Comrades, I believe you have taken an entirely correct decision in preferring to discuss the question of concessions first within the fraction. The question of concessions has aroused considerable agitation, even anxiety, not only in party circles and among the working masses, but also among the broad peasant masses, according to the information we have. All comrades have pointed out that following the decree of November 23 of this year, at the majority of meetings devoted to various topics, questions about concessions most frequently arose and notes were submitted on this subject, and the general tone of both these notes and conversations was one of concern: we have expelled our own capitalists, and now we want to let in foreign ones. I believe that these concerns, this broad interest in concessions shown far from only by party comrades, is a favorable sign, demonstrating to us that over three years of immeasurably difficult struggle, workers' and peasants' power has become so strengthened and experience with capitalists so consolidated that the broad masses consider workers' and peasants' power sufficiently strong to do without concessions, and themselves sufficiently instructed to avoid unnecessary dealings with capitalists without extreme necessity. Such supervision from below, such concerns emanating from the masses, such agitation among non-party circles testify to extraordinarily close attention to relations between ourselves and capitalists. I believe that from this side we must absolutely welcome such concerns as a sign of the mood of the broad masses.

Nevertheless, I believe we shall still arrive at the conviction that we cannot be guided on the question of concessions solely by this revolutionary instinct. Having weighed all aspects of the question, we shall become convinced of the correctness of the policy we have adopted—which consists in offering concessions. I can briefly say that the main theme of my report, or rather the repetition of a conversation that took place not long ago in Moscow with several hundred responsible workers{5}—for I have not prepared a report and cannot present one—the main theme of this conversation is the proof of two propositions, namely, first, that every war is a continuation of the politics that existed in peace, only by other means; second, that the concessions which we give, which we are forced to give, are a continuation of war in another form, by other means. To prove these two propositions, or rather only the second one, since the first does not especially require proof, I shall begin with the political side of the question. I shall dwell on those relations between contemporary imperialist powers which are essential for understanding all present-day foreign policy. This is essential for understanding why we have adopted this policy.

The American Vanderlip addressed the Council of People's Commissars with a letter in which he said: "We, Republicans, belonging to the Republican Party of America, to the party of the largest financial capital, which is connected with the memory of the war for liberation against the Southern States, are not in power at present." He wrote this even before the elections that took place in November: "We shall win in the November elections (now they have won), and in March the president will be ours. Our policy will not repeat those stupidities that dragged America into European affairs; we shall concern ourselves with our own interests. Our American interests lead us to a conflict with Japan; with Japan we shall wage war. Perhaps it will interest you to know that in 1923 our fleet will be stronger than the English. To wage war, we need to have oil in our hands; without oil we cannot conduct modern warfare. Not only do we need to have oil, but we must take measures so that the opponent does not have oil. Japan is in poor conditions in this regard. Near Kamchatka there is some bay (I have forgotten its name) where there are sources of oil, and we want the Japanese not to have this oil. If you sell us this land, then I guarantee that there will be such enthusiasm among our people that we shall recognize your government immediately. If you don't sell but only give concessions, I cannot say that we would refuse to consider this project, but I cannot promise such enthusiasm that would guarantee recognition of the Soviet government."

Vanderlip's letter expressed with utter frankness and unheard-of cynicism the point of view of an imperialist who clearly sees that war with Japan is impending and directly and openly poses the question: enter into a deal with us, and then you will obtain certain advantages. The question stood as follows: The Far East, Kamchatka, and a piece of Siberia are in fact currently under Japanese control, insofar as her military forces exercise authority there, insofar as, as you know, circumstances have compelled the creation of a buffer state—in the form of the Far Eastern Republic—and we know perfectly well what enormous suffering the Siberian peasants endure from Japanese imperialism, what an unheard-of quantity of atrocities the Japanese have committed in Siberia. The comrades from Siberia know this: their recent publications recount this in detail{59}. But nevertheless, we cannot wage war with Japan and must do everything to attempt not only to postpone war with Japan, but, if possible, to avoid it altogether, because for us it is currently beyond our powers for obvious reasons. And at the same time, by cutting us off from connection with world commerce through the Pacific Ocean, Japan inflicts on us colossal damage. Under such conditions, when before us looms a growing conflict, a growing collision between America and Japan—for over many decades the most stubborn struggle has been waged over the Pacific Ocean and possession of its coasts between Japan and America, and the entire diplomatic, economic, and commercial history concerning the Pacific Ocean and its coasts is full of perfectly definite indications of how this collision grows and makes war between America and Japan inevitable—we find ourselves in the same position we have been in for three years: a socialist republic surrounded by imperialist countries which are incomparably more powerful than us militarily, which employ all means of agitation and propaganda to strengthen hatred toward the Soviet republic and will not miss a single opportunity for military intervention, as they put it—that is, for strangling Soviet power.

