V. I. LENIN
19. Notes from “Our Word”...
20.-
21. Bibliographical References.
22. The Aggregate Capital in Joint-Stock Companies.
23–28. Kestner, “Compulsion to Organize.”
29. The Vienna “Arbeiter-Zeitung” on Viennese Banks.
30. “The Annals of the American Academy.”
31–35. Completion of Excerpts from “Social Economics.”
36.-
37. Bibliographical References.
38. Stiillich, “Money and Banking.”
+41–42.
39–40. Lifman, “Cartels and Trusts.”
43–48. From “Social Economics”... (Schulze-Gaevernitz).
{+1–3

and 31–35}
Bibliographical References:
p. 5. p. 21 + 32 || p. 44.
p. 9. p. 37 NB p. 46.
p. 17 + 16. p. 38. p. 48.
DRAFT FOR AN ARTICLE ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE “SWAMP”
(Notes on Kautskyanism) 2
Our Struggle Against the “Swamp.”
The Swamp = K. Kautsky, Huysmans, etc.
The Significance of the Distinction Between Plekhanov, Geyndmann,
Heine, and K. Kautsky, Vandervelde, etc.—two distinct “tones.”
Eclecticism in Place of Dialectics. The “Middle Way”: the “reconciliation” of extremes, the absence of clear, definitive, sharp conclusions, a tendency toward vacillation.
Reconciliation and the dulling of class antagonisms in words, while in practice these antagonisms are intensifying.
Reconciliation with Opportunism.
The obscuring of the theoretical and practical-political chasm that separates us from opportunism, NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
The Renunciation (Renegacy) of the Perspective of “The Road to Power” and of the Revolutionary Essence (and Revolutionary Tactics) of the Basel Manifesto 3...
The distinction between the concept of a “Marxist Center” (= independent politics, independent ideas, an independent theory) and the “Swamp” (= vacillation, lack of principle, the “turning wheel” (“Drehscheibe”), the weather vane).
Illegal Organization.

Work in the Military.

Support for and Development of Mass Movements.
NB
State-Driven Optimism: the Objective Course of Events… everything must turn out for the better.

“The Proletariat” and “Class Struggle” in General.
“The Process”
NB
cf. Martov on the “hopelessness” of socialism—if… opportunism is hopeless!!!
It is not the denial of legal activity and the struggle for reforms that should constitute the essence of the “struggle against the swamp,” but rather the aforementioned recognition of revolutionary activity.
The Possibility of a Fusion Between Socialism and Syndicalism Along a New and More Fundamental Line.
Parliamentarism and a Different Conception of It. “Illegal Parliamentarism.”
FROM BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
From the Philosophical Works in the Zurich Cantonal Library:
Gideon Spicker, “On the Relationship Between Natural Science and Philosophy” (especially in relation to Kant and Lange’s “History of Materialism”). 8°. Berlin, 1874.

Hegel, “Phenomenology” (ed. Boland, 1907).
Erich Kaufmann, “The External Power and Colonial Might of the United States.” Leipzig, 1908 (in the “Treatises on State and International Law,” Volume I). A Legal Study. Imperialist Politics Brought Forth the Question of Colonies in America.

Cantonal Library (Zurich).
“Journal asiatique” (Paris, 1857 – up to 1913, including Table 10 of the series; plus Series 11, Volumes 1 and 2).
“Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana.” Volume 1 (1887) – Volume 26 (1913/14).
Kuznetsov, “The Struggle of Civilizations and Languages in Central Asia.” (Dissertation.) 8°. Paris, 1912.
Lehmann-Haupt, “Armenia.” 8°. Berlin, 1910.
Büchler, “Congo – the State of Leopold.” Zurich, 1912. 1914.
Fress, “The International Situation of the Dependent Countries of the Congo Basin, Their Division.” 1907.

Kate Brusso
. “The Education of Negroes in the United States.” Dissertation. Paris, 1904. (“American Writings and Reports on
Education
”.)

“The Census of India.” (1911. Bombay, 1911.)
Moffett, “The Americanization of Canada.” Dissertation. New York, 1907.
Patuyé, “American Imperialism.” (Dissertation. Dijon, 1904.)
Ed. Dettmann, “The Rise of Brazil in German Light.” 1908.
Ishida, “The International Position of Japan as a Great Power.” New York, 1905.
Lefebvre, “Railways as a Path of Penetration into Southern China.” Dissertation. Paris, 1902.
Rousseau, “The Partition of Oceania.” Dissertation. Paris, 1905.
RAVESTEYN ON THE BALKAN PROBLEM
V. van Ravesteyn, “The Balkan Problem.” “Die Neue Zeit,” 1913 (31st year of publication, Volume 1), November 15, 1912.
NB
“A federation of this kind” (a federation of Balkan states, including Turkey) “would be capable of satisfying the cultural needs of this geographically unified region, of presenting an insurmountable barrier to the advance of European imperialism—as well as to the expansionist ambitions of the Russian world power. Any other resolutions to the Balkan problem can only be temporary in nature and are incapable of

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
providing lasting satisfaction to the interests of all the races and nations inhabiting that region” (p. 228).
“European imperialism—and Tsarist Russia—will naturally resist, by every available means, a federation of all the Balkan states. Their common interest has been—and remains—directed toward exacerbating mutual animosity and rivalry among these peoples and Turkey, so that it may be easier for them to exploit these territories as colonial domains. Will the statesmen of Turkey and the Balkan states come to understand their shared interests and put an end to this destructive war by drawing closer to one another? If they fail to do so, they will sacrifice the interests of their own peoples to European capitalism and to the interests of the Balkan dynasties” (p. 229).
 
NB
 
NB
VERNER ON CONCENTRATION IN THE RUHR COAL INDUSTRY
G. Werner, “The Concentration of Capital in the Ruhr Coal Industry.” “Die Neue Zeit,” 1913, p. 138 (October 25, 1912).

The Ruhr Region:
1) The Deutsche Bank Group

Four individuals hold positions as directors and members of the board in four banks:
(α) Deutsche Bank—all four (β) Essen Creditanstalt—two of them
(γ) Essen Bankverein—two of them (δ) Bergisch-Märkischer Bank—two of them
The mines falling within the sphere of influence of this bank:
20 mines—66,233 workers; 18.6 million tons (1907)

72,594 workers; 19.3 million tons (1910)
2) The “Dresdner Bank” and the “Schaffhausen Bankverein”
Nine individuals hold directorial and board positions in both banks. Under the influence of this group:
7 mines: … 23,269 workers – 5.98 million tons (1907)

27,963 workers – 7.2 million tons (1910)

Mines?

