V. I. Lenin

Report On

Concessions at a Meeting of the Communist Group

Of The All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions

April 11, 1921 [1]

Comrades, the concessions question has, rather unexpectedly,
brought out some differences among us, for it appeared to have
been finally settled in principle as long ago as the autumn of
last year, and when the Council of People’s Commissars issued its concessions decree on November 23, there was no sign
of protest, or of any disagreement, in Party circles, among the
responsible workers, at any rate. You are, of course, aware that
the Party Congress had to take a special decision confirming the
concessions decree and specifically extending it to cover any
concessions in Baku and Grozny. [2] This had to be done
at the Party Congress to prevent any vacillation on policy in
the Central Committee, whose division on this very question has
to some extent proved to be quite out of line with earlier
groupings, but which is largely connected with Baku. Some Baku
comrades resented the idea that Baku too—or, perhaps, specifically—is to have concessions, and that it is
desirable to lease out a major part of its oilfields. Their
arguments were highly diverse, and ranged from references to
their own "exploration", which could be done without any
foreigners, to assertions that the old workers, who spent a
lifetime fighting the capitalists, refuse to be saddled with
their yoke once again, etc.

I am not going to say offhand how much of these arguments was
based on general principles and how much on Baku "patriotism"
and localism. Let me say for my part that I have opposed this
view most vigorously in the belief that if we do not manage to
conduct a concessions policy and attract foreign capital to our
concessions, we can hardly consider any serious practical
measures to improve our economic position. We cannot seriously
entertain the idea of an immediate improvement of the economic
situation, unless we operate a policy of concessions, unless we
discard our prejudices, our local patriotism, discard to some
extent our craft patriotism, and to some extent the idea that we
can do our own "exploring". We must be prepared for inconveniences, hardships and sacrifices; we must be ready to
break our habits and possibly our addictions as well, for the
sole purpose of working a marked change and improvement in the
economic state of the key industries. This must be done at all
costs.

The Party Congress concentrated on the policy in respect of the
peasants and on the tax in kind, which has, in general, a high
legislative priority and is, in particular, central to the
Party’s political efforts. In the context of both these
issues, we have become aware that we are unable to boost
productivity in large-scale industry as swiftly as the satisfaction of peasant needs demands, without the makeshifts of
unrestricted trade and free production. These are the two
crutches we must now use to move on, for, otherwise, as everyone
in his right mind will see, we shall be unable to keep abreast
of developments. After all, the situation is worsening, if only
because the floating this spring has been largely hampered by
various factors, chiefly the weather. There is a looming fuel
crisis. The spring also holds out the threat of another crop
failure, again because of the weather; this is liable to create
a fodder shortage, which may, in its turn, still further reduce
the fuel supply. If on top of this we happen to have a drought,
the crisis threatens to be truly exceptional. We must understand
that in these conditions what the Programme says—chiefly
about the great need to increase the food supply—is not
intended Ior admiration or for a show of great love for various
resolutions (which the Communists have been doing with great
zeal), but as a call to increase the quantity of foodstuffs at
any cost. That is something we cannot do without the help of
foreign capital. This should be plain to everyone who takes a
realistic view of things. That is why the concessions question
became important enough to be dealt with by the Party
Congress.

After a short debate, the Council of People’s Commissars
adopted the basic principles of concessions agreements. [3] I shall now read them and underscore
those which are of especial importance or have given rise to
disagreements. We cannot seriously entertain the idea of
economic development unless all members of the Party, specially
the leaders of the trade union movement, that is, of the
organised masses of the proletariat—its organised majority—understand the present situation and draw the
appropriate conclusions. I shall read out the basic principles
of the concessions agreement one by one, as they were adopted by
the Council of People’s Commissars. Let me add that we have not yet concluded a single concessions agreement. We have
already given expression to our disagreements of principle—we are past masters at that sort of
thing—but have not yet secured any concessions. I suppose
this will make some people happy, which is unfortunate, because
if we fail to attract capital to our concessions, we shall
merely prove that we are poor businessmen. But then, of course,
the Communists can always have a field day with resolutions,
filling up all the stocks of paper that we have. Here is Point
One:

"1.  The concessionaire shall improve the condition of the
workers employed at the concession enterprises (as compared with
that of other workers employed at similar enterprises in the
area) up to the average standard abroad."

