Date: 1922-03-19
Source: ru:ND; en:Pipes

Top Secret

Under no circumstances are copies to be made; each member of the Politburo— including Comrade Kalinin— is to record their own notes directly on the document itself.1

Lenin.

To Comrade Molotov. For the Members of the Politburo

With regard to the incident in Shuya2—which has already been placed before the Politburo for discussion—I believe it is imperative that we adopt a firm resolution forthwith, in light of the broader strategic plan for combating this threat in this particular direction. Since I doubt I will be able to attend the Politburo meeting on March 20th3 in person, I shall set forth my views in writing.

The incident in Shuya must be seen in connection with the report recently transmitted by ROSTA1* to the newspapers—not for publication, but as a confidential dispatch—namely, the report concerning the anti‑Soviet resistance being prepared in Petrograd by the Black Hundreds against the decree on the confiscation of church property. If we juxtapose this fact with what the newspapers are reporting about the clergy’s attitude toward the decree on the confiscation of church property, and then consider what we know about the clandestine appeal issued by Patriarch Tikhon, it becomes utterly clear that the Black Hundred clergy, led by its chief ideologue, is deliberately pursuing a plan to deliver a decisive blow against us precisely at this moment.

It is evident that at secret meetings of the most influential faction within the Black Hundred clergy, this plan has been carefully considered and adopted with considerable resolve. The events in Shuya are but one manifestation—and one application—of this overarching strategy.

I contend that our adversary is making a grave strategic error in attempting to draw us into a decisive confrontation at a time when such a struggle is especially hopeless and particularly disadvantageous for them. On the contrary, for us, this very moment not only presents an exceptionally favorable opportunity—it is, in fact, the sole moment in which we can, with a probability of 99 out of 100, crush the enemy utterly and secure for ourselves the positions we need for decades to come. It is precisely now—and only now—that, while people are eating one another in famine‑stricken regions and hundreds—if not thousands—of corpses litter the roads, we can (and therefore must) carry out the confiscation of church property with the utmost ferocity and relentless energy, stopping at nothing to suppress whatever resistance may arise. It is precisely now—and only now—that the vast majority of the peasant masses will either stand with us or, at the very least, be unable to offer any sustained support to that small band of Black Hundred clerics and reactionary urban petty bourgeoisie who seek to test the policy of violent resistance to the Soviet decree.

We must, at all costs, carry out the confiscation of church property in the most resolute and most rapid manner possible—thereby securing for ourselves a fund amounting to several hundred million gold rubles (we must remember the colossal wealth held by certain monasteries and lavras). Without this fund, no state work whatsoever—no economic reconstruction in particular—and no defense of our position in Genoa, especially, would be conceivable. We must seize this fund of several hundred million gold rubles—or perhaps even several billion—in any case. And we can succeed in doing so only now. All indications point to the fact that later on we will no longer be able to accomplish this: for no other moment, save perhaps the desperate hunger of these times, will afford us the kind of mood among the broad peasant masses that would either win their sympathy or, at the very least, ensure that these masses remain neutral—so that victory in the struggle over the confiscation of church property will rest unconditionally and completely on our side.

An astute writer on state affairs once rightly observed that if, in order to achieve a given political objective, it becomes necessary to resort to a series of harsh measures, then those measures must be carried out with the greatest vigor and in the shortest possible time; for the masses cannot endure prolonged exposure to cruelty. This insight is further reinforced by the fact that, given Russia’s international situation, it is highly likely that, after Genoa, we may find—or indeed may be forced to find—that harsh measures against the reactionary clergy will prove politically irrational, perhaps even excessively dangerous. At present, victory over the reactionary clergy is assured for us in every respect. Moreover, among our principal foreign adversaries among the Russian émigrés abroad—namely, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks—their ability to oppose us will be greatly hampered if, precisely at this moment, precisely in the context of widespread famine, we proceed with maximum speed and ruthless efficiency to suppress the reactionary clergy.