“Werke,” or “Zechen”
Magnates of Capital   Major Banks   Firm, Number of Mines and More

~~~~~1910
Workers

(thousands)   Tons (millions)
4 individuals—forming a “personal union” among four banks:

“Deutsche Bank” + 3 other banks (“Deutsche Bank Consortium”) (20 mines) α72.619.3
Ganier   Private property and the “Gute Hoffnungshütte” mine (2 mines) γ35.19.9
Kirdorf   “Disconto-Gesellschaft” “Gelsenkirchener Bank Aktiengesellschaft” δ(1)34.48.5
Stinnes   “Disconto-Gesellschaft”   Private property and “Deutsch-Luxemburger” δ(2)34.69.1 “Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft”
“Harpenberger Bank Aktiengesellschaft” ε(1)25.97.1
9 individuals—forming a “personal union” “Dresdner Bank,” “Schaffhausen Bankverein”
“Dresdner-Schaffhausen Banken” β(7)28.07.2 “Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft”   “Hibernia Aktiengesellschaft” ε(1)18.35.4

Thyssen γ(1)16.23.9

Krupp γ(1)12.23.1

Fisk(1)11.12.3

Σ* = 288.575.9
Total in the Ruhr region: 354.289.3
Percentage of these firms: 81.5–85
Number

of Mines   Workers (thousands)   Millions of Tons α) 20   72.619.3   “Deutsche Bank”
β) 7   28.07.2   “Dresdner Bank” + “Schaffhausen Bankverein”
γ) 4   63.516.9   A magnate’s holdings δ) 3   69.017.6   “Disconto-Gesellschaft”
ε) 2   44.212.5   “Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft”
Fisk) 1   11.12.3

* – Sum. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)

“In the Ruhr mining industry, the interests of the entire people come into conflict with the interests of an utterly negligible number of capitalists—hardly more than a hundred in all” (p. 144).

|

|

|——————|

|

|
Incidentally, this article also addresses whether the syndicate will be revived or not. Consult Conrad’s chronicle for this period (X–XII.1912, etc.).
—————— MEYER (THE PLACEMENT OF CAPITAL) AND LITERARY REFERENCES
From the literature:
Dr. A. Meyer. Editor of the Business Department at the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung.” “The Placement of Capital.” (Zurich, 1912). A small book of “practical advice” for capitalists. Profit statistics for stock corporations, pp. 130–132.
In England, 38,928 companies were founded between 1893 and 1902. Of these, 14,538—or 37%—were forced to liquidate their affairs!! In France, the number of bankrupt companies was around 10% (Leroy-Beaulieu).
Notable works from the literature include:
Wilhelm Gerden. “The Secret to Stock Market Success.” Berlin, (date unknown?)
|

|

|

|——————|

|

|

|
A German private speculator who shared “his own experiences,” p. 139: “a truly minuscule number” of traders actually profit on the stock exchange.

p. 149: 1 out of every 50 trades involving price differentials results in a profit. ((Numerous examples of fraud, etc., etc.))
—————— Africanus. “Shares in Gold Mines as a Form of Capital Investment.” Leipzig, 2nd edition, 1911.
V. Ruppel. “Transactions in Mining Securities.” Jena, 1909.
René Nouel. “Stock Corporations.” Paris, 1911.

? I. Steiger. “Trusts and Cartels Abroad and in Switzerland.” Zurich.
G. Albert. “The Historical Development of Interest Rates in Germany, 1895–1908.”
Karl. “Gold Mines of the World.” London, 1902.
Gumpel. “Speculation in Securities of Gold Mines” (Freiburg, 1903).
T. Huber. “How Should One Read a Balance Sheet?” (Stuttgart, 1910).
Robert Stern. “The Commercial Balance Sheet” (Leipzig, 1907).
G. Brozius. “The Balance Sheet” (Leipzig, 1906),
LIFMAN ON FRANKFURT METAL TRADING
Robert Lifman. “The International Organization of Frankfurt Metal Trading.” “Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,” Volume I. Jena, 1913, pp. 108 et seq.
From the enterprises of Merton (an Anglo-German family), the Merton Group emerged.

“In total, the Merton Group has invested—not counting, of course, the private wealth held by the capitalists behind it—perhaps more than 200 million marks” (p. 121).
“Frankfurt metal trading—which, incidentally, includes several other firms of considerable importance—thus encompasses, through its various enterprises, especially those of the Merton Group, virtually the entire world” (p. 122).
Diagram (p. 120): [see page 11. Ed.] The cities have been entered by me.
The commercial capital of Merton here transformed into productive capital.
“A hallmark of modern wholesale trade, in nearly every one of its branches, is its penetration into the sphere of production” (p. 111).
After the electrical industry (“Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft” in Germany, “General Electric Company” in America, etc.), perhaps the most international entrepreneurial sector…

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
Diagram from page 11

In Germany (109), metal trading—particularly copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals—is concentrated, with Frankfurt serving as the primary hub.
The current head, Dr. Wilhelm Merton (a member of the board of most of the companies), is based in Frankfurt. His father, Henry R. Merton, was based in London.
The key distinction of all these companies from their counterparts lies in the fact that the capitalists who lead these enterprises still directly—on p. 119—participate in both commercial and productive ventures. They “supplement” their own capital with the capital of the public.
Of course, the number of “companies” in which they “participate” far exceeds what is shown in the diagram.
BURGEOIS SCHOLARS ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM
NB: Bourgeois scholars on the struggle against imperialism.
“Nationalities and Subordinate Races.”
Report of the conference held at Caxton Hall, Westminster, June 28–30, 1910. London, 1911 (XII + 178 pages).
A review in “Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,” Volume II, p. 193, signed by X. Y. Niebuhr (The Hague). The reviewer notes that this report contains brief speeches delivered by representatives of “various peoples under foreign domination: Egyptians, Indians, Moroccans, Georgians, Negro tribes of Africa, South American Indians, as well as European nations such as the Irish and Poles” (p. 194).

“With imperialism,” we are told, “we must fight; the dominant powers must recognize the right of subjugated peoples to self-determination; an international tribunal must oversee the implementation of treaties concluded between great powers and weaker nations. Beyond these innocuous wishes, the conference goes no further. We see not the slightest trace of an understanding of the truth that imperialism is inextricably bound to capitalism in its present form—and that, therefore, direct struggle
NB
NB

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
against imperialism is hopeless, unless one confines oneself to denouncing individual, especially egregious, excesses” (p. 195) *.
!!

NB

!!
It is instructive to note that bourgeois “imperialists” in the Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv closely monitor the national liberation movements in the colonies—though at least those that are not German **.
For example, Volume III, Part 2 the ferment and protests in India (p. 230)

idem in Natal (Africa), triggered by restrictions on Indian immigration (230–1).
Volume IV, Part 1, p. 130—movement toward self-government in Dutch India ***.
MORID. “COMPANIES WITH BRANCHES”
Pierre Morid. “Companies with Numerous Branches in France and Abroad.” Paris, 1913 (Alcan). (Review in the Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, IV, Part 1, p. 286.)
Branches
England: 497 firms with 20,644
Germany: 1,445 firms with 34,464 (including 31,799 which function as shops or stores)
↓↓↓

Number

of employees: 926,369 – – – 473,077

France? 12,000
50,000 employees and workers
125 million francs in wages.
– – – “a manifestation of the process of concentration observed in trade, just as in factory industry”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 273. At the end of the volume, on pp. 823–826, references from the 4th edition to the 5th edition of V. I. Lenin’s Collected Works are provided in footnotes within this very volume. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 272. Ed.
*** Ibid. Ed.

LITERATURE REFERENCES
at the Museum Society
NB: “The Edinburgh Review”

October 1915:

“Factories and War.”
[A highly interesting article on the working class’s attitude toward war and its economic consequences (improvement in workers’ conditions; reduction in unemployment, etc.)] “The Atlantic Monthly,” 1916, perhaps June. White. “A Different World After the War.”
NB: “Schmoller’s Jahrbuch,” 37th year of publication. Marx on emission statistics in Germany and abroad.
? Albin Geier. “Yearbook of World History.” Published in 1913–14. Leipzig, 1914. (“Karl Prochaska’s Illustrated Yearbooks.”)

[This is not a collection of documents, nor a reference work—but rather lively essays spanning a single year.]
[Ch. K.] Hobson. “The Export of Capital.” London, 1914,
[D. A. Hobson.] “Imperialism.”
“South African War.”
Ballod. “Fundamentals of Statistics.” Berlin, 1913.
Ishkhanian. “National Composition, etc., of the Caucasian Peoples.” 1914 (81 pages).
Taylor (German edition, 1914).
Dietrich. “The Organization of Enterprise.”
Eli. “Monopolies and Trusts.”
Jenks was published in Schmoller’s Jahrbuch or another economic journal. “Yearbooks for National Economy and Statistics” by Konrad. ((Third Series, Volume I.))