If, remembering this, we cast a general glance at the three years we have lived through from the perspective of the international position of the Soviet republic, it will become clear that we could withstand and could defeat the unheard-of mighty alliance of Entente powers, supported by our White Guards, only because there was no unity whatsoever between these powers. We could gain victories up to now only thanks to the deepest discord among imperialist powers and only because these discords were not chance internal party squabbles, but the deepest, ineradicable antagonism of economic interests between imperialist countries which, standing on the basis of private property in land and capital, cannot but pursue the predatory policy under which attempts to unite their forces against Soviet power have come to naught. If we take Japan, which held almost all of Siberia in its hands and which could certainly have helped Kolchak at any time, the fundamental reason why it did not do so lies in the fact that its interests fundamentally diverge from the interests of America, in that it was unwilling to pull chestnuts from the fire for American capital. Knowing such weakness, we naturally could conduct no other policy than one which sets itself the task of using this discord between America and Japan in such a way as to strengthen ourselves and postpone the possibility of an agreement between Japan and America against us, and that such agreement is possible is already shown by example: in American newspapers was printed the text of an agreement between all countries which promised support to Kolchak{60}.

Of course, this agreement fell apart, but there is nothing impossible in the possibility that they will attempt to restore it at the first opportunity. And the deeper, the more ominously communist movement grows, the more repeated attempts they will make to strangle our republic. And hence our policy—to use the discord of imperialist powers to make agreement difficult or, if possible, to make it temporarily impossible. This is the basic line throughout three years of our policy, which necessitated the signing of the Brest Peace, which necessitated the signing of a treaty with Bullitt—a treaty extremely disadvantageous to us, concerning peace and armistice. This same line determines our current situation in such a way that we must seize with both hands such a proposal as concessions. We are now giving America Kamchatka, which is essentially not ours anyway, since Japanese troops are stationed there. We are unable to fight Japan at the present moment. We are giving America such territory for economic utilization, where we absolutely have neither naval nor military forces and cannot provide them. And by giving this, we attract American imperialism against Japanese and against the Japanese bourgeoisie nearest to us, which has thus far held the Far Eastern Republic in its hands.

So the main interests in the negotiations over concessions were for us political. And recent events have proven with complete obviousness that by these very discussions of concessions we have already gained something. We have not yet given concessions and cannot give them until the American president takes office, which will not be before March, and besides, we preserve the possibility of refusing to sign the treaty when it is worked out in detail.

Thus, economically this question is entirely secondary, and its entire essence lies in political interest. And that we have gained something is proven by all the publications in the press which we have received. Vanderlip himself insisted that the concession project should remain secret until the Republican Party wins. It should remain secret until then, and we agreed not to publish either his letters or the entire preliminary project. But it turned out that such secrecy cannot be kept for long. And as soon as Vanderlip came to America, various exposures began immediately. Before the American elections, Harding, the candidate for president who has now won, published a denial in the newspapers that he was conducting relations with Soviet power through Vanderlip. His denial was very categorical, almost of the following character: I do not know Vanderlip and do not recognize any relations with Soviet power. But it is perfectly understandable what prompted such a denial. On the eve of elections in bourgeois America, for Harding to acquire a reputation as a supporter of agreement with Soviet power would have meant losing, perhaps, several hundred thousand votes, and therefore he hastened to publish that he knows no Vanderlip. But as soon as the elections ended, we began to receive from America information of an entirely different character. Vanderlip in a series of newspaper articles recommends agreement with Soviet power in every way, and in one newspaper even wrote that he compares Lenin with Washington. It turned out, thus, that we have in bourgeois countries propagandists for agreement with us, and we obtained these propagandists not in the person of a Soviet ambassador and not among any sort of journalists, but among representatives of exploiters of the worst type, such as Vanderlip.

