V. I.

Lenin

The Fifth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party

April 30-May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907

2

Speech on the Report on the Activities of the Central
Committee

May 4 (17)

Ishould have liked to speak solely on the political aspect of the question. But
Comrade Abramovich’s last speech compels me to deal briefly with his
remarks. When Comrade Abramovich spoke about the “besieged”
Menshevik Central Committee, I thought to myself: “Poor Mensheviks! Again
they are in a state of siege. They are ’besieged’ not only when they are in the
minority, but even when they are in the majority I”

Arethere not certain inner reasons stemming from the very nature of Menshevik
policy, which impel the Mensheviks to complain eternally about being besieged
by the proletarian party?

Whatare the facts adduced by Comrade Abramovich regarding the siege of the
Menshevik Central Committee? There were three—the agitation for an
extraordinary congress, the conference of military and combat organisations,
and finally “other organisational questions”, as Comrade Abramovich
put it.

Letus examine these three facts.

Agitationfor an extraordinary congress became wide spread when it emerged that
the Central Committee was indisputably running counter to the will of the
majority of the Party. Let me remind you that this was after the Central
Committee had launched a slogan calling for support of a responsible
ministry. At that time, the Bund had not joined our Party, but the Poles and the
Latvians had. Both the former and the latter quite definitely rejected the
policy

of the C.C. Hence, it is an absolutely indisputable fact that the C.C. was at
the time at variance with the vast majority of the Party. Who, then, was
besieging whom—was it the majority of the Party that besieged the Party
C.C. when it demanded that the latter render an account of its activities to
the congress? Or was it the C.C. that besieged the Party by going counter to it?
Call to mind how far Plekhanov went at the time. His letter against the congress
was published in Sotsial-Demokrat , official publication of the C.C. In
this letter Plekhanov reacted to the call for a congress with suspicions
concerning the motives behind the agitation, and tirades about the workers’
mites. Give this thought: was it not Plekhanov who was wrong to permit himself
to do such things against the majority of the Party, which was demanding a
congress?

Iwill say only this—after the decision of the November All-Russian
Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. the agitation for an extraordinary congress ceased.

Thesecond fact—the conference of military and combat organisations. There
were two conferences. This, of course, is unfortunate, but it is strange to see
in this anything like a “siege” of the C.C. Would it not have been
better to explain what was wrong with the decisions of the conference which took
place independently of the C.C., rather than to dismiss the matter by
complaining about a siege? Let me remind you that representatives of the Moscow
and St. Petersburg committees were present at both conferences—hence no Party group as such was linked up with either
conference. The resolutions of the Bolshevik conference of military and combat
organisations, published in November 1906, have not so far encountered any
serious criticism.

Thethird fact—“other organisational questions”. Just what does this
mean? Concretely, what is included in this. Is it the St. Petersburg split at
the time of the elections, engineered by the Mensheviks with the help of the
C.C.? But it would be simply ridiculous to speak about a siege of the C.C. in
this connection.

Ishall now proceed to the political aspect of the question. Our main task is to
examine how the C.C. guided the class struggle of the proletariat, how it
applied in practice the tactics adopted at the Unity Congress.

Thefirst slogan which the Central Committee offered the Party was that of
support for the demand for a “Duma” or “responsible” ministry. Comrade Martov has stated to us here
that this slogan was put out for the purpose of extending and intensifying
the conflict between the Duma and the government.

Isthat the case? What should the proletarian extension and intensification of
the conflict consist in? It should, of course, consist in pointing out the real
field of struggle and clashes giving rise to the conflict—the field of the
class struggle in general, and, in this particular case, the struggle of the
people against the old regime. To extend and intensify the Duma conflict, we
ourselves should have understood and explained to the people that the Duma
conflict was simply an incomplete and distorted reflection of the conflict
between the people and the old regime, that the struggle in the Duma was a faint
echo of the revolutionary struggle outside the Duma. To extend and intensify the
conflict, we should have raised political consciousness and political demands
from the level of Duma slogans to the level of those calling for a general
revolutionary struggle. The C.C. acted in the opposite way. It blunted and
narrowed down the slogans calling for a revolutionary struggle to the dimensions
of those calling for a Duma ministry. It did not call on the people to fight for
power, even though this struggle stemmed from the entire objective situation,
but to struggle for a deal between the liberals and the government. Whether
deliberately or not, the C.C. called upon the Party to adopt the slogans of
the parliamentary “peaceful” path at a time when actually objective
conditions demanded a revolutionary struggle outside of parliament. Actually
there was no serious social movement whatever for a “responsible minis
try”, nor could there have been one. Even the Menshevik Social-Democratic
group in the Duma (the First Duma) did not adopt this slogan of the
C.C. ( Martov : “That’s not true!”) Yes, it is true, Comrade Martov, and a simple reference to the resolution of the C.C. and to the
verbatim reports of the First Duma will show that it is true.

