V. I.

Lenin

Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

July 17 (30)-August 10 (23), 1903

22. Speech at the Election of the Editorial Board of Iskra

August 7 (20) [1]

Comrades! Martov’s speech was so strange that I find myself obliged to
protest emphatically against his presentation of the question. In the
first place, let me remind you that Martov’s protest against the editorial
board election itself, his refusal, and that of his colleagues, to work on
the editorial board which is to be elected, is in crying contradiction to
what we all said (Martov included) when Iskra was recognised as
the Party organ. The objection was then presented to us that such
recognition was pointless because you cannot endorse a mere title without
endorsing the editorial board; and Comrade Martov himself explained to the
objectors that this was not true , that it was a definite
political trend that was being endorsed, that the composition of the
editorial board was not being predetermined in any way, and that
the election of the editors would come up later under Point

24[ During the Congress it was changed to Point 18 on the agenda.— Ed . ] of our

Tagesordnung [ Agenda.— Ed . ]

Comrade Martov, therefore, had no right whatever now to speak
about the recognition of Iskra being limited. Comrade Martov’s
statement that his inclusion in the trio without his old colleagues of
the editorial board would cast a slur on his whole political reputation
is therefore indicative only of an astounding confusion of political ideas. To adopt this point of view is to deny the right of the
Congress to hold new elections, make new appointments of any kind, and change the composition
of its authorised boards. The Organising Committee provides an example of
the confusion created by such an approach. We expressed to the Organising
Committee the complete confidence and gratitude of the Congress but at the
same time we ridiculed the very idea of the Congress having no right to
examine the internal relations of the Organising Committee, and rejected
every supposition that the old composition of the Organising Committee
would be an embarrassment to an “uncomradely” change of this
composition and the formation of a new Central Committee of any
elements we pleased. I repeat: Comrade Martov’s views on the
permissibility of electing part of the old board reflect an
extreme confusion of political ideas.

Inow come to the question of the “two trios.” Comrade Martov said
that this whole plan for “two trios” was the work of one
person, of one member of the editorial board (that it was my plan, in
fact), and that no one else was responsible for it. I categorically protest against this assertion and declare that it is simply untrue. Let me remind Comrade Martov that several weeks before the
Congress I plainly told him and another member of the editorial board that
at the Congress I would demand the tree election of the
editorial board. I gave up this plan only because Comrade Martov himself suggested to me the more convenient plan of electing
“two trios.” I thereupon formulated this plan on paper and
sent it first 01 all to Comrade Martov himself, who returned it
to me with some corrections—here it is, I have the very copy, with
Martov’s corrections in red ink. Many of the comrades later saw this plan
dozens of times, all the members of the editorial board saw it too, and
no one at any time formally protested against it. I say
“formally” because, if I am not mistaken, Comrade Axelrod on
one occasion dropped some private remark to the effect that he did not
sympathise with the plan. But it is obvious that for a protest the
editorial board required something more than a private remark. It was not
without reason that, even before the Congress, the editorial board adopted
a formal decision to invite a definite seventh person, so that,
should it be necessary to make a collective statement at the Congress, a
firm decision could be made—which we so often failed to reach on our board of six. And all the members of the editorial board know that the addition of a seventh permanent
member to the board of six was a matter of constant concern to us for a
very long time. And so, I repeat, the election of “two trios” was a perfectly natural solution, and one which I
incorporated in my plan with the knowledge and consent of
Comrade Martov. And on many subsequent occasions, Comrade Martov,
together with Comrade Trotsky and others, at a number of private
meetings of Iskra supporters, advocated this system of electing
“two trios.”

However,in correcting Martov’s statement about the private character of
the plan for “two trios,” I have no in tention of denying Martov’s assertion of the “political significance”
of the step we took in not endorsing the old editorial board. On the
contrary, I fully and unreservedly agree with Comrade Martov that this
step is of great political significance—only not the significance
which Martov ascribes to it. He said that it was an act in a struggle for
influence on the Central Committee in Russia. I go farther than
Martov. The whole activity of Iskra as a separate group has
hitherto been a struggle for influence; but now it is a matter of
something more, namely, the organisational consolidation of this
influence, and not only a struggle for it. How profoundly Comrade Martov
and I differ politically on this point is shown by the fact that
he blames me for this wish to influence the Central Committee,
whereas I count it to my credit that I strove and still strive to
consolidate this influence by organisational means. It appears that we are
even talking in different languages! What would be the point of all our
work, of all our efforts, if they ended in the same old struggle for
influence, and not in its complete acquisition and consolidation? Yes,
Comrade Martov is absolutely right: the step we have taken is undoubtedly
a major political step showing that one of the trends now to be
observed has been chosen for the future work of our Party. And I am not at
all frightened by the dreadful words a “state of siege in the
Party,” “emergency laws against particular individuals and groups,”
etc. We not only can but we must create a “state of siege” in
relation to unstable and vacillating elements, and all our Party

Rules, the whole system of centralism now endorsed by the Congress are
nothing but a “state of siege” in respect to the numerous
sources of political vagueness. It is special laws, even if they
are emergency laws, that are needed as measures against vagueness, and the
step taken by the Congress has correctly indicated the political direction
to be followed, by having created a firm basis for such Laws and
such measures.

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Notes:
[1]
At the thirty-first session of the Second Congress Lenin delivered a
speech on the subject of the election of the Iskra editorial
board. When the minutes of this session were ratified at the thirty-fifth
session of the Congress, a change was made, with Lenin’s consent, in the
text of his speech. The beginning of the speech—from the words:
“Comrades I Martov’s speech was so strange that I find myself
obliged to protest emphatically against his presentation of the
question...” and ending with the words "...is therefore indicative
only of an astounding confusion of political ideas”—was
deleted and replaced by the following:

“Iask the Congress to allow me to reply to Martov.

“Comrade Martov said that the vote in question cast a slur on his
political reputation. The election has nothing to do with an insult to a
political reputation. ( Shouts: ’Wrong! Not true!’ Plekhanov and Lenin protest against recesses. Lenin asks the secretaries to enter in the minutes that Zasulich, Martov, and Trotsky have interrupted him, and he asks that the number of times they have interrupted him should be recorded .)”

Inthe present volume Lenin’s speech is printed in the form in which he
wrote it and delivered it at the Congress.