We have inserted this basic provision in the agreement to bring
out the gist of the matter at once for our Communists and chiefs
of economic agencies. What is the most important aspect of any
concession? It is, of course, an increase in the quantity of
goods. That is self-evident. But what is also highly—if
not much more—important is that we can secure an immediate
improvement in the condition of the workers employed at the oil
concession enterprises. These provisions of the concession
agreement were adopted after several discussions, in particular,
on the basis of the talks the plenipotentiaries of the
R.S.F.S.R., specifically Comrade Krasin, have had with some of
the financial magnates of modern imperialism. Let me say—and you are of course all aware of this—that the
great majority of our Communists have a book knowledge of
capitalism and finance capital; they may even have written a
pamphlet or two on the subject, but 99 per cent of them
don’t know how to do business with financial magnates and,
I’m afraid, will never learn.

In that respect, Comrade Krasin has had some exceptional
experience, for he has made a study of the practices and
organisation of industry in Germany and Russia. We informed him
of these terms, and he replied that they were, on the whole,
acceptable. The concessionaire is above all duty bound to
improve the condition of the workers. This very point was
discussed by Krasin in his exploratory talks with an oil king,
and the West-European capitalists were quite clear on the point
that, the condition of the workers being what it is, it was
absolutely impossible to expect greater productivity. The
proviso that the concessionaire must improve the workers’
condition is not a humanitarian but a purely business proposition. Point Two:

"2.  Account shall be taken of the lower productivity of
the Russian worker and provision made for the possibility of a
revision of the Russian worker’s rate of labour productivity, depending on the improvement of his living
conditions."

We had to make this reservation to prevent a one-sided reading
of the clause. All these provisions are rules and directives for
any representatives of the Soviet power who may have to deal
with the concessions, and are the basis on which the agreements
are to be worked out. We have drafts of an oil agreement, an
agreement on ball-bearing plants, a draft timber concession, and
an agreement on Kamchatka, which is being aired for a long time
but is not being implemented for various reasons. Point Two was
required to prevent a literal reading of Point One. We must
consider the fact that labour productivity will not rise until
the workers’ condition improves. Refusal to consider this
would be so unbusiness-like that the capitalist would not even
bother to negotiate. Point Three:

"3.  It shall be the duty of the concessionaire to supply
the workers employed at the concession enterprises with the
necessary means of subsistence from abroad, selling them to the
workers at no higher than cost price plus a certain percentage
for overhead expenses."

There was a proposal to set the figure at 10 per cent, but it
was discarded in the final discussion. The important thing here
is that we stipulate the supply of the means of subsistence for
the workers from abroad. We know that with the present state of
peasant farming and the fuel problem we shall be unable, within
the next few years, to effect a radical improvement in the
workers’ condition, and, consequently, to increase labour
productivity. It is, therefore, necessary for the concessionaire
to include in the agreement a provision covering the supply of
all the means of consumption from abroad, something he can
easily do, and we already have the tentative consent of some
capitalist sharks on this point. The concessionaires will accept
these terms because they are extremely anxious to obtain the
tremendously valuable raw materials. For them the supply of raw
materials is a prime necessity. Whether these priority enterprises will be employing 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 workers,
the concessionaires will have no trouble in obtaining the
necessaries for the workers, considering the ties between modern
syndicates and trusts, for very few capitalists today are not
syndicated and trustified, and all large enterprises are based
on monopoly, instead of the free market; consequently, they can
always block supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs for other
capitalists and obtain all they require under all manner of
provisional agreements. These syndicates operate with hundreds
of millions of dollars. They will have vast stocks of food at
their disposal, and will, consequently, be able to obtain
foodstuffs and other necessaries for several tens of thousands
of workers, and transport them to Russia.

