Conspectus of Hegel’s
Science of Logic — Book II (Essence)

Note: Quoted text and page numbers—i.e., (66) —indicate links to passages in
Hegel’s Science of Logic and to Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline , also known as the Shorter Logic .

Book Two:
Essence

Volume IV. (Berlin, 1834) Part I.
Objective Logic. Book II. The Doctrine of Essence

SECTION ONE:
ESSENCE AS REFLECTION IN ITSELF

“The truth of Being is Essence.” (3) [1] Such is the first sentence, sounding thor- oughly idealistic and mystical. But immediately afterwards, a fresh wind,
so to speak, begins to blow: “Being is the immediate. Knowledge seeks to understand that truth [2] which Being, in and for itself , is, and therefore it does not halt” ( does not halt NB) “at the imme-
[theory of knowledge] diate and its determinations, but pene- trates ( NB ) through ( NB ) it, assum- ing that behind (Hegel’s italics) this Being there is something other than Being itself, and that this background constitutes the truth of Being. This cognition is mediated knowledge, for it is not lodged immedi- ately. with and in Essence, but begins at an Other, at Being, and has to make a pre-
liminary passage, the passage of transition beyond Being, or rather of entrance into it....”
[“ passage ”]
This Bewegung, [3] the path of knowl- edge, seems to be the “activity of cognition” (Tätligkeit des Erkennens) “external to Be- ing.”
“However, this movement is the move- ment of Being itself.”
[Objective signifi- cance] “Essence ... is what it is ... by virtue of its own infinite movement of Being.” (4) “Absolute Essence has no Determinate Being . Into this, however, it must pass.” (5) Essence stands midway between Being and the Notion, as the transition to the No- tion (=Absolute). Subdivisions of Essence : Semblance or Show (Schein), Appearance (Erscheinung), Actuality (Wirlichkeit). Das Wesentliche und das Unwesentli- che. [4] (8) Der Schein. (9) In the unessential, in Semblance, there is a moment of not-Being. (10)
i.e., the unessential, seeming, super- ficial, vanishes more often, does not hold so “tightly,” does not “sit so firmly” as as “Essence.” Etwa [5] : the movement of a river—the foam above and the deep currents below. But even the foam is an expression of essence!
Semblance and scepticism, Kantianism, respectively: “Semblance then is the phenomenon of scepticism; or again the appearance of ideal- ism, such an immediacy, which is neither Something nor Thing, and, generally, is not an indifferent Being which could be outside its determinateness and relation to the subject. Scepticism did not dare to
affirm ‘it is’; modern idealism did not dare to regard cognition as a knowledge of the Thing-in-itself; with the former,
Semblance was supposed to have no basis at all in any Being; with the latter, the Thing-in-itself was supposed incapable of entering into cognition. But at the same
time scepticism admitted manifold deter-
[NB] minations of its Semblance, or rather its Semblance had for content all the manifold riches of the world. In the same manner the appearance of idealism comprehends the whole range of these manifold determi- natenesses.“
You include in Schein [6] all the wealth of the world and you deny the objectivity of Schein!!
Semblance and appearance are immediate- ly determined so diversely. The content may then have no basis in any Being nor in any thing nor Thing-in-itself; for itself it remains as it is: it has only been translated from being into Semblance; thus Semblance contains these manifold determinatenesses,
which are immediate, existent and recip- rocally other. Semblance itself is, then, immediately determinate. It may have this or that content; but whatever content it has is not posited by itself but belongs to it immediately. The idealism of Leibnitz,
[the imme- diacy of Semblance]
Kant or Fichte, like any other form of ideal- ism, did not reach beyond Being as deter- minateness, beyond this immediacy any more than scepticism. Scepticism allows
[they did not go deeper!] the content “that which is immediately given” !! of its Semblance to be given to it; for it, it is immediate , whatever con- tent it is to have. The monad of Leibnitz develops its presentations out of itself; but it is no creative and connecting force,— the presentations arise in it like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate rela- tive to one another, and therefore to the
monad itself. Similarly Kant’s phenomenon is a given content of perception; it presup- poses affections, determinations of the sub-
[cf. Machism!!] ject which are immediate to one another and to the subject. The infinite limitation or check of Fichte's idealism refuses per- haps, to be based on any Thing-in_itself, so that it becomes purely a determinate- ness in the Ego. But this determinateness is immediate and a limit to the Ego, which, transcending its externality, incorporates it; and though the Ego can pass beyond the limit, the latter has in it an aspect of indifference by virtue of which it contains an immediate not-Being of the Ego, though itself contained in the Ego.” (10-11) ...“Determinations which distinguish it” (den Schein) “from Essence are deter- minations of Essence....” (12)
...“It is the immediacy of not-Being which constitutes Semblance; in Essence, Being is not-Being. Its nullity in itself is the negative nature of Essence itself....” (12)
[Semblance = the negative nature of Essence]
...“These two moments thus constitute Semblance: Nullity, which however persists, and Being, which however is Moment; or again negativity which is in itself, and reflected immediacy. Consequently these moments are the moments of Essence it- self....” “Semblance is Essence itself in the deter- minateness of Being....” (12-13)
Semblance is (1) nothing, non-exis- tent (Nichtigkeit) which exists —(2) Being as moment
“Thus Semblance is Essence itself, but Essence in a determinateness, and this in such a manner that determinateness is only its moment: Essence is the showing of it- self in itself.” (14)
That which shows itself is essence in one of its determinations, in one of its aspects, in one of its moments. Essence seems to be just that. Semblance is the showing (Scheinen) of essence itself in itself.
...“Essence ... contains Semblance within itself, as infinite internal movement....” (14) ...“In this its self-movement Essence is Reflection. Semblance is the same as Re- flection.” (14)
Semblance (that which shows itself) is the Reflection of Essence in (it) itself.
...“Becoming in Essence—its reflective movement—is hence the movement from Nothing to Nothing and through Nothing back to itself....” (15)
This is shrewd and profound. Move- ments “to nothing” occur in nature and in life. Only there are certainly none “from nothing.” Always from something.
“Commonly Reflection is taken in the subjective meaning of the movement of judgment which passes beyond a given im- mediate presentation, seeking universal de- terminations for it or comparing them with, it.” (21) (Quotation from Kant— Critique of the Power of Judgment [7] ).... “Here, however, neither the reflection of conscious- ness nor the more determinate reflection of understanding, which has the particular and the universal for its determinations, is in question, but only Reflection in general....”
Thus here too, Hegel charges Kant with subjectivism . This NB . Hegel is for the “objective validity” (sit venia verbo [8] ) of Semblance,