When I had occasion at a meeting of responsible workers to recount what I am recounting now{6}, one comrade who had returned from America, where he had worked in Vanderlip's factories, expressed his horror to us and said that he had never seen such exploitation as he had witnessed in Vanderlip's factories anywhere else. And so in the person of such a shark of capitalism we have obtained a propagandist for trade relations with Soviet Russia, and even if beyond the proposed concession treaty we obtained nothing else, even then it could be said that we have won. We have a whole series of communications, of course secret ones, that capitalist countries have not abandoned the intention of renewing war with Soviet Russia in the spring. We have a whole series of information that preparatory steps are being taken by certain capitalist powers, and White Guard emigration, one might say, is conducting preparatory work in all powers. Therefore our main interest is to achieve the restoration of trade relations, and for this we must have at least some part of capitalists on our side.

In England the struggle has been going on for a long time. We have already gained by obtaining from representatives of the most vicious capitalist exploitation of people those who stand for the policy of restoring trade relations with Russia. A treaty with England, a trade agreement with England, has not yet been signed. Krasin is now conducting intensive negotiations on this in London. The English government has submitted its project to us, we have given our counterproject, but still we see that the English government is dragging out the agreement, that the military reactionary party is working intensively there, a party which has thus far prevailed and which prevents the conclusion of trade agreements. Our direct interest and our direct duty is to support everything capable of strengthening the parties and groups striving to conclude this treaty with us. In the person of Vanderlip we have obtained such a supporter, and this is not only chance; this cannot be explained solely by the fact that Vanderlip is particularly enterprising or that he is very familiar with Siberia. There are deeper causes here, connected with the development of the interests of English imperialism, which controls an incredible number of colonies. The discord between American and English imperialism is deep here, and to rely on this is our absolute duty.

I mentioned that Vanderlip is a particular expert on Siberia. When our conversations were coming to an end, comrade Chicherin pointed out that Vanderlip should be received because this would have an excellent effect on his subsequent appearance in Western Europe. And although of course the prospect of having a conversation with such a capitalist shark is not among the pleasant ones, but after having had to conduct myself very courteously even with the late Mirbach in my official capacity, I could certainly not be frightened by a conversation with Vanderlip. It is interesting that when we were exchanging various courtesies with Vanderlip and he began jokingly to say that Americans are an extraordinarily practical people and will not believe anyone until they see it with their own eyes, I replied to him also half-jokingly: "Well, you look now at how well things are in Soviet Russia and introduce this in America in your own country." He replied to me, but this time not in English but in Russian: "Perhaps." "What, you even know Russian?" He says: "I traveled five thousand versts through Siberia many years ago, and Siberia interested me extraordinarily." This jocular exchange of courtesies with Vanderlip ended with Vanderlip saying, as he was leaving: "Yes, one must admit that Mr. Lenin has no horns, and I shall have to tell this to all my acquaintances in America." It would be, of course, no joking trifle if we had not received subsequent information in the European press that Soviet power is a monster, that one cannot conduct relations with it. We obtained the opportunity to throw a stone into this swamp in the person of Vanderlip—a supporter of restoring trade relations with us.

Was there ever a single communication from Japan that did not speak of extraordinary agitation in Japanese commercial circles? Japanese public opinion says that it will never sacrifice its interests, that it is opposed to concessions with Soviet power. In a word, we have obtained a gigantic exacerbation of enmity between Japan and America and thereby have obtained an undoubted weakening of the pressure of Japan and America against us.