Therefore, I arrive at the unequivocal conclusion that we must now deliver the most resolute and most merciless blow against the Black Hundred clergy and crush their resistance with such severity that they will never forget it for decades to come. I envision the campaign to implement this plan as follows:

Only Comrade Kalinin should officially undertake any public initiatives—never, under any circumstances, should Comrade Trotsky appear in print or address the public in any other form.

The telegram already dispatched on behalf of the Politburo regarding the temporary suspension of confiscations must not be rescinded5. It serves our interests, for it will give our opponents the impression that we are wavering, that we have somehow been intimidated by them (as for this secret telegram—precisely because it is secret—the enemy will, of course, soon learn of it).

Send to Shuya one of the most energetic, capable, and resourceful members of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee or other representatives of central authority (it is better to send just one than several)6, and provide him with verbal instructions through one of the members of the Politburo. These instructions should direct him to arrest, in Shuya, as many as possible—no fewer than several dozen—representatives of the local clergy, the local petty bourgeoisie, and the local bourgeoisie, on suspicion of direct or indirect involvement in the act of violently resisting the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee’s decree on the confiscation of church property. Upon completion of this task, he must immediately return to Moscow and personally deliver a report to the full session of the Politburo—or to two members of the Politburo specifically authorized to receive it. Based on this report, the Politburo will issue detailed directives to the judicial authorities, also delivered orally: the trial of the Shuya rebels who resisted aid to the starving must proceed with the utmost speed and conclude only with the execution of a very large number of the most influential and most dangerous Black Hundred elements in the city of Shuya7—and, where possible, not only in that city, but also in Moscow8 and several other spiritual centers.

As for Patriarch Tikhon himself, I believe it is advisable not to disturb him—at least for now—though he undoubtedly stands at the head of this entire rebellion of slaveholders. Regarding him, we must issue a secret directive to the State Political Administration, instructing them to monitor and expose all of this figure’s connections with the utmost precision and thoroughness, precisely at this moment. We must also require Dzerzhinsky and Unshlikht to personally report to the Politburo on this matter weekly.

At the Party Congress, convene a secret meeting bringing together all—or nearly all—delegates on this issue, along with the leading officials of the GPU, the People’s Commissariat of Justice2*, and the Revolutionary Tribunal9. At this meeting, pass a secret resolution of the Congress stating that the confiscation of church property—especially the wealthiest lavras, monasteries, and churches—must be carried out with ruthless determination, stopping at nothing and completing the task in the shortest possible time. The more representatives of the reactionary clergy and the reactionary bourgeoisie we manage to execute in this regard, the better. We must, precisely now, teach this crowd such a lesson that for several decades to come they will not dare even to think of resisting us again.

To oversee the swift and successful implementation of these measures, appoint a special commission right there at the Congress—specifically, at its secret session—ensuring the mandatory participation of Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Kalinin, without any public announcement regarding the commission itself, so that all operations under its jurisdiction are carried out not in the name of the commission, but in accordance with the general Soviet and Party line. Appoint the most capable and responsible workers to carry out this measure in the richest lavras, monasteries, and churches.

Lenin.

March 19, 1922

I ask Comrade Molotov to endeavor to circulate this letter to the members of the Politburo today—without making copies—and to request that they return it to the secretary immediately upon reading, accompanied by a brief note indicating whether each member of the Politburo agrees with the basic thrust of the letter or whether the letter gives rise to any disagreements.

Lenin.

March 19, 1922

Received by telephone

M. Volodicheva.

Published in “Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” 1990, No. 4, pp. 191–193.

Fund 2, Inventory 1, File 22947—typewritten text.

1* ROSTA—Russian Telegraph Agency.

2* GPU—State Political Administration under the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs; NKY—People’s Commissariat of Justice.

3* CHON—Units of Special Purpose.