“of that which is immediately given” [the expression “ that which is given ” is gener- ally used by Hegel, and here see p. 21 i.f.; p. 22]. The more petty philosophers dispute whether essence or that which is immediately given should be taken as basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists). Instead of o r , Hegel puts and , explain- ing the concrete content of this “and.” | Thus here too, Hegel charges Kant with subjectivism . This NB . Hegel is for the “objective validity” (sit venia verbo [8] ) of Semblance,
“of that which is immediately given” [the expression “ that which is given ” is gener- ally used by Hegel, and here see p. 21 i.f.; p. 22]. The more petty philosophers dispute whether essence or that which is immediately given should be taken as basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists). Instead of o r , Hegel puts and , explain- ing the concrete content of this “and.”
Thus here too, Hegel charges Kant with subjectivism . This NB . Hegel is for the “objective validity” (sit venia verbo [8] ) of Semblance,
“of that which is immediately given” [the expression “ that which is given ” is gener- ally used by Hegel, and here see p. 21 i.f.; p. 22]. The more petty philosophers dispute whether essence or that which is immediately given should be taken as basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists). Instead of o r , Hegel puts and , explain- ing the concrete content of this “and.”
“Die Reflexion is the showing of Essence into itself” (27) (translation? Reflectivity? Reflective determination? Рефлексия is not suitable). [9] “It” (das Wesen) “is a movement through different moments, absolute self-media- tion....” (27) Identity — Difference — Contradiction (+Gegensatz [10] )   (Ground)... (  in particular ) (  antithesis   ) Therefore Hegel elucidates the one-sided- ness, the incorrectness of the “law of iden- tity” (A = A), of the category (all determi- nations of that which is are categories— pp. 27-28 ). “If everything is self-identical it is not distinguished: it contains no opposition and has no ground.” (29) “Essence is ... simple self-identity.” (30) Ordinary thinking places resemblance and difference next to (“daneben”) each other, not understanding “ this movement of transition of one of these determinations into the other ” (31) And again, against the law of identity (A = A): its adherents
“since they cling to this rigid Identity which as its opposite in Variety, they do not see that they are thereby making it into a one-sided determinateness, which as such as no truth.” (33)
[NB terms under- lined by me] (“Empty tautology”: 32) “It contains only formal truth, which is abstract and incomplete.” (33)
Kinds of reflection: external , etc.; ex- pounded very obscurely.
The principles of difference: “All things are different....” “A is also not A....” (44) “There are no two things which are en- tirely alike....” There is a difference in one or another aspect (Seite), Rücksicht, etc. “insofern,” [11] etc. bien dit !! “The customary tenderness for things, whose only care is that they shall not contradict one another, forgets here as else- where that this is no solution of the contra- diction, which is merely planted elsewhere, namely, into subjective or external re- flection; and that the latter does in fact contain the two moments—which this re- moval and transplantation proclaim to be a mere positedness—in one unity as tran- scended and related to each other.” (47) (This irony is exquisite! “Tenderness” for nature and history (among the philis- tines)—the endeavour to cleanse them from contradictions and struggle....) The result of the addition of plus and mi- nus is nought. “ The result of contradiction is not only nought .” (59) The solution of the contradiction, the re- duction of positive and negative to “only determinations” (61) converts Essence (das Wesen) into Ground (Grund) (ibidem).
...“Resolved Contradiction is, then, Grund, that is, Essence as unity of Positive and Negative....” (62)
[NB] “Even a slight experience in reflective thought will perceive that, if anything has just been determined as Positive, it straight- way turns into Negative if any progress is made from that base, and conversely that a Negative determination turns into Positive; that reflective thought becomes confused in these determinations and con- tradicts itself. Insufficient acquaintance with the nature of these determinations leads to the conclusion that this confusion is a fault which should not occur, and attributes it to a subjective error. And in fact this transition does remain mere
confusion insofar as the necessity for this metamorphosis is not present to consciousness.“ (63)
...“The opposition of Positive and Nega- tive is especially taken in the meaning that the former (although etymologically it expresses being posited or positedness) is to be an objective entity, and the latter subjective, belonging only to external reflection and in no way concerned with the objective, which is in and for itself and quite ignores it.” (64) “And indeed if the Negative expresses nothing but the abstraction af subjective caprice....” (then it, this Negative, does not exist “für das objective Positive” [12] )....
Truth, too, is the Positive, as knowl- edge, corresponding with its object but it is this self-equality only insofar as knowledge has already taken up a negative attitude to the Other, has penetrated the object , and transcended that negation which the object is. Error is a Positive, as an opinion affirming that which is not in
[Truth and Object]
Truth, too, is the Positive, as knowl- edge, corresponding with its object but it is this self-equality only insofar as knowledge has already taken up a negative attitude to the Other, has penetrated the object , and transcended that negation which the object is. Error is a Positive, as an opinion affirming that which is not in
and for itself, an opinion which knows itself and asserts itself. But ignorance is either indifference to truth and error, and thus determined neither as positive nor as negative,—and if it is determined as a de-
[that which is in and for itself] ficiency, this determinatian belongs to ex- ternal reflection; or else, objectively and as proper determinatian af a nature, it is the impulse which is directed against itself, a negative which contains a positive direction.—It is of the greatest impor- tance to recognise this nature af the Deter- minations af Reflection which have been considered here, that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and therefore in the fact that each contains the other in its own concept. This must be understood and remembered, far without this understanding not a step can really be taken in philosophy.” (65-66) This from the Note 1.———— Note 2. “ The Law of the Excluded Middle ” Hegel quotes this proposition af the ex- cluded middle. “Something is either A or not A; there is no third” (66) and “ anal- yses ” it. If it implies that “alles ein Entgegengesetztes ist,” [13] that everything has its positive and its negative determi- nation, then it is all right. But if it is understood as it is generally understood, that, of all predicates, either a given one, or its not-Being, applies, then this is a “triviality”!! Spirit ... sweet, not sweet? green, not green? The determination should lead to determinateness, but in this triv- iality it leads to nothing. And then—Hegel says wittily—it is said that there is no third. There is a third in this thesis itself. A itself is the third, for A can be both + A and - A . “The Some- thing thus is itself the third term which was supposed to be excluded.” (67)