Garms.
Agad. “Major Banks and the Global Market.” 1914.
Risser. “Major Banks.” 1906.
Macrosti. “Trusts.” 1910.
Shadwell. “England, Germany, and America.” Berlin, 1908.
Eidel’s. “The Relationship Between Major Banks and Industry.” Schmoller’s Forschungen, Volume 24, Leipzig, 1905.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
Schilder.

Levi. “Monopolies and Trusts.”

Chirski.

Lifman. “Cartels and Trusts.”

Fogelstein. “Capitalist Organizational Forms,”
SCHILDER. 5 VOLUMES OF THE “ARCHIVE OF WORLD ECONOMY”
Sigmund Schilder. “The Prerequisites for World War in the World Economy.” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Volume 5(1) (pp. 1–22).
A very fine essay (certainly pro-German in tone).
The shift toward protectionism in other countries compelled England in the 19th and 20th centuries to adopt military planning strategies.
Austria—its ambitions in the Balkans.
Interestingly, in Serbia (during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908–09), there were calls for war against Austria-Hungary for the following reasons: If we win, we will wrest Serbs away from Austria-Hungary; if we are defeated, Serbia will be incorporated into the customs border of Austria-Hungary—and that, too, would be preferable. We have nothing to lose (p. 11).
!!

NB
In Russia, after all, “above all else” lies “the private economic interest of the military-bureaucratic ruling class” (12). The sole exception: the drive toward the Dardanelles.
In France, discontent over the Morocco–Congo Agreement of November 4, 1911.
Belgium could preserve its Congo only with the help of England; under the treaty of February 5, 1895, France secured “the right of first refusal” on the Congo (p. 16).
NB
Japan seeks dominance over China.
Until 1913, Turkey was “more an object than a subject of world politics” (19).
Portugal remains dependent on England.
Spain obtained (through a treaty with France dated November 27, 1912) the northern portion of Morocco (France opposed, while England supported). Over the course of 16 years—from 1898 to 1914—Spain made significant strides forward.

NOTES FROM “OUR WORD”
NB

⁄⁄“Our Word,” No. 11 (February 10, 1915).
Zalevsky’s article, “On the National Question.”

Under Section 9.4, he quotes from No. 44 of Iskra:
…“But unconditional recognition of the struggle for the right to self-determination does not, in itself, obligate us to support every demand for national self-determination. As the party of the proletariat, Social Democracy sets as its positive and primary task not the promotion of self-determination among peoples and nations, but rather the advancement of the proletariat within each nationality” *. No. 82 (May 6, 1915). Editorial: “Imperialism and the National Idea.”
(contrasting with Hervé: “The naked national idea is reactionary.”)

The 20th century was the age of imperialism; the 19th century was the age of nationalism.

No. 116 (June 17, 1915): “K. Kautsky on Plekhanov” (from a Bulgarian journal), No. 130 (July 3, 1915): “Nation and Economy” by N. Trotsky + No. 135 (July 9).
and No. 117 (June 18, 1915)
and No. 118 (June 19)

No. 170 (August 21, 1915) – L. Martov versus “Social-Democrat” (on the question of defeat).
and No. 171 (August 22…
No. 172 (August 24… )

No. 192 (September 16, 1915) – Martynov on the “United States of Europe.”

No. 209 (October 8, 1915) – N. Trotsky on Zimmerwald.
REFERENCES
From the Cantonal Library (Zurich).
NB: Atlantikus. “Production and Consumption in the Social State.” 1898. Preface by Kautsky.

Henry Demarest Lloyd. “Wealth Versus Public Welfare.” New York, 1901.

? “Statistical Yearbook for the German Reich” (1915).

Stillich. “Political-Economic Studies on Large Industrial Enterprises.” Volumes I and II. 1904 and 1906.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Volume 6, p. 412. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
“Bulletin de l’Institut International de Statistique” (vols. 1–19).

Clark. “The Labor Movement in Australasia.” 1906.

André Léss. “The Social Question.” Paris, 1895.

Gruntzel. “On Cartels.” 1902.

Baumgarten and Messleni. “Cartels.” 1906.

Jurasek. “Surveys of the World Economy.”

Neumann-Spallart. “Surveys.” Published between 1879/80 and 1883/4.

Quintens. “The Impact of Agricultural Machinery on Production and Labor.” 1904. (Dissertation.)

I. Plenge. “From Accounting Policy to Dominance in the Money Market.” 1913.

Schulze-Gevernitz. “British Imperialism.” 1906.

? Émile Brezigar. “Precursors of the Economic Crisis in Germany.” Berlin, 1913 (1.80 marks) – a prediction of the crisis in 1913/14.

Bernhard Mereins. “The Emergence and Development of Major French Credit Institutions.” 1911.

Lysis. “Against Financial Oligarchy in France.” 1908.

André Léss. “Portraits of Financiers.” 1909.

Testis. “The Truth About Lysis’s Writings.” 1908.

Edm. Téry. “Economic Progress in France.”
Pierre Bodin. “The Surge.”

Maurice Schwob. “Before the Battle. (The Trade War).” Paris, 1904.
R. Klaus. “Russian Banks.” 1908 (“Schmoller’s Forschungen,” Issue 131).
Dr. Mentor Bunyatyan. “Economic Crises and Recapitalization.” Munich, 1908.
Edm. Téry. “Europe and the United States: General Statistics.” Paris, 1899.
Kelti.
“The Partition of Africa.” 1895.

NB:
O. Schwarz. “Financial Systems of the Great Powers.” (A series published by Göschen.) Two volumes. Leipzig, 1909.
NB
|
[Interesting tables on developments in the 1870s – 1900. NB]
“Foundations of Social Economics.” Tübingen, 1914 and onward.

CAPITAL AGGREGATES IN JOINT STOCK COMPANIES
What sums are “they” handling?
“Bank-Archiv,” Volume XIII. June 15, 1914. “Results of the Activities of German Joint Stock Companies for the Years 1907/8–1911/12”...
1911/12… number of joint stock companies: 4,712 their share capital: 14,880 million marks
actual reserves: 3,515 million marks income: 1,470 million marks
Number of companies paying dividends: 3,481
Total dividend amount: 1,220 million marks = 8.39%
Growth in capital:
from 1907 to 1912 (5 years)

= +2,766 million marks in nominal terms
+3,346 million marks at current exchange rates
!!|||above par value +579 million marks (!!)
KESTNER. “COERCION TO ORGANIZATION”
Dr. Fritz Kestner. “Coercion to Organization.”
“An Investigation into the Struggle Between Cartels and Outsiders.” Berlin, 1912.
The author systematically examines conflicts between cartels and “outsiders,” as well as internal conflicts within cartels—and the various “strategies of struggle”:

1) Depriving them of raw materials…

2) Depriving them of labor through alliances…

3) Cutting off their supply lines…

4) Restricting their outlets…

5) Securing customers through exclusive clauses.

6) Systematically driving down prices

7) Withdrawing credit…

8) Declaring boycotts *

[From the “Cartel Questionnaire” (5 volumes, 1903–06) and other sources]
Numerous examples. Detailed discussions on the state and legal implications…

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Volume 22, p. 194. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
“When founded in 1893, the ‘Rheinisch-Westfälische Kohlensyndikat’ concentrated 86.7% of Rhineland–Westphalian coal production… by 1910, this figure had risen to 95.4% (p. 11)… * The American Steel Trust, in 1911, controlled 45% of pig iron output…” (Other examples: 98%–85%, and so on.)
“The decision to join a cartel is, for any individual enterprise, a business transaction governed by calculations of profitability. As with the general dynamics of cartels, the significance of this particular act becomes most evident during periods of economic depression. Conflicts between cartels and outsiders arise primarily from differing assessments of the impact that sales restrictions—inevitable consequences of cartel activity—have on individual enterprises. Such sales restrictions are especially burdensome for firms capable of growth, which therefore resist them with the greatest vigor” (pp. 25–26)…
…“The distinction between the two concepts—cartel and trust—lies, after all, in the nature of ownership: in a cartel, there are multiple owners; whereas in a trust, there is but one” (p. 53, citing Lifman).
“It has often been observed—and this can be regarded as a common phenomenon—that the profitability generated through cartelization attracts new entrepreneurs and fresh capital into a given industry” (p. 57). For example, the Potash Syndicate raised its prices. The result:
In 1879, there were 4 enterprises; by 1898, that number had grown to 13;
by 1909, it had reached 52 (p. 57).
Conditions for raising prices for outsiders are sometimes formulated as reductions in discounts offered to them (p. 73)…
“Buchhändler Börsenverein” introduced a ban on selling books to “merchants who sell at bargain prices” (p. 84).
“Depriving suppliers of materials, coupled with the practice of securing customers through exclusive clauses—about which we will speak further—should be regarded as one of the most important tactics used to compel participation in a cartel” (p. 91)…

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., Volume 22, p. 191. Ed.

…Export premiums… (107)
“dependent organizations of merchants” are established (109)…
(coal – kerosene…)