1.The document bears only a note from V.M. Molotov: “Agreed. However, I propose that we limit the campaign not to all gubernias and cities, but to those where significant assets truly exist, concentrating the Party’s forces and attention accordingly. March 19. V.M. Molotov.”

2.The newspaper “Izvestia of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee,” No. 70, dated March 28, 1922, published the government communiqué adopted by the Presidium of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee on March 27, 1922, “On Events in the City of Shuya in Connection with the Confiscation of Church Property.” The communiqué provided a detailed account of all events. In particular, it reported that on March 3, 1922, by resolution of the Shuya County Executive Committee, a commission had been established pursuant to the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee’s decree of February 23, 1922, “On the Procedure for the Confiscation of Church Property Held in the Use of Religious Groups,” as well as the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee’s and the People’s Commissariat of Justice’s instructions of the same date pertaining to the decree (see: Izvestia of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee, No. 46, February 26, 1922; No. 47, February 28, 1922). Having confiscated valuables from three small churches, on March 13, 1922, the commission proceeded to the cathedral—but, encountering a crowd of agitated believers, postponed its work until March 15. On March 14, in a calm atmosphere, the commission took inventory of the synagogue’s valuables. On March 15, a large crowd gathered in Cathedral Square. When mounted police—a detachment of six cavalrymen—arrived, they were met with threats, stones, and logs. The bells on the cathedral’s belfry began to ring the alarm. Then a half‑company of the 146th Infantry Regiment arrived, along with two trucks equipped with machine guns. Revolver shots rang out from the crowd; the crowd attempted to surround the half‑company. At the commander’s order, the Red Army soldiers fired a shot into the air—but this did not help; the second volley was directed into the crowd, which then scattered. Four people were killed and ten were wounded (all injuries were minor, some from revolver bullets fired by the crowd). By evening, traders, teachers, and others spotted in the square had been arrested. That same evening, representatives of the faithful turned over 3.5 poods of silver from the cathedral’s treasures to the county executive committee. On March 23, the county commission, together with representatives of the faithful and in the presence of members of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee’s commission, began the process of confiscating the cathedral’s valuables. About 10 poods of silver were turned over to the county financial department; precious stones, pearl vestments, and other valuables were transferred to the State Repository of Church Treasures. All confiscated items were placed under special supervision by the Central Commission for Aid to the Starving.

3.At the Politburo meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 20, 1922, it was decided to propose to the Presidium of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee that a commission be sent to the city of Shuya, consisting of: P.G. Smidovich (Chairman), N.I. Muralov, and I.I. Kutuzov. On March 21, the commission arrived in the city, completed its work on March 23, and reached the following conclusion: “1) To recognize the actions of the county commission in confiscating church property as correct and consistent with the directives of the center. 2) To recognize the actions of the local authorities as generally correct, but insufficiently energetic and systematic—both in preparing for the work of confiscating valuables and in maintaining public order. 3) To instruct the commission for the confiscation of valuables to immediately complete this work. 4) To instruct the gubernial and county authorities to take measures to thoroughly investigate violations of public order in connection with the confiscation of valuables, to identify those responsible for resisting the authorities and attacking Red Army soldiers and militia, and to refer the entire case to the Revolutionary Tribunal for final adjudication and exemplary punishment of the guilty.”

At the Politburo meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 20, attended by L.B. Kamenev, I.V. Stalin, L.D. Trotsky, and V.M. Molotov, the draft directives on the confiscation of church property proposed by Trotsky on March 17 was also discussed—and was adopted with amendments:

“1. In the center and in the gubernias, establish secret steering commissions for the confiscation of valuables, modeled after the Moscow commission of Sapronov and Unshlikht. Each of these commissions must include, as a matter of course, either the secretary of the gubernia committee or the head of the agitation and propaganda department.

Note: In the most important gubernias, set earlier deadlines for confiscation; in less important gubernias, set later deadlines—after information about confiscations in Petrograd and other central gubernias has spread throughout Russia.