They will not find it an economic problem at all. They will
regard these enterprises as being on the priority list—they will make a profit of 100, if not 1,000, per
cent—and supply them with food. I repeat, that will be no
economic problem for them at all. We must put at the heart of
our concessions policy the task of improving the condition of
the workers at the enterprises of the first category, and then
at the rest. Here is Point Four:

"4.  It shall also be the duty of the concessionaire, in
the event of a request on the part of the R.S.F.S.R. Government,
to import another 50-100 per cent over and above the supplies he
brings in for the workers employed at the concession enterprises, handing it over to the R.S.F.S.R. Govern- ment in return for a payment of similar size (cost plus a
certain percentage for overhead expenses). The
R.S.F.S.R. Government shall have the right to meet this payment
with a part of the product extracted by the concessionaire (that
is, to deduct it from its own share)."

This stipulation was also accepted by the financial magnates in
the exploratory talks because they put the concession enterprises on the priority list.

They will be in a position to monopolise the marketing of the
oil which they can obtain from us, and this is why they can
supply foodstuffs not only to the workers employed at their
enterprises but also a certain percentage over and above that. A
comparison of this clause with Point One shows that the pivot of
our concessions policy is improvement of the condition of the
workers, initially of those employed at the concession enterprises, and then, to a somewhat lesser extent, of the other
workers as well, with some of the consumer goods being obtained
from abroad. Even if we had the wherewithal to pay for them, we
ourselves are not in a position to purchase them in the
international market. You may have the currency, say, gold, but
you must bear in mind that there is no free market, for it is
all, or nearly all, controlled by the syndicates, cartels and
trusts, which are ruled by their imperialist profits. They will
supply consumer goods only to workers of their own enterprises,
and not for those of others, because the old capitalism—meaning the free market—is no longer
there. That shows the essence of our concessions policy in the
context of the present conditions of finance capital and the
behemoth struggle between the trusts. The concessions policy is
an alliance concluded by one side against another, and so long
as we are not strong enough, we must play off their hostile
rivalry, so as to hold out until the victory of the international revolution. They can assure the workers of their
maintenance because it is no trouble at all for a large modern
enterprise to supply an extra 20,000 or 30,000 workers. This
would allow us to meet the expenditure with raw materials, say,
oil. If we were able to pay for this additional quantity of
necessaries for the workers with an additional quantity of
timber or ore—our chief resources—we should be in a position to start by improving the condition of the workers
employed at the concession enterprises and use what is left to
improve, to a lesser extent, the condition of other workers. Point Five:

"5.  It shall be the duty of the concessionaire to abide by
the laws of the R.S.F.S.R., in particular, those relating to
working conditions, terms of payment, etc.; and enter into
agreements with the trade unions (in the event of the concessionaire’s demand we are prepared to add that under
such agreements both parties shall be bound by the average norm
of American or West-European workers)."

This reservation is being made to remove any fears the capitalists may have in respect of our trade unions. We say that
agreements must be entered into with our trade unions because
their participation is stipulated by all the relevant laws—all essential laws stipulate the participation of
trade unions which enjoy statutory status in accordance with
socialist principles. The well-informed capitalist is aware that
the trade unions are guided by Communist groups and, through
them, by the Party, and he would be highly suspicious if we told
him that he would have to enter into agreements with our trade
unions, because he would be apprehensive of all sorts of
absurdities on the part of these Communists, and would, in
consequence, make the most incredible demands. Such fears are
quite natural from the capitalist standpoint. That is why we
must say that we favour a business agreement—otherwise there is nothing to discuss. That is why we say we are prepared
to make that addendum. We are prepared to accept, for ourselves
and our trade unions, a norm equal to the average American or
West European labour norm. Otherwise, I repeat, there can be no
question at all of any agreement adapted to capitalist relations. Point Six:

"6.  It shall be the duty of the concessionaire strictly to
observe the scientific and technical regulations in conformity
with Russian and foreign legislation (details to be stated in
each agreement)."