Price suppression… In the gasoline industry, prices once fell from 40 to 20–22 marks (118)—while in Upper Silesia, the price of alcohol dropped as low as 49.5 marks (in Breslau, the price stood at 62.2 marks)…
Denial of credit: “Phoenix” had refused to join the Steel Works Association. The firm’s director opposed the merger. The banks bought up the shares—stripped away the export premiums—and then, at the shareholders’ meeting, pushed through the merger!! (pp. 124–125).
Contracts among cartel members within the cartel itself… (fines; arbitration tribunals instead of ordinary courts)…
The most effective means of control is the “Unified Sales Bureau” (153)…
“Eidel’s (p. 87 of his work) is undoubtedly correct when he asserts that the establishment of a new, large, independent bank in Germany would be impossible” (p. 168).
“Even in the realm of purely economic activity, we observe a discernible shift—from commercial operations in the traditional sense toward organizational and speculative ventures. The greatest success is no longer achieved by the merchant who, drawing on his technical and commercial expertise, can best anticipate the needs of consumers, identify and, so to speak, ‘uncover’ latent demand—but rather by the speculative genius who can foresee, or at least intuitively sense, the organic development of institutions, the emergence of certain linkages between individual enterprises and banks” (p. 241)*.

“Executives of large enterprises have at all times the capacity to recruit the most astute and skilled lawyers for their staff; and if they themselves lack a thorough grasp of purely commercial matters, they can enlist the aid of outstanding merchants. It is widely known that in the central offices of major enterprises there operates an entire cadre of individuals who bear no direct relation to the enterprise as such—right down to the political economist who heads the firm’s economic propaganda efforts” (p. 242).
!!

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 194–195. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
“The formation of cartels thus far has, as is usually the case, led to shifts in prices—and with them, in income—favoring heavy industry or raw-materials industries while working to the detriment of manufacturing. Long-term price increases, resulting from the emergence of cartels, have so far been observed only in relation to the most critical means of production, especially coal, iron, and potash; conversely, such increases have never been seen in the realm of finished goods. The accompanying rise in profitability, likewise, has been confined largely to industries producing means of production. This observation must further be supplemented by the fact that manufacturing industries processing raw materials—not semi-finished products—do not merely reap substantial profits thanks to the formation of cartels, to the detriment of industries engaged in the further processing of semi-finished goods; rather, they have come to occupy, in relation to these latter industries, a position of dominance that was absent under conditions of free competition” (p. 254)*.
NB

Cartels do not always lead to concentration (they may, in fact, “save” smaller enterprises that are part of the cartel); yet cartels invariably result in the “intensification of capital” (274)… in the strengthening of the role of enterprises endowed with abundant capital and formidable financial resources (272 and 274).
When considering the significance of cartels, one must not overlook the fundamental distinction between, say, the organization of consumers (which represents socialism, p. 282) or of industries producing finished goods, and the organization of raw-materials industries:
“The modern situation—whereby increasingly significant segments of industry become dependent upon the production of raw materials—shares with it (with the union of consumers and the like) a certain superficial external resemblance, yet internally constitutes a direct opposite” (p. 282). ((Lifman consistently forgets this crucial distinction—note, p. 282.))
“Debates persist over whether cartels have improved workers’ conditions—as some maintain, while others dispute—and whether they embody cooperative—

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 195. Ed.

the democratic principle” ((Chirshki!! The author opposes it: note, p. 285)) “or whether, precisely for Germany, they instead reveal an anti-democratic stance—owing to the shifting of the center of gravity toward heavy industry, which stands in opposition to professional associations” (285)…

THE VIENNA WORKERS’ NEWSPAPER ON VIENNA’S BANKS
Vienna’s “Arbeiter-Zeitung.” 1916 (April 11, 1916), No. 101.
Figures concerning the banks (eight major institutions: “Kreditanstalt”; “Union Bank”; “Ferker’s Bank”; “Esconthaus”; “Bankverein”; “Bodenkreditanstalt”; “Mercur” + “Allgemeine Depositenbank”).
Capital—657.4 million crowns
Reserves—383.2 million
1,040.6
Third-party funds—4,833.8 million
Net profit—81.4 million
Deposit growth compared to 1914—1,067.9 million “ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY”
“The Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science.” Volumes LVII–LIX (1915)

Back

(composed of separate booklets plus bibliography, etc.; volume LIX [May 1915]: “The Prospects of American Industry”). A collection of articles.
Wage Trends in the United States 5
1/10—$1,000 and above (p. 115)
2/10—$750–$1,000
7/10—less than $750
Incidentally, William S. Kaiser’s article, “Bank Branches and Our Foreign Trade” (p. 301).

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
“Forty English banks engaged in overseas operations maintain 1,325 branches; in South America, five German banks operate 40 branches, while five British banks run 70 branches… Over the past 25 years, Britain and Germany have invested roughly 4 billion dollars in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay—and as a result, they account for 46% of all trade among these three countries.” *
((and further on, regarding New York’s ambitions and attempts to secure this very position…))
A detailed examination of the question of whether the United States can increase its trade with South America—and other related matters—on the occasion of the war.
NB
p. 331 (in another article)... “In his latest annual review of the journal ((The Statist)), Sir George Pease estimated that the total capital exported by the world’s five major creditor nations—Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands—to less developed countries exceeded 40 billion dollars…” **

200 billion francs = 40 billion dollars {= 160 billion marks}
cf. p. 2 here ***
From another article on “South American Markets”: “Another key factor—and the most crucial of all for the expansion of trade with South America—is the deployment of U.S. capital in loans, construction projects, and similar ventures. A country that receives capital from the United States is likely to see the greatest influx of orders for building materials used in construction, railway development, and the like, as well as contracts for public works undertaken by governments. This fact has been brilliantly confirmed—

NB

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 233. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.
*** See this volume, pp. 40–41. Ed.

by English investments channeled into Argentine railways, banks, and loans” (314)...
110 corporations hold capital totaling 7.3 billion dollars, with 626,984 shareholders.
For comparison, in 1910, among other things, we find “Funds and the Stock Exchange.” The total value of American funds amounted to 34.5 billion dollars—though excluding duplicates, the figure comes to around 24.4 billion dollars—while total national wealth reached 107.1 billion dollars.
LITERATURE REFERENCES
From the Lausanne Catalogue (Lausanne Cantonal Library). Continued from 1902.

Deschanel. “The People and the Bourgeoisie.” Paris, 1881.

Godin. “The Republic of Labor and Parliamentary Reform.” Paris, 1889.

L. Lallemand. “Revolution and Poverty.” Paris, 1898.

Ch. Renard. “The History of Strikes.” Paris, 1887.

Eugène Schuyler. “American Diplomacy.” New York, 1886.

Ioori. “Essays on the Dutch Colonies.” Liège, 1883.

T. Rogers. “The History of Prices.” Six volumes.

Melholl. “The History of Prices Since 1850.” London, 1885. “War Against War.” (A collection.)

Ipagaki. “Japan and the Pacific Ocean.” 1890.

Swift. “Imperialism and Freedom.” Los Angeles, 1899.

Viallat. “Political Life in the Old and New Worlds.” Year VII (1912/13) and earlier.

Paul Fayeil. “The Political History of the 19th Century.” Paris, 1914. Two volumes.

Camille Vallot. “Land and State. (Social Geography).” Paris, 1911.

Le Carpentier. “International Trade.” Paris, 1908.

“Maritime Trade and the Merchant Marine.” Paris, 1910.

Martin Saint-Léon. “Cartels and Trusts.” Paris, 1909.

Chisholm. “A Guide to Commercial Geography.” London, 1911.

Eckert. “An Outline of Commercial Geography.” Two volumes. Leipzig, 1905.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
Reichlen. “Franco-German Rivalry in Switzerland.” 1908 [shouldn’t it also be in Bern?].

Rafalovich. “The Money Market.” 1911/12 ((Year 21)).

Van der Leeuwe. “Strives for Universal Peace.” 1916. Rotterdam, 1915.