Irrespectiveof the desires and motives of the C.C., its slogan was actually an
adaptation to liberal policy. And this adaptation could not have yielded any
results, because liberal policy did not reflect the genuine social movement of the time but was
merely a dream of halting the revolution, although it has by no means halted
yet. The course of events showed that this entire business with the
“responsible ministry” was an attack with ineffective weapons.

Thesecond slogan of the C.C. dates back to the period of the July strike. We
must not blame the C.C. for the failure of the strike at the time. It is not to
the discredit, but rather to the credit, of a central committee like that of the
Mensheviks that it on that occasion nevertheless went to meet the revolution
half-way. It is not the fault of the C.C. that, from its St. Petersburg purview,
it did not know the sentiments of the proletariat throughout Russia. Nor can we
declare it to be a mistake for us to have been confident of an uprising at the
time, and to have expected it. The uprising actually took place, and our
preliminary slogans, our policy prior to the uprising, were among the elements
which made for the success or failure of this uprising.

Themistake of the Central Committee was, as I see it, in endeavouring, once the
revolutionary struggle reached the stage of an uprising, to confine that
struggle to non-revolutionary or curtailed revolutionary slogans. This was
reflected in the C.C. slogan—“Partial mass expressions of
protest”. This was reflected still more vividly in the slogan—“For
the Duma as an organ of power for the convocation of a constituent
assembly”. The issue of such lifeless slogans was tantamount to adapting
proletarian policy to the policy of the liberal bourgeoisie. And once again
events showed how utterly vain and impotent were the attempts to effect such an
adaptation. Complaints and whining about the helplessness of the workers’ party
are frequently heard among us. But let me tell you that you are helpless
precisely because you dull the edge of your slogans. ( Applause from the Bolshevik benches .)

Toproceed. Let us examine the question of the bloc with the Cadets during the
elections to the Second Duma. In his report on behalf, of the C.C. Martov washed
his hands of this question with amazingly complacent formalism. You see, he
says, the C.C. agreed that blocs are permissible, and in strict accordance with the C.C. directive blocs were permitted!
( Laughter .) It would not be at all amiss if, in a political report of the C.C., one were to base oneself not on the formal
legitimacy of a decision but on the essential correctness of the given
policy as tested in practice. We Bolsheviks constantly asserted that the
notorious Black-Hundred danger was nothing but liberal defence against the
danger from the Left, and that if we were guided in our policy by fear of
the Black-Hundred danger, we should actually be rising to the liberal
bait. The election results showed that we were right. In a number of cities
the election returns refuted the tales of the liberals and
Mensheviks. ( Voices : “What about Kiev, Poland, and
Wilno!”) I haven’t the time to go into individual localities,
but I shall deal with the political results in general. Statistician Smirnov
calculated the election returns for 22 cities as follows:

41,000 for the Left bloc; 74,000 for the Cadets; 34,500 for the Octobrists, and
17,000 for the monarchists. Of the 72,000 votes cast in 16 other cities, 58.7
per cent went to the opposition and 21 per cent went to the reactionaries. The
elections revealed the fictitiousness of the Black-Hundred danger, while the
policy of the “permissibility” of blocs with the Cadets, allegedly
by way of exception, proved to be a policy of proletarian dependence on
the liberal bourgeoisie.

Letme tell you that you should not scorn theoretical disputes, or
contemptuously dismiss differences in opinion as factional inventions. Our old
disputes, our theoretical, and especially our tactical, differences are
constantly being converted, in the course of the revolution, into the most
downright practical differences. It is impossible to take a single step in
practical politics without coming up against the very same fundamental problems
underlying an appraisal of the bourgeois revolution, the relations between the
Cadets and Trudoviks, and so forth. Practical experience does not erase
differences of opinion; it sharpens and vitalises them. And it was not by chance
that such prominent Mensheviks as Plekhanov reduced to the absurd the policy of
blocs with the Cadets. In advancing his celebrated “Duma with full
powers”, Plekhanov advocated a common slogan for the proletariat and the
liberal bourgeoisie. Plekhanov only reflects more saliently and more forcibly than others the quintessence, the
basic tendency, of the entire Menshevik policy—replacing the independent
line of the working class with adaptation to the liberal bourgeoisie. The
bankruptcy of our C.C. was primarily and above all the bankruptcy of this policy
of opportunism. ( Applause from the Bolsheviks and part of the Centre .)

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