V. I.

Lenin

Plekhanovhas broken the silence that was his only wise tactics after his
renowned proposal of a common slogan— a Duma with full powers—for
the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. Plekhanov has come out in Russkaya Zhizn with a new attempt to impel our Party towards the Cadets, an attempt
to impose on the Party the slogan of support for a “responsible
ministry”—a slogan already rejected by the Party in the period of the
First Duma.

Letus examine Plekhanov’s arguments.

Firstof all we must note that, in the zeal of his campaign against the
Bolsheviks, Plekhanov resorts to an absolute untruth as to their
views. Namely, he very definitely ascribes to us the desire to “smash
through”, the desire and aspiration to do battle “right away”.

Forour readers to see how wrong Plekhanov is, we shall cite an official
Bolshevik publication dated February 11 :

“...A struggle ... is undoubtedly inevitable. But it is precisely because
of it.s inevitability that we must not force the pace, spur or goad it on. Leave
that to the Krushevans and Stolypins. Our task is to reveal the truth
to the proletariat and the peasantry clearly, directly and with unsparing
candour, to open their eyes to the significance of the coming storm, to help
them to meet the enemy in organised fashion with ... calmness.... ’Shoot first,
Messrs. Bourgeois!’ said Engels to the German capitalists in 1894. And we say:
’Shoot first, Krushevans!’... Therefore—no premature calls .” [1]

Theease with which our esteemed Plekhanov performs the duties of
“critic” is really wonderful. No premature calls , the
Bolshevik organisations declare a week and a half before the opening of the
Duma. The Bolsheviks want to do battle “right away” , Plekhanov declares in an article which appeared on February 23; they want
to “smash through”.

Ofcourse, that is the simplest, the cheapest, the easiest method of crushing
the Bolsheviks: first impute an absurd idea to them, and then raise a
fuss and fulminate (“excessive zeal”, “stupidity”, “worse than treachery”, and so on, and so forth). But Plekhanov
should not forget that when he slanders the Bolsheviks he is not slandering the
dead— that the Bolsheviks can make it clear to all the world, by
simply referring to an official document, how false Plekhanov’s
statements are. That will put Plekhanov out of countenance. And then Plekhanov
will begin to understand that he cannot get away scot-free with statements about
the Bolsheviks such as only Novoye Vremya has hitherto been in
the habit of making about revolutionaries.

Letus proceed to the substance of the question Plekhanov raises, the question
of whether the workers’ party should support the slogan of “a responsible
ministry”. Plekhanov defends this slogan as follows:

“Oneof the two: either the swiftly growing forces of revolution
already surpass the forces of the government, in which case the demand
for a responsible ministry can and should serve as the signal for the decisive
conflict against reaction.

“Orthe forces of revolution do not yet surpass the government’s forces of resistance, so that the decisive conflict is
not yet in order; but the demand should be supported in that case, too,
for it is a splendid means of education, of developing the political
understanding of the people, and thus preparing them for a victorious fight, in
the future.

“Thus,in either case the Social-Democratic deputies must not fail
to take up this demand , in the interests of the people and in the
interests of the revolution.”

Avery edifying argument. Let us start with the first part. Thus, we assume,
with Plekhanov, that the forces of revolution already surpass those of the
government. If that were so, the demand for a responsible ministry would be,
first, superfluous, secondly, harmful and, thirdly, the liberals would not
support it.

1.It would be superfluous because in any case such a “signal for the
decisive conflict” is a roundabout signal, not a direct one. This
“signal” does not express the definite idea of a really decisive
battle against the reactionary forces; on the contrary, it expresses the
idea of a concession such as the reactionaries might themselves voluntarily
concede. We do not deny that, generally speaking, it may be right under
certain special conditions to issue signals, not for a decisive battle, but
for a minor .preliminary skirmish—even a demonstration—which has all
the appearances of a battle. But that is another question. In the
conditions which Plekhanov has assumed (that the forces of
revolution already surpass, etc.), a roundabout signal would
obviously be superfluous.