The Commission. “The Plague in India (1899–1900).” Volumes 4 and 5. Conclusion.

Avenel. “Peasants and Workers Over the Last 700 Years.” Paris, 1907.

Avenel. “The Wealthy Over the Last 700 Years.” Paris, 1909.

Fabre. “Asian Competition” (and European Workers). Paris, Nîmes, 1896.

Langhard. “The Anarchist Movement in Switzerland.” Berlin, 1903.

From recent literature:
Ergang. “The Displacement of Labor by Machinery.” “Technik und Wirtschaft.” Published in year 4, issue 10.

Kammerer. “Lines of Technological Development.” Ibidem. Published in year 3. + “Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik.” Volume 132.

Gruntzel. “The Triumph of Industrialization.” 1911.

Rathenau: see p. 32 *.

Ergang. “Research on the Problem of Machines in the Theory of National Economy.” 1911.

Manstedt. “The Capitalist Application of Machinery.” 1905.

A. Riedler. “On the Historical Significance of Technology and Its Future Implications.” Berlin, 1910.

Eckelhöizer. “Technical Work Then and Now.” Berlin, 1906.

E. Reyer. “Powerful Energy: An Economic, Technical, and Other Study of the Growth of State Power.” Leipzig, 1908.

Neuhaus. “The Technical Prerequisites for Mass Production.” “Technik und Wirtschaft.” 1910 (3rd year of publication).

M. Gra. “On Mechanization.” Paris, 1911.

Van Mite. “Technology in the 20th Century.” 1911/12.

F.-Mataré. “The Means of Production: Machines, etc.” 1913.
Levasser. “A Comparison of Manual Labor with Machine Labor.” 1900.

* See this volume, p. 45. Ed.

STILLICH. “MONEY AND BANKING”
Dr. Oscar Stillich, “Money and Banking.” Berlin,
1907. A highly popular little work.
Proudhonist fool, banker against money
p. 95. Banker Julius Huke. “The Monetary Problem and the Social Question” (5th edition). 1903.
p. 143: “There is not a single banking operation that yields such high returns as the business of issuing banknotes *. The profit margin on issuance is higher than anywhere else… The profit margin on the issuance of industrial shares—which is often justified by both issuance costs and the anticipated rise in dividend yields—turns out, in reality, to be largely an economically unjustified windfall. According to Der Deutsche Oekonomist, the average annual profit margin on such issuances was:
NB
1895: 38.6%

NB
Similarly, more fully in Sombart’s “The German National Economy in the 19th Century” (2nd edition, 1909), p. 526, Appendix 8

1896–36.1
1897–66.7
1898–67.7
1899–66.9
1890–55.2%
NB
Over the course of ten years, from 1891 to 1900, more than one billion marks were “earned” solely through the issuance of German industrial capital.

p. 138: “Recovery Measures”… “Shares are consolidated, and their nominal value is reduced. A classic example of such reductions in share capital is the ‘Dortmund Union,’ founded by the ‘Discount-Gesellschaft.’ In the first volume of my ‘Political-Economic Studies on Large Industrial Enterprises,’ I examined in detail the financial history of this bank’s ill-fated offspring (Leipzig,
NB

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 222. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
1904). Over the span of thirty years, through a series of share-value-reduction operations, more than 73 million marks disappeared from the books of this company. Today, the original shareholders of this company hold in their hands only 5% of the nominal value of their shares” !! (138) *.

A good

example

!!!
The current account serves as a tool for exerting influence over industry.
“How significant the influence of banks on their correspondent banking relationships can be is illustrated, for example, by the following letter that the Dresdner Bank addressed to the Board of the North-Western Central German Cement Syndicate on November 19, 1901—a letter excerpted from the Kuxenzeitung. The letter reads: ‘From the announcement you published on the 18th of this month in the Reichsanzeiger, it is clear that we must reckon with the possibility that at your syndicate’s general meeting, scheduled for the 30th of this month, decisions may be adopted that could bring about changes in your enterprise—changes that would be unacceptable to us. It is therefore with deep regret that we are compelled to terminate the credit facility you have been enjoying. We therefore ask you to cease all demands for funds from our bank and, at the same time, respectfully request that you repay the amounts due to us no later than the end of this month. However, should this general meeting fail to adopt any decisions unacceptable to us—and should we receive appropriate guarantees regarding the future in this regard—we express our willingness to enter into negotiations concerning the granting of a new line of credit to you’” ** (146–147).

A good

example

!!!

!!!

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 223. Ed.
** Ibid., pp. 211–212. Ed.

A good

example

!!!

!!!
… “In our major banks, a considerable number of employees spend their days engaged not in anything other than calculating interest on current accounts. Over time, they attain a remarkable degree of expertise in this work… They serve as a striking example of how capital subjugates the individual and transforms the single person into a mere machine” (148)…
!!!
 
NB
“‘Every bank is a stock exchange’—this modern adage contains ever greater truth the larger the bank becomes, the more profound the successes achieved through concentration in the banking sector” (169) *.
Ha-ha!!

(cf. K. Kautsky)
“Through Pereira’s subsidiary banks” (the founders of Credito Mobiliare) “they sought… to entangle various nations financially and thereby advance the cause of universal peace” (180)…
“Areas of Operation” for Banking Capital

The 1870s—Germany’s railways (nationalized in the late 1870s)

The 1880s—The Rhine-Westphalian heavy industry

The 1890s—The electrical industry (and mechanical engineering).
Attitudes Toward Employees “In 1906, four Berlin-based D-Banks—Deutsche Bank, Discount-Gesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, and Darmstädter Bank—entered into an agreement whereby they pledged not to hire employees who were already serving in any of these institutions without first obtaining official clearance from their current positions!” (203). Employee opposition ultimately led to “significant (??) modifications” (??) of this agreement ((in what way? How????)).
End

NB: G. Wieser, “Money and Credit in England,” 1911.

Filippovich

Sombart

“The Foundations of Social Economics” (Bücher, Schulze-Gevehrnitz, and others, among others).

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 206. Ed.

LIFMAN. “CARTELS AND TRUSTS”
Prof. Dr. R. Lifman, “Cartels and Trusts and the Further Development of National Economic Organization,” 2nd edition. Stuttgart, 1910. Library of Legal and Political Science.
====
A popular little book that offers a solid overview of the subject matter. The perspective is that of a bourgeois apologist—stupid, complacent, self-satisfied.
====
The facts are presented quite well, though, of course, from an apologetic standpoint.

NB: p. 161:
“In Germany, a very large number of mergers took place—mergers that were, in most cases, devoid of monopolistic tendencies. As a typical example, among many from earlier times, consider the gunpowder industry. As early as the 1870s, seventy gunpowder factories had already merged into a single joint-stock company. This company, in turn, merged in 1890 with its largest competitor to form the joint-stock company ‘Vereinigte Köln-Rotweiler Pulverfabriken.’ This major joint-stock company subsequently entered into cartels not only with other gunpowder manufacturers but also with the aforementioned trust of dynamite factories. Thus was forged a truly modern, tightly knit alliance among all German explosives manufacturers—which, together with similarly organized French and American dynamite factories, effectively divided up, so to speak, the entire world” (p. 161) *.
division of the world
The number of industrial cartels in Germany—(1905) 385 (in reality, far more: p. 25) **.

NB || When citing this statistic, Rißer (p. 137) adds: “These cartels involved, in a direct sense,

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 240. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 190. Ed.

approximately 12,000 enterprises.” Rißer, “German Major Banks and Their Concentration,” 3rd edition. Jena, 1910.

The number of international cartels—including those involving Germany—stood at roughly 100 (compared to around 40 in 1897),*
Potash Industry.
The first cartel: 1879—4 enterprises.
Prices began to rise: 1898—10 enterprises.
“Potash Fever”: 1901–1921—21 enterprises.
1909–52 (Some ultimately went bankrupt.)
The Steel Trust in America (in 1908: 165,211 workers) saw its workforce shrink to 210,180 workers by 1907—representing 161 million dollars in wages, 170 million dollars in net profits, and a capital base of 1.1 billion dollars (p. 124).
Germany’s largest mining enterprise, the “Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Gesellschaft,” employed 1,705 salaried staff and 44,343 laborers in 1908—totaling 70.5 million marks in wage payments.
(p. 135). In 1902, Schub (June 17, 1902), founded the “Ship-Building Company,” with a capital of 70.9 million dollars—of which 20 million belonged to Schub himself. The company soon collapsed, leaving the public utterly impoverished!