This is shrewd and correct. Every con- crete thing, every concrete something, stands in multifarious and often con- tradictory relations to everything else, ergo it is itself and some other.
Note 3 (at the end of Chapter 2 , Sec- tion 1 of Book II of the Logic ). “ the Law of Contradiction .” “If now the primary Determinations of Reflection—Identity, Variety and Oppo- sition—are established in a proposition, then the determination into which they pass over as into their truth (namely Con- tradiction) should much more so be com- prehended and expressed in a proposition: all things are contradicto- ry in themselves , in this meaning,
that this proposition as opposed to the others expresses much better the truth and essence of things .—Contradiction,
which emerges in Opposition, is no more than developed Nothing; and this is already contained in Identity, and occurred in the expression that the law of identity states nothing. This negation further determines itself into Variety and into Opposition, which now is posited Contradiction. “But it has been a fundamental prejudice of hitherto existing logic and of ordinary imagination that Contradiction is a deter- mination having less essence and immanence than Identity; but indeed, if there were
any question of rank, and the two deter- minations had to be fixed as separate, Cont- radiction would have to be taken as the more profound and more fully essential.
For as opposed to it Identity is only the determination of simple immediacy, or
of dead Being, while Contradiction is the rood of all movement and vitality , and it is only insofar as it contains a Con- tradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity .
“Ordinarily Contradiction is removed, first of all from things, from the existent and the true in general; and it is asserted that there is nothing contradictory. Next it is shifted into subjective reflection, which alone is said to posit it by relat-
ing and comparing it. But really it does not exist even in this reflection, for it is impossible to imagine or to think anything contradictory. Indeed, Contradiction, both in actuality and in thinking reflection, is considered an accident, a kind of abnormal- ity or paroxysm of sickness which will soon pass away. “With regard to the assertion that Con- tradiction does not exist, that it is non- existent, we may disregard this statement. In every experience thete must be an ab- solute determination of Essence—in every actuality as well as in every concept. The same remark has already been made above, under Infinity, which is Contradic- tion as it appears in the sphere of Being. But ordinary experience itself declares that at least there are a number of contradic- tory things, arrangements and so forth, the contradiction being present in them and not merely in an external reflection. But it must further not be taken only as an abnormality which occurs just here and
there; it is the Negative in its essential determination, the principle all self-
movement, which consists of nothing else but an exhibition of Contradiction. Exter-
nal, sensible motion is itself its immediate existence. Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contra- dictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no mo- tion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself. “And similarly internal self-movement proper, or impulse in general (the appe- titive force or nisus of the monad, the en- telechy of absolutely simple Essence), is nothing else than the fact that something is in itself and is also the deficiency or the neg- ative of itself, inbne and the same respect. Abstract self-identity has no vi- tality but the fact that Positive in itself is negativity causes it to pass outside itself
and to change . Something therefore is living only insofar as it contains Contra- diction, and is that force which can both
comprehend and endure Contradiction. But if an existent something cannot in its pos- itive determination also encroach on its negative, cannot hold fast the one in the other and contain Contradiction within it- self, then it is not living unity, or Ground, but perishes in Contradiction. Speculative
thought consists only in this, that thought holds fast Contradiction and itself in Con- tradiction and not in that it allows itself to be dominated by it—as happens to imag- ination—or suffers its determinations to be resolved into others, or into Nothing.” (67-70) Movement and “ self- movement ” (this NB! arbitrary (independent), spon- taneous, internally-necessary movement), “change,” “movement and vitality,” “the principle of all self-movement,” “impulse” (Trieb) to “movement” and to “activity”— the opposite to “ dead Being ”—who would believe that this is the core of “He- gelianism,” of abstract and abstrusen (pon- derous, absurd?) Hegelianism?? This core had to be discovered, understood, hin- überretten, [14] laid bare, refined, which is precisely what Marx and Engels did. The idea of universal movement and change (1813 Logic ) was conjectured before its application to life and society. In regard to society it was proclaimed earlier (1847) than it was demonstrated in application to man (1859). [15] “In movement, impulse, and the like,
the simplicity of these determinations con- ceals the contradiction from imagination; but this contradiction immediately stands revealed in the determinations of relation.
[simplicity conceals]
The most trivial examples—above and be- low, right and left, father and son, and so on without end—all contain Contradiction in one term. That is above which is not below; ‘above’ is determined only as not being ‘below,’ and is only insofar as there is a ‘below,’ and conversely: one deter- mination implies its opposite. Father is the Other of son, and son of father, and each exists only as this Other of the other; and also the one determination exists only in relation to the other: their Being is one subsistence.......... (70) ”Thus although Imagination everywhere has Contradiction for content, it never becomes aware of it; it remains an external reflection, which passes from Likeness to Unlikeness, or from negative relation to intro-reflectedness of the different terms.
It keeps these two determinations external to each other, and has in mind only these and not their transition, which is the es- sential matter and contains the Contradic-
tion.—On the other hand, intelligent reflec- tion, if we may mention this here, consists in the understanding and enunciating of Contradiction. It does not express the con- cept of things and their relations, and has only determinations of imagination for ma- terial and content; but still it relates them, and the relation contains their contradic- tion, allowing their concept to show through the contradiction.—Thinking Reason, on the other hand, sharpens (so to speak) the blunt difference of Variety, the mere manifold of imagination, into essential difference, that is, Opposition. The mani- fold entities acquire activity and vitality in relation to one another only when driven on to the sharp point of Contradiction; thence they draw negativity, which is the inherent pulsation of self-movement and vitality....” (70-71)