2.“The forces of revolution already surpass the forces of
reaction”.... What does that imply? Does it include awareness on
the part of the forces of revolution? Plekhanov will probably agree that it
does. A people unaware of their revolutionary tasks cannot be strong enough
to triumph over reaction in the decisive conflict. Further: does the demand
we are examining, correctly express the aims of the revolution in
the fight against the reactionaries? No, it does not; for in the first
place, a responsible ministry does not by any means signify the transfer of
power into the hands of the people, or even the transfer of power into the
hands of the liberals, but is, in essence, a deal, or an attempt at a deal,
between the reactionaries and the liberals; and in the second place, in
view of the objective conditions, even the actual transfer of
power to the liberals cannot bring about the realisation
of the fundamental demands of the revolution. This idea is expressed
clearly in the passage Plekhanov quotes from the article in Symposium No. 1 , [2] but he has not even attempted to touch upon the actual
substance of the idea.

Thequestion now arises: how would the decisive (Plekhanov’s
condition) conflict with reaction be affected by a slogan in which the demands
of the revolution (the forces of which already surpass—Plekhanov’s condition! —the forces of reaction) are
incorrectly expressed? Obviously, its effect would undoubtedly be
harmful . This slogan dulls the consciousness of the masses
that are advancing to the decisive conflict. If we launched this slogan, we would actually be calling for
a decisive battle, but pointing to a battle objective that can decide nothing—you shout about shooting a cow, but
aim at a crow.

Itcan never be exactly determined before the battle whose
forces “already surpass” those opposed to them. Only a pedant could
dream of such a thing. The concept of “forces surpassing the
forces of the enemy” implies that the fighters are fully conscious of their tasks. Plekhanov is causing direct harm to the
revolution when he speaks of the “decisiveness” of the conflict and
at the same time dulls this consciousness. That is really “worse
than treachery”, my dear critic! With “forces” sufficient for
a victory over reaction, the “leader” calls on his troops to fight
for a deal with the reactionaries.... Plekhanov jokingly compares
himself to the Roman general who executed his son for prematurely starting the
battle. A pretty jest. Now, if I were the “son”, at a time when the
decisive conflict was at hand, when “the forces of revolution
already surpassed those of the government”, I would shoot (or, in the Roman days, stab) the “ daddy ”
who advanced the slogan of a deal with the reactionaries—would do so
without the slightest compunction, calmly leaving it to future Mommsens to
investigate whether my action was the killing of a traitor, the execution of a
traitor, or whether it was an act of criminal insubordination.

3.In arguing against the slogan of “a responsible ministry” in the
days of the First Duma, we adduced only the two arguments cited above. We
must now add a third: the liberals themselves would withdraw the
demand for a responsible ministry if this demand could possibly
become, directly or in roundabout fashion , a signal for the decisive
battle between “revolution” and reaction.

Whydo we now have to add this argument? For the reason that the liberals
(including the Cadets) have shifted far to the Right since the First Duma, and
have come out decisively against the revolution. For the reason that
Golovin, who is supported by bad Social-Democrats for his liberalism, came out
in his very first speech not as a liberal, not as a Cadet, but as an
Octobrist .

If Plekhanov has so much fallen behind affairs in Russia as to be ignorant of
this, his article is, of course, deserving of clemency. But even aside from such
mistakes, the whole gist of his arguments is fundamentally wrong.

Letus proceed to the second case. The forces of revolution do not yet
surpass the forces of reaction, and the decisive conflict is not yet
in order. In that case, says Plekhanov, the importance of this slogan is in its
influence on the development of the political consciousness of the people. That
is true. But in that case—and here Plekhanov is a thousand times
wrong—a slogan of this kind will corrupt , not enlighten, the
minds of the people; it will confuse , not revolutionise—demoralise, not educate. This is so clear that we need not
bother to develop the idea—at any rate, until our next talk with the most
esteemed Plekhanov.

Andso, no matter how you put it, it’s still the same. Whether the forces of
revolution have matured or not, Plekhanov’s slogan cannot be considered
“mature” food for the minds of the Social-Democratic proletariat. This slogan sacrifices the fundamental interests of
democracy and of our revolution—the enlightenment of the masses as to the
aims of a real people’s fight for real power—sacrifices these interests to temporary, casual, unessential,
muddled liberal slogans, aims and interests.

Andit is just such sacrifice of the fundamental interests of the proletariat to
the half-hearted, muddled aims of liberalism that makes up the essence of
opportunism in tactics.

Afew words in conclusion. In his article Plekhanov tries to bait us on the
subject of the boycott. We shall discuss this with him in more detail when he
deigns to go over from baiting, to a contest on the actual issues. Mean while,
we might note this: the son of the Roman general, Plekhanov sarcastically
declares, did gain the victory in his premature battle, whereas the Bolsheviks,
so far, have nothing but defeats to their credit.