(173 and elsewhere) “Interweaving,” “participation” (passim), “the elimination of isolation” (p. 155)—these are Lifman’s “little phrases” used to sidestep—and obscure—the Marxian concept of “socialization” in section 6.
((End of excerpts from Lifman))
FROM “FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS” “Foundations of Social Economics,” by S. Altman… K. Büchner, and many others.
Section V, Part II: “Banks” (Schulze-Gaevernitz and Jaffe). Tübingen, 1915.
I. Schulze-Gaevernitz. “The German Credit Bank” (1–190),

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 240. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
II. Edgar Jaffe. “Anglo-American and French Banking” (191–231).

(Somewhat like a textbook—but, it seems, more filled with idle chatter and “systematic” digressions.)
======
There is also something quite interesting: the very spirit of “imperialism” permeates everything.
======

p. 53: In 1914, eight major Berlin banks held
shareholder capital totaling 1,245 million marks.

|

|

|including the “Deutsche Bank”—250|

|

|
“Discount-Gesellschaft”—300 “Dresdner Bank”—200

Reserves: 432
Total liabilities: 1,677
External funds: 5,328 (Total capital): 7,005

p. 140: Category of employment: “Monetary and Credit Trading.”
1882–1907
Institutions: 58–79–139–71
Persons employed: 2,163–366–275 (including women: 244–308–9)
In 1907, three institutions had more than 1,000 employees:
“The Deutsche Bank” in 1912—6,137; “The Dresdner Bank” —4,638;
cf. p. I: In 1907, Germany boasted 14,000 “banking institutions,” of which 4,000 were auxiliary establishments…

p. 145: … “Large banks have become the most important instrument for the economic unification of the German Empire”…
“If, in the final analysis, the leadership of German banks rests in the hands of a dozen individuals, then their activities already play a more vital role in the national welfare than the work of most government ministers” (pp. 145–146)*.
||||

||||

||||

||||“A dozen individuals”

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 289. Ed.

Ha-ha!!
||||

||||

||||

||||
“If, however, this is indeed the case, then the interests of our national existence demand the emergence of a new spiritual type of banking magnate—whose abstract” (ha-ha!) “drive for profit is infused with national-political considerations, and thereby with concerns of the national economy…”

If we follow through to the end the development of the tendencies we have observed, we arrive at this conclusion: the nation’s monetary capital is concentrated in banks; banks are linked together in cartels; the nation’s capital, seeking outlets for investment, takes shape as securities. At that point, the brilliant words of Saint-Simon come into full effect: “The present anarchy in production—which corresponds to the fact that economic relations unfold without unified regulation—must give way to the organization of production. Production will no longer be directed by isolated entrepreneurs, independent of one another and ignorant of the economic needs of the people; rather, this task will fall into the hands of a well‑established social institution. A central governing committee, capable of surveying the broad field of social economics from a higher vantage point, will regulate production in ways that benefit society as a whole, channeling the means of production into the appropriate hands—and, above all, ensuring a constant harmony between production and consumption. There are institutions that have already incorporated the organized management of economic labor into their core missions: banks.” We are still far from realizing these words of Saint-Simon, but we are already on the path toward their fulfillment: Marxism, though different from how Marx himself envisioned it—in form only! (p. 146)*.
Saint-Simon is also Marxism||||

||||

||||

||||

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 289–290. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
“Of course, investments such as those undertaken by England—for example, in the Suez Canal, based on its political might—where shares were purchased in 1876 for 4 million pounds sterling and are now worth 30 million pounds—remain beyond Germany’s reach…” (pp. 159–160).

What a fine example! (One can’t help but feel a bit envious.)

4 and 30

p. 164 quotes I. I. Levin’s “German Capital in Russia,” St. Petersburg, 1914.

“The banking system’s function in the national economy has long been the much-discussed task of managing public property” (citing Lansburg’s article in the journal Die Bank, 1908). “The more credit-based economic practices are introduced today, the greater the share of total capital that flows to the entrepreneur selected by the bank. Banks are now forging channels through which not only annual savings but also previously accumulated capital—constantly being renewed—can circulate. Let us recall, above all, the tremendous growth of ‘external funds.’ In Germany, at the end of 1891, these funds amounted to as much as 1.28 billion marks in our joint-stock banks; by the end of 1906, they had risen to 6.305 billion marks; today, they are estimated at roughly 10 billion.”
||||

||||

||||NB

10 billion.
By the end of 1913, nine major Berlin banks alone held as much as 5.1 billion marks*. Yet alongside this, banks also serve as conduits for even larger flows of capital in the realm of finance. – Even with the best of intentions, banks can still err; they may direct billions down the wrong path.
||||

||||

5 billion.

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 199. Ed.

NB||||

||||

||||
and, under certain conditions, to incur losses. Today, several large banks are capable of exerting a significant degree of influence over our economic development. As a result, their responsibility shifts from being purely private—focused on the interests of shareholders—to becoming national—involving the broader public good. In practice, these banks have channeled capital into trade and industry, primarily into the colossal enterprises of heavy industry, while simultaneously investing in real estate—once in aristocratic estates, and now in rental properties within the major cities. From this emerged the dramatic rise of Germany’s iron and steel industry, second only to that of America, and of Germany’s great cities, which have come to rival—even surpass—their American counterparts” (p. 12)...

NB||||

||||

||||

NB|||

|||

|||
p. 27: “At the end of 1908, non‑own funds (funds belonging to creditors and depositors) totaled 8.25 billion marks in credit banks, 15 billion marks in savings banks, and 3 billion marks in credit cooperatives. The aggregate amounted to 26.25 billion marks.

NB|||

|||
“Private banking houses are increasing in number (1892: 2,180; 1902: 2,564; by 1912, the figure had risen to nearly 3,500) yet declining in relative importance” (p. 16), Throughout his work—and indeed, everywhere one looks—Schulze-Gevehrnitz conveys the triumphant tone of German imperialism, the swaggering arrogance of a self‑assured pig!!!!
||

||

||
characteristic of the crisis
||

||

||
p. 35: In 1870, 376 million marks of capital were tied up in 31 banks;
in 1872, 1.112 billion marks were tied up in 139 banks;
by 1873, 734,320 banks had been liquidated due to the crisis.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
The State Bank’s cash turnover and settlement activity (in billions of marks)
||

||1891

98.71901

196.61913

452.8||

||

||

||NB
including cash payment turnover
||24.3 (=24.7%) 29.7 (=15.1%) 43.4 (=9.6%)

…“In 1909, the French Bank recorded 7.5 million bills of exchange worth less than 100 francs, whereas the German State Bank accounted for only 700,000 bills of exchange valued at less than 100 marks” (p. 54).
||

||

||

“The ‘democratization’ of banking!!’ Compare this to the minimum share price of one pound sterling in England versus the minimum of 1,000 marks in Germany (p. 111)*. The average value of a bill of exchange registered in Germany was 2,066 marks (State Bank); in France, it stood at 683 francs (“Banque de France”).”
“G. von Siemens declared in the Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that the one‑pound‑sterling share was the cornerstone of British imperialism” (p. 110)**.
||

||NB

“The English industrial state relies less on credit than the German state, placing greater emphasis on its own capital” (p. 55).
||

||

“England, as an international clearinghouse for payments, is said to earn as much as 80 million marks annually today in commission fees on accepted bills. It is claimed that through England, Europe’s overseas trade is settled to the tune of 6 billion marks each year” (p. 83).

p. 100: Under the heading “Do Banks Dominate the Stock Exchange?”—while such claims may be exaggerated, “their influence is nonetheless extensive”...

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 216. Ed.
** Ibid. Ed.

|||

|||

|||||