NB (1) Ordinary imagination grasps dif- ference and contradiction, but not the transition from one to the other, this however is the most important . (2) Intelligence and understanding. Intelligence grasps contradiction, enunciates it, brings things into rela- tion with one another, allows the “concept to show through the contra- diction,” but does not express the concept of things and their relations. (3) Thinking reason (understanding) sharpens the blunt difference of vari- ety, the mere manifold of imagination, into essential difference, into opposi- tion . Only when raised to the peak of contradiction, do the manifold enti- ties become active (regasm) and lively in relation to one another,—they re- ceive [16] acquire that negativity which is the inherent pulsation of self-movement and vitality.
Subdivisions: Der Grund—(ground) (1) Absolute Ground—die Grundlage (the foundation). “Form and Matter.” “Con- tent.” (2) Determinate Ground (as the ground [for] a determinate content)
Its transition to Conditioning Media- tion die bedingende Vermittelung
(3) The Thing-in-Itself (transition to Exis- tence ). Note. "The Law of Ground" Customary proposition: “Everything has its sufficient Ground.” “In general this just means that what is must be considered not as an existent im- mediate, but as a posited entity. We must not remain at immediate Determinate Be- ing or at determinateness in general, but must pass back to its Ground....” (76) It is superfluous to add: sufficient Ground. What is insufficient, is not Ground. Leibnitz, who made the law of sufficient ground the basis of his philosophy, un- derstood more profoundly. “ Leib- nitz especially opposed the sufficiency of Ground to causality in its strict meaning of mechanical efficacy.” (76) He looked for “Beziehung” der Ursach- en [17] (77),——“the whole as essential unity.”
He looked for ends , but teleology does not belong here, according to Hegel, but to the doctrine of the No- tion.
...“The question cannot therefore be asked, how Form is added to Essence; for Form is only the showing of Essence in itself—it is its own immanent (sic!) Re- flection....” (81)
Form is essential. Essence is formed. In one way or another also in dependence on Essence....
Essence as formless identity (of itself with itself) becomes matter . (82) “...It” (die Materie [18] ) “is the real foun- dation or substratum of Form....” (82) “If abstraction is made from every de- termination and Form of a Something, indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure abstract . (—Matter cannot be seen or felt, etc.—what is seen or felt is a de- terminate Matter , that is, a unity of Matter and Form).” (82) Matter is not the Ground of Form, but the unity of Ground and Grounded. (83) Matter is the passive , Form is the active (tätiges). “Matter must be formed, and Form must materialise itself....” (84)
Now this, which appears as the activity of Form, is equally the proper movement of Matter itself....” (85-86)
[NB]
Now this, which appears as the activity of Form, is equally the proper movement of Matter itself....” (85-86)
...“Both—the activity of Form and the movement of Matter—are the same.... Mat- ter is determined as such or necessarily has a Form; and Form is simply material, persistent Form.” (86) Note: “Formal Method of Explanation from Tautological Grounds” Very often, Hegel says, especially in the physical sciences, “Grounds” are explained tautologically: the movement of the earth is explained by the “attractive force” of the sun. And what	then is attractive force? It is also movement!! (92) Empty tautol- ogy: why does this man go to town? Be- cause of the attractive force of the town! (93) It also happens in science that at first molecules, the ether, “electrical matter” (95-96), etc., are put forward as “ground,” and then it turns out “that they”	(these con- cepts) “are determinations deduced from that for which they are meant to be the grounds—hypotheses and figments derived by an uncritical reflection....” (96) Or it is said that “we do not know the inner nature itself of these forces and classes of matter...” (96) then there remains indeed Nothing to “explain,” but one must simply limit one- self to the facts.... Der reale Grund [19] ... is not tautology, but already “some other determination of Content.” (97) On the question of “Ground” (Grund), Hegel remarks inter alia: “If it is said of Nature that it is the ground of the world, then what is called Nature is identical with the world, and the world is nothing but Nature itself.” (100) On the other hand, “if Nature is to be the world, a manifold of determinations is added externally....” Since everything has “mehere”—“Inhalts- bestimmungen, Verhältnisse und Rücksich- ten,” [20] so any number of arguments for and against can be put forward. (103) That is what Socrates and Plato called sophistry. Such arguments do not contain “the whole extent of the thing,” they do not “exhaust” it (in the sense “of constituting its connections” and “containing all” its sides). The transition of Ground (Grund) into condition (Bedingung).
If I am not mistaken, there is much mysticism and leeres [21] pedantry in these conclusions of Hegel, but the basic idea is one of genius: that of the univer- sal, all-sided vital connection of every- thing with everything and the reflec- tion of this connection—materialistiisch auf den Kopf gestellter Hegel [22] human concepts, which must likewise be hewn, treated,	flexible, mobile, rel- ative, mutually connected, united in opposites, in order to embrace the world. Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the dialec- tical elaboration of the history of hu- man thought, science and technique. ——————————————— A river and the drops in this river. The position of every drop, its relation to the others; its connection with the others; the direction of its movement; its speed; the line of the movement— straight, curved, circular, etc.—upwards, downwards. The sum of the movement. Concepts, as registration of individual aspects of the movement, of individ- ual drops (=“things”), of individual “ streams ,” etc. There you have à peu près [24] the picture of the world according to Hegel’s Logic ,—of course minus God and the Absolute.
[And purely logical elaboration? Das fällt zusam- men. [23] It must coincide, as induction and deduction in Capital ——— The word “ moment ” is often used by Hegel in the sense of moment of connec- tion , moment of concate- nation]
If I am not mistaken, there is much mysticism and leeres [21] pedantry in these conclusions of Hegel, but the basic idea is one of genius: that of the univer- sal, all-sided vital connection of every- thing with everything and the reflec- tion of this connection—materialistiisch auf den Kopf gestellter Hegel [22] human concepts, which must likewise be hewn, treated,	flexible, mobile, rel- ative, mutually connected, united in opposites, in order to embrace the world. Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the dialec- tical elaboration of the history of hu- man thought, science and technique. ——————————————— A river and the drops in this river. The position of every drop, its relation to the others; its connection with the others; the direction of its movement; its speed; the line of the movement— straight, curved, circular, etc.—upwards, downwards. The sum of the movement. Concepts, as registration of individual aspects of the movement, of individ- ual drops (=“things”), of individual “ streams ,” etc. There you have à peu près [24] the picture of the world according to Hegel’s Logic ,—of course minus God and the Absolute.
“When all the conditions of a thing are present, it enters into existence....” (116)
Very Good! What has the Absolute Idea and idealism to do with it? ————————— Amusing, this “derivation” of . . . exis- tence ....

