Report on the Internal and External Position of the Republic at a Conference of the Active Members of the Moscow Organization of the RCP(b), October 9, 1920
Доклад о внутреннем и внешнем положении республики на совещании актива Московской организации РКП(б) 9 октября 1920 г.
Date: 1920
Source: ru:PSS/v41
Translated by: AI (Claude)

There is no need to speak about our internal position at this meeting, as it is sufficiently known to all comrades from our press and from work in the localities. Food has been procured in much greater quantity than last year, fuel too, and this is the foundation of our work. But in terms of supply, things are worse. A certain part of large factories can already be put into operation, and the mood of workers in them, of course, can no longer be as hopeless as during the standing idle of factories. Taking into account our economic position, one can assume that there will be a turning point in mood.

It is necessary to dwell on our external position, on the news of foreign policy. Inside Poland there is a grandiose crisis: economically Poland is destroyed much more than we are; in political terms it has reached the point that even the PPS, an opportunist party that has always conducted malicious persecution against the Bolsheviks, protests against the government's reprisal against workers. In the localities that we give them under the peace treaty, Poland will hold on only by violence. In the masses of workers and peasants of Poland there is an enormous desire for peace. By proposing peace to Poland and making enormous concessions, we will ensure that political parties understand our rightness, understand that we did not want war with Poland. Having taken an indemnity from us, Poland will still not profit from this, as it will not receive money – France will take it. Until now this has been concealed in Poland, but now this situation is gradually being exposed to the workers, and we must ensure that this is visibly shown to the workers. Therefore, we now need to sign peace. Besides, we will gain time and use it to strengthen our army.

On the Wrangel front, the preponderance of forces is on our side, but nevertheless there was at one time a serious threat to the Donets Basin. Wrangel disrupts our plan of general offensive by separate strikes in different directions.

In a political sense, at first glance an insignificant case is characteristic. Germany permitted entry to Comrades Zinoviev and Bukharin to the upcoming congress of the Independent Party in Germany. Perhaps this is crude provocation, but, on the other hand, undoubtedly, Comrade Zinoviev's arrival will accelerate and deepen the split among the "independents," which has already taken shape. Part of the split-off "independents" and up to a million members of the Communist Party of Germany will constitute a grandiose revolutionary force. Besides, there will be enormous agitational material here for all of Europe.

The nail of everything is that France's imperialist policy has manifested itself, which always disrupted our peace negotiations and now again puts spokes in the wheels. We must use every hour of the armistice to strengthen. To intensify supply activity, to achieve rapid success on the Wrangel front, and then there will be hope to break the network of diplomatic intrigues against us.

The situation in the Far East is such that Japan must leave, as a winter campaign is impossible for it. This strengthens us. At present in Moscow there is one American billionaire who is conducting negotiations about a concession in Kamchatka. By giving this concession, we exacerbate relations between Japan and America.

In Turkestan and in the Caucasus the situation is more complex. Recently the Turks began to advance on Armenia with the aim of capturing Batumi, and then, perhaps, Baku. It is clear that in this question we must show maximum caution. There is no data on military complications yet.

However great the disagreements between France and England may be, we cannot now play on them while we have not victory but defeat. Disagreements, apparently, still exist. England wants to conduct trade relations with us, and we are trying to implement them.

What the armament of our army is, I cannot say in detail. There was a shortage of cartridges recently, but now the difficulties have decreased. Work stands on a solid foundation, it only needs to be strengthened even more. Party organizations must help this through work in cells and through trade unions.

What are the chances of victory, I cannot answer now, as the mood is difficult to determine for now. The disappointment is too great; six weeks have already passed since we began to retreat and we still haven't stopped. The main thing is that we were late with winter supply; this coincided with defeat. Undoubtedly, we must use every moment of the armistice to strengthen.

We cannot give the tone of agitation until we know something definite. This meeting already gives tone to it.

According to Comrade Trotsky, the question of Makhno was discussed very seriously in military circles and it became clear that nothing but gain can be expected here. This is explained by the fact that the elements that grouped around Makhno have already experienced Wrangel's regime and what he can give them did not satisfy them. Our agreement with Makhno is hedged with guarantees that he will not go against us. Here we got the same picture as with Denikin and Kolchak: as soon as they touched the interests of kulaks and the peasantry in general, the latter went over to our side.

Undoubtedly, the Poles will also use the armistice for their strengthening, perhaps they will bring up equipment during this time, but this does not mean that we should not do the same.

As long as there is war, secret diplomacy must exist as one of the means of war. We cannot renounce it. The evaluation of this diplomacy depends on the general evaluation of the war.

First published in 1959 in Lenin Miscellany XXXVI

Printed from the stenogram