V. I.

Lenin

Comrades! That our Party is going through a severe crisis is known by
now to all, and has in fact been directly and openly stated in our
Central Organ also.

We consider it our duty to call on all members of the Party to take a
conscious and active part in putting an end to the crisis as speedily
and painlessly as possible.

Comrade Plekhanov, who at the Party Congress and— long after it—at the Congress of the League Abroad belonged to
the Party Congress majority, now comes forward in No. 57 of
Iskra as a champion of the demands of the minority, accusing the Central Committee of “eccentricity”, of
an intransigence that only benefits our enemies, of refusing to
co-opt minority adherents. Such co-optation is, in Comrade
Plekhanov’s eyes, nothing less than “the only way to deliver our Party from its state of severe crisis, which sorely
weakens our positions and strengthens those of our numerous
enemies and opponents”. One must be guided not only by the
Rules, says Comrade Plekhanov—in reference presumably to
this state of severe crisis—but also by the actual position of affairs, by the existing relation of forces in the
Party. One must rise above the circle and doctrinaire standpoint
which pushes to the forefront what divides the workers instead
of what unites them.

These general principles are undoubtedly correct, and it only remains
for every Social-Democrat to acquaint himself precisely with the facts
and reflect seriously on the position in order correctly to apply
them.

Yes,we must without fail, at the cost of any and every effort,
undaunted by the prospect of a long and arduous job, cure our Party of
the circle spirit, of faction and schism over trifles, of unseemly and unworthy wrangling over the conductor’s
baton! Take a good look, then, at the events that have developed in
our Party since its Second Congress. Have the courage to expose our
sores, in order to diagnose them without hypocrisy or official humbug
and to apply the right treatment.

The minutes of the Second Congress have now been published in their
entirety; the minutes of the Congress of the League Abroad have
likewise been made available to the Party membership. Party literature
has already laid bare many manifestations and symptoms of our crisis,
and although much still remains to be done in that respect, a certain
summing up already can and should be made.

The Second Congress ended with a bitter struggle over the
composition of our central bodies. By a majority of 24 to 20, a
Central Organ editorial board of three was elected (Plekhanov,
Martov and Lenin), and a Central Committee likewise made up of
three comrades. Martov refused to fill the post he had been
elected to, and he and all of the minority refused to take part
in the elections to the Central Committee. From the very time of
the Congress the minority started a bitter fight against the
central bodies, a regular war over the conductor’s baton, a
regular war of the circle spirit against the party spirit, a war
to get the old editorial board reinstated and a due (in the view
of the minority) number of their adherents co-opted to the
Central Committee. This war went on for months, and was
accompanied by the minority’s total withdrawal from work under
the direction of the central bodies, by a boycott of them, and
by purely anarchistic preachings, specimens of which the Party
membership will find in profusion in the minutes of the League
Congress. The struggle chiefly centred abroad, among the section
furthest removed from positive work and from the participation
of class-conscious proletarians. It involved the central bodies
set up by the Second Congress in an appalling waste of energy on
trips, meetings, and negotiations intended to obviate countless
petty dissatisfactions, disputes and squabbles. That the
demands of the opposition utterly disregarded the relation of
forces whether at the Second Congress or in the Party as a whole
may be seen, for example, from the fact that while the editors
of the Central

Organ (Plekhanov and Lenin) actually agreed to the co-optation
of two—that is, to equal representation of the Party
Congress majority and minority—the opposition demanded a
huge majority (four to two) on the editorial board. Under the
threat of an inevitable and immediate split, the two central
bodies finally made a number of concessions to the demands
regarding the conductor’s baton: the editors were co opted,
Lenin resigned from the editorial board and the Council,
another majority member resigned from the Council likewise, the
reorganisation of the League Abroad, whose Congress had flouted
everything the Party Congress had decided, was allowed to lapse,
and the opposition was offered two seats on the Central
Committee.

