless
attempts to pour new wine into the old bottles of the old,
bureaucratic state apparatus.

Take the history of the democratisation of the army in the 1917
Russian revolution, the history of the Chernov Ministry, of
Palchinsky’s “reign”, and of Peshekhonov’s resignation—you will find what we have said above strikingly
borne out at every step. Because there was no full confidence in
the elected, soldiers’ organisations and no absolute observance of
the principle of soldiers electing their commanding officers, the
Kornilovs, Kaledins and counter-revolutionary officers came to be
at the head of the army. This is a fact. Without deliberately
closing one’s eyes, one cannot fail to see that after the Kornilov
affair Kerensky’s government is leaving everything as before , that
in fact it is bringing back the Kornilov affair . The appointment
of Alexeyev, the “peace” with the Klembovskys, Gagarins,
Bagrations and other Kornilov men, and leniency in the treatment
of Kornilov and Kaledin all very clearly prove that Kerensky is in
fact bringing back the Kornilov affair.

There is no middle course. This has been shown by experience. Either all power goes to the Soviets and the army is
made fully democratic, or another Kornilov affair occurs.

And what about the history of the Chernov Ministry? Didn’t it
prove that every more or less serious step towards actually
satisfying the peasants’ needs, every step showing confidence in
the peasants and in their mass organisations and actions, evoked
very great enthusiasm among them? Chernov, however, had to spend
almost four months “haggling” with the Cadets and bureaucrats, who by endless delays and intrigues finally forced
him to resign without having accomplished anything. For and during
these four months the landowners and capitalists “won the
game”—they saved the landed estates, delayed the convocation
of the Constituent Assembly, and even started a number of
repressions against the land committees.

There is no middle course. This has been shown by experience. Either all power goes to the Soviets both centrally
and locally, and all land is given to the peasants immediately ,
pending the Constituent Assembly’s decision, or the landowners and
capitalists obstruct every step, restore the landowners’ power,
drive the peasants into a rage and carry things to an exceedingly
violent peasant revolt.

The same thing happened when the capitalists (with the aid of
Palchinsky) crushed every more or less serious attempt to
supervise production, when the merchants thwarted the grain
monopoly and broke up the regulated democratic distribution of
grain and other foodstuffs just begun by Peshekhonov.

What is now necessary in Russia is not to invent “ new reforms ”,
not to make “ plans ” for “ comprehensive ” changes .
Nothing of the kind .
This is how the situation is depicted — deliberately depicted in a false light — by the capitalists, the Potresovs, the Plekhanovs, who shout against
“ introducing socialism ” and against the “ dictatorship of the proletariat ”. The situation in Russia in fact is such that
the unprecedented burdens and hardships of the war, the
unparalleled and very real danger of economic dislocation and
famine have of themselves suggested the way out, have of
themselves not only pointed out, but advanced reforms and other
changes as absolutely necessary. These changes must be the grain
monopoly, control over production and distribution, restriction of
the issue of paper money, a fair exchange of grain for manufactured goods, etc.

Everyone recognises measures of this kind and in this direction
as inevitable, and in many places they have already been launched
from the most diverse sides.
They have already been launched , but they have been and are being obstructed everywhere by the
resistance of the landowners and the capitalists, which is being
put up through the Kerensky government (an utterly bourgeois
and Bonapartist government in reality ), through the old
bureaucratic state apparatus, and through the direct and indirect
pressure of Russian and “Allied” finance capital.

Not so long ago I. Prilezhayev, lamenting the resignation of
Peshekhonov and the collapse of the fixed prices and the grain
monopoly, wrote in
Dyelo Naroda (No. 147):

“ Courage and resolve are what our governments of all compositions have lacked. . . . The revolutionary democrats must
not wait; they must themselves show initiative, and intervene in
the economic chaos in a planned way. . . . If anywhere, it is here
that a firm course and a determined government are necessary.”

That goes without saying. Words of gold. The only trouble is
that the author forgot that the question of the firm course to
take, of courage and resolve, is not a personal matter, but a
question of which class is capable of manifesting courage and
resolve. The only class capable of this is the proletariat. A
courageous and resolute government ..steering a firm course is
nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor
peasants. I. Prilezhayev unwittingly longs for this dictatorship .

What would such a dictatorship mean in practice? It would mean
nothing but the fact that the resistance of the Kornilov men would
be broken and the democratisation of the army restored and
completed. Two days after its creation ninety-mine per cent of the
army would be enthusiastic supporters of this dictatorship. This
dictatorship would give land to the peasants and ‘full power to
the local peasant committees. How can anyone in his right senses
doubt that the peasants would support this dictatorship? What
Peshekhonov only promised (“the resistance of the capitalists
has been. broken” was what Peshekhonov actually said in his
famous speech before the Congress of Soviets), this dictatorship
would put into effect, would translate into reality. At the same
time the democratic organisations of food supply, control, etc.,
that have already begun to form would in no way be eliminated. They would, on the contrary, be supported and
developed, and all obstacles in the way of their work would be
removed.

Only the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants
is capable of smashing the resistance of the capitalists, of
displaying truly supreme courage and determination in the exercise
of power, and of securing the enthusiastic, selfless and truly
heroic support of the masses both ‘in the army and among the
peasants.

Power to the Soviets — this is the only way to make further progress gradual, peaceful and smooth , keeping perfect pace with
the political awareness and resolve of the majority of the people
and with their own experience. Power to the Soviets means the
complete transfer of the country’s administration and economic
control into the hands of the workers and peasants, to whom
nobody would dare offer resistance and who, through practice, through
their own experience, would soon learn how to distribute the land,
products and grain properly.

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Notes:
[1]
See pp. 17–19 of this volume.— Ed .