At that meeting of responsible workers in Moscow where I had occasion to report this fact, the following sort of question was posed during the discussion: "It turns out," as one comrade wrote, "that we are dragging Japan and America into war, but workers and peasants will do the fighting. And although these are imperialist powers, but for us socialists, is it fitting to drag two powers into war and bring about the shedding of the blood of workers?" I replied to this that if we were indeed dragging workers and peasants into war, that would be a crime. But all our policy and propaganda is directed not at all toward dragging peoples into war, but toward ending war. And experience is sufficient to show that only socialist revolution is the way out of eternal wars. Thus our policy does not consist in inciting war. We have done nothing that would justify war, directly or indirectly, between Japan and America. All our propaganda and all newspaper articles are full of explaining the truth that war between America and Japan will be the same imperialist war as was the war between the English group and the German group in 1914, that socialists must not think about defense of the fatherland but about the overthrow of capitalist power, about workers' revolution. But if we, doing everything within our power to accelerate this revolution, find ourselves in the position of a weak socialist republic attacked by imperialist brigands, is our policy of using the discord among them to make it difficult for them to unite against us correct? Of course, such a policy is correct. We have pursued it for four years. And the main fact showing this policy was the Brest Treaty. While German imperialism was resisting, we, using contradictions among imperialists themselves, could withstand even when the Red Army was not yet created.

This is the situation under which our concession policy with regard to Kamchatka was formed. Concessions of this kind are rather exceptional. I shall go on to speak about how the other objects of concessions are taking shape. For now I shall confine myself to the political side of the question. I wish to indicate that in the relations between Japan and America lies the explanation for why the proposal for concessions or the luring of concessions is advantageous for us. Concession presupposes one or another restoration of peaceful agreements, restoration of trade relations, presupposes the possibility for us of opening direct broad purchases of the machines necessary to us. And we must direct all efforts toward achieving this. This has not yet been achieved.

A comrade who raises the question about the restoration of trade relations with England asks why is the signing of an agreement with England being delayed? I answer: it is being delayed because the English government is wavering. The majority of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of England stands for restoration of relations and clearly sees that to take steps supporting war means to risk enormously and to accelerate revolution. You remember how during our advance on Warsaw the English government threatened an ultimatum and said it would order the fleet to move against Petrograd. You remember how all of England was covered with "Action Committees,"{61} and the Menshevik leaders of the English working class declared they were against war, that they would not permit this war. On the other hand, the reactionary part of the English bourgeoisie and the court military clique stand for continuation of war. There is no doubt that their influence must be credited with the fact that the signing of the trade agreement is being delayed. I shall not recount the separate vicissitudes of these trade relations with England, of this treaty on trade relations with England, because it would lead me too far afield. In the Central Committee of the party this delicate question has had to be discussed very assiduously of late. We returned to it extraordinarily frequently, and our policy here has been clearly defined in the direction of maximum concessions. Our goal now is to obtain a trade agreement with England, so as to begin commodity exchange more properly, so as to have the possibility to purchase as quickly as possible the necessary machines for our broad plan of restoration of the national economy. The sooner we do this, the more basis we shall have for economic independence from capitalist countries. It is precisely now, when they have burned their fingers on military invasion of Russia, that they cannot immediately think of renewing war; we must seize the moment and direct all forces to achieving trade relations, even at the cost of maximum concessions, for we do not believe for a second in permanent trade relations with imperialist powers: this will be a temporary respite. Experience from the history of revolutions and major conflicts teaches that wars, a series of wars, are inevitable. The very question of the existence of the Soviet republic alongside capitalist countries—a Soviet republic surrounded by capitalist countries—is such an impossible thing for capitalism that they will seize upon every opportunity to renew war. Now peoples are tired of imperialist war, they threaten upheaval if war continues, but it is not impossible that after the lapse of a small number of years capitalists may be able to renew it. That is why we must direct all forces to using the possibility as it presents itself and concluding trade relations. I can say the following here (I ask that this not be written down). I believe that by our firm position that the Communist International is not a governmental institution, we shall ultimately prevail. All the more so since by reason the English bourgeoisie should see the absurdity of attempting to rise up against the III International. The III International was formed in March 1919. In July 1920 the II Congress took place, and after this in all countries the Moscow Conditions were openly proclaimed{62}. Open struggle for joining the Communist International is underway. Everywhere there are organizational bases of the communist party. Under such conditions an attempt to pose us a serious ultimative question—be so good as to settle accounts with the Communist International—is an inadmissible thing. But the fact that they are pressing on this shows where their shoe pinches and what they dislike in our policy. And without this we already knew what they dislike in our policy. Another question, which can be discussed at a party meeting and which troubles England, is the East. England wants to obligate us that we undertake nothing against England's interests in the East. We are gladly prepared to give such a guarantee. For example, the Congress of the Peoples of the East{63}, a communist congress, took place in Baku, in the Azerbaijan Independent Republic, not in the RSFSR. To accuse us of undertaking something against England's interests, the English government will not succeed. Not knowing our constitution well, they sometimes confuse the Azerbaijan Republic with the Russian Soviet Republic. On this matter our laws are precise and definite, and it is easy to refute the false interpretations of English ministers. However, disagreements on this topic continue, and around these two sore points Krasin goes about with ministers.