SECTION TWO:
APPEARANCE

The first phrase: “ Essence must appear ....” (119) The appearance of Essence is (1) Existenz (Thing); (2) Appearance (Erschei- nung). (“Appearance is what the Thing is in itself, or its truth” “The intro- reflected self-existent world stands opposed to the world of Appearance....“ (120) (3) Verhältnis (relation) and Actuality . Incidentally: “Demonstration in general is mediated cognition....” (121) ...“The various kinds of Being demand or contain their own kind of mediation; consequently the nature of demonstration too is different for each.......” (121)
And again ... on the existence of God!! This wretched God, as soon as the word existence is mentioned, he takes offence.
Existence differs from Being by its medi- ation (Vermittlung: 124) [?By concrete- ness and Connection?] ...“The Thing-in-itself and its medi- ated Being are both contained in Existence, and each is an Existence; the Thing-in-it- self exists and is the essential Existence of the Thing, while mediated Being is its unessential Existence....” (125)
The Thing-in-itself is related to Being as the essential to the non- essential?
...“The latter” (Ding-an-sich) “is not sup- posed to contain in itself any determinate multiplicity, and consequently obtains this only when brought under external reflec- tion, but remains indifferent to it. (—The Thing-in-itself has colour only in relation to the eye, smell in relation to the nose, and so forth.)...” (126) ...“A Thing has the Property of effecting this or that in an Other, and of disclosing itself in a peculiar manner in its relation to it....” (129) “The Thing-in-itself thus exists essentially....” (131) The Note deals with “The Thing-in-itself of Transcendental Idealism....” ...“The Thing-in-itself as such is no more than the empty abstraction from all deter- minateness, of which it is admitted that nothing can be known just because it is meant to be the abstraction from all deter- mination....” (131) Transcendental idealism ... places “all determinateness of things (both with regard to form and to content) in consciousness...” (131) “accordingly, from this point of view, it falls within me, the subject, that I see the leaves of a tree not as black but as green, the sun as round and not as square, and taste sugar as sweet and not as bit- ter; that I determine the first and second strokes of a clock as successive and not as simultaneous, and determine the first to be neither the cause nor the effect of the second, and so forth” (131)....	Hegel further makes the reservation that he has here investigated only the question of the Thing-in-itself and “äußerliche Refle- xion.” [25]
“The essential inadequacy of the stand- point at which this philosophy halts con- sists in this, that it clings to the abstract Thing-in-itself as to an ultimate determi- nation; it opposes Reflection, or the deter- minateness and multiplicity of the Prop- erties, to the Thing-in-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and deter- mines itself as an entity endowed with its proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is seen that the abstraction of the Thing, which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue determination.” (132)
[the core = against sub- jectivism and the split between the Thing-in- itself and appearances]
...“Many different Things are in essen- tial Reciprocal Action by virtue of their Properties; Property is this very recipro- cal relation, and apart from it the Thing is nothing....” (133) Die Dingheit [26] passes over into Eigen- schaft. [27] (134) Eigenschaft into “matter” or “Stoff” [28] (“things consist of sub- stance”), etc. “Appearance at this point is Essence in its Existence....” (144) “Appearance ... is the unity of semblance and Existence....” (145)
Unity in appearances: “This unity is the Law of Appearance. Law therefore is the positive element in the mediation of the Apparent.” (148)
[law (of appearances)]
He re in general utter obscurity. But there is a vital thought,	evident- ly: the concept of law is one of the stages of cognition by man of unity and connection , of the recip- rocal dependence and totality	of the world process. The “treatment” and “twisting” of words and concepts to which Hegel devotes himself here is a struggle against making the con- cept of law absolute, against simplify- ing it, against making a fetish of it. NB for modern physics !!!
“This enduring persistence which belongs to Appearance in Law....” (149) NB Law is the endur- ing (the persisting) in appearances
...“Law is the Reflection of Appearance into identity with itself.” (149) (Law is the identical in appearances: “the Reflection of Appearance into identity with itself.”)
[(Law is the identical in appearances)]
...“This identity, the foundation of Ap- pearance, which constitutes Law, is the peculiar moment of Appearance....” (150)
[NB]
Hence Law is not beyond Appearance, but is immediately present in it; the realm of Laws is the quiescent (Hegel’s italics) reflection of the existing or appearing world....” (150)
[Law = the quiescent reflection of appearances]
NB
This is remarkably materialistic and remarkably appropriate (with the word “ruhige” [29] ) determination. Law takes the quiescent—and there- fore law, every law, is narrow, in- complete, approximate.
“Existence passes back into Law as into its Ground; Appearance contains them both—simple Ground and the dissolving movement of the appearing universe, of which Ground is the essentiality.” “Hence law is essential appearance.” (150)
[NB Law is essential appear- ance]
Ergo, law and essence are concepts of the same kind (of the same order), or rather, of the same degree, expressing the deepening of man’s knowledge of phenomena, the world, etc.
The movement of the universe in ap- pearances, (Bewegung des erscheinenden Universums), in the essentiality of this movement, is law.
[NB (Law is the reflection of the essential in the move-]
“The realm of Laws is the quies- cent content of Appearance; Appearance is this same content, but presents itself in unquiet change and as Reflection into other.... Appearance, therefore, as against
[ment of the universe.) (Appearance, totality) ((law = part))]
Law is the totalisy , for it contains Law, but also more , namely the moment of self-moving Form.” (151)
[(Appearance is richer than law)]
But further on, although unclearly, it is admitted, it seems, p. 154, that law can make up for this Man- gel [30] and embrace both the negative side and the Totalität der Erschei- nung [31] (especially 154 i. f.). Re- turn to this!
The World in and for itself is identical with the World of Appearances, but at the same time it is opposite to it. (158) What is positive in the one is negative in the other. What is evil in the World of Appear- ances is good in the world which is in and for itself. Cf.—Hegel says here— The Phe- nomenology of Mind , p. 121 et seq. “The Appearing and the Essential World are each ... the independent whole of Exis- tence. One was to have been only reflected Existence, and the other only immediate Existence; but each continues itself in the other, and consequently in itself is the identity of these two moments....	Both in the first instance are independent, but they are independent only as totalities, and they are this insofar as each essentially has in itself the moment of the other....” (159-160)
The essence here is that both the world of appearances and the world in itself are moments of man’s knowledge of nature, stages, alterations or deepen- ings (of knowledge). The shifting of the world in itself further and further from the world of appearances—that is what is so far still not to be seen in Hegel. N B . Have not Hegel’s “moments” of the concept the significance of “mo- ments” of transition?
...“ Thus Law is Essential Relation .” (160) (Hegel’s italics) ( Law is relation . This N B for the Machists and other agnostics, and for the Kantians, etc. Relation of essences or be- tween essences. ) “The term world expresses the formless totality of multifariousness....” (160) And the third chapter (“ Essential Rela- tion ”) begins with the proposition: “The truth of Appearance is Essential Relation....” (161) Subdivisions : The relation of Whole to Parts ; this relation passes into the following one (sic!! (p. 168)):—of Force to its Man- ifestation ;—of Inner to Outer .— The transition to Substance , Actu- ality . ...“The truth of the relation consists, then, in mediation ....” (167) “Transition” to Force: “Force is the neg- ative unity into which the contradiction of Whole and Parts has resolved itself; it is the truth of that first Relation.” (170) ((This is one of 1,000 similar passages in Hegel, which arouse the fury of naïve philosophers like Pearson, the author of The Grammar of Science . [32] —He quotes a similar passage and exclaims in fury: What a galimatias is being taught in our schools!! And in a certain limited sense he is right. To teach that is stupid. One must first of all extract the materialistic dialectics from it. Nine-tenths of it, however, is chaff, rubbish.)) Force makes its appearance as “belong- ing” (als angehörig) (171) ”to the existing Thing or Matter....” “When therefore it is asked how the Thing or Matter comes to have a Force, then the Force appears as connected with it externally, and impressed on the Thing by an alien power.” (171)
...“This is apparent in all natural, scientific, and, in general, intellectual development ;
and it is essential to understand that the First, when as yet Something is internal , or in its concept , is, for this reason, only its immediate and passive existence....” (181)
# The beginning of everything can be regarded as inner—passive—and at the same time as outer. But what is interesting here is not that, but something else: Hegel’s criterion of dialectics that has acci- dentally slipped in: “ in all nat- ural, scientific and in- tellectual development ”: here we have a grain of profound truth in the mystical integument of Hegelianism!
Example: the germ of a man, says Hegel, is only internal man, dem Anderssein Preis- gegebenes, [33] the passive. Gott [34] at first is not yet Spirit. “ Immediately, therefore, God is only Nature .” (182) (This is also characteristic!!)
[Feuerbach daran “knüpft an”. [35] Down with Gott, there remains Nature . [36]]