2. The Central Commission should consist of Chairman Comrade Kalinin, Yakovlev, and Sapronov (after Comrade Sapronov joins the commission, Comrade Beloborodov should join as his deputy—and must be brought up to speed on the matter no later than Wednesday, March 22), Comrade Unshlikht, Krasikov (Galkin’s deputy), Vinokurov, Bazilevich. The Commission has a bureau that meets daily (Yakovlev, Sapronov (Beloborodov’s deputy), Unshlikht, Galkin). Once a week, the Commission convenes with the participation of Comrade Trotsky.

3. In gubernial cities, the commission should include the division commissioner, brigade commissioner, or head of the political department.

4. Alongside these secret preparatory commissions, there are official commissions or desks attached to the committees for aid to the starving, tasked with the formal acceptance of valuables, negotiations with religious groups, and the like. Strictly ensure that the national composition of these official commissions does not provide grounds for chauvinistic agitation.

5. In each gubernia, designate an unofficial week of agitation and preliminary organization for the confiscation of valuables (of course, without formally announcing such a week). To this end, select the best agitators—and, in particular, military personnel. Give the agitation a character that is entirely alien to any struggle against religion or the Church, and direct it solely toward aiding the starving.

6. Simultaneously, sow discord among the clergy, taking decisive initiative in this regard and placing under the protection of state authority those priests who openly advocate for the confiscation of church property.

7. Of course, our agitation—and the agitation of loyal priests—must never merge; however, in our own agitation, we point to the fact that a significant portion of the clergy has begun to fight against the criminal, miserly treatment of church property by the inhumane and greedy ‘princes of the Church.’

8. Throughout the duration of the campaign—especially during the week—we must ensure complete awareness of everything that is happening among the various groups of clergy, the faithful, and the like.

9. Should we discover that bourgeois merchant elements, former officials, and the like are acting as organizers of the uprising, we must arrest their leaders. If necessary—especially if Black Hundred agitation goes too far—we should organize a demonstration involving the garrison, armed with banners bearing slogans such as ‘Church Treasures for the Salvation of the Lives of the Starving’ and the like.

10. As much as possible, avoid touching prominent priests until the end of the campaign—but secretly, yet officially (through the gubernia political departments, with a signed acknowledgment), warn them that in the event of any excesses, they will be the first to bear responsibility.

11. Alongside agitation, organizational work must also proceed: prepare the appropriate apparatus for the very accounting and confiscation of valuables, ensuring that this work is carried out in the shortest possible time. It is best to begin the confiscation with a church headed by a loyal priest. If no such priest is available, start with the most significant temple, carefully preparing all details (Communists must be stationed on all neighboring streets, preventing gatherings; a reliable contingent—preferably from the CHON3*—should be nearby, and so on).

12. Wherever possible, send representatives of the starving to churches, to meetings, to barracks, demanding the swift confiscation of church property.

13. In the gubernias and in the center, allow representatives of the loyal clergy to participate in the accounting of confiscated church property, widely informing the population that it will have full opportunity to ensure that not a single grain of church treasure is diverted to any purpose other than aiding the starving.

14. Should groups of the faithful propose to redeem the valuables, declare that the matter must be considered in each individual case by the Central Committee for Aid to the Starving—and under no circumstances should the work of confiscation be suspended in the meantime. Experience in the provinces shows that such negotiations are conducted without serious intent to redeem, and instead only bring uncertainty and demoralization.

15. In Moscow, work should proceed according to the established schedule, so that the confiscation can begin no later than March 31.

16. I believe that for Petrograd, we could set roughly the same deadline, in agreement with Comrade Zinoviev—under no circumstances forcing the campaign too quickly or resorting to force until the entire operation is fully secured, both politically and organizationally.