In July, when complete defeat threatened Poland, when destruction by the Red Army threatened Poland, England offered the complete text of an agreement, in which it was said: in principle you must declare that you will not conduct official propaganda and will undertake nothing against England's interests in the East. This will be worked out further by a political conference, but now we are concluding such a trade agreement. Do you agree to sign? We answered: we agree. We say now as well that we are signing this agreement. A political conference will more precisely define England's interests in the East. We too have certain interests in the East and, when it is necessary, we shall set them out in detail. England cannot say directly that it is backing away from its July proposal. Therefore it is dragging things out and hiding the truth about the negotiations from its own people. The negotiations are in an uncertain position; we cannot vouch that an agreement will be signed. The strongest influence in England, court and military, is working against this agreement. But we are now making maximum concessions and believe that it is in our interest to obtain a trade agreement and to be able to purchase as quickly as possible some of what is most essential for restoration of transport—that is, locomotives—for restoration of industry, for electrification. This is most important for us. If we obtain this, then in several years we shall so strengthen ourselves that even in the worst case, if military intervention occurs in several years, it will fail, because we shall be stronger than now. Our policy in the Central Committee goes along the line of maximum concessions to England. And if these gentlemen think to catch us in some promises, we declare that our government will conduct no official propaganda, we do not intend to touch any of England's interests in the East. If they hope to tailor themselves a fur coat from this, let them try; we shall not suffer from it.

I have come to the question of the relation of England to France. Here the relations are entangled. On the one hand, England and France are in the League of Nations{64} and are obligated to act together; on the other hand, at every exacerbation, they do not act together. When comrade Kamenev was in London and conducted negotiations together with Krasin, this was revealed with clarity. France was for supporting Poland and Wrangel, whereas the English government declared: "We shall not go with France." Concessions are more acceptable for England than for France, which still dreams of obtaining debts, whereas in England businesslike capitalists have ceased to think about this at all. And from this side it is advantageous for us to use the discord between England and France, and therefore we must insist on the political proposal of concessions to England. Now we have a draft treaty regarding forest concessions in the far north. We find ourselves in such conditions that, thanks to the fact that there is no political unity between England and France, it is our obligation not to refuse even a certain risk, only in order to achieve the goal of making it difficult for England and France to create a military alliance against us. The new war which England and France would support against us would bring us (even on the condition that we end it completely victoriously, just as we have now ended it with Wrangel) colossal burdens, would hamper our economic development, would worsen the position of workers and peasants. Therefore we must accept everything that will bring us fewer losses. And that losses from concessions are nothing compared to what would have been the result of delays in our economic construction and the death of thousands of workers and peasants if we fail to resist the alliance of imperialists—this is clear. And one of such means to resist their alliance is negotiations with England about concessions. That is the political side of the question.

And finally, the last side—the relation of England and the entire Entente to Germany. Germany is the most advanced country, with the exception of America. In respect to the development of electricity it even stands higher in technical achievement. And this country, bound by the Versailles Treaty, finds itself in impossible conditions for existence. And under such circumstances Germany naturally is pushed toward alliance with Russia. When Russian troops approached Warsaw, all of Germany was in turmoil. Alliance with Russia—this country, which is strangled, which has the ability to set in motion gigantic productive forces—this situation led to the fact that in Germany there occurred a political confusion: German Black Hundreds went along in sympathy with Russian Bolsheviks with the Spartacists{65}. And this is entirely understandable, since it flows from economic causes, since this constitutes the basis of all the economic situation and of our foreign policy.