SECTION THREE:
ACTUALITY

...“Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence....” (184) Subdivisions: 1) “ The Absolute ”— 2) Actuality proper. “ Actuality, Possibil- ity and Necessity constitute the formal moments of the Absolute.” 3) “Absolute Relation”: Substance . [37] “In it itself” (dem Absoluten) “there is no Becoming” (187)—and other nonsense about the Absolute .... The Absolute is the absolute Absolute...
The Attribute is a relative Absolute...
[(!!)]
In a “note” Hegel speaks (all too gener- ally and obscurely) of the defects of the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibnitz.
Inter alia note: “The one-sidedness of one philosophic principle is generally faced by its opposite one-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totality at least is found as a dispersed complete- ness ” (197)
[usually: from one extreme to the other totality =(in the shape of) dispersed completeness]
Actuality is higher than Being , and higher than Existence .

(1) Being is Imme- diate “ Being is not yet actual .” (200) It passes into other.
(2) Existence (it passes into Ap- pearance) —arises out of Ground, out of Conditions, but it still lacks the unity of “Relfection and immediacy.”
(3) Actuality unity of Existence and Being-in-self (Ansichsein)

...“Actuality also stands higher than Exis- tence” (200).... ...“Real Necessity is a relation which is full of content ”.... “But this Necessity is at the same time relative....” (211) “Absolute Necessity then is the truth into which Actuality and Possibility in general pass back, as well as Formal and Real Necessity.” (215) (Continued) [38] ... (End of Volume II of the Logic , the Doc- trine of Essence)... It is to be noted that in the small Logic (the Encyclopaedia ) [39] the same thing is expounded very often more clearly, with concrete examples. Cf. idem Engels and Kuno Fischer. [40] On the question of “possibility,” Hegel notes the emptiness of this category and says in the Encyclopaedia : “Whether a thing is possible or impossible depends on the content, i.e., on the sum- total of the moments of Actuality which in its unfolding discloses itself to be Ne- cessity.” ( Encyclopaedia , Vol. VI, p. 287, [41] § 143, Addendum.)
“The sum-total, the en- tirety of the moments of Actuality , which, in its unfold- ing discloses itself to be Necessity.” The unfolding of the sum-total of the moments of actuality N B = the essence of dialectical cognition.
Cf. In the same Encyclopaedia , Vol. VI, p. 289 , the eloquent words on the vanity of mere delight at the wealth and flux of the phenomena of nature and on the neces- sity ...“of advancing to a closer insight into the inner harmony and uniformity of nature ....” (289) ( Closeness to materialism . ) Ibidem Encyclopaedia , p. 292: “Devel- oped Actuality, as the coincident alternation of Inner and Outer, the alternation of their opposite motions combined in a single motion, is Necessity.”
Encyclopaedia , Vol. VI, p. 294: ...“Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood....” Ibidem, p. 295 “it happens to him” (dem Menschen [42] )...
“that from his activity there arises something quite different from what he had meant and willed....” Ibidem, p. 301 “ Substance is an essen- tial stage in the Process of development of the Idea ....”
Read: an important stage in the proc- ess of development of human knowl- edge of nature and matter .
Logik, [43] Vol. IV ...“It” (die Substanz) “is the Being in all Being....” (220) [44] The Relation of Substantiality passes over into the Relation of Causality. (223) ...“Substance attains ... Actuality only when it has become Cause....” (225) .
On the one hand, knowledge of mat- ter must be deepened to knowledge (to the concept) of Substance in order to find the causes of phenomena. On the other hand, the actual cognition of the cause is the deepening of knowledge from the externality of phenomena to the Substance. Two types of examples should explain this: 1) from the his- tory of natural science, and 2) from the history of philosophy. More exactly: it is not “examples” that should be here—comparison n’est pas raison, [45] — but the quintessence of the history of both the one and the other + the his- tory of technique.
...“Effect contains nothing whatever which Cause does not contain...” (226) und um- gekehrt [46] ....
Cause and effect, ergo, are merely mo- ments of universal reciprocal dependence, of (universal) connection, of the	recip- rocal concatenation of events, merely links in the chain of the development of matter.
NB : “It is the same fact which displays itself first as Cause and then as Effect,—here as peculiar persistence and there as posited- ness or determination in an Other.” (227)
NB The all-sidedness and all-embrac- ing character of the interconnection of the world, which is only one- sidedly, fragmentarily amd incom- pletely expressed by causality.
[NB]
NB The all-sidedness and all-embrac- ing character of the interconnection of the world, which is only one- sidedly, fragmentarily amd incom- pletely expressed by causality.
“But we may here and now observe that, insofar as the relation of cause and effect is admitted (although in an improper sense), effect cannot be greater than cause; for effect is nothing further than the manifes- tation of cause.” (230)
And further about history. Hegel says that it is customary in history to quote anecdotes as the minor “causes” of major events—in fact they are only occasions , only äußere Erregung, [47] which “the inner
[in history “minor causes of major events”] spirit of the event would not have required.” (230) “Consequently, these arabesques of history, where a huge shape is depicted as growing from a slender stalk, are a spright- ly but a most superficial treatment.” (Ibi- dem)
This “inner spirit”—c.f. Plekhanov [48] — is an idealistic, mystical , but a very profound indication of the historical causes of events. Hegel subsumes his- tory completely under causality and un- derstands causality a	thousand times more profoundly and richly than the multitude	of “savants” nowadays.