This point is to be elaborated in the agreement in particular
detail. The oil agreement, for instance, contains 10 clauses
setting forth and describing detailed scientific regulations. Inability to attend to the proper scientific
exploitation of labour-power, as of the land, is the hallmark of
capitalist economic operations. Scientific and technical
regulations are a way of overcoming it. Incorrect or insufficiently correct working of oilfields is known to result
in their flooding. It is clearly very important for us to obtain
the technical equipment. You will recall that The Plan for the Electrification of Russia estimated just how much of
that equipment we needed. I do not remember the exact figure,
but the overall expenditures for electrification were estimated
at 17,000 million gold rubles, with the priority projects taking
about a decade to fulfil. We expect to cover up to 11,000
million from our own resources—gold and exports—which leaves 6,000 million outstanding. The
authors of the plan say that we shall either have to borrow or
lease. The deficit has to be made good. The plan was worked out
for the whole Republic by the best brains and provides for a
balanced development of all branches of industry. The chief
problem is fuel and its most economic, rational and efficient
use in the key industries. We should be unable to solve it if we
did not have any concessions or credit facilities. These
conditions may suddenly turn out to be non-existent, and that
at the most welcome moment, say, after a large strike, like the one now on in Britain, or the one which was
recently defeated in Germany. [4] But a successful strike and a successful revolution will come in the wake of an
unsuccessful one, and we shall then find ourselves with
socialist, instead of capitalist, relations.

Stoppages in oil extraction may prove to be disastrous. The
capitalists have failed to reach Baku’s 1905 rate. It turns out that the danger of flooding is also reckoned with
abroad, for instance, in California and Rumania. Insufficient
pump-off of water results in ever greater flooding.

There are detailed regulations on this score in Russian and
foreign legislation. When dealing with this matter in Baku, we
sought the opinion of our experts on Rumanian and Californian
legislation. If we are to safeguard our oil resources, we must
see that the scientific and technical regulations are observed. If we are to lease, say, a tract of forest we must see
that the lumbering is done in a proper manner. If it should be
an oil lease, we must stipulate measures to prevent flooding. In
each case, there must be observance of scientific and technical
regulations and rational exploitation. Where are the regulations
to come from? They are to be taken from Russian and foreign
legislation, and this will allay any suspicions that they are
our own invention, in which case no capitalist will bother to
negotiate with us. We intend to take what there is in Russian
and foreign legislation. If we take the best of what there is in
Russian and any foreign legislation, we shall have a basis to
guarantee the standards attained by the leading capitalists. These are well-known business standards borrowed
from capitalist practice, and not a Communist flight of fancy
which the capitalists fear most of all. We guarantee that none
of the terms, aspects or clauses of our concession agreement
will go beyond the framework of capitalist legislation. We must
never lose sight of this key proposition. We must take capitalist relationships as a basis to show that the capitalists
will find these terms acceptable and profitable, but we, for our
part, must turn them to good advantage. Otherwise, it is a waste
of time to talk about concessions. But to return to what is
recognised in capitalist legislation. Advanced capitalism is
known to be superior to our own industry in technical organisation and improvements. For that reason, we are not
confining ourselves to Russian legislation, and in the case of
oil we have started to borrow from Russian, Rumanian and
Californian legislation. We are entitled to take any law, which
will dispel any suspicions of arbitrariness or whim. That will
be easily understood by the modern advanced capitalist and
financial magnate, in fact, finance capital as a whole, for our
terms and standards will conform to those prevalent abroad, and
we are proposing them with an eye to the business practices of
capitalism. In this case, we are not indulging in any flights of
fancy, but are setting ourselves the practical goal of improving
our industry and raising it to the levels of modern advanced
capitalism. Anyone who has an idea of the state of our industry
will see that this will be a tremendous improvement. If we were
to do this even in respect of a certain section of our industry,
say, one-tenth of it, we should still be taking a great step
forward, which would be feasible for them, and highly desirable
for us. Point Seven:

"7.  A rule similar to that set forth in Point Four shall
also apply to the equipment imported by the concessionaire from
abroad."

Point Four says that the concessionaire shall be bound, in the
event the clause is written into the agreement, to import a
certain quantity of goods for sale, against a special payment,
over and above what he imports for his own operations. If the
capitalist should import improved types of bores and tools for
himself, we shall be entitled to demand that he import, say, an
extra 25 per cent for us, over and above the bores he imports
for himself, the payment arrangements to be the same as those
specified in Point Four, that is, cost plus a definite percentage for overhead expenses.