“In the past, during the 1870s, the stock exchange—with its youthful excesses—ushered in the era of Germany’s industrialization, seizing upon the lucrative opportunities offered by stocks. But today, banks and industry can ‘manage on their own.’ The dominance of our major banks over the stock exchange—though not limited to mere reporting operations—is nothing other than the expression of a fully organized German industrial state. As the sphere of action governed by automatically operating economic laws narrows, while the scope of conscious regulation through banks expands dramatically, so too does the national economic responsibility borne by the few leading figures grow immeasurably” (p. 101)*.
“completely organized— 8|||

|||

|||
||

||

NB||

||

||
(Cited from) A. Levenstein, “The History of the Württemberg System of Credit Banks and Its Relationship to Large-Scale Industry”... “Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften,” Supplement No. 5, Tübingen, 1912.

Issuances (p. 104):
Domestic assets
My calculations

Σ:3 =

190919101911
Germany with colonies3.22.52.2
7.9: 3 = 2.6
England » »1.93.11.8
6.8: 3 = 2.3
France1.40.70.6
2.7: 3 = 0.9

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 206. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
Foreign

assets

My calculations

190919101911Σ : 3
ΣΣ
Germany with colonies0.30.50.5
1.3 : 3 = 0.43.0 billion marks
England » »1.82.32.0
6.1 : 3 = 2.04.3»
France » »2.03.83.1
8.9 : 3 = 2.93.8»
German Issuances (at market value)
billions of marks
Public

credit

(governmental and municipal loans)
Land

credit

(mortgages)
Industrial and commercial credit
Domestic assets in general
Foreign

assets

in general
[1886–1890]1.81.21.34.32.3
[1891–1895]1.82.20.84.81.5
[1896–1900]1.71.94.38.22.4
[1901–1905]3.32.32.68.32.1
[1906–1910]6.02.64.812.61.5
The author concludes:
“Emission statistics reveal, in the most striking manner, the distinctly state‑socialist and industrialist character of the German national economy” (p. 104).
In Germany, after all, the “Prussian railway system” stands as “the greatest economic enterprise in the world” (p. 104)...
Shareholding companies in Prussia in 1911:
number

of

companies
Nominal

value
Market

value
%

(Exchange rate)
Millions of marks
% of nominal value
% of exchange rate

soviets

costs

|||

|||

|||

|||

|||

|||
15.7

−8.8
177.9%|||890882115696177.995210.8%6.1%6.9 billion.

NB||

||

||

||
…“Supporters of small-scale shareholding emphasize, above all, that it affords workers the opportunity to participate in industrial enterprise—a socially and politically desirable alignment of workers’ interests with those of entrepreneurs, enabling workers to share in profits in a modern form” (pp. 110–111)—(with regard to one-pound shares).

phrases and falsehoods!!

In § on “speculation in securities” (pp. 111 et seq.), instead of exposing the speculative practices of banks—(cf. the journal Die Bank, Eschwege, and others)—the scoundrel Schulze-Gevernitz merely resorts to empty rhetoric: “If our banks were to become speculative institutions… that would spell… the collapse of the German national economy” (p. 112)… ((“If only…”))… this “correctness” is what saves our “business world,” while bank officials are forbidden from speculating in other people’s banks (though, of course, such prohibitions are easily circumvented—in large cities)… but what of the bank directors? After all, they are “initiates” (“Wissenden”)!! Here, no law can help; what is needed is “a strengthening of the merchant’s sense of honor and of his awareness of his own position” (p. 113)…
!!|

|

|
9 banks account for 83% of the total!!||

||
“At the end of 1909, nine major Berlin banks, together with their affiliated institutions, controlled 11.3 billion marks—roughly 83% of Germany’s total banking capital. The Deutsche Bank, which, together with its affiliated banks, managed roughly 3 billion marks, was, alongside the Prussian State Railways Administration, the largest—and highly decentralized—concentration of capital in the Old World” (p. 137)… *

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 199. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
Bank Agreements: The Darmstädter Bank had sought to conclude an agreement with the City of Berlin for the “income-generating utilization” of the Tempelhof Field, offering a 10% share of the profits. Later, when the Deutsche Bank finalized this deal, the Darmstädter Bank found itself incorporated into the latter’s consortium!! (p. 139)… “Banking consortia of this kind tend to engage in price-fixing agreements…”

||

||

||to the banking cartel
“Still, the ‘general agreements’ concluded in the summer of 1913 went so far that, after their implementation, it was hardly possible to speak of free competition in banking activities”… (p. 139)…
||

||

||1913

“At the Disconto-Gesellschaft, for example, a staff of 25 individuals was constantly engaged in overseeing the accounting and formal aspects of transactions” (p. 143).
|||

|||25 individuals in oversight
“For large enterprises—especially in the banking sector—the Prussian–German military service performs essential preparatory work, training personnel in disciplined, mass-based labor. Even if this were not already necessary for political reasons, it should nonetheless be introduced as a preparatory school for capitalist large-scale enterprises—and as a means of increasing economic intensity” (pp. 144–145)…
||

||

||

||

||

||banks and the military

“Thirty years ago, freely competing entrepreneurs carried out 9/10 of the economic work that did not fall within the realm of ‘manual labor’ performed by ‘workers.’ Today, officials handle 9/10 of this intellectual economic work. Banking stands at the forefront of this development (p. 151)*. In its gigantic enterprises, the official is everything—even the director—a ‘servant’ of the institution…”
|||

|||

|||

|||

|||

|||

|||NB

NB

NB

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, p. 207. Ed.

…The Frankfurter Zeitung (May 2, 1914) encouraged the merger of the Disconto-Gesellschaft with the Schaffhausen Bankverein with the following words:

“As the concentration of banks increases, the circle of institutions to which one can turn for substantial credit steadily narrows, thereby intensifying the dependence of large industry on just a few banking groups. With the close interconnection between industry and the financial world, the freedom of movement for industrial enterprises seeking bank capital becomes increasingly constrained. For this reason, large industry views the growing trend toward trustification—whether through mergers or transformation into trusts—with mixed feelings; indeed, we have repeatedly observed the nascent stages of certain agreements among individual conglomerates of major banks—agreements that ultimately amount to restricting competition” (p. 155)*.
 NB |||

|||
NB|||

|||

154–5: the question of who depends more on whom—banks on industry, or vice versa…
Weverowski. “The Influence of German Banking Concentration on Crisis Phenomena” (“Freiburg Dissertation”). Berlin, 1911.
|||

|||
Fölker. “Forms of Consolidation and Profit Sharing in German Large Industry.” Leipzig, 1909 ((Schmotier’s Yearbook, vol. 33, issue 4)).

Chapter X. “Foreign Investments.”
NB|||

|||
“In order for our banks to channel the capital flowing into them toward foreign investments, appropriate preconditions of a private‑economic nature must first be met by their clients. The primary incentive is the need for a higher rate of return than that, NB|||

|||

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 207–208. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
which domestic investments yield—especially as wealth accumulates and interest rates decline within the country…
||

||NB
…At the same time, banks are primarily driven by the pursuit of emission profits, which, from foreign countries—poor in capital yet rich in raw materials—are usually higher than those earned domestically” (p. 158)…
||

||NB
NB [cf. above, p. 44, quotation: from pp. 159–160 *] NB
“According to numerical estimates, foreign capital investments are reckoned at 70 billion for England, 35 billion for France (in 1910), while for Germany, by 1913, they had reached scarcely 20 billion marks” (160).
||

||

||70

In substantiating the “export clauses” and the industrial benefits derived from foreign investment, Schulze-Gevernitz, among other things, notes that France itself also reaps these advantages:
“The French rentier state is thus experiencing a secondary industrial boom”—the issuance of the Turkish loan in 1910 was conditioned in France on the stipulation that Turkey should not place orders with any single nation exceeding those placed with France… (p. 163).
||||

||||
||

||characteristic!!
“At present, Germany is the quintessential ‘entrepreneur operating abroad,’ whereas France—and, gradually, England as well—are becoming ossified as rentiers. … If the world today bears an Anglo-Saxon visage, then our banks are busy imbuing this very image with the spirit of Germany—through railways, mines, plantations, canals, irrigation systems, and the like” (164)…
||

||
|||

|||NB
(NB: p. 1, note: “Written before the war.”)
In Chapter X.

* See this volume, p. 33. Ed.

NB||

||
S. “A Political Assessment of Foreign Investments.”
||

||
The export of capital serves as a tool for pursuing foreign policy objectives, and its success, in turn, depends upon foreign policy itself.