“Thus a stone in motion is cause; its movement is a determination which it has, while besides this it contains many other determinations of colour, shape, and so on, which do not enter into its causal na- ture.” (232)
Causality, as usually understood by us, is only a small particle of universal interconnection, but (a materialist ex- tension) a particle not of the subjective, but of the objectively real intercon- nection.
“But the movement of the Determi- nate Relation of Causality has now resulted in this, that the cause is not merely extinguished in the effect, and with it the effect too (as happens in Formal Causality),—but the cause in its extinction, in the effect, becomes again; that effect vanishes into cause, but equally becomes again in it. Each of these determinations cancels itself in its positing and posits it- self in its cancellation; what takes place is not an external transition of causality from one substratum to another, but this its becoming other is at the same time its own positing. Causality, then, presup- poses or conditions itself.” (235)
“The movement of the relation of cau- sality” = in fact: the movement of mat- ter, respective the movement of history, grasped, mastered in its inner connec- tion up to one or other degree of breadth or depth....
“At this point Reciprocity presents itself as a reciprocal causality of presupposed substances conditioning each other; each is, in relation to the other, at once active and passive substance.” (240) “In Reciprocity, original Causality pre- sents itself as an arising out of its negation (or passivity) and as a passing away into it—as a Becoming....
“Necessity and Causality have, then, vanished in it; they contain both the imme- diate identity (as connection and relation )
[“connection and relation”] and the absolute substantiality of dis-
tincts , and therefore their absolute con- tingency,—the original unity of substan- tial variety, hence absolute contradiction. Necessity is Being, because it is;—the self-
[“unity of sub- stance in the distinct”] unity of Being, which has itself for ground ; but, conversely, because it has a ground,
it is not Being, it is nothing whatever but Semblance, relation or mediation . Cau- sality is this posited transition of original Being, or cause, into Semblance or mere
[relation, mediation] positedness, and conversely of positedness into originality; but the identity itself of Being and Semblance is, still, inner Ne- cessity. This internality (or Being-in-Self) transcends the movement of Causality; and concurrently, the substantiality of the sides
which are in relation is lost—Necessity reveals itself. Necessity does not become Freedom because it vanishes, but only because its identity (as yet an inner iden- tity) is manifested.” (241-242)
[necessity does not disap- pear, when it becomes freedom]
When one reads Hegel on causality, it appears strange at first glance that he dwells so relatively lightly on this theme, beloved of the Kantians. Why? Because, indeed, for him causality is only one of the determinations of univer- sal connection, which he had already covered earlier, in his entire exposition, much more deeply and all-sidedly; al- ways and from the very outset empha- sising this connection, the reciprocal transitions, etc., etc. It would be very instructive to compare the “ birth- pangs ” of neo-empiricism (respective “physical idealism”) with the solutions of rather with the dialectical method of Hegel.
It is to be noted also that in the Ency- clopaedia Hegel stresses the inadequacy and emptiness of the bare concept of “re- ciprocal action.” Vol. VI, p. 308 [49] : “Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proxi- mate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so to say, on the thresh- old of the Notion, nevertheless, precisely on this account one should not rest con- tent with applying this relation, insofar as it is a matter of, conceptual cognition.
If one gets no further than considering a given content merely from the point of view of reciprocity, then such an atti- tude is in fact quite without concept; it is
[mere “recipro- city” = emptiness] then merely a matter of a dry fact, and
the requirement of mediation, which is the point of immediate concern in apply- ing the relation of causality, still remains
[the require- ment of med- iation, (of] unsatisfied. On closer examination, the deficiency in the application of the rela- tion of reciprocal action is seen to be that this relation, instead of being the equiva- lent of the Notion, has itself to be grasped first of all. And this occurs through its
[connection), that is the point at issue in applying the relation of causality]
two sides not being left as an immediate datum but, as was shown in the two pre- ceding paragraphs, being recognised as mo- ments of a third, higher determination, which is precisely the Notion. If, for example, we regard the customs of the Spartans as the effect of their constitu- tion, and the latter, conversely, as the effect of their customs, such a view may
perhaps be correct, but it is a conception that. gives no final satisfaction , because in point of fact it enables neither the con- stitution nor the customs of this people
[NB NB] to be understood. Such understanding can only come about when these two aspects, and likewise all the other special aspects of the life and the history of the Spartans are recognised to be grounded in this Notion.” (308-309)
[all the “spe- cial aspects” of the whole (“Begriff” [50] )]
— — — — — At the end of the second volume of the Logic, Vol. VI, p. 243 , in the transition to the “Notion,” the determination is given: “the Notion, the realm of Subjectivity, or of Freedom....”
NB Freedom = Subjectivity (“or”) End, Consciousness, Endeavour NB