The opposition rejected this offer. It evidently demands a larger
number of seats, and for persons who would not be chosen by the
Central Committee, but named by the opposition. Neither the relation
of forces nor the interests of the work furnish the slightest
justification for such demands:
all that these ultimatums are backed by is threats of a split and acts
of grossly mechanical pressure, such as boycotts and withholding of
funds.

The Party has been disorganised and demoralised to the utmost by this
fight for posts, which diverts its forces from positive work. This
demoralisation is not lessened but, if anything, heightened by the
fact that the minority’s so-called differences of principle lend this
fight a false colouring.

Weall agreed unanimously—and said so emphatically time and again—to recognise all decisions of the Second
Congress and all its elections as unconditionally binding. Now
the minority has in practice repudiated the entire Rules and all
the elections; now those who uphold the common decisions are
found to be “formalists"—those who received their powers from the Congress are labelled “bureaucrats"—
those who take their stand by the vote of the majority, which
(by our common consent) expressed the relation of forces in the
Party, are accused of a grossly mechanical and bureaucratic
point of view. Those who at the Congress, having been charged by
the membership with the duty of electing the Party’s officials,
transferred some editors to the status of contributors and some
members of the Organising

Committee to that of ordinary Party workers, are now found guilty of
converting Party members into cogs and wheels, etc., etc. The unsound
and unstable position the minority already adopted at the Party
Congress led inevitably to this dishonesty, which we are far from
attributing to anyone’s subjective will.

Is it not time to put an end to this strife and faction? Let everyone
who cares about our Party’s future ask himself that.

Is it not time to make a determined end of this fight for
control of the central bodies, of this contention over posts,
which is having such a disruptive effect on all our work? Is it
fitting to embark yet again, after months and months of
negotiations, upon new negotiations with the opposition, or to
raise the question of the Central Committee’s being one-sided or
eccentric? For the raising of that question, after the co-optation of the editors had already seemed to ensure peace,
inevitably calls up again the question of the one-sidedness and
eccentricity—the anti-Party nature,even— of our
Central Organ. How long are we going to engage in this indecent
wrangling over the composition of the central bodies? And how
can we settle the issue as to which side is right in its
demands? By what yardstick are we to measure it? Why is it the
“firm-liners” that are to be counted intransigent, when they have ceded a very great deal of what the Congress
decided, and not the “soft-liners”, who in practice have turned out uncommonly firm in their drive for a split and
direct preparation of a split?

Let the comrades consider how this abnormal position can be
ended. The Central Committee had hoped that the change of
cabinet at the Central Organ would bring peace. When the dispute
had already gone very far, when the fight over the conductor’s
baton had brought us to the very verge of a split—just one
hope still remained: the achievement of some sort of disengagement, so as not to interfere with each other, so as
gradually, in the process of working within one Party, to reduce
the friction, so as not to touch, or to touch more seldom, on
“sore” points. The division of the central bodies, one would have thought, at least partially ensured the ending of
the crisis: the minority had the Central Organ to itself and
could freely group around it, freely advocate its views, freely carry on its Party work, without feeling
“alien” in the Party. And with the majority also controlling one of the central bodies—the Central Committee (or
out numbering the minority upon it)—the majority too could feel
at least some satisfaction. The fight over the central bodies could
have ended and given place to a purely ideological clearing up of
disagreements and shades of opinion.

This hope is shattered by Iskra’s raising the question of
co-optation to the Central Committee. We do not deem it possible to
engage anew in this bargaining over posts, which fills us with
repugnance. We should actually prefer, failing any other solution, to
hand over all the conductor’s batons to the minority, if it
positively cannot bring itself to work in the Party except in the top
posts. Our readiness to do so increases as this ugly new malady of our
movement drags on—as these petty squabbles, the more unbearable
for being petty, become chronic.

But we should first wish to know with all possible certainty the
opinion of the Party, to consult revolutionary public opinion,
especially within Russia. We invite comrades closely to examine and
study the facts relating to our “crisis”, to make a thorough appraisal of the present position in the Party, and to state
their views on all the questions raised.

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