The future is very bright, but we should never confuse our
activity in these two planes: on the one hand, there is the
agitation which brings nearer this future, and on the other, the
ability now to adapt ourselves to and exist in the capitalist
encirclement. If we fail to do that we might find ourselves in
the position of one who has had his chance but was not alert
enough to act in time. We must manage, by taking advantage of
the peculiarities of the capitalist world and the capitalist
avidity for raw materials, to derive all the benefits that would
help us to consolidate our economic positions among the
capitalists, strange as that may sound. The task seems to be an
odd one: How can a socialist republic improve its positions with
capitalist support? We had an instance of this during the
war. We did not win the war because we were stronger, but
because, while being weaker, we played off the enmity between
the capitalist states. Either we now succeed in playing off the
rivalry between the trusts, or we shall find ourselves unadapted
to capitalist conditions and unable to exist in the capitalist
encirclement. Point Eight:

"8.  A special clause in each agreement shall regulate the
question of payment to the workers employed at the concession
enterprises of wages in foreign currency special coupons, Soviet
currency, etc."

You see that in this case we are prepared to accept payment in
any currency, whether foreign or Soviet, or in coupons, and show
goodwill by being prepared to consider any of the businessmen’s proposals. Of the concrete proposals there
is the one Vanderlip made to our representatives. He said: "I
should like to pay the workers an average wage of, say, a dollar
and a half a day. On my concession territory I would set up
stores carrying all the goods the workers may need, and these
will be available to those who receive special coupons; these
coupons will be issued only to workers who are employed at my
concession enterprises." Whether things work out as he says,
remains to be seen, but we find this acceptable in principle. A
great many difficulties naturally arise. It is, of course, no
easy task to harmonise a concession geared to capitalist
production with the Soviet standpoint, and every effort of that
kind is, as I have said, a continuation of the struggle between
capitalism and socialism. This struggle has assumed new forms,
but it remains a struggle nonetheless. Every concessionaire
remains a capitalist, and he will try to trip up the Soviet
power, while we, for our part, must try to make use of his
rapacity. We say: "We shall not grudge him even 150 per cent in
profits, provided the condition of our workers is improved."
That is the pivot of the struggle. In this sphere, of course,
you need to be even more skilled than in struggling for the
conclusion of a peace treaty. The capitalist powers behind the
scenes take part in the struggle for the conclusion of any peace
treaty. There was a foreign power pulling the strings behind
each of the countries with whom we have signed a peace treaty—Latvia, Finland and Poland. We had to conclude
these treaties in such a way that, on the one hand, they allowed
the bourgeois republics to exist, and on the other, they secured
advantages for the Soviet power from the standpoint of world
diplomacy. Every peace treaty with a capitalist power is a
record of certain war clauses. In much the same way, each clause
of a concession agreement records some aspect of a war, and we
should organise things in such a way as to safeguard our own
interests in that war. This can be done because the capitalist
will be receiving big profits from the concession enterprise,
while we shall be obtaining some improvement in the condition of
our workers, and some increase in the quantity of goods from our
share in the output. If the wages should be paid in foreign
currency, this will give rise to a number of complex problems:
how is this currency to be exchanged for Soviet currency? how
are we to fight speculation? etc. We have accepted the idea that
we have an answer to all these problems, and need not fear any
of them. This point tells the capitalists that they are free to
invent anything they like. It makes no difference to us whether
you bring in the goods and sell them for special coupons, on
special terms, or only upon presentation of special certificates
issued personally to workers employed at the concession. We
shall manage to adapt ourselves to any terms in such a way as to
fight the capitalists on these terms and secure a certain
improvement in the condition of our workers. This is the task we
have set ourselves. We can’t tell how it will be resolved
in a concession agreement, for we can’t very well offer
the same terms of payment in some place like Kamchatka as over
here or in Baku. If the concession should be located in the
Donets Basin, the forms of payment cannot conceivably be the
same as for one in the far North. We are not holding down the
capitalists to some specific form of payment. Every clause of
the agreement will contain an element of struggle between
capitalists and socialists. We are not afraid of this struggle,
and are sure that we shall manage to derive every possible
benefit from the concessions. Point Nine:

"9.  The concessionaire shall be free to make his own terms
of employment, living conditions and remuneration with foreign
skilled workers and employees.

" The trade unions shall not have the right to demand application
of Russian pay rates or of Russian rules of employment to that
category of workers."