17. As for the gubernias, the gubernia committees must, based on this directive, in accordance with the deadline set in Moscow and under the supervision of the Central Commission, set their own deadlines—on the one hand, ensuring thorough preparation, and on the other, avoiding delays by even a single day, calculating so that the most important gubernias go first.” (RGASPI, F. 17, Inv. 3, Doc. 283, pp. 6–7).

The Politburo resolved to circulate the directives to all gubernia committees.

4No trace of the ROSTA communiqué could be found. Judging from subsequent events in Petrograd, it appears to have concerned the clergy—led by Metropolitan Veniamin—preparing resistance to the commissions tasked with confiscating church property. Anti‑Soviet demonstrations on this basis took place at Kazan Cathedral, the Church of the Sorrowful Mother of God, Vladimir Cathedral on the Petrograd Side, the Pokrovskaya Church on Borovaya, and elsewhere. Members of the commissions and individual citizens who tried to calm the crowd were beaten; there were wounded.

5We are referring to the telegram sent on the basis of the Politburo’s decision of March 16, 1922: “After consulting comrades who had been involved in the matter of confiscating valuables from churches, the Politburo concluded that the work of organizing the confiscation of church property was not yet ready and required postponement in at least some places” (ibid., Doc. 282, p. 2).

6See Note 3.

7At the trial concerning the events in the city of Shuya, it was stated that the anti‑Soviet uprising had been prepared and led by clergymen Rozhdestvensky, Svetozarov, Lavrov, and Smelchakov, by church warden Paramonov, by merchants Pokhlebkin and Afanasiev, by former homeowner Kokovnikov, by Socialist Revolutionary Yazikov, and others.

8In Moscow, the organizers of the uprising were tried by a tribunal, which on May 8, 1922, sentenced 11 individuals (priests, deans, and civilians) to the highest penalty, 4 individuals to 5 years, 13 to 3 years, 10 to 1 year of imprisonment; 14 individuals were released (see: Pravda, No. 101, May 9, 1922). On the same day, L.B. Kamenev submitted a proposal to the Politburo to overturn the tribunal’s verdict—but the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) did not agree with him. Those sentenced to the highest penalty filed an appeal with the Cassation Department of the Supreme Tribunal, which resolved to petition the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee for clemency (see: Pravda, No. 119, May 31, 1922); on May 8, 1922, the prisoners’ appeal was discussed at a meeting of the Presidium of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee; it was decided: “With regard to the convicted priests Khristofor Nadezhdin, Vasily Sokolov, Makariy Telegin, Sergei Tikhomirov, and Alexander Zaozersky, the petition should be rejected and the Revolutionary Tribunal’s verdict should be upheld. With regard to the remaining six individuals sentenced to the highest penalty, the Revolutionary Tribunal’s verdict should be commuted to 5 years of imprisonment.”

On May 11, 1922, L.B. Kamenev once again raised the question of pardoning the convicted at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); the proposal put forward by L.D. Trotsky was adopted: “a) suspend the execution of the verdict; 6) instruct Comrade Trotsky to assess the situation by the evening of May 12 and submit a written proposal to the Politburo” (RGASPI, F. 17, Inv. 3, Doc. 292, p. 4). On May 14, 1922, L.D. Trotsky presented a conclusion denying the existence of grounds for mitigating the sentences of five of the convicted (the same individuals mentioned in the Presidium of the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee’s decision—see above). The mitigation of the sentences of six of the convicted was justified “solely by considerations of how, with the least possible damage to the essence of the verdict—just and equitable for all 11— we might best accommodate the plea of progressive clergy” (ibid., F. 17, Inv. 3, Doc. 293, p. 12). On May 18, 1922, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) agreed with this conclusion.

9On March 25, 1922, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the agenda for the Eleventh Party Congress—but the question proposed by V.I. Lenin was not included. No records of a meeting related to this matter were found in the Congress’s documentary materials. The Eleventh Party Congress was held in Moscow from March 27 to April 2, 1922.