Youhave a had memory, Comrade Plekhanov. I suggest that you recall the
Bulygin

Duma. [3] Remember how Parvus and the new

Iskra , [4] which you supported, opposed the boycott at
the time. The Bolsheviks were for the boycott.

Thedevelopment of the revolution brought complete victory for
Bolshevism; and in the October and November days only Trotsky’s
exuberances distinguished the Mensheviks.

Thusit was, and thus it will be , my dear Comrade Plekhanov. When the
revolution is on the decline, the pedant.s who, after the event, arrogate to
themselves the role of “Roman generals” come onto the stage with
their lamentations. When the revolution is on the upswing, things happen as
the revolutionary Social-Democrats desire, compare them as you may to
“impatient youths”.

---
Notes:
[1]
See p. 117 of this volume.—Ed.

[2]
Symposium No. 1 —a Bolshevik collection of articles summing up the history of the First Duma and analysing the prospects
for the Second Duma; it was published by Novaya Duma in 1907. Lenin’s
articles from the Bolshevik newspapers Volna , Vperyod and
Ekho were reprinted in the

Symposium —“The Workers’ Group in the State Duma”, “The Manifesto of the Workers’ Deputies In the State Duma”, “Unity”, “The Declaration of Our Group in the Duma”, “The Parties in the Duma and the People”, and others.

[3]
The Bulygin Duma—a consultative State
Duma to be convened according to a law drafted by A. G. Bulygin, Minister of the
Interior. On August 6 (19), 1905, the tsar’s manifesto, the law instituting the
State Duma and instructions for elections to it were published. The right to
participate in the elections to the Duma was granted only to landlords, big capitalists and a small number of peasant
householders. The peasants were to have only 51 of the 412 seats
established by the law. The majority of the population— workers,
poor peasants, agricultural labourers and the democratic intelligentsia
were not granted the franchise; all women, men serving in the army and
navy, students, men under twenty-five and a number of the oppressed
nationalities of Russia were also denied franchise. The State Duma had no
legislative powers and was permitted only to discuss certain questions as
an advisory body to the tsar. In his description of the Bulygin Duma,
Lenin said that it was “the most barefaced mockery of ’popular
representation’\thinspace" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 194).

The Bolsheviks appealed to workers and peasants to organise an active boycott of
the Bulygin Duma and concentrated their agitational campaign on the
slogans—insurrection, a revolutionary army and a provisional revolutionary
government. The Mensheviks considered that participation in the Duma was
possible, and called for co-operation with the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Bolsheviks made use of the Duma boycott campaign to mobilise all the
revolutionary forces, conduct mass political strikes, and prepare an armed
uprising. The elections to the Bulygin Duma were not held, and the government
was unable to convene the Duma, which was swept away by the growing
revolutionary upsurge and the all-Russian October political strike in 1905.

Forfurther information on the Bulygin Duma see Lenin’s articles: “The
Constitutional Market-Place”, “The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma, and
Insurrection”, “Oneness of the Tsar and the People and of the People
and the Tsar”, “In the Wake of the Monarchist Bourgeoisie or in the
Van of the Revolutionary Proletariat and Peasantry”.

[4]
New Iskra —the Menshevik Iskra ( Spark ). At the
Second Congress of the Party an editorial board for Iskra , as the
Central Organ of the Party, was appointed, consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov and
Martov. In violation of the Congress decision, the Menshevik Martov refused to
be a member of the Editorial Board without the old Menshevik editors
(P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov and V. I. Zasulich), who had not been elected by
the Second Congress; issues No. 46 to No. 51 inclusively were edited by Lenin
and Plekhanov. After that Plekhanov went over to the Menshevik stand and demand
ed that the old Menshevik editors, rejected by the Congress, be
reinstated. Lenin could not agree to this and left the Editorial Board on
October 19 (November 1), 1903; he was co-opted into the Central Committee of the
Party and from there continued his struggle against the Menshevik
opportunists. Issue No. 52 of Iskra was edited by Plekhanov alone and
on November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, acting alone and In contravention of the
will of the Second Congress, co-opted the former editors—Axelrod, Potresov
and Zasulich—into the Editorial Board of Iskra . From its fifty
second issue Iskra ceased to be a fighting organ of revolutionary

Marxism, and became an instrument of struggle against Marxism and against the
Party, an organ that preached opportunism. The newspaper Iskra ceased
publication in October 1905.