We believed Point Nine to be absolutely indispensable because it
would be quite absurd to expect the capitalists to trust the
Communists. This is clearly stated both from the standpoint of
principle and especially from the businessman’s standpoint. For if we insisted on trade union endorsement of
these terms of employment, if we told the capitalists that we
accepted any foreign technician or specialist but only within
the framework of the Labour Code of the R.S.F.S.R., it would be
too much to expect any of the latter to accept, and the demand
would be a mere formality. It could be said that the government
says one thing and the trade unions another, because they are
two distinct bodies, thereby leaving a legal loophole. But this
was not written for lawyers but for Communists, and it was done
on the basis of the decisions of the Tenth Party Congress on how
to conduct the concessions policy. All of our writings, to which
people in Europe have access, say that the concessions policy is
being directed by the Communist Party, which is the ruling
party. This has been rendered into all foreign languages, and
there is no catch in it. We would not be in a position to
consider any concessions policy at all, if we, being the
political leadership, failed to say that in this case we were
unable and unwilling to make use of our influence with the trade
unions. There is no sense in teaching communism to the capitalists. We are fine Communists, but we are not going to
usher in the communist order through concessions. After all, a
concession is an agreement with a capitalist power. We would
surely have committed to a lunatic asylum any Communist who
decided to go and conclude a treaty with a capitalist power on
the basis of communist principles. We would tell him that he was
a fine Communist in his way but a complete flop as a diplomatist
in a capitalist country. The Communist who tried to demonstrate
his communism in respect of the concessions policy in an
agreement would be just as near to being committed to a lunatic
asylum. What you need to have is a good idea of capitalist
trade, and if you haven’t got it, you’re no good. Either don’t go in for concessions at all, or make
an effort to understand that we must try to use these capitalist
conditions in our own interest, by allowing the foreign
technicians and workers complete freedom. That we shall not
insist on any restrictions in this sphere goes without saying.

Section Three of Point Nine, which follows, does contain a
restriction:

" The proportion of foreign workers and employees to Russians,
both in total and within the several categories, shall be agreed
upon by the parties in concluding each concession agreement
separately."

We cannot, of course, object to the importation of foreign
workers into areas which we are unable to supply with Russian
workers, as, for instance, in the Kamchatka timber industry. In
the case of, say, the mining industry, where there is a lack of
drinking water or foodstuffs, and where the capitalists would
wish to build, we shall also allow them to bring in the greater
part. On the other hand, where Russian workers are available, we
stipulate a proportion to give our workers a chance, a) to
learn, and b) to improve their condition. After all, we do want
our workers to benefit from an improvement of our enterprises
according to the last word in capitalist technology. The
capitalists have not raised any objections in principle to any
of these provisions. And here is Point Ten, the last one:

"10.  The concessionaire may, by agreement with the government organs of the R.S.F.S.R., be granted the right to
invite highly skilled specialists from among Russian citizens,
the terms of employment being agreed with central government
bodies in each case."

Plainly, we cannot guarantee full scope in this respect, as we
can in respect of foreign technicians and workers. In the latter
case, we refrain from interfering, and they are left entirely
within the framework of capitalist relations. We promise no such
scope for our specialists and technicians, for we cannot have
our best men working at the concession enterprises. We have no
desire to shut off all access for them to that area, but there
must be supervision over the performance of the agreement from
above and from below the workers, members of the Communist
Party, who will be employed at these enterprises, must supervise
the performance of the terms of the agreement, both in respect
of their technical training and observance of our laws. There
were no objections in principle on this point in the exploratory
talks with some of the magnates of modern capitalism.

All these points have been confirmed by the Council of
People’s Commissars, and I hope they give you a clear picture of the concessions policy we intend to conduct.