Our foreign policy, as long as we are alone and the capitalist world is strong, on the one hand consists in the fact that we must use the disagreements (to defeat all imperialist powers would of course be the most pleasant, but we are unable to do this for quite a while). Our existence depends on the fact that there exists a fundamental divergence of imperialist powers, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that the victory of the Entente and the Versailles Peace threw into an impossible position to live the enormous majority of the German nation. The Versailles Peace created such a situation that Germany cannot dream of a respite, cannot dream of not being plundered, of not having its means of livelihood taken away, of its population not being condemned to starvation and extinction—Germany cannot dream of this, and naturally the only means for it to save itself is only in alliance with Soviet Russia, toward which it directs its gaze. They are raging against Soviet Russia, they hate Bolsheviks, they shoot their communists like genuine White Guards. The German bourgeois government rages with hatred against Bolsheviks, but the interests of the international situation push it toward peace with Soviet Russia against its own will. This, comrades, is the second pillar of our international, foreign policy: to prove to peoples conscious of bourgeois oppression that there is no salvation for them outside the Soviet republic. And insofar as the Soviet republic has withstood for three years the onslaught of imperialists, this testifies to the fact that there exists in the world one country, only one country, which successfully resists this oppression of imperialism. Let it be a country of "brigands," "robbers," "bandits," Bolsheviks and so forth, but still without this country it is impossible to improve the economic situation.

Under such a situation the question of concessions acquires yet another side. Here is this brochure which I have in my hands, this decree of November 23 on concessions. It will be distributed to all members of the congress. We intend to publish a brochure on concessions abroad in several languages{66}. Our goal is immediately to do everything to interest in concessions the population of the greatest number of countries and precisely those countries which are most oppressed. The divergence of interests between Japan and America is very great. They cannot divide China, a series of islands and so forth among themselves. The divergence of interests between Germany and the Entente is of a different sort. Germany's existence is impossible because of the conditions which the Entente created for it. The people there are dying because the Entente takes engines and cattle. Such a situation pushes Germany toward rapprochement with Soviet Russia. I do not know the details of the treaty between Germany and the Entente; in any case it is known that in this treaty direct trade relations between Germany and Soviet Russia are forbidden. And if we concluded a deal regarding German locomotives, we concluded it in such a way that our contracting party is not Germany but Sweden. It is unlikely that Germany will be able to restore open trade relations with us before April 1921. But our steps toward trade relations with Germany are moving faster than with the Entente. The conditions of existence force the German people as a whole, not excepting German Black Hundreds and capitalists, to seek relations with Soviet Russia. Germany is already bound with us by certain trade relations. Germany can be further bound with us inasmuch as we are offering her a food concession. Thus it is clear that we must put forward concessions as an economic method, even independently of how much of the project we succeed in implementing. The interest in concessions is so obvious that even if we failed to grant a single concession, even if not a single treaty of ours were realized (and this is still quite possible), even if it turned out so, we would still have won, we would still have to pursue this policy, because by doing so we make difficult the march of imperialist countries against us.

Independently of this, we must appeal to all oppressed peoples as a whole with an indication—and this flows from the Versailles Treaty—that a handful of countries is strangling other peoples, and these peoples appeal to our aid openly or covertly, consciously or unconsciously, but they are becoming accustomed to recognizing the economic necessity of alliance with Soviet Russia against international imperialism. Therefore food concessions go beyond the bounds of old bourgeois concessions; they no longer resemble old capitalist concessions. They remain capitalist insofar as we say to German capitalists: bring such-and-such quantity of tractors, and we shall give you virgin excellent land and grain. We attract capital with enormous profit. In this respect the concession remains a purely capitalist enterprise, but it acquires immeasurably greater significance insofar as Germany, as a nation, Austria and other countries cannot exist, insofar as food aid is necessary for them and insofar as the entire people, regardless of the fact that the capitalist makes one or two hundred percent, insofar as the entire people sees, despite prejudices against Bolshevism, that Bolsheviks are creating completely different international relations, giving the possibility for all oppressed peoples to free themselves from imperialist oppression. Therefore our success over the past three years will be an even greater success over the coming year in our foreign policy. Our policy groups around the Soviet republic capitalist countries which imperialism is strangling. That is why this proposal for concessions has significance not only capitalist, that is why—this is a hand extended not only to German capitalists: "Bring us hundreds of tractors and take even three hundred percent on the ruble"—but this is a hand extended to oppressed peoples, this is an alliance of oppressed masses, which is one of the factors of the coming proletarian revolution. The doubts and concerns which still exist in the advanced countries, which say that Russia could risk a socialist revolution because it is large and has its own means of livelihood, but we, the industrial countries of Europe, cannot undertake this because we have no allies—are baseless, and we say: "You already have an ally—Soviet Russia." And insofar as we realize the concession, this will be that alliance which will strengthen the alliance against world imperialism. This position cannot be lost sight of; it justifies our concession policy and points to the necessity of concluding these concessions.

