V. I.

Lenin

Animportant question in connection with the Russian revolution is the following:

I. Will it go on to the complete overthrow of the tsarist government
and the establishment of a republic?

II.Or will it limit itself to a curtailment of tsarist power, to a monarchist
constitution?

Inother words, are we to have a revolution of the 1789 type or of the 1848 type? [1] (We say type in order to dispose of the preposterous idea that
there can be any repetition of the irrevocably vanished social, political, and
international situations of 1789 and 1848.)

Thata Social-Democrat must want and work for the former, of this there can hardly be any doubt.

Yet Martynov’s way of stating the issue reduces itself wholly to a tail-ender’s
desire for a more modest revolution. In type lithe “danger”, so
frightening to the Martynovs, of the proletariat and the peasantry seizing power
is entirely eliminated. In this case Social-Democracy will unavoidably remain
“in opposition”—even to the revolution; this indeed is what
Martynov wants—to remain in opposition even to the revolution.

Thequestion is, which type is the more probable?

Infavour of type I we have: (1) An immeasurably greater store of resentment and
revolutionary feeling among the lower classes in Russia than there was in the
Germany of 1848. With us the change is sharper; with us there have been no intermediate stages between autocracy and political freedom (the
Zemstvo does not count); with us despotism is Asiatically virginal. (2)
With us a disastrous war increases the likelihood of a severe
collapse, for it has involved the tsarist government completely. (3) With us
the international situation is more favourable, for proletarian Europe will
make it impossible for the crowned heads of Europe to help the Russian
monarchy. (4) With us the development, of class-conscious revolutionary
parties, their literature and organisation, is on a much higher level than
it was in 1789, 1848, or 1871. (5) With us the various nationalities
oppressed by tsarism, such as the Poles and Finns, provide a
powerful impulse to the attack on the autocracy. (6) With us the
peasantry is in particularly sorry plight; it is incredibly impoverished and has absolutely
nothing to lose.

Ofcourse, all these considerations are by far not absolute. Others may be
contraposed to them:

(1) We have very few survivals of feudalism.

(2) The government is more experienced and has greater facilities for detecting the
danger of revolution.

(3) The spontaneity of a revolutionary outburst is complicated by the war, which creates problems that have no bearing on the
revolution. The war demonstrates the weakness of the Russian revolutionary
classes, which would not have had the strength to rise without it (cf. Karl
Kautsky in The Social Revolution).

(4) Other countries provide no stimulus to a revolution in ours.

(5) The national movements towards the dismemberment of Russia are
likely to tear the bulk of t.he Russian big and petty bourgeoisie away
from our revolution.

(6) The antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie with us
is much deeper than it was in 1789, 1848, or 1871; hence, the
bourgeoisie will be more fearful of the proletarian revolution and will throw itself more readily into the arms of
reaction.

Onlyhistory, of course, can weigh these pros and cons in the balances. Our task
as Social-Democrats is to drive the bourgeois revolution onward as far
as it will go, without ever losing sight of our main task—the
independent organisation of the proletariat.

Thisis where Martynov gets muddled. The complete revolution means seizure of
power by the proletariat and the poor peasantry. These classes , once in
power, cannot but strive for the socialist revolution. Ergo , seizure of power,
from being at first a step in the democratic revolution, will, by force
of circumstances, and against the will (and sometimes without the awareness) of
its participants, passinto the socialist revolution. And here failure is inevitable. If attempts at the socialist revolution are bound to
end in failure, we must (like Marx in 1871, when he foresaw the inevitable
failure of the insurrection in Paris) advise the proletariat not to rise , but to wait and organise, reculer pour mieux sauter . [2]

Such,in substance, is Martynov’s idea (and that of the new
Iskra , too), had he been able to reason it out to its logical end.

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Notes:
[1]
N.B. Some might add here “or of the 1871 type”? This question must be
considered as a probable objection raised against us by many
non -Social-Democrats.— Lenin

[2]
To step back, the better to leap.— Ed .