a) Creditor states: France, England, Germany. England and France—both among the world’s foremost creditor powers—are, in essence, political bankers.
Here, the state and the banking world act as one. For example, the French government and Crédit Lyonnais; or the friendship between Edward VII and Sir E. Cassel. In the hope of securing the ultimate prize in the political lottery, France staked billions on the Russian card alone. Russia, receiving funds from France, was even able to project itself into the Far East—in China, in Persia—as a political lender. As a lender, France bound Spain and Italy to itself, where, at Algeciras, they rendered her services as clients. France was prepared to extend loans to Kossuth’s ministry—loans it had denied Count Kuhn, on the grounds that “such a move would entail the Triple Alliance.” As a political creditor, England once again forged the bonds of the British world empire, unafraid to exert pressure on the yield of its own consols. The comprehensive guardianship extended to colonial government bonds within the metropole ensured that, for instance, a newly settled land like Natal enjoyed cheaper credit than the long-established, highly consolidated Prussia—with its vast railway network and sprawling state-owned landholdings. This credit relationship constituted “ties of interest” that, perhaps, carried greater weight than any preferential tariffs Chamberlain could ever have dreamed of. By venturing

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
beyond intra-imperial ties, the British creditor held Japan as its political vassal, Argentina in a state of colonial dependency, and Portugal locked in outright debt bondage. The governors of Portuguese Africa, adorned with golden braid, were nothing more than British puppets” (165)...
...“The total sum” of German capital invested in Russia “is estimated at 3 billion. The preference our banks accord to this greatest debtor in all of world history
becomes understandable when we consider the high banking profits generated precisely by Russian assets” (166).
||

||NB
“Without a doubt, the countries of the semi-civilized world—still not yet partitioned as colonies—while striving for political and economic independence
|||

|||pearl!!
cannot receive from any European power the same selfless support that they find in Germany. China, Persia, and Turkey know that Germany harbors no territorial ambitions whatsoever” (167).
||

||pearl!!
… “Domestic conditions hostile to the ideals of freedom likewise hinder the penetration of global political thought deep into the popular soul. How far we still are from the slogan ‘imperium et libertas’ *—to which the Anglo-Saxons, from Cromwell to Rhodes, owe their greatest achievements!” (168)
||

||

||

||imperialism and democracy 9

pearl!!

(and NB)

the co-opting of broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the upper echelons of the proletariat is more subtle, more cunning “Everywhere, German banks abroad encountered competition from long-established English ‘foreign banks,’
||

||

* – “empire and freedom.” Ed.

||

||
which, even today, far outstrip German banks in terms of both transaction volume and shareholder equity” (173)...
||

||

||
…“With even greater sobriety, we must acknowledge the fact that we entered the stage rather late. The activities of German foreign banks may be likened to the promising strides of a young man eager for action—yet for whom the greater part of the world remains inaccessible, reserved for its fortunate possessors.”
pearl!!!||

||
Within the British world empire—and certainly not to mention France or Russia—there exists barely a single German banking institution; and yet it was claimed that the Briton ruled the world as if in the interests of all.
NB||

||
The future of the German banking system abroad hinges in large measure on the resolution of a political task: to keep open those parts of the world that remain unconquered; to revive the Muslim world; to establish a German colonial empire in Africa”… (174).

The second part of Jaffe’s work presents a dry survey of Anglo-American and French banking practices. Nil.

VI Department: “Foundations of Social Economics.” “Industry, Mining, Construction.” Tübingen, 1914.
Numerous references in the literature (cf. p. 37 *).
For certain statistical data on large-scale industry, see the lined notebook **.
Extract from the book: pp. 34 and 143; industry in 1882 and 1907.

* See this volume, pp. 24–25. Ed.
** Referring to notebook “μ.” See this volume, pp. 442–443. Ed.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
From M. R. Weiermann’s article: “Modern Industrial Technology”
Quotation from K. Rathenau’s book: “The Influence of Increased Capital and Output on Production Costs in German Machine-Building Industry,” 1906.
||

||NB
Such examples:

(pumps)

Pump Models
Increased Output by roughly 50% ABC
197,880,159.3 marks
102,738,134.5
Typewriters (p. 157)
100 units produced. Price = 200 marks
500 → 160
1,000 → 140
2,000 → 125

Emissions of German Industrial Shares {according to the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Dictionary of State Sciences} (“The Emission Business”)
1903–195.3 million. Initial surge
1904–267.6 million »»»
1905–492.5 million »»»
1906–624.3 million »»» peak
1907–240.2 million »»» crisis
1908–326.7 (beginning of recovery)

||

||

||

||

||

||Recovery

versus

Crisis
According to Bera, shoe consumption in the United States was (p. 175):
1880–2.5 pairs per capita
1905–3.12 »»»

||

||

||NB
From T. Vogelstein’s article: “The Financial Organization of Capitalist Industry and the Formation of Monopolies.”
“Ten years after May 9, 1873—the day when, in Schenklank’s hyperbolic formulation, the hour of the birth of cartels arrived, and when the final hour of the economic boom struck—Fr. Kleinwächter published his book on cartels” (216).
||

||

||NB

From the History of Cartels:

“One may cite isolated instances of capitalist monopolies dating back to before 1860; one may discern within them the embryonic forms that are now so commonplace—but all of this is, without question, prehistoric time for cartels. The true dawn of modern monopolies dates, at the earliest,
NB||

||
to the 1860s. The first major phase of monopoly development begins with the international suppression of industry in the 1870s and extends into the early 1890s” (222).
||

||
NB||

||

||
“When viewed on a European scale, the zenith of free competition is reached in the 1860s and 1870s. By then, England had completed the construction of its old-style capitalist organization. In Germany, this organization entered into a decisive struggle against craft production and home industry, beginning to forge its own distinctive modes of existence” (ibidem).
“The great upheaval commences with the crash of 1873—or, more precisely, with the depression that followed it, which, save for a barely perceptible interlude in the early 1880s and an extraordinarily intense but brief upswing around 1889—spanned twenty-two years of European economic history” (222)...
...“During the brief upswing of 1889–1890, cartels were heavily exploited to take advantage of favorable market conditions. Unwise policies drove prices upward even faster and more sharply than they would have risen without cartels, and almost all of these cartels met a inglorious end in the ‘grave of collapse.’ Five more years of poor performance and low prices followed, yet industry no longer retained its former mood. Depression was no longer regarded as something inevitable; rather, it came to be seen merely as a pause before a new, favorable conjuncture.
The Second Era of Cartels|||

|||

|
And so the cartel movement entered its second epoch. No longer a transient phenomenon, cartels became one of the fundamental pillars of economic life itself. They conquered one industrial sector after another, beginning above all with the processing of raw materials.

NOTEBOOK “α” (“ALPHA”)
As early as the 1890s, cartels had developed within the organization of the coke syndicate—and following this model, the coal syndicate was established—a cartel technique beyond which the movement, in essence, did not advance. The great upswing at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900–1903 stood—especially in the mining and iron and steel industries—as the first truly comprehensive era dominated by cartels. And if, at that time, this still seemed like something novel, by now it had become a self-evident truth in the broad public consciousness that large segments of economic life were, as a general rule, removed from the realm of free competition” (224)...*
|||

|||

|||NB
Forms of Cartels:

a) Cartels that determine the terms of goods’ release (sales conditions, delivery schedules, payment terms, etc.)

b) Cartels that define sales territories

c) Cartels that regulate output volumes

d) Cartels that set prices

e) Cartels that allocate profits
Syndicates—unified sales offices (Verkaufsstelle)
Trusts—ownership over all enterprises unified, absolute authority
Consider Condé

Lindenberg

Sayu

Steller

Stillrich

Warschauer

Weber

* See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th ed., vol. 22, pp. 189–190. Ed.