Notes:
[1] Hegel , Werke , Bd. IV, Berlin,
1834.— Ed.

[2] Incidentally. Hegel more than once pokes fun at [cf.
the passages cited above on gradualn ess] the word (and the concept)
erklären (explanation), obviously opposing to the metaphysical solution once
for all (“it has been explained”!!) the eternal process of cognition
penetrating deeper and deeper. Cf. Volume III, p. 463: “can be cognised
or,	as they say, explained .”— Ed.

[3] movement— Ed.

[4] The Essential and the Unessential.— Ed.

[5] approximately.— Ed.

[6] Semblance or Show— Ed.

[7] The refernece is to Die Kritik der Urteilskraft by Kant .

[8] If it may be called that— Ed.

[9] Variants of the translation of the German word “die
Reflexion” into Russian are given within the parentheses.— Ed.

[10] The word Gegensatz is crossed out in the MS.— Ed.

[11] consideration, etc., “insofar as,” etc.— Ed.

[12] “for the objective positive”— Ed.

[13] “everything is the term of an opposition”— Ed.

[14] rescued— Ed.

[15] Lenin is referring to the appearance of the following three
works: Hegel’s Science of Logic (the first two books were published
in 1812 and 1813, respectively); Marx and Engels ’ Manifesto of the Communist Party (written at the end of 1847 and published in February 1848); and
Darwin ’s Origin of Species (published in 1859).

[16] The word “receive” is crossed out in the MS.— Ed.

[17] “relation” of causes— Ed.

[18] matter— Ed.

[19] real Ground — Ed.

[20] “multiple”—“content determinations,
relations and considerations”— Ed.

[21] empty— Ed.

[22] Hegel materialistically turned upside down— Ed.

[23] It coincides.— Ed.

[24] approximately— Ed.

[25] “external reflection”— Ed.

[26] thinghood— Ed.

[27] property— Ed.

[28] “substance”— Ed.

[29] “quiescent”— Ed.

[30] deficiency— Ed.

[31] Totality of Appearance— Ed.

[32] The reference is to K. Pearson’s work The Grammar of Science , London, 1892.

[33] something given up to otherness— Ed.

[34] God— Ed.

[35] “links up” to this— Ed.

[36] nature— Ed.

[37] Here Lenin’s manuscript gives the list of chapters of Section III:
1) “The Absolute”; 2) “Actuality”; 3) “The Absolute
Relation.”— Ed.

[38] At this point Lenin’s manuscript continues in a new
notebook.— Ed.

[39] The reference is to Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse . Hegel, Werke , Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840 ( Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline , Hegel, Works , Vol. 6, Berlin, 1840). “Logic”
constitutes Part I of the Encyclopaedia and is referred to by Lenin as “small” to
distinguish it from the “large” Science of Logic , which consists of three volumes.

[40] Lenin is referring to remarks by Engels on Hegel’s Encyclopaedia .
See Engels’ letter to Marx dated September 21, 1874. Also see Engels’ letter to Conrad Schmidt
dated November 1, 1891 (Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence , Moscow, 1955, pp. 519-520).
Kuno Fischer —a German bourgeois historian of philosophy and
the author of The History of Modern Philosophy , one of whose volumes (Vol. 8) is devoted to Hegel.

[41] Hegel, Werke , Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.— Ed.

[42] to man.— Ed.

[43] Logic — Ed.

[44] Hegel, Werke , Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.— Ed.

[45] comparison is not proof— Ed.

[46] and vice versa — Ed.

[47] external stimulus— Ed.

[48] See G. Plekhanov , “ For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel’s Death ,” ( Selected Philosophical Works , Vol. I, Moscow, 1960).

[49] Hegel, Werke , Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.— Ed.

[50] “ notion ”— Ed.

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