Each concession will undoubtedly be a new kind of war—an
economic war—the fight carried into another plane. This
calls for adaptation, but one that is in line with the Party
Congress. If we are to attain our goal, we must have a respite
and must be prepared to make sacrifices and endure hardships. Our goal is: in the capitalist encirclement to make
use of the greed of the capitalists for profit and the rivalry
between the trusts, so as to create conditions for the existence
of the socialist republic, which cannot exist without having
ties with the rest of the world, and must, in the present
circumstances, adjust its existence to capitalist relations. There is the question of actual terms. For oil
agreements, they are as follows: from one-quarter to one-third
of the whole of Grozny and of the whole of Baku. We have worked
out our share of the output: we shall be retaining from 30 to 40
per cent of the oil extracted. We have inserted a commitment to
increase output within a certain period to, say, 100 million,
and another commitment to extend the oil pipeline from Grozny
and Petrovsk to Moscow. Whether we shall have to make any extra
payments is to be stipulated in each agreement. But we should be
quite clear on the type of agreement concluded in these
conditions. The important thing, from the trade union standpoint, is for the Party leadership to see the specific
features of this policy and set themselves the task of securing
such concessions at any cost, in pursuance of the decisions of
the Party Congress, in the context of tasks facing the socialist
system in the capitalist encirclement. Every concession will be
a gain and an immediate improvement in the condition of a
section of the workers and peasants. The latter will stand to
gain because each concession will mean the production of
additional goods, which we are unable to produce ourselves, and
which we shall be exchanging for their products, instead of
taking them through a tax.

This is a very difficult operation, especially for the organs of
the Soviet power. With this point as pivotal we must set about
to secure concessions, overriding the prejudices, inertia,
ingrained customs, and the inconvenience of some workers having
a bigger pay packet than the others. We could invent any number
of excuses, in the way of objections and inconveniences, to
frustrate any practical improvement, and that is what the
foreign capitalists are really banking on. I know of no other
point that has drawn so many objections from the most intelligent writers in the Russian whiteguard press, the men the
Kronstadt events proved to be head and shoulders above Martov
and Chernov. They are very well aware that if we fail to improve
the condition of our workers and peasants because of our
prejudices, we shall multiply our difficulties and altogether
undermine the prestige of the Soviet power. You know that we
must have that improvement at all costs. We shall not grudge the
foreign capitalist even a 2,000 per cent profit, provided we
improve the condition of the workers and peasants. It is
imperative that we do it.

Endnotes

[1] The meeting was
held on April 11, 1921, to discuss the concessions question,
because some leading trade unionists were hesitant, while
A. G. Shlyapnikov and D. B. Ryazanov carried on demagogic
propaganda against the idea of concessions.

Lenin gave a report on the issue, argued against
Shlyapnikov’s and Ryazanov’s statements in the debate and made notes of all the arguments, which he used in his
summing-up speech. He defined the essence of the concessions
policy and its importance for the Soviet state.

[2] The reference is to
the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress, " The Soviet Republic
in Capitalist Encirclement". See K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh . . . ( The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses , Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings ,
Part 1, 1954, pp. 566-67).

[3] On February 1,
1921, the Council of People’s Commissars adopted a decree
on oil concessions in Baku and Grozny, which made it necessary
to work out the basic principles of concessions agreements. A. I. Rykov, Chairman of the Supreme Economic
Council, was assigned to draft the project. As the work dragged
out, Lenin studied the relevant material and in late March came
out with a project, " The Basic Principles of Concessions
Agreements". He made some additions and corrections (the
document is at the Central Party Archives of the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism under the C.C., C.P.S.U.) in the original (see
Lenin Miscellany XX , p. 148), and his draft project was
adopted as the basis of the March 29 resolution of the Council
of People’s Commissars.

[4] In March 1921, the
workers of Mansfeld, led by Communists, went on strike against
an order setting up police patrols at plants and factories in
Central Germany. In some places there were armed clashes with
the police. The workers of Berlin, Hamburg and several other
towns expressed their solidarity with the heroic strikers, but
the Communist Party of Germany failed to unite the working-class
forces against the bourgeoisie because of the treacherous
behaviour of Paul Levi and other opportunists in the party
leadership.

The miners’ strike in Britain lasted from April until June
1921, in protest of the mineowners’ intention to cut wages. More than a million workers participated in the strike,
with all the miners taking part. The miners’ federation
called on the executive committees of the transport and railway
unions to strike in solidarity, but their reformist leaders were
secretly negotiating with the government and the mineowners for
a compromise to break up the strike. The miners had to return to
work after a heroic three-month struggle.