Further, some purely economic considerations. I now pass to economic considerations and shall read some provisions from the law, although I hope that the comrades present here have read this law of November 23. But I shall briefly remind you of it; it says that concessioners will be provided compensation in the form of a share of products, that in case of special technical improvements we are ready to give trade advantages, that the duration of concessions will be more or less lengthy depending on the volume and character of expenditures. We guarantee that property invested in an enterprise will not be confiscated or requisitioned.

Without this, of course, private capital and private owner cannot have relations with us. But here the question of courts is eliminated, which was first touched upon in the draft treaty. Then we saw that this was disadvantageous for us. Thus judicial power on our territory remains in our hands. In case of collision, the question will be decided by our judges. This will not be requisition, but the application of legitimate judicial rights of our judicial institutions.

The fifth point speaks of the code of labor laws. With Vanderlip, according to the original draft of the treaty, an exception was provided for the non-extension of the labor code to areas where, we do not know which, underdeveloped tribes live. In these areas the labor code is impossible. The exception will consist in the fact that instead of the labor code a special agreement on worker guarantees will be concluded.

The last point, in which we guarantee the concessioner the inadmissibility of unilateral alteration. Without this, of course, there can be no question of allowing concessions. But what one-sided alteration means, this question is left open. This depends on the text of the treaty regarding each concession. Arbitration by some neutral powers is possible. This is a point which may give occasion for disagreement and which leaves a certain freedom in defining the conditions of the concession itself. It must be pointed out that, for example, Menshevik leaders of workers are considered reliable people in the capitalist world. They enter bourgeois governments, and it is very difficult for bourgeois governments to refuse such mediators or arbitrators as Mensheviks or social traitors of European countries. Meanwhile our experience has shown us that in case of any serious exacerbations these American and European gentlemen Mensheviks conduct themselves just like Russian Mensheviks, that is, do not know how to conduct themselves and are forced to yield to the pressure of revolutionary masses, remaining opponents of revolution. This is an open question. We do not prejudge it.

From these conditions which I have read to you, you see that the economic relations between capitalist concessioners and the socialist republic are far from stable and sustainable. It is understandable that a capitalist, preserving private property and relations of exploitation, cannot but be a foreign body in a socialist republic. And from this it follows what constitutes one of the main subjects of my report: that concession is a continuation of war, only in another form. I shall now pass to this in detail; first I wish to set forth the three main types or objects of concessions.

In this brochure we have written a list of the main objects of concessions, and comrades from the VSNKh, who provided material for this brochure and edited it, attached maps which clearly show these objects of concessions. On these maps one can see that the objects of concessions are divided into three main types: forest concessions in the far north—that is one; food concessions—that is two; mining concessions in Siberia—three.

In forest concessions in the far north of European Russia, where there are tens, hundreds of millions of desiatinas of forest, which we are completely unable to exploit due to the absence of communication routes, means of production, and the absence of possibility to deliver food for workers there, where a state possessing a strong fleet has the possibility to properly procure forest goods and export them in gigantic quantities—here the economic interest for us is obvious.

If we want commodity exchange with foreign countries, and we do want it, we understand its necessity; our primary interest is to obtain as quickly as possible from capitalist countries those means of production (locomotives, machines, electrical apparatus) without which we cannot restore our